Skip to main content

Full text of "Congress and foreign policy - 1975"

See other formats


COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 






/ 



V 



Congress and 
Foreign Policy 
1975 












I 

# 



^>^*~ ^. tit" 



"'ss///t> 



COMMITTEE PRINT 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

^4-032 WASHINGTON : 1976 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $1.90 



COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 



THOMAS E. MORGAN, 
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin 
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio 
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina 
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida 
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan 
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania 
DONALD M. ERASER, Minnesota 
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York 
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana 
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York 
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York 
'.rs YATRON, Pennsylvania 
KOY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina 
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts 
LEO J. RYAN, California 
DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr., Michigan 
c AIlDIXS COLLINS, Illinois 
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York 
BELBS S. MEYNER, New Jersey 
DON BUNKER, Washington 
GERRY E. S'lTDDS, Massachusetts 



Pennsylvania, Chairman 
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan 
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois 
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois 
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr.. Alabama 
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida 
PIERRE S. du PONT, Delaware 
CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio 
EDWARD G. BIESTER, Jr., Pennsylvania 
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas 
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio 
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California 



Marian A. Czarnecki, Chief of Staff 
John H. Sullivan, Staff Consultant 



(II) 



FOREWORD 



House of Representatives, 
Committee ox International Relations, 

Washington, D.C., August 12, 1976. 

With the resurgence of congressional activity in foreign affairs, the 
need has arisen for a document which summarizes the activities of 
the Congress in that area. 

The Committee on International Relations long has provided sum- 
maries of its own activities in documents such as the annual "Survey 
of Activities" and the biannual "Legislative Review Activities" report. 
Those documents do not, however, provide information in any com- 
prehensive way about foreign affairs-related activities of other House 
committees, the Senate or the Congress as a whole. 

For that reason, the Committee on International Relations has 
requested that the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, prepare an an- 
nual report of actions taken by Congress which impact on American 
foreign policy. The first such report appeared in 1974. 

This report has been expanded by the Foreign Affairs and National 
Defense Division to include subject areas not covered in last year's 
edition and is, in general, a more comprehensive study. 

It is expected that these documents will be of assistance to the com- 
mittee and its members in undertaking both legislative and oversight 
responsibilities in the area of foreign affairs. The report should also 
prove helpful to other committees and Members of Congress, as well 
as to scholars, the press, and the public. 

Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman. 
(in) 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2013 



http://archive.org/details/coeignpOOunit 



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 



The Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, 

Washington, D.C., August 12, 1976. 
Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, 

Chairman, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Rep- 
resentatives, Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. Chairman : I am pleased to transmit to yon at this time 
"Congress and Foreign Policy — 1975." a report summarizing congres- 
sional contributions to the shaping of U.S. foreign policy in 1075. 

In examining congressional input into specific foreign policy deci- 
sions, the report attempts to analyze the larger issue of the role of 
Congress and its relation to the executive branch in the formulation 
of U.S. foreign policy. Statutory directives and their subsequent ap- 
plication provide the most common A^ehicle for congressional involve- 
ment in foreign policy, while consideration of executive agreements, 
generation of public opinion by discussion of issues in public hearings, 
and reports and observations by members and staff contribute to the 
policymaking process. 

Primary attention in "Congress and Foreign Policy — 1975" is given 
to the activities of the House International Relations and Senate 
Foreign Relations Committees. However, pertinent activities of other 
committees and of the whole House and Senate are included in the 
overall analysis. The report does not attempt to detail all congres- 
sional activities relating to foreign policy or to present legislative 
histories of all foreign policy related measures. 

As the preparation for "Congress and Foreign Policy — 1975" con- 
tinued well into 1976, an attempt has been made to provide the reader 
with references to occurrences in early 1976 which were a logical ex- 
tension of events of 1975. The purpose of the report, however, has 
remained to study the congressional role in U.S. foreign policy in 
1975 ; December 31, 1975 was in many instances simply too arbitrary 
a line for an adequate evaluation of Congress role in various issues. 

This report was prepared by members of the Foreign Affairs and 
National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, and was 
edited by Margaret Goodman, analyst in international relations. 

XORMAN BECKMAN, 

Acting Director, 

Congressional Research Service. 

(V) 



CONTENTS 



Page 

Foreword m 

Letter of Transmittal v 

The Debate Over the U.S. Role in the World 1 

Introduction 3 

U.S. foreign policy issues and goals and the defense budget 5 

Action on component parts of the defense budget 5 

Other related issues 10 

Diego Garcia and U.S. Indian Ocean policy 11 

Congressional oversight of intelligence activities 15 

Activities of House and Senate select committees 18 

Issues and areas for congressional action 26 

The Debate Over U.S. Policymaking System and the Congressional 

Role in Foreign Policy 29 

Introduction 31 

Congressional organization for the conduct of foreign affairs 32 

Study commission proposals for reorganization 32 

Changes in congressional organization 36 

Congress and war powers 39 

Presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolution 40 

Inclusion of U.S. civilian combatants under the War Powers 

Resolution 43 

Congressional oversight of executive agreements 45 

Legislative proposals ^ 45 

Implementation of the Case-Zablocki Act 48 

Review of specific agreements 50 

The congressional role in the determination of specific policies 54 

The Turkish aid controversy 54 

The Jackson-Vanik amendment 60 

Major Functional Problems Facing U.S. Foreign Policy 65 

Introduction 67 

Weapons transfer, proliferation, and control 68 

Conventional arms transfers 68 

Nuclear exports, nuclear proliferation 73 

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 78 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 82 

Relations with the Third World 84 

Foreign aid 84 

Multilateral economic relations with developing countries 92 

Congress and the international economy 100 

International monetary affairs 100 

Foreign investment policy 102 

International trade 109 

Participation in the United Nations system 112 

Review of 1974 General Assembly 112 

Seventh Special Session, September 1975: Preparations and re- 
sults 115 

Participation in the 30th session 115 

Congress and financing the U.N. svstem 1 16 

The status of Israel _ 117 

Other congressional activities 119 

(vn) 



VIII 

Major Functional Problems Facing U.S. Foreign Policy — continued Page 

Problems of Global Resource Management 121 

Congress and U.S. foreign energy policy 121 

U.S. international food policy 126 

Congress and the Law of the Sea 132 

Space research 139 

Other international environmental issues 141 

Congress and individual rights: Human rights and MIA's 146 

Human rights 146 

Status of MIA's 150 

Specific Regional Issues 1 .' ", 

Introduction 157 

Detente policies 1~> N 

Relations with the U.S.S.R 158 

Relations with China 161 

Middle East affairs 1(>C> 

Congress and Latin America 1 ! > s 

Panama Canal treat v negotiations 168 

Cuba * 172 

Congress and Africa 174 

- uthern Africa: Unresolved Issues 174 

Zaire 177 

East Africa: The Horn 17S 

Aid and development 179 

Conclusion 180 

Congress and Asia: Selected issues 1S2 

United States-Korean relations 1S2 

Congressional approval of commonwealth status for the northern 

Mariana Islands 184 



The Debate Over the U.S. Role in the World 



Page 

Introduction 3 

U.S. Foreign Policy Issues and Goals and the Defense Budget 5 

Action on component parts of the defense budget 5 

Other related issues 10 

Diego Garcia and U.S. Indian Ocean policy 11 

Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Activities 15 

Activities of House and Senate select committees 18 

Issues and areas for congressional action 26 



INTRODUCTION 

Congressional influence on U.S. foreign policy frequently stems 
from decisions on specific issues, in reaction to positions initiated by 
the executive branch. This generalization held true for the most part 
in 1975, but the Congress also attempted at various times to step back 
and look at the larger picture of U.S. commitments and role in the 
world. These attempts were characterized as inconclusive, for no evi- 
dence of policy change, or even clear evidence of consensus, emerged 
from the debates and hearings. However, they did serve to communi- 
cate an indication of congressional concern over future directions of 
U.S. foreign policy, and over the role of Congress in shaping that 
policy. 

The great debate on foreign policy in 1975 occurred during Senate 
debate on the fiscal year 1975 Defense Department authorization. The 
debate ranged over such questions as basic foreign policy objectives, 
political and military alliances, and the future of detente. In another 
attempt at a wider perspective on foreign policy, both the Senate and 
House foreign affairs committees conducted hearings to consider 
future directions of U.S. foreign policy. 

A major area of congressional foreign policy involvement in 1975 
was the evaluation of U.S. intelligence activities conducted by House 
and Senate select committees. The primary focus of both investigations 
was on abuses of power by U.S. intelligence agencies, reflecting con- 
cern for the image of the United States in the world today as gener- 
ated by these activities. 

(3) 



U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AND GOALS AND THE 
DEFENSE BUDGET* 

Through its action on the defense budget, the Congress annually 
establishes military force levels and spending authority, and thereby 
provides the underpinnings of national security policy. In many cases, 
action on the defense budget has even more direct impact on inter- 
national affairs. Congressional decisions during action on the fiscal 
year 1976 defense budget with a direct relationship to U.S. foreign 
policy included : 

(1) The provision of funds to add three combat divisions to the 
Army, including two brigades to be added in NATO Europe through 
the replacement of support troops. (The program was approved 
tacitly. Congress did not vote funds specifically for this purpose.) 

(2) Approval of military construction funds for the Indian Ocean 
base at Diego Garcia, with certain qualifications. 

(3) Funds for foreign military assistance, including military assist- 
ance funds in support of U.S. Middle East peace objectives. 

(4) The denial, through an amendment to the Department of De- 
fense appropriation bill, of funding for any involvement in Angola. 

(5) The rejection of amendments to reduce forces in Korea and 
elsewhere. 

( 6 ) The unilateral phaseout of the sole U.S. ABM site. 

(7) Beductions in funds for intelligence activities. 

(8) A new requirement, included in the defense authorization bill, 
that the Secretary of Defense consult with the Secretaiw of State and 
annually submit a joint report on foreign policy and military force 
structure. 

The total national defense request of $107.7 billion in budget au- 
thority included $101.7 billion for Department of Defense military 
functions and $4.6 billion for foreign military assistance (excluding 
subsequently requested funds for the Middle East and other revisions) . 

The administration did not seek to relate the defense budget request 
directly to international developments or current U.S. foreign policy. 
The underlying assumptions, as outlined by Secretary of Defense 
Schlesinger, included continued power rivalry with the Soviet Union, 
the primacy of NATO Europe to American security interests and 
the necessity for U.S. leadership, and the continued importance of 
U.S. interests elsewhere, including Asia and the Middle East. 

Action on Component Parts of the Defense Budget Request 

Funding the total national defense budget annually involves a dozen 
or more authorization and appropriation acts. In addition, the year 
1975 saw the first trial run of the new congressional budget process. 

♦Prepared by Richard P. Cronin, analyst in national defense; and Joel M. Woldman, 
analyst in U.S. foreign policy. 

< 5 > 



In House Concurrent Resolution 218, the first concurrent resolution 
on the budget, approved by both Houses on May 14, 1975, the Congress 
established target ceilings for the national defense functional area. 
These targets constituted reductions of $7 billion in budget authority 
and $3.3 billion in outlays from the amounts requested. $1.3 billion 
of the budget authority reduction stemmed from the collapse 
of South Vietnam and the elimination of any need for fiscal year 
li>7() funds for South Vietnamese forces. House Concurrent Resolu- 
tion 46G, the second concurrent resolution on the budget, received final 
approval in the Senate on December 1 and in the House on Decem- 
ber 12, 1975. The second budget resolution, which adjusted the con- 
gressional budget for fact-of-life changes and converted targets 
(aggregate basis) into ceilings, assumed a reduction of $200 million in 
budget authority and $100 million in outlays for non-Middle East 
military assistance, but assumed, without passing judgment on its 
merits, congressional approval of the full Middle East assistance 
package. 

The Department of Defense App ropriation Authorization Act {Public 
Law 94-106) — 7'he So-Called Procurement Bill 

The Department of Defense authorization request for major weap- 
ons procurement, R.D.T. & E., manpower strength levels, and other 
purposes, totaled $29.9 billion for fiscal year 1976, including funds 
requested for military assistance to South Vietnam. As passed by the 
House on May 20, 1975, H.R. G674 included $26.5 billion in funding 
authorizations, a $3.4 billion reduction. The Senate bill (S. 920), 
passed on June 6, included $25 billion for procurement and R.D.T. & 
E., a reduction of $1.9 billion from the administration request. In 
both cases, the major reductions were obtained through the elimina- 
tion of unneeded funds for South Vietnam, by proposing to fund only 
pari of the requirements for cost growth in previously authorized 
Navy shipbuilding programs, and declining to approve a $300 million 
request for an inventory contingency fund. 

The Senate report on the authorization bill (S. Kept. 94-146) in- 
cluded several provisions of foreign policy significance, including a 
directive to the Department of Defense to submit, by December 81, 
L975, a report on long-term basing alternatives in the Pacific. As par! 
of the basing study, the committee also directed that the Department 
of Defense conduct an indepth study of military alternatives in 
Korea, including mutual defense arrangements and r.S. troop levels. 

Prior to its consideral ion of the specific budget items covered by t he 
military procurement authorization bill on the floor, the Senate held 
a wide-ranging "greai debate" June 2 to :'., L 975, on foreign policy 
and security issues in an effort to clarify the policies and postures 

underlying the administration request. The major focus of this debate 1 

was on such questions as basic foreign policy objectives, political and 

military alliances, and the rivalry between the Communist ami the 

iion ( lommunist worlds. 
Senator Dick Clark, for example, saw the end of the Vietnam conflict 

as an opportunity to initiate a new era in I '.S. foreign policy and to 
"cultivate new attitudes :md relationships that reflect an awareness 
of the world as if really is small, perilous, :nid int enlcpendent." * 



'ci.irk Dick Mintnrv Procurement Authorization Act. 1075. Remarks in the Senate, 
Congressional Record (dally ed.), v. 121, Jmm 8, 1078 : B. !•»•_•:;. 



In a somewhat more critical vein, Senator Adlai Stevenson III as- 
serted that the United States had no foreign policy now. Because of 
this, he argued, it is difficult to intelligently debate military priorities. 2 
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey stated that the problem for the United 
States in international affairs was the absence of a mechanism for 
coordinating national security policy in its totality. 

Senator Thomas Mclntyre urged that the United States "learn to 
discriminate in the kinds of commitments we make." He said that our 
role must lie between that of policeman of the world and Fortress 
America. 3 Both Senators Alan Cranston and Edward M. Kennedy 
expressed similar views, with Senator Kennedy suggesting that "the 
United States must become a peaceful world neighbor, and stop being 
a militant world meddler." 4 

Other participants in the debate, such as Senators Barry Goldwater 
and Strom Thurmond, however, urged a strong defense posture abroad 
as the best protection for this country's security. Senator Goldwater 
warned that "post- Vietnam international politics would not improve, 
but would almost certainly grow worse." He therefore insisted that the 
United States had to maintain all of its political and military alli- 
ances in Asia, as well as Europe. While he called for the United States 
to develop a "more flexible" defense posture permitting greater free- 
dom of choice overseas, he also warned that the Nation "can neither 
deny nor dodge certain distinct but terrible forces at work; namely, 
the increasing power of the U.S.S.R. and China and their continuing 
messianic stance." 5 Senator Harry F. Byrd cautioned his colleagues 
that history has taught that "our international commitments have 
value only insofar as they are perceived to be credible by both our 
allies and our adversaries." 6 

Senator Sam Nunn linked a strong defense posture to the continued 
viability of detente, and emphasized that the military capabilities of 
the Soviet Union, not that country's current posture toward the 
United States, must be the basis of national security policy. "Friendly 
smiles and gestures," he said, "can disappear in a period of about 
8 hours." 7 

The results of the debate, however, proved disappointing to those 
who wished to link foreign policy commitments, especially reduced 
commitments in Southeast Asia, with a smaller U.S. force structure 
and a reduced defense budget. The main achievement in this respect 
was the adoption of an amendment offered by Senator John Culver 
requiring that the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense 
annually submit a report on foreign policy and military posture for 
the upcoming fiscal year. This report was intended to explain the 
relationship of our military force structure to overall foreign policy 
in the year ahead. Although the amendment was adopted by voice 
vote in the Senate, the House conferees on the bill considered the 

2 Stevenson. Acllai. Military Procurement Authorization. Act, 1975. Remarks in the 
Senate. Congressional Record (daily ed.). v. 121, June 3, 1975 : S. 9411. 

3 Mclntyre, Thomas J. Military Procurement Authorization Act. 1975. Remarks in the 
Senate. Congressional Record (daily ed.). v. 121, June 3. 1975 : S. 9425. 

* Kennedy. Edward M. Military Procurement Authorization Act. 1975. Remarks in the 
Senate. Congressional Record (daily ed.). v. 121, June 2, 1975 : S. 9220. 

"Goldwater, Barry. Military Procurement Authorization Act, 1975. Remarks in the 
Senate. Congressional Record (daily ed.), v. 121, June 3, 1975 : S. 941 5. 

«Byrd. Harry F. Military Procurement Authorization Act. 1975. Remarks in the Senate. 
Congressional Record (daily ed.), v. 121, June 3, 1975 : S. 9459. 

7 Nunn, Sam. Military Procurement Authorization Act. 1975. Remarks in the Senate. 
Congressional Record (daily ed.) v. 121, June 2, 1975 : S. 9213. 



8 

proposed annual report "unnecessary and redundant." 8 But the Senate 
conferees insisted that a report of this kind was "necessary to provide 
the Congress a better comprehension of the actual need for our military 
force structure required to support our current and projected foreign 
policy." 9 

Consequently, the final version of the fiscal year 1976 military pro- 
curement authorization legislation (Public Law 94-106, Oct. T, 1975) 
included a new section requiring that such a report be submitted : 

Sec. 812. The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary 
of State, shall prepare and submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives a written annual report on the foreign 
policy and military force structure of the United States for the next fiscal year, 
how such policy and force structure relate to each other, and the justification 
for each. Such report shall be submitted not later than January 31 of each 
year. 10 

The salient fact of congressional action on the fiscal year 1976 
defense request is that economics and the debate over national priori- 
ties, not foreign policy goals, carried the most weight. AVhile the 
uncertainties following the Vietnam debacle prevented an effective 
consensus on foreign policy goals and national security means, the trial 
run of the new congressional budget process facilitated the making of 
clear choices, not only on total levels of Federal revenues and expendi- 
tures, but also the proportions to be devoted to each of the 15 budget 
functions — including national defense and international affairs. The 
departures from the President's budget request in these areas were 
dear and significant expressions of congressional intent, and the 
targets set by the Congress for the national defense and international 
a Hairs functions were reflected in the subsequent spending legislation. 

The initial defeat in the Senate of the first conference report on the 
procurement authorization bill, an unprecedented action, dramatically 
highlighted the importance placed on the new budget process. The 
was not the direction of U.S. foreign policy, or the relationship 
of the spending request to real U.S. security requirements, but the 
'|iic-! ion of whether the proposed authorization, if fully funded, would 
exceed the congressionally established budget targets. 

Tl< Depart/merit of Deft nse Appropriation Act {J^uhih- Law 9i-%12) 

As amended, the administration request for the Department of 
I )c fense appropriation bill, the ma in defense spending measure, tot aled 
$97.9 billion in budget authority for fiscal year L976 and $86.6 billion 
in estimated total outlays. The administration requested $23.1 billion 
in budget authority for the transition quarter. The fiscal year 1970 
total included $1.3 billion in budget authority for military assistance to 

South Vietnam. 

ILK. 9861, passed by the House on October 2, included $90.2 billion 
in new obi i gat ion authority for Department of Defense military act iv- 
ities for fiscal year l ( .)7c> and siM.7 billion for the transition quarter. 



r s. Congress. Senate: Committee on Conference. Authorizing appropriation! for fiscal 

1976 and the i>i-rioii beginning .Inly 1. 1976. and ending September 30 1976. for i"iii 

tary procurement, research and development, active duty, reserve, .-ml civilian personnel 

i h levels, military training student Loads, and f"r other purposes ; C report 

to accompany ill:. 8674. Washington, is. Government Printing Office, li'T-". 94th Cong., 

Rept. a i 865. p. <;:». 

'M.I. 

1 " in accordance with this requirement, such a report wai added as ;i preface t<> the 
posture Btatement of the Secretary of Defense f<>r fiscal year ia77. 



9 

The bill represented a reduction of $7.6 billion in budget authority and 
$3.7 billion in outlays from the fiscal year 1976 request, and an increase 
of $8.1 billion over the amount appropriated in last year's bill. 

The House Appropriations Committee report (H. Kept. 94-517) 
and the resultant bill included several provisions of foreign policy 
significance. The committee cut $40.6 million, or about one-half, from 
the funds requested to operate the Safeguard ABM site at Grand 
Forks, N. Dak., and directed the Department of Defense to deactivate 
the site by the end of fiscal year 1976. The Army had planned to oper- 
ate the site during fiscal year 1976 but to maintain the system below 
full operational readiness status thereafter. The committee did not 
accept the argument that valuable operational experience could be 
gained during fiscal year 1976 and stressed its belief that the impend- 
ing deployment of MIRVed missiles by the Soviet Union would nullify 
the future ability of Safeguard to protect the Minuteman ABM fields. 

In its fiscal year 1975 report, prior to the Communist victory in 
Vietnam and other parts of Indochina, the House Appropriations 
Committee had recommended a number of changes in the U.S. com- 
mand and force structure in both Japan and South Korea. These pro- 
posals included withdrawal of U.S. 2d Infantry Division elements 
from proximity to the Demilitarized Zone and the total removal from 
Korea of a nuclear weapons command. In its report on the fiscal year 
1976 legislation, however, the committee modified its position in re- 
sponse to the changed U.S. position in the Pacific after the fall of 
Vietnam, and decided not to press for the accomplishment, during 
1976. of certain troop realinements which it had originally recom- 
mended. Instead, the committee reaffirmed the U.S. treaty commitment 
to the Republic of Korea and simply asked the administration to 
implement those of its recommendations which were possible and to 
exercise necessary caution. The committee maintained, however, that : 

* * * plans should be made for trimming the entire U.S military presence in 
Korea to a force of approximately 20,000 men by fiscal year 1978 on the assump- 
tion that the situation will have stabilized appreciably by that time and our 
military assistance programs will have improved the defensive posture of ROK 
ground and air forces. 

The committee also went on record as affirming the central nature of 
the U.S. security relationship with Japan while encouraging Japan's 
recent movement toward assuming more responsibility for its con- 
ventional warfare defense. 

In Europe the committee stated its intention not to provide funds 
for the annual Reforger and Crested Cap exercises subsequent to fis- 
cal year 1976. The committee questioned the military utility of these 
annual rotations of U.S. units to Europe and indicated its belief that 
the exercises served only the purpose of reassuring NATO of the capa- 
bility and will to deploy forces to Europe. 

Of the $7.7 billion in House reductions, the Department of Defense 
appealed roughly $2.6 billion in cuts to the Senate Appropriations 
Committee. 

The Senate bill, which passed on November L Q . 1975, included $90.7 
billion in budget authority for fiscal year 1976 and $21.8 billion for 
fiscal year 1977. In its report on the measure (S. Kept. 94- I ho 
the Senate Appropriations Committee specifically opposed certain 
foreign policy objectives contained in the House report. Without fore- 

74-032— 7G 2 



10 

closing the possibility of changes in the mission and structure of U.S. 
forces in Korea, the Senate committee opposed recommending any 
firm plans or a timetable for a drawdown in U.S. troop levels. Noting 
the expressed intention of the Senate Armed Services Committee to 
look into the Korean issue, the committee deferred action pending 
completion of the Armed Services Committee's study of the question. 
The Senate committee also opposed the action of the House in order- 
ing the "unilateral mothballing" of the Safeguard ABM site, and it 
restored $40.6 million which the House had cut from the request. 

In floor action the committee's position on ABM was overturned by 
the passage of an amendment providing for the dismantling of the 
ABM site save for the perimeter acquisition radar (PAR) system. 

The conference report (H. Kept. 94-710), which passed the House 
on December 12 and the Senate on December 19, included $90.5 billion 
in budget authority for fiscal year 1976 and $21.9 billion for the tran- 
sition quarter. Conference action confirmed the decision to phase out 
Safeguard but provided the full requested funds to cover termination 
costs. The conferees agreed that the Department of Defense should 
plan for a drawndown of U.S. forces in Korea, but that the Congress 
should not predetermine personnel reductions or time phasing. 

Final action was delayed until January 27, 1976, when the House 
concurred in a Senate amendment (to a House amendment) which 
provided that no funds in the bill could be used for any activities in- 
volving Angola, other than intelligence gathering. 

The Military Construction Appropriation Act, 1976 (Public Law 
94-138) 
The military construction appropriation bill, H.R. 10029, which 
received final approval in the House on November 18, 1975, and in 
the Senate on November 19, funds military construction and family 
J musing activities for fiscal year 1976 and the transition quarter. Items 
of foreign policy interest in the bill included $13.8 million for con- 
struction at the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, and $117 mil- 
lion for Trident submarine facilities. 

Other Related Issues 

In addition to the foreign policy issues raised during the Senate's 
consideration of the military procurement authorization bill, other 
aspects of U.S. commitments abroad were considered by the Congress 
during 1975. They included approval by both Houses of the U.S. pro- 
posal to station 200 American civilian technicians in the Sinai to mon- 
itor the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement. The Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee, however, had previously required the ad- 
tninisl ral ion to certi fy t hat all secrei assurances to t he t wo belligerents 
be revealed before proceeding to vote on the measure. 11 These develop- 
ments are discussed in greater detail in the section of this study deal- 
ing with executive agreements (see pp. 45-5tt). 

In addition, the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research 

and Development of the House Committee on Internationa] Rela- 

11 r.s. Congress. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relatione. Early warning system In 
Sinai. Hearings, 94th Cong., lit bom. Oct »; and 7, i:i7f). Washington, r.s. Government 
Printing Office., idt:.. 264 pp. 



11 

tions 12 and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee each began a 
series of hearings aimed at a broad reassessment of U.S. foreign policy 
for the years ahead. The House Committee on Armed Services also 
held a series of hearings on overall national security programs and re- 
lated budget requirements which covered, among other subjects, the 
relationship between foreign policy and defense planning, and alter- 
natives in foreign and supporting military policy. 13 

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, responding to a Senate 
resolution in November 1973, held hearings to review the U.S. commit- 
ment to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and organiza- 
tion the following March. No further action on the question was taken 
by the Congress, however. In any event, the SEATO Council of Min- 
isters at their annual meeting in New York on September 24, 1975, 
voted to phase out the organization over the next 2 years. The Council 
did not discuss the Manila Pact and it is assumed that it will continue 
to be in effect. 

Diego Garcia and U.S. Indian Ocean Policy 

In several major actions in 1975 the Congress supported adminis- 
tration proposals regarding development of U.S. military support 
facilities on Diego Garcia, a small island in the Indian Ocean. The 
question involved in approving funding for this development goes 
beyond the issue of the actual costs, which represent a rather small part 
of the defense budget ; the decision to develop the Diego Garcia fa- 
cility bears on great power relationships, the potential for an arms race 
in the Indian Ocean, U.S. interest in open sealanes to the Persian 
Gulf, and questions regarding the information made available to 
Congress by the executive branch detailing the agreement with Great 
Britain to release the island for U.S. use. The case of Diego Garcia 
presents an interesting example of the interrelationship of foreign 
policy, defense goals, and strategic considerations. 

In accord with provisions of the 1975 Military Construction Act 
(Public Law 93-552) the President was required to certify to Congress 
that construction of military support facilities on Diego Garcia was 
essential to the national interest ; if neither House adopted a resolution 
of disapproval within 60 days, funds authorized under Public Law 
93-552 could be obligated for Diego Garcia. The President issued such 
a certification on May 12, 1975 (House Document 94-140), and Sen- 
ator Mansfield introduced a resolution of disapproval, Senate Resolu- 
tion 160, on May 19, 1975. (No comparable resolution of disapproval 
was filed in the House.) 



"IKS. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Future 
Foreign Policy Research and Development. Reassessment of U.S. foreign policy. Hearings, 
94th Cong.. 1st sess. July 15, 22, 23, and 24, 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 1975. 183 pp. 

The Press and Foreign Policy. Panel discussion. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Sept. 24, 1975. 
Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 34 pp. 

"U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Armed Services. Full committee consideration 
of overall national security programs and related budget requirements. Hearings. 94th 
Cong.. 1st sess. Dec. 3, 4. 5. 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1975. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975. 586 pp. 



12 

Following hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee 14 
Senate Resolution 160 was reported adversely to the Senate. 15 The com- 
mittee's report on the resolution and additional and minority views 
filed with it present a summary of both sides of the argument on the 
Diego Garcia issue. The position of the majority of the committee was 
that the United States has vital interests in the Indian Ocean area, be- 
cause the sealanes there lead to the natural resources of Africa, India, 
and the Middle East, and are particularly important for shipment of 
Middle Eastern oil. Second, the committee noted that the Soviet Union 
had increased its presence (to a force of 15 to 20 ships, half of which 
can be classed as combatants), and its capability to operate in the 
Indian Ocean by the reopening of the Suez Canal and the construction 
of a naval support facility at Berbera, Somalia; the Diego Garcia 
facility would provide the United States a comparable capability to 
sustain naval operations in the area. Third, the committee argued that 
construction of modest facilities at Diego Garcia would be a prudent 
action in view of the fact that the nearest independent U.S. fuel supply 
in the absence of the Diego Garcia operation is at Subic Bay in the 
Philippines, 4.000 miles from the Indian Ocean. 

The minority views on Senate Resolution 160, presented by Senators 
Mclntyre, Culver, Hart of Colorado, and Leahy, argued that con- 
vincing evidence that expansion of the Diego Garcia base facility was 
essentia] to U.S. national security had not been presented. To the con- 
trary, they considered it essential to assure that all avenues toward 
preventing a superpower arms race in the Indian Ocean be explored 
before a U.S. commitment in the area be made, and noted that despite 
previous suggestions of the Senate Armed Services Committee and 
similar suggestions from the U.N. General Assembly, the administra- 
tion had not approached the Soviet Union on the issue of an Indian 
Ocean arms limitation agreement since 1071. The report also noted 
that none of the 20 nations on the Indian Ocean littoral had given 
public support to the proposed U.S. base expansion on Diego Garcia. 

Looking to the strategic arguments presented by those favoring ex- 
pansion of the Diego Garcia facility, the minority views concluded 
that if the U.S. goal is to be able to "show the flag." it has the capability 
o so without Diego Garcia: but if the goal is actually to be able to 
conducl major military operations. Diego Garcia by itself is probably 
not sufficient." The minority views concluded that the proposed base 
i nsion on Diego Garcia had assumed a symbolic importance beyond 
significance. 

Senate Resolution L60 was rejected by the Senate I t3 53) on July 28 
after a lengthy debate along the lines presented in the preceding sum- 
mary. Since no resolui ion of disapproval was considered by t he I louse. 
the administration was \'v^ to obligate fiscal year L975 military con- 
struction funds for t he const nui ion on Diego ( Jarcia. 

S. L247, the fiscal year n>7<; military construction authorization, 
contained a provision authorizing $13.8 million for military construc- 



• ii.it*- : Committee <»n Armed Services, Disapprove Construction 
Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia. Hearing, June 10, 1978. 94th Con jr., 1st sess. Wash 
Ington U.S. Government Printing Office, r.>7.~>. (An executive session of the committee was 
bIho held «>n June 1 7. i 975. > 

i nate : D approve Construction Projecti on the [sland of Diego 

Garcia. (Rent. No. I 202) 94th Cong., 1st sees. June 18, L975. Washington, D.S Govern- 
ment Printing Office, J u n<- 1 s. 1075, 22 |>|' 
10 [bid. p. 21. 



13 

tion on Diego Garcia. 17 H.R. 5210, the comparable House measure, also 
contained a $13.8 million authorization for Diego Garcia. During 
debate on the measure on July 28, 1975, Representative Leggett in- 
troduced an amendment, which was subsequently rejected, to strike the 
Diego Garcia funds. 

Diego Garcia funding was carried through the conference report on 
S. 124? (H. Kept. 94-483), and the report was passed by the House 
without debate on September 24. During Senate debate on the con- 
ference report on September 29, Senator Culver raised the issues of 
the status of former inhabitants of Diego Garcia and of the nature of 
the secret agreement between the United States and Great Britain. On 
both issues, evidence was presented to indicate that the administration 
had not provided Congress with complete information, but had 
presented the impression that the island had for some time been unin- 
habited, and that no financial arrangements were involved in the 
United States-British agreement. 18 

The final debates in 1975 on the implications of U.S. base develop- 
ment at Diego Garcia for U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean occurred 
during Senate consideration of the fiscal year 1976 military construc- 
tion appropriation measure, H.R. 10029. (The measure had passed 
the House on October 8 without debate on the $13.8 million for Diego 
Garcia. The report accompanying H.R. 10029 (H. Kept. 94-530) stated 
that the Navy's request for those funds had been approved because 
of the expanding Russian influence in the Indian Ocean shipping- 
lanes.) The Senate Appropriations Committee also approved the $13.8 
million Diego Garcia request (S. Kept. 94-442) in H.R. 10029. On 
the floor of the Senate, however, an amendment proposed by Senator 
Culver was approved on November 6, 1975, to delay use of the Diego 
Garcia funds appropriated by H.R. 10029 until July 1, 1976. The 
major thrust of the arguments in support of the amendment was to 
reduce the likelihood of an arms race in the Indian Ocean, and to give 
the administration an additional opportunity to move toward a mu- 
tual anus restraint agreement for the Indian Ocean with the Soviet 
Union. 

The conference report on H.R. 10029 (H. Rept. 94-055) passed by 
the House on November 18 and the Senate on November 19, revised 
the Culver amendment to delay use of the appropriated funds only 
until April 15, 1976, with the exception of $250,000 to be expended 
without time restriction for aircraft arresting gear. Senate and House 
floor debate on this compromise indicated that the delay would not 
present problems for the Navy's leadtime and procurement schedule, 

17 Sop U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Armed Services. Report to aecompanv 
S. 1247. "Military Construction Authorization. Fiscal Year 1970.'' S. Kept. 94-ir>7. 94th 
Cone:.. 1st sess. Washington. U.S. Government Printing OfhVe. 1975. 

The Senate hill contained a provision (sec. 609) to withhold the Diego Garcia authoriza- 
tion if a resolution disapproving obligation of fiscal 1975 funds had heen passed. As 
S. Res. 100 was defeated prior to final consideration of S. 1247, the issue was dropped in 
the conference measure. 

18 See also Congressional Record (daily ed.), "Diego Garcia — A Question of Human 
Rights," v. 121. Sept. 24. 1975 : S16556, 16560. Senator Culver had presented an amendment 
to the State Department authorization for fiscal year 1976. S. 1 ."> 1 7 . adopted on Septem- 
ber 17. requiring the President to report to Congress by November 1. 1975, on the role 
of the United States in the removal of Inhabitants from Diego Garcia, and expressing the 
sense of Congress that the United Spates should negotiate with the U.S.S.K. to limit 
arms buildup in the Indian Ocean. Th<> amendmenl was subsequently dropped in con- 
ference with the House. 



14 

and would still provide time for a U.S. initiative to test Soviet inter- 
est in an arms restraint agreement. 19 

In addition to this legislative activity, additional congressional ac- 
tions to evaluate the need for and implication of further construction 
on Diego Garcia included hearings by the House International Rela- 
tions Committee and two factfinding missions to Somalia. The major 
themes of the House hearings were the role of the Soviet Union in the 
littoral 9tates of the Indian Ocean, the prospects of arms limitations 
in the Indian Ocean, and the status of former islanders. 20 

At the invitation of the Somalian Government, the House and Sen- 
ate Armed Services Committees both sent factfinding missions to Ber- 
bera, Somalia. 21 The reports of the two missions both concluded that 
development of a substantial Soviet installation was taking place in 
Berbera, and the Senate report recommended expansion of the Diego 
Garcia facility to counter this development. However, Representative 
Leggett, a member of the House team, described the Soviet facility as 
a "rather modest facility' 22 in a statement introducing his amendment 
to strike Diego Garcia construction funds from the House military 
construction authorization. 

Thus, in 1975, Congress resolved to develop U.S. military support 
facilities for the Indian Ocean. However, the Congress did not reach 
any consensus on the potential implications of this commitment for 
U.S. foreign and defense policy, or receive clarification from the ad- 
ministration on details of agreements with the British permitting 
U.S. use of the island. While supporters of the U.S. development 
argued that increased U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean is necessary 
to counter Soviet activities by providing fueling and communication 
facilities for the U.S. Xavy. opponents of the Diego Garcia funding 
have claimed that the facility will lead to the development of a three- 
ocean U.S. Navy, contribute to the arms race in the Indian Ocean, and 
add to tensions in that region. 



10 The State Department reported to the Congress on April 15, 197fi, as requested by 
the Culver amendment, on the status of negotiation efforts. The report concluded that 
'•* * * we do not perceive it (an arms limitation agreement in the Indian Ocean) to he 
in the O.S. interest at this time. Congressional Record (daily ed.), v. 122. Mav t;. l!i7f, : 

B. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. "Diego Garcia. 1075: 
The Debate over the Base and the Island's Former Inhahitants." Hearings. 94th Cong.. 1st 
Washington, r.s. Government Printing Office, 1975. 
■ I'.S. Congress, House : Committee on Armed Services. "Report of the Special Sub- 
committee to [nspecl Facilities at Berbera. Somalia." Hearing, .lulv in. l!)7f>. 94th Cong., 
1st sess. (HASC NO, 94 19). Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 197.~>. 11 pp. 
Senate: Committee On Armed Services "Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia *' 
Committee print. 94th Cong., 1st Bess. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1!I7.">. 



29 pp 



Congressional Record (dally ed.) v. 121. July 28, 197."> : H7<;."4. 



CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES* 

In 1975 the key agencies of the U.S. intelligence community were 
subjected to the most intensive congressional scrutiny since their crea- 
tion in the years following World \Var II. Through the efforts of two 
select committees, one in the House and one in the Senate, Congress 
and the American people were given detailed information regarding 
the operations, procedures, and missions of the American intelligence 
establishment. 

In the fall and winter of 1974 serious charges were made in the Xew 
York Times concerning the activities of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. On September 8, the Times reported that the CIA had di- 
rected the infusion of millions of dollars into Chile between 1970 and 
1973 in an effort to aid groups opposed to the Marxist regime of Presi- 
dent Salvadore Allende Gossens and in an attempt to "destabilize*' 
the Allende government. A coup did occur in Chile in September 1973. 
during the course of which President Allende was killed, or committed 
suicide. Following the publication of the September 8 Times article. 
President Ford acknowledged at a press conference that the CIA had 
been involved in certain efforts in Chile aimed at assisting the oppo- 
nents of Allende, although he denied that the CIA was involved in 
the coup itself. One key result of these revelations was the focusing of 
congressional attention once again on the CIA's foreign covert action 
operations, a subject that had been the source of intermittent con- 
troversy for a number of years. 

An important legislative enactment related to this controversy that 
emerged in the latter months of 1974 was section 6G2 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961. as amended (Public Law 93-559, the Hughes- 
Ryan amendment) which stipulated in part that : 

Xo funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be 
expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in 
foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary 
intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is im- 
portant to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely 
fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees 
of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United 
States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House 
of Representatives. 

It was presumed at the time of its passage that this amendment to the 
Foreign Assistance Act would enable Congress to maintain better 
oversight by requiring the CIA to report, through the President, on 
covert action operations conducted by the Agency overseas. Questions 
regarding the effectiveness of this provision in enabling the Congress 
to stop covert actions with which it came to disagree were raised late in 
1975 when a controversy developed between the President and Congress 



♦Prepared by Richard F. Grimmett, analyst In national defense. 

(15) 



16 

regarding ( IIA funding of pro-Western forces in Angola. (See United 
States-African Relations, pp. 176-77. The questions regarding section 
662 centered on the fact that under its provisions the appropriate 
congressional oversight committees do not have an express veto 
authority over covert action operations of the CIA. This situation 
creates serious problems for these committees should any of them 
wish to end any of the covert actions that are brought to their 
attention. 

On December 22, 1 ( J74. the Xew York Times reported that the CIA, 
in direct violation of its statutory charter, conducted a ''massive, illegal 
domestic intelligence operation during the Xixon administration 
against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the 
United States." The Times article also charged that "intelligence files 
on at least 10,000 American citizens" had been maintained by the CIA, 
and that the Agency had engaged in ''dozens of other illegal activities'* 
within the United States, starting in the 1950's, ''including break-ins, 
wiretapping and the surreptitious inspection of mail." Following the 
publication of the December 22 Times story, President Ford ordered 
CIA Director William E. Colby to provide him with a report on the 
allegations. After reviewing the Colby report. President Ford on 
January 4. 1975 established an eight-member Presidential Commission, 
chaired by Vice President Xelson A. Rockefeller, to "ascertain and 
evaluate any facts relating to activities conducted within the United 
States by the Central Intelligence Agency." Yet within 2 weeks of the 
Rockefeller Commission's creation, CIA Director Colby had acknowl- 
edged, before subcommittees of the Senate Appropriations and Armed 
Services Committees, that the CIA had in fact engaged in certain 
domestic operations against American citizens in recent years. Colby 
emphasized, however, that these activities were not of the scope alleged 
in the New York Times article of December 22. 

At this juncture, the Senate and the House determined that separate 
congressional probes of the allegations raised against the CIA would 
be necessary in order to establish the facts at issue and to restore public 
confidence in the agency once again. Inasmuch as other units within 
the American intelligence network, such as the Federal Bureau of In- 
vestigation, had also been charged with misdeeds in recent years, pri- 
marily in the area of domestic surveillance, it was decided that the 
congressional inquiries would focus not only on the CIA, but on all 
U.S. agencies engaged in intelligence activities, foreign and domestic, 

On January 27, L975, the Senate, by a vote of 82 to I. established the 

Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With 
Respect to [ntelligence Activities. Eleven Senators were appointed to 
the committee, six Democrats and five Republicans. Senator Frank 
Church (D-Idaho) was named chairman. Senator John Tower (\l- 
Tex. ) \ ice cl airman. Senate Resolul ion 21, which established the Sen- 
ate select committee, gave it broad authority to determine whether the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
or any other agency of the Federal ( rovernment, or any persons work- 
ing for or on behali of such agencies, had engaged in "illegal, improper 
or unethical activities." The committee was subsequently charged to 
submit its findings and recommendations not later than April 30, L976. 
On February L9, the House of Representatives voted 2W> L20 its 
approval oi House Resolution L38, authorizing an inquiry into "allega- 
tions of improper and illegal activities of intelligence agencies in the 



17 

United States and abroad," through the creation of the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence. 

Ten Representatives were appointed to the House committee, seven 
Democrats and three Republicans. Representative Lucien X. Nedzi 
(D-Mich.) was named chairman. In early June some members of the 
House select committee raised questions concerning the propriety of 
Representative Xedzi remaining as chairman of the committee in view 
of the fact that he had previously received secret briefing from the CIA 
on matters that had now become a focus of the committee's inquiry. 
Subsequently, the controversy was resolved through the passage of 
House Resolution 591 on July 17, 1975, which added two Democrats 
and one Republican to the committee. Representative Michael Har- 
rington (D-Mass.) and Representative Xedzi were not reassigned to 
this reconstituted House Select Committee on Intelligence. All other 
members of the first select committee retained their seats on the new 
one. Representative Otis G. Pike (D-X.Y.) replaced Mr. Xedzi as 
chairman. 

House Resolution 138 gave the House select committee broad powers 
to investigate "the organization, operations, and oversight of the intel- 
ligence community of the U.S. Government." The resolution author- 
ized an inquiry into the activities of the key agencies or units of the 
intelligence network, such as the CIA, the FBI, and the Defense Intel- 
ligence Agency (DIA), as well as "any other instrumentalities of the 
U.S. Government engaged in or otherwise responsible for intelligence 
operations in the United States and abroad." House Resolution 591 
reaffirmed this mandate in its entirety and directed the select committee 
to report its findings to the House no later than January 31, 1976. 

In the course of public hearings held by the two Select Committees 
on Intelligence a number of important subjects related to U.S. intelli- 
gence were examined. The Senate select committee focused its public 
hearings on major controversies that had been the subject of the Rocke- 
feller Commission report (President's Commission on CIA Activities 
Within the United States) and press accounts of questionable opera- 
tions of the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence units. This approach led 
the Senate committee to examine the involvement of the CIA in assassi- 
nation plots against foreign leaders, CIA operations in Chile against 
Salvadore Allende Gossens, and FBI counterintelligence programs 
within the United States. The House select committee focused its pub- 
lic hearings on the budget of the intelligence community, the perform- 
ance of the intelligence community in selected crises, and the questions 
related to risks and control of foreign intelligence programs of the 
United States. 

Efforts of the House select committee to obtain various kinds of 
classified data from executive branch agencies led to a number of dis- 
putes between the committee and executive branch officials over the 
kinds of documents, papers, and testimony that would be made avail- 
able to the committee and the restrictions that would be placed on the 
use of such information should it be given to the committee. On a num- 
ber of occasions, the House select committee found it necessary to sub- 
pena classified documents in order to receive them. The House select 
committee made a compromise agreement in November in order to 
obtain a subpenaed State Department memorandum of Mr. Thomas B. 
Boyatt, relating to the 1974 Cyprus crisis. In accepting this arrange- 



18 

ment, the committee specifically stipulated that its action "shall in no 
way be considered as a precedent affecting the right of this committee 
with respect to access to executive branch testimony or documents." In 
November, the House committee also voted to hold Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger in contempt of Congress for failing to appropriately 
respond to three separate committee subpenas for data relevant to the 
committee's investigation. By early December, the administration had 
responded to the three subpenas to the degree that the House committee 
was able to conclude that "substantial compliance" with them had 
occurred. As a result, final House proceedings against Secretary Kis- 
singer were dropped by the House select committee. 1 

Activities of House and Senate Select Committees 

The following is a synopsis of information developed or expanded 
upon by the two select committees in the course of their respective 
hearings. Information from other congressional hearings in 1975 that 
are directly related to the subheadings below is also incorporated. 
Sources for this information are either hearing documents or press 
accounts of hearings. 

Intelligence commini'/ty hud get 

Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats told the House select commit- 
tee in July that the ( General Accounting Office does not know how much 
the United States spends on intelligence because of current restric- 
tions on its auditing authority with respect to intelligence agencies. As 
the result of these legal obstacles, the GAO is not in a position to 
know whether or not there is duplication or lack of coordination 
among the agencies of the U.S. intelligence community. James T. 
Lynn. Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
testified before the House select committee in August that because cur- 
rent law permits the Director of Central Intelligence to expend large 
sums of money on his own authority, the Director of OMB could not 
give assurances that none of the moneys currently appropriated for 
the CIA were being spent for illegal activities. William E. Colby. 
Director of Central Intelligence, stated in testimony before the House 
select committee in August that the CIA did not inform either the 
intelligence subcommittees of Congress or the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) about the CIA's mail-opening program or its 
dealings with organized crime until after these activities had been 
terminated. In testimony before the House select committee in Au- 




19 

gust, FBI witnesses stated that the Bureau's budget for intelligence- 
gathering and counterintelligence activities for fiscal year 1975 was 
$82,488,000 — a substantial portion of which went for counterespionage 
purposes. During one of his appearances in August before the House 
committee, CIA Director Colby urged that the entire budget of the 
CIA be kept secret by Congress. 2 The House, on October 1, supported 
this position by rejecting, by a vote of 267 to 147, an amendment of 
Representative Robert N. Giaimo (D-Conn.) that was intended to 
make possible public disclosure of the total amount appropriated to 
the CIA. During the House debate on the Defense Department ap- 
propriations bill in 1975, Representative George H. Mahon, chair- 
man of the House Appropriations Committee, extended the oppor- 
tunity to all Members of the House to have access to classified budget- 
ary data on intelligence under proper safeguards which would pro- 
tect the information from public disclosure. 

CIA domestic activities 

In February and March in testimony before the Defense Subcom- 
mittee of the House Appropriations Committee and the Government 
Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee of the House Gov- 
ernment Operations Committee, respectively, CIA Director William 
E. Colby acknowledged that "over the past 8 years" the CIA has main- 
tained files on four Members of Congress, 3 and that the agency main- 
tains a wide range of files containing information on American citi- 
zens. Colby cited reasons for these files being maintained, but added 
that it was not possible to make an accurate estimate as to the number 
of names kept on file. On June 10, the Rockefeller Commission re- 
port was released. It stated that the "great majority-' of CIA do- 
mestic activities complied with the law, but that certain operations- 
mail openings, buggings, break-ins, and the collection of materials 
involving the names of more than 300,000 individuals and organiza- 
tions — "were plainly unlawful and constituted improper invasions 
upon the rights of Americans.-' 4 In June, CIA Director Colby testi- 
fied before the Government Information and Individual Rights Sub- 
committee of the House Government Operations Committee that a 
continuing CIA review of its records had led to the determination 
that the agency had files on 75 current Members of Congress. Colby 
stated there was "no provision for immunity for Members of Con- 
gress from such attention." He also acknowledged that beginning in 
August 1973, the CIA had destroyed some files, including some 
documents that conceivably might have been used as evidence of 
criminal activity by the agency. This destruction has since been sus- 
pended. Colby added. 

In hearings held in October, the Senate select committee received 
testimony from a number of former public officials on the CIA's mail- 
opening program. Details of this program were first provided in March 
with the release of the testimony of William J. Cotter, Chief Postal 



2 U.S. Congress. House: Select Committee on Intelligence. "U.S. Intelligence Agencies 
and Activities: Intelligence Costs and Fiscal Procedures." Hearings. Pt. 1. July 31, Aug. 1, 
4-8. 1075. 94th Cong., 1st sess.. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 107.". 

"T'.S. Congress. House: Subcommittee on Department of Defense. Committee on Appro- 
priations. "Central Intelligence Agency Domestic Activities.'' Hearings. Feb. 20. 107."). 
04th Cone.. 1st sess. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 

4 US President 1074 — (Ford). "President's Commission on CIA Activities Within 

the United States." Report to the President. June 1075. \ Washington. For sale by the 
Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1075. ] 200 pp. 



20 

Inspector of the United States, on the subject taken in executive session 
before the courts. Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice 
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. During the Senate 
select committee's hearings, it was revealed that in the course of its 
20-year program of mail opening, the CIA had opened foreign cor- 
respondence to and from "selected American politicians," including 
Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Hubert H. Humphrey. Frank Church : 
Representative Bella Abzug: and Richard M. Xixon. Arthur F. Burns, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and civil rights leaders 
Martin Luther King, Jr.. and his wife Coretta, also had their mail 
opened. In addition, mail of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations 
and Harvard University was opened and examined by the CIA. An 
official "watch list" for mail opening was kept by the Agency— an 
index of at least 1.300 names that the CIA had determined were to 
receive special attention. Individuals whose names were on this "watch 
list*' included author John Steinbeck; Linus Pauling, Nobel Laureate : 
and Victor Reuther, United Auto AVorkers official. Officials of the CIA 
stated that the mail-opening program of 1953-73 was known to be 
illegal within the Agency while it was being carried out. Operation 
IITLIXGUAL, as it was termed, resulted in the filming of 2,705,726 
envelopes and the opening of :Ur>,8^0 Letters in New York during the 
20-year period. Former Postmasters Genera] J. Edward Day, John A. 
Gronouski, and Winton M. Blount testified that they could not recall 
ever being told during their respective tenures with the Postal Service 
that the CIA was opening U.S. mail. 5 

( 7 1 and assassination plots 

In Xovember, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released 
a 347-page interim report on "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving 
Foreign Leaders" 8 which discusses the role of the CIA and others in 
plots against Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba. Rafael Trujillo of the 
Dominican Republic, Gen. Rene Schneider of Chile, Patrice Lumumba 
of the Coniro — now Zaire — and President Xgo Dinh Diem of South 
Vietnam. The report held in paitthat "officials of the U.S. Government 
initiated plots to assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba," that 
"American officials encouraged or were privy to coup plots which re- 
sulted in the deaths of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider" and that "( J] A 
officials made use of known underworld figures in assassination efforts," 
The report also observed that the "apparent lack of accountability in 
the command and control system was such that the assassination plots 
could have been undertaken without express authorization." On De- 
cember 18, Senator Church and nine of his colleagues on t]\c Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence introduced S. 2S:>r), a. bill to make 

unlawful the entering into ;i conspiracy to assassinate a foreign offi- 
cial outside the United Slater or the attempted assassination <>f o 

foreign official outside the I nited States. 



[j,P Congress Senate: Belee! Commlttpe 'I'm Study Governmental Oneratlona with 

• To int. ■Ml;-. mm-.. Activities "Intelligence Activities : Mall Openlne." H*»arlnes. 
■..i • OH "' 22, and 24. 1975. 94th Cong., 1st seas. Washington, U.S. Government Prlnt- 

.... |fi7fl 
i Coi 'iite: Sc'f'i Committee To Study Governmental Operations with 

• to intidlleenee Vctlvltlps. \n <' sssasslnatlon i.i<»i< Involving PorHeTi leaders. 

Nov 20 1875. Senate Repl No. 94 160 94th Cong., 1-t Bess. Washington, r.s. Govern- 
ment Printing Offlee. 1975. 347 it 



21 

CIA and Chile 

In February, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released por- 
tions of executive session testimony given by Richard Helms, former 
Director of the CIA, before the committee on January 22, 1975. In 
this testimony, Mr. Helms acknowledged that he had provided in- 
complete information concerning the involvement of the CIA in 
Chilean affairs when he testified before a Senate committee after Presi- 
dent Salvador Allende Gossens had come to power. 7 

In December, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released 
a 62-page staff report entitled, "Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973." 8 
which discussed the participation of the CIA in efforts intended to 
block the election of and later to further the overthrow of the govern- 
ment of Marxist President Allende of Chile. The report estimated that 
the CIA spent $13.4 million for such purposes in Chile during the 10- 
year period. Of this total, roughly $8 million was spent on propaganda 
and support of political parties, while another $4.3 million was spent 
to influence and support the mass media in the country. The report 
added, however, that no direct involvement of the CIA in the 1973 
Chilean coup itself had been established. 9 

National Security Agency operations 

In hearings before the House select committee in August, Roy 
Banner, General Counsel for the NSA, stated that current law on 
Aviretaps does not prohibit the National Security Agency from eaves- 
dropping on overseas telephone calls placed by American citizens. 10 
In testimony before the Senate select committee in October, National 
Security Agency Director, Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.. stated that from 
1967 to 1973, the NSA had secretly scanned international telephone and 
cable traffic, intercepting the messages of 1,680 American citizens and 
groups and the messages of 5,925 foreign nationals or organizations. 
This program, formally designated Project Minaret in 1969, was 
halted in 1973. Allen testified that the National Security Agency had 
not obtained court orders to authorize this electronic surveillance by 
his Agency nor had the NSA received the specific approval of Presi- 
dent Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon or that of any Attorney 
General. Director Allen stated that all communications intercepted by 
the NSA had at least one foreign terminal. 11 

NSA supplied information to other intelligence agencies and units 
such as the CIA, FBI, DIA, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Danger- 
ous Drugs (BNDD) on the basis of watch lists given to NSA by these 
other intelligence groups. The information supplied by NSA was 

7 U.S. Congress. Senate : Committee on Foreign Relations. CIA Foreign and Domestic 
Activities. Hearing on Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreisrn Countries 
and in the United States, Jan. 22, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office. 1975. 39 pp. 

8 U.S. Congress. Senate: Select Committee To Studv Government Operations With 
Respect to Intelligence Activities. Covert action in Chile 1963-197:}. Staff Report. 94th 
Cons . 1st sess. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 197."). 62 pp. 

9 For testimony and other documents related to covert action in Chile see U.S. Congress. 
Senate: Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence 
Activities. Intelligence Activities : Covert Action. Hearings, vol. 7. Dec. 4 and 5, 1975. 
94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govertment Printing Office, 1976. 

10 House Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings. Part 1. 

11 U.S. Congress. Senate: Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With 
Respect to Intelligence Activities. Intelligence Activities: The National Securitv Agency 
and Fourth Amendment Rights. Hearings, vol. 5. Oct. 29 and Nov. 6, 1975. 94th Cong.. 
1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 197(5. 



22 

selected from interceptions the Agency conducted as part of its foreign 
intelligence mission. Among the categories of individuals marked for 
surveillance in this matter were : ( 1) about 30 Americans and about 700 
foreign nationals and groups suspected by the CIA of extremist and 
terrorist activities, (2) approximately 20 Americans who had traveled 
to North Vietnam and were believed to be a link to possible foreign 
influence on the antiwar movement. (3) about 450 Americans and 3,000 
foreigners suspected of illegal drug activities by the BNDD, (4) 
approximately 180 American individuals and groups and 525 foreign 
nationals and groups suspected by the Secret Service of being a 
danger to the President, and (5) about 1,000 American individuals 
and groups and 1.700 foreign individuals and groups suspected by 
the FBI of terrorist and extremist activity. 12 

In November, the Senate select committee disclosed the details of 
Operation Shamrock, a secret program through which three interna- 
tional telegraph companies, specifically. KCA Global Communications. 
ITT World Communications, and Western Union International, pro- 
vided the National SecurityAgency (XSA) with copies of the great 
bulk of the international messages these companies sent from 1047 to 
May 15, 1975, when the program was terminated by Secretary of 
Defense James Schlesinger. Senator Frank Church, chairman of the 
select committee, stated that it had been estimated that the "XSA in 
recent years selected about 150,000 messages a month for XSA analysts 
to review." Senator Church also noted that FBI agents had reviewed 
messages in the Washington offices of these three companies. Some 
details of these activities were first publicly mentioned in late October 
through a report by the staff of the Government Information and 
Individual Eights Subcommittee of the House Government Operations 
( 'ommittee. In his November testimony before the Senate Select Com- 
mittee. Attorney General Edward H. Levi expressed no conclusions 
on the legality of Operation Shamrock or on XSA's practice of moni- 
toring overseas phone calls of U.S. citizens, noting that the matter was 
currently under review by the Justice Department. 13 

Pi riorum nee of the intf Hiffrnce COmmu nit if 

During hearings before the House Select Committee on Intelligence 
in September and October, testimony and evidence were received re- 
garding the performance of the intelligence community prior to nota- 
ble international incidents. The post mortem report of the intelligence 
community regarding the 1973 Middle East war stated, for example, 
that "there was an intelligence failure in the week's preceding the out- 
break of war in the Middle Bast on October 6. Those elements of the 
intelligence community responsible for the production of finished in- 
telligence did not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab attack 
and thus did not warn of its imminence." In addil ion. the intelligence 
community, according to William (J. Ilvland of the State Depart- 
ment, did not provide any "specific warning of the coup on April 25, 
L974, in Portugal.*'' Furthermore, the performance of the intelligence 
community in connection with the 1974 Cyprus coup, in the words of 

the intelligence community's post mortem report, "fell quite short of 

the 1 1 1 :i rl< ."" " In a sworn statement, released bv the House committee. 



" n.M. 
* Ibid. 
u House select Committee on Inteligence. Hearing!. Part 2. 



23 

former Ambassador to Greece Henry J. Tasca, stated that the CIA in 
Greece had not informed him of a potential coup against Archbishop 
Makarios, the President of Cyprus, before the coup occurred, even 
though the CIA had received information that such a coup was possi- 
ble. 15 A former CIA analyst, Samuel A. Adams, charged that months 
before the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, U.S. intelligence "had de- 
liberately downgraded the strength of the enemy army in order to 
portray the Vietcong as weaker than they actually were." Adams added 
that then CIA Director Richard Helms "fed the phoney figures" to 
Congress prior to the Tet attacks stating that the strength of the 
enemy was declining. 16 These charges were disputed in December 
hearings before the House committee by Defense Intelligence Agency 
Director, Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham and by CIA Director William E. 
Colby. General Graham and Director Colby both stated that no con- 
spiracy to coverup Vietcong strength had occurred and that Tet did 
not represent an intelligence failure by U.S. intelligence agencies. 17 

Executive control of the intelligence community 

In testimony before the Senate select committee, in September, CIA 
Director William E. Colby acknowledged that the CIA had, from 
May 1952 until February 1970, operated a $3 million program to ex- 
periment with and develop poisons and biochemical weapons, as well 
as devices to administer them. This project, known as NKNAOMI, 
was undertaken in conjunction with the Special Operations Division 
of the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick, Md. Colby also 
confirmed that the CIA had maintained a secret cache of deadly 
poisons — one derived from cobra venom, the other a shellfish toxin — ■ 
in spite of a direct Presidential order that such materials be de- 
stroyed. Richard M. Helms, former CIA head, testified that he had 
issued an oral instruction to the appropriate CIA personnel that the 
CIA's cache of poisons be destroyed in accordance with President 
Nixon's 1969 and 1970 directives on the subject. Helms said he did not 
follow up his oral directive with a written one. He assumed his order 
had been carried out because CIA employees were trained to accept 
oral commands as orders written in "blood." 18 

The House Select Committee on Intelligence received testimony in 
October from James R. Gardner, a former liaison officer of the State 
Department to the Forty Committee of the National Security Council, 
that between April 1972 and December 1974, about 40 covert action 
operations had been approved by the Forty Committee without a single 
formal meeting of that group being held. The Forty Committee is the 
NSC subcommittee charged with reviewing and making final recom- 
mendations to the President concerning proposed covert action opera- 
tions., Gardner said that in place of formal meetings, the business of 
the Forty Committee was conducted by telephone and telephone 
votes. The decision to hold or not to hold a formal meeting was made 



15 Ibid., part 4. 

16 Ibid., nart 2. 

"U.S. Congress. House : Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Intelligence Agencies 
and Activities : Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence. Hearings, pt. 5, Nov. 4. (5 ; 
Dec. 2-3. 0-12, and 17, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 1975. 

18 U.S. Congress. Senate: Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With 
Respect To Intelligence Activities. Intelligence Activities: Unauthorized Storage of Toxic 
Agents. Hearings, vol. 1. Sept. 16. 17, 18, 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 197G. 



24 

by the Forty Committee's Chairman — the Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger 
later testified before the House select committee that every covert ac- 
tion operation undertaken by U.S. agents is "personally approved by 
t lie President." The Chief Executive. Kissinger said, receives "all the 
decisions" of the Forty Committee for his "final determination." 19 

Drug and biological agent U &tmg program* related to intelligence 

In September, representatives of the Army, in testimony l>efore the 
Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 
disclosed that the Army had surreptitiously given LSD to servicemen 
in the course of drug experiments conducted between 1958 and 1962 
to determine the potential applications of the drug in intelligence op- 
erations. Dr. Van M. Sim. former head of the Army's drug testing pro- 
gram, testified in September before a joint hearing of the Administra- 
tive Practice and Procedure Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and the Health Subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Pub- 
lic Welfare Committee, that the Army was experimenting on soldiers 
with a powerful drug known as BZ as late as 1074. The subjects who 
took the drug were never told what they would be taking or how it 
might affect them. Dr. Sim added that few followup studies have been 
made on the individuals who took the drugs through the program. 

In September. Charles Sensenv. a weapons expert who worked with 
the Army's Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick, testified be- 
fore the Senate select committee that the unit carried out simulated 
poison and irerm attacks on the New York subway system and Gov- 
ernment installations such as the Pentagon and the White House. The 
attacks were carried out. said Sensenv. in an effort to develop counter- 
measures airamst possible enemy use of poisons or germ agents against 
the United States. 20 Tt was revealed in November in testimony before a 
joint hearing of the Administrative Practice and Procedures Subcom- 
mittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Health Subcommit- 
tee of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, that drug 
addicts, undergoing rehabilitation at the National Institute of Mental 
Health's Addiction Research Center in Lexington, Ky., were rewarded 
with payments in narcotics in return for their participation in CIA- 
funded drug experiments. The program was funded by the CTA under 
tin- cover of the Office of Naval Research from 1951 to in:). ), and through 
other CIA arrangements from VXu\ to 1D(;2. when the program was 
terminated. Although the experiments with hallucinogenic drugs in- 
volved volunteers who had knowledge of the fact that they were hav- 
ing drugs administered to them, they al<o included hundreds of un- 
witting subject- as well. 

(' 1 . 1 ami m W8 orga nidations 

Iii testimony before the House select committee. CTA Director 
William E. Colby acknowledged that the CIA employs as informants 
abroad part time correspondents of major American news-gathering 
organizations. These CIA informants include free-lance television and 



• Bonte Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings P< 2 

enate Beled Committee To study Governmental Operation* with Respect to Intelli- 
gence Activities. Hearings. VoL l. 



25 

radio correspondents as well as part-time writers for various news- 

papers and magazines. Colby added, however, that the CIA did not 

employ any full-time staff correspondents of U.S. news-gathering 

organizations. 21 

Intelligence agencies and the Internal Revenue Service 

Donald C. Alexander, IRS Commissioner, testified before the Senate 
select committee in October that the CIA and the FBI had used the 
Internal Revenue Service to harass political activist groups. Alexander 
also confirmed that the IRS Special Services Staff had a watch list 
of groups and individuals for possible income tax audits. Individuals 
on the IRS list included former Senators Charles Goodell and Ernest 
Gruening; civil rights leaders Jesse Jackson and Coretta King; 
columnists Joseph Alsop and Jimmy Breslin. and former New York 
Mayor John Lindsey. Organizations on the IRS list included the Na- 
tional Education Association, the American Jewish Committee, As- 
sociated Catholic Charities, the NAACP. the American Civil Liberties 
Union, the John Birch Society, and the Ford Foundation. 22 In August, 
Commissioner Alexander told the House select committee that the In- 
ternal Revenue Service had ended its generalized intelligence activities 
in January 1975. He added, however, that it was his view that controls 
over the distribution of tax return information among Government 
agencies were too lax and should be strengthened through new 
legislation. 23 

FBI counterintelligence and surveillance activities 

In July, FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley acknowledged at a press 
conference that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had for many 
years engaged in "surreptitious entries'' of private premises in the 
United States for the purpose of "securing information relative to 
the security of the Nation." Kelley confirmed also that the FBI had 
broken into foreign Embassies in the United States for "counter- 
intelligence" purposes. In September, the Senate select committee 
disclosed that the FBI from 1942 until April 1968. had committed at 
least 238 illegal burglaries against 14 "domestic subversive targets." 
At least three other such domestic targets were subjected to numerous 
break-ins from October 1952 until June 1966. FBI witnesses also told 
the Senate select committee in October that for 26 years, from 1940- 
1966. the FBI had opened and read mail in eight cities — New York. 
Washington, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco. Detroit. Seattle, and 
Boston — apparently without the approval of the Attorney General 
and without a warrant from a court. The purpose of this program, 
said W. Raymond Wannell, Assistant FBI Director for the Intel- 
ligence Division, was to aid in the location of potential spies. 21 

In November and December, the House and Senate select com- 
mittees heard detailed testimony regarding various counterintelligence 

- 1 House Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings. Pt. 5. 

"U.S. Congress. Senate: Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With 
Respect To Intelligence Activities. Intelligence Activities : Internal Revenue Service. Hear- 
roL ?>. Oct. 2. 1!)7."). 94th Con-;., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, uito. 

-' House Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearings. Pt. 1. 

-•> ••Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to 
Intelligence Activities." Hearings, vol. 4. 



•i 032 — 7 r - 



26 

efforts of the FBI. 25 The Senate select committee received testimony 
during November regarding an FBI program, in effect since 1961, to 
discredit the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. — a program which, in 
the words of FBI Assistant Deputy Director James Adams, had no 
''statutory basis or justification." In December, the Senate select com- 
mittee heard a report from its staff, based on FBI documents and 
testimony of various witnesses, which held that the FBI had been 
used for political purposes from the Presidency of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to that of Richard M. Nixon. The report recounted evidence 
that the FBI had — for Presidential political ends — conducted wire- 
taps, supplied secret dossiers, and engaged in physical surveillance of 
persons. 26 

Strategic arms limitation talk's and intelligence 

On December 2, 1975, former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.. testified before the House select committee 
that Secretary of State Kissinger had been less than candid with the 
President and Congress regarding what Zumwalt asserted were "gross 
violations'- by the Soviet Union of the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation 
Agreement (SALT I). Zumwalt also charged that U.S. intelligence 
analysts had been denied access to important data by U.S. policy- 
makers during the period prior and subsequent to the signing of the 
SALT 1 agreement — making their jobs all the more difficult. Znm- 
walt's testimony was challenged before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee the following day by former Defense Secretary James 
Schlesinger, and by Secretary of State Kissinger in a December 9 
press conference. At a later date, the House select committee received 
the testimony of CIA Deputy Director Edward Proctor that certain 
documents regarding Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements 
had been withheld by Mr. Kissinger from certain administration 
officials, including Secretary of State William Rogers. 27 

Issues and Areas for Congressional Action 

A- l ( .>7r> ended, the House and Senate select committee began pre- 
paring their final reports and recommendations.'- 25 The Senate Grov- 
ernment Operations Committee in mid-December scheduled hearings 
for January l!>7f> to consider legislative proposals to oversee the intel- 
ligence community. In view of the issues raised during the months 
of public hearings before the two seled committees, it seems likely 
that the Congress in 1976 will be confronted with a number of choices 
related to oversight of the U.S. intelligence community — once all of 
the final reports and recommendations are tiled and released. The fol- 

» U.S. Congress : 

House: Select Committee on Intelligence. "U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: 
Domestic intelligence Programs." Hearings, pi 3, <><•!. 9; Nor. 18, I v . and De< 
1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess.. Washington, 0.8. Government Printing Office. 1975. 
Senate: s<d<-ct Committee To study Governmental Operations With Respect to IntelH- 
genct itelligence Activities: Federal Bureau of Investigation." Hear- 

\ i-. lit. !»,•<•. 2, ::. 9, in, and 11, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st 
bington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 
« Sennte Rplecl Committee To study Governmental Operations With Reaped to Intelli* 
I -i i\ Ities. Hearings. roL «'>. 

,-c Select Committee on intelligence. Hearings, pt 5. 

he final recommendations of 1 1 * « » House select committee were Sled on Feb, 11, 1976. 

Committee on intelligence. Recommendations of the final 

reporl <<i the He I Committee on Intelligence, pursuant to H. Rea 591. Feb. 11. 

\.. •'! B33 94th Cong., 2d Bess. Washington, 0.8. Government Printing 

Office, 1976. '-"•< pp. 'l'lo- Benate sele< i committee's final recommendations and report 

Bled '.n Apr. 26 and 28, i«)7<; ts. Rept 94 755). 



27 

lowing are some of the more important issues and subject areas that the 
Congress may address. 

Intelligence Oversight Committee 

Congressional oversight of the intelligence community has generally 
been the responsibility of the Appropriations and Armed Services 
Committees of the House and Senate. In October 1974, the House 
expanded this oversight responsibility by adopting House Resolu- 
tion 988, which included a provision giving the Committee on For- 
eign Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations) the 
special oversight function of "reviewing and studying, on a con- 
tinuing basis, all laws, programs, and Government activities deal- 
ing with or involving * * * intelligence activities relating to foreign 
policy * * * ." Since the passage of the Hughes-Evan amendment 
to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974, the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee has participated in the formalized review of CIA 
covert action operations along with the other intelligence oversight 
committees. 

In the wake of the investigations by the House and Senate select 
committees, the Congress is likely to be asked to consider changes 
in the current oversight arrangement. Possible changes could be 
the establishment of either a joint intelligence oversight committee 
or an oversight committee for one or both Houses. Should the Con- 
gress or either House decide to establish such a committee, a num- 
ber of issues would have to be resolved in the process. Congress 
or the individual Houses would have to determine the appropriate 
size of such a committee as well as what the permissible tenure 
of service of committee members should be. The jurisdiction of 
such a committee over agencies of the U.S. intelligence community 
will also have to be determined, Should this jurisdiction, for exam- 
ple, be limited to U.S. foreign intelligence agencies or extended to 
include domestic intelligence units as well? Should such a commit- 
tee have legislative jurisdiction and authorization authority over 
the agencies within its purview? Should such a committee have ex- 
clusive legislative, authorization, and oversight jurisdiction over the 
intelligence community, or should it share these authorities with 
other standing committees in the House and Senate? If the Con- 
gress or either House decides to establish a new oversight committee 
arrangement, it seems likely that standards will have to be de- 
veloped to govern disclosure of classified information by Members 
who serve on anv new committee that is created. Such standards 
would undoubtedly address the means by which classified informa- 
tion could be released to other Senators and Members of Congress, 
or the public at large. 

Covert action operations of the CIA 

A major point of controversy during recent years has been covert 
action operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. In light of 
the revelations regarding CIA activities in this area, it is possible 
that it will be recommended that current procedures governing noti- 
fication of the appropriate congressional committees (as required 
by section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 19G1 as amended) 
be changed. It may be recommended that a new oversight committee 
be given the statutory right to a comprehensive briefing on each 



28 

proposed CIA foreign covert action operation prior to its initiation. 
It may further be recommended that such an oversight committee 
have the authority to disclose to the Senate and/or to the House, CIA 
covert action operations it believes should be terminated should they 
be initiated over the objections of the committee. The Congress will 
certainly be asked to determine whether or not the assassination of 
foreign officials, the entering into a conspiracy to do so, or the attempt 
to assassinate such an official by U.S. citizens should be made a crim- 
inal offense. 

Intelligence community budget 

In view of the controversy that has developed in recent months 
over the intelligence community's budget and the uses to which it 
is put, it is possible that legislation will be recommended to change 
the budgetary process currently in effect for intelligence groups. 
especially the CIA. This may be done in an effort to facilitate greater 
oversight of such units by both the Congress as a whole and any new 
oversight committee that may be created. It may be proposed, for 
example, that an annual authorization of the national intelligence 
community budget be required, including direct votes on it in secret 
ns of the House and/or the Senate. Restrictions on the ability 
of the CIA to reprogram or transfer funds for its use from other 
accounts, as well as checks on the authority of the CIA Director 
to expend funds for the CIA on his own certificate, may also be rec- 
ommended. Should Congress determine that an annual authoriza- 
tion of the national intelligence community budget be required, it 
will need to establish specific guidelines to govern access to and use 
of this budgetary data by Members of both Houses. 

Ri organization of the intelligence community 

To define more clearly the missions and permissible activities of 
the CIA. NSA. and other agencies of the U.S. intelligence com- 
munity, and thus facilitate oversight of such matters in the future, 
the Congress may be asked to amend the statutory charter of the 
CIA and to legislate new charters for other intelligence units. To 
promote greater efficiency and to eliminate unnecessary duplication 
of effort within the intelligence community, a general reorganiza- 
tion of it may be proposed, including a redefinition of the position 
of the Director of Central Intelligence and the powers and respon- 
sibilities that inhere in it. 

The above issues and subject a reus are illustrative of the scope of 
choices in the intelligence oversight areas thai face the Congress 
as 1976 commences. Problems in this area are exceedingly complex 
and they will undoubtedly require intensive examination and debate 
to resolve satisfactorily. Yet an important step toward that reso- 
lution was taken in L975 through the wide-ranging use of congres- 
Bional invest igal ive powers. 



The Debate Over U.S. Policymaking System and the 
Congressional Role in Foreign Policy 



Page 

Introduction 31 

Congressional Organization for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs. _ 32 

Study commission proposals for reorganization 32 

Changes in congressional organization 36 

Congress and War Powers 39 

Presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolution 40 

Inclusion of U.S. civilian combatants under the War Powers Resolu- 
tion 43 

Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements 45 

Legislative proposals 45 

Implementation of the Case-Zablocki Act 48 

Review of specific agreements 50 

The Congressional Role in the Determination of Specific Policies. 54 

Turkish aid controversy 54 

The Jackson-Vanik amendment 60 



INTRODUCTION 

The years since the height of U.S. involvement in Vietnam have 
produced a reaction in Congress to a perceived imbalance between 
the Congress and the executive branch in foreign policy decisionmak- 
ing. A majority of the Congress has agreed that efforts must be made 
to reestablish and strengthen the congressional voice in foreign pol- 
icy; passage of the War Powers Act (1973) , the Case-Zablocki Execu- 
tive Agreements Act (1972) , specific policy directives such as the Jack- 
son- Vanik amendment (1974) and the Turkish aid cutoff (1975), and 
various other legislative actions to require increased executive branch 
reporting in order to facilitate congressional oversight, respond to this 
concern. 

This section of Congress and Foreign Policy 1975 attempts to look 
at the issues which, in 1975, were pivotal in the effort to redefine the 
relationship of Congress to the executive branch in foreign policy- 
making. For instance, in an attempt to deal more efficiently and effec- 
tively with foreign policy issues, the House International Relations 
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have both 
reorganized subcommittee structures. Other proposals for reform of 
the congressional foreign policymaking structure were made by a con- 
gressionally appointed Commission on the Organization of the Gov- 
ernment for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commis- 
sion.) Many of the Commission's recommendations, however, have 
not been implemented. 

In 1975, the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolu- 
tion were invoked on four occasions, with some questions raised as to 
the extent to which the act did permit greater congressional involve- 
ment in the decisionmaking process. Congress also reviewed its role 
regarding executive agreements and considered various legislative 
proposals to increase its oversight of such agreements. 

Congressional efforts to reassert foreign policymaking prerogatives 
resulted in at least two instances in the passage of legislation specifical- 
ly affecting U.S. policy toward particular countries. The issues of U.S. 
aid to Turkey and the linkage of U.S. trade concessions with Soviet 
emigration policies provoked controversy with the administration, 
which tends to see the congressional foreign policy role as one of in- 
fluencing policy rather than making it. 

(31) 



CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE 
CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS* 

Congress 1 concern about assuming a more responsible role in foreign 
policy in recent years has directed increased attention to ways in 
which congressional performance in foreign policymaking is related 
to congressional organization. This concern for organization in 1075 
produced a substantial number of proposals for reorganization, but 
rather limited actions to implement these proposals. A congressionallv 
appointed Commission on the Organization of Government for the 
Conduct of Foreign Policy * (referred to as the Murphy Commission 
after its Chairman, Robert D. Murphy) made its report in June 107."): 
its proposals for both congressional and executive branch reorganiza- 
tion focused primarily on the increasing relationship between inter- 
national economic and political affairs. Reorganization proposals made 
by the Congress itself have related to such matters as intelligence 
oversight and the possibility of establishing a Joint Committee on 
National Security, and reorganization of existing committee and sub- 
committee structures. 

S-rrnv Commission Proposals for Kf.oroaxizatiox 

Mm /) h y Co m m us to n 

The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the 
Conduct of Foreign Policy was established by the Congress in 1972 
to study ways by which the executive and legislative branches make 
and implement foreign policy. Congressional interest in the report's 
recommendations was minimal in 1-975; no committee conducted hear- 
ings on the Commission report, and only isolated references have been 
made to its specific recommendations. 

The only recommendation made by the Murphy Commission io re- 
ceive congressional action called for including the Secretary of the 
Treasury as b stat utory member of the National Security Council. The 
measure, S. 2350, was passed by the Senate on October 9, 1075, and by 
the House on December 17. 1975. It was subsequently vetoed by Presi- 
dent Ford (S. Doc. \)A -145, Jan. 19, 1976), who argued that enactment 
of the legislation is unnecessary because the President has the author- 
ity to invite the Secretary of the Treasury to participate in Council 
affairs when issues of substantia] interest to the Treasury Department 
are involved. The Senate overrode the Presidential veto on January 
22, 1976; as of this writing the House has not considered the matter. 

The two sections of the Murphy Commission report dealing specif- 
ically with congressional participation in foreign policymaking out- 
line recommendations to meet congressional responsibility in two im- 

- Prepared by 0;ii<> a. Ifattox, analyst in Internationa] relation* 

1 is. Commission <>n th<' Organisation of the Government for 1 1 > . - Conduct of Foreign 
Policy. (Beport) June 1975. Washington, U.S. Qorernment Printing Office, 1075. 278 pp. 

(82) 



33 

mediate challenges to U.S. foreign policy: Increasing international 
economic and physical interdependence, and the resultant merging of 
domestic and foreign policy issues. 

The Commission maintained that the Congress has too long deferred 
to and allowed its powers to be usurped by the executive branch, and 
it cited a survey of Members of Congress that indicated dissatisfaction 
with Congress' diminished role in foreign policy. The Commission 
expressed the belief that the security of the Xation requires that Con- 
gress and the executive branch resolve foreign policy issues through 
"shared participation and responsibility/' Although the Commission 
recognized that the executive branch must conduct U.S. relations with 
other countries. Congress and the executive do share important respon- 
sibilities in foreign affairs : War powers, the appointive process, and 
treaty powers. And only Congress has the power to regulate foreign 
commerce, an increasingly important responsibility. 

To facilitate the effective legislative/executive sharing of responsi- 
bility the Commission : 

(1) Endorsed the War Powers Resolution and encouraged both 
the executive branch and the Congress to adhere to its spirit of 
cooperation; 

(2) Recommended that a statement of national commitment be 
adopted by a congressional concurrent resolution to assure that 
any promise to use armed force in defense of a foreign country 
result from a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution approved 
by both the legislative and executive branches; 

(3) Proposed that to curtail excess of executive authority, all 
national emergencies and statutes delegating emergency powers 
should conform to the National Emergencies Act. all existing 
formal states of national emergency should be terminated and 
in the future, declared emergencies should contain provisions for 
termination; 

(4) Asserted that the flow of information within the Govern- 
ment should be as free as possible, all unnecessary classification 
procedures be terminated, and a more comprehensive system of 
classification be enacted, with oversight and maintenance of this 
system of classification performed by a Joint Committee on 
National Security: 

(5) Urged the Senate to continue to demand that all appointed 
foreign policy officials possess the necessary qualifications for their 
positions: and 

(6) Encouraged the Congress to exercise more effective review 
and oversight through report back requirements for executive 
testimony and reports, thus encouraging more executive legisla- 
tive cooperation. 

WTiile the Commission acknowledged that Congress had made "sub- 
stantial progress" in many of these areas, it offered the above recom- 
mendations to qualify or strengthen the advances already made. 

The Commission then turned its attention to recommendations for 
congressional organization and procedures. The Commission report 
concluded that it is necessary that the House International Relations 
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have broad 
jurisdictional flexibility on foreign policy issues, particularly in the 
consideration of economic questions that may have implications for 



34 

foreign policy. It expressed general approval of the Senate's jurisdic- 
tional responsibilities, but proposed a review of the Senate subcommit- 
tee system. The Commission was more critical of the House and 
recommended that the House Banking and Currency Committee and 
the International Relations Committee have concurrent legislative 
oversight of international financial organizations and that the Inter- 
national Relations Committee broaden its oversight functions in trade 
policy issues, particularly over reciprocal tariff agreements. The Com- 
mission report endorsed the full utilization of subcommittees and joint 
hearings to coordinate congressional action in the foreign policy field. 
Specifically, the Commission proposed that the Foreign Relations 
and International Relations Committees be afforded the opportunity 
to review and comment on the budget estimates made by the appro- 
priations committees to determine the foreign policy implications, if 
any, of the estimates. These two committees should also be represented 
on the budget committees of both Houses. To expedite the authoriza- 
tion process the Commission suggests that authorization bills be 
limited to general expenditure and that more detailed review peri- 
odically be made of permanent legislation or multivear authorizations 
with focus on the long-term effectiveness of programs. The Congress 
might also consider combining authorizations and appropriations into 
a single process handled by House-Senate ''program committees/' 

The Commission felt that more evaluation and review of major 
programs and policy were necessary. The report of the Commission 
also recommended that: 
— There be a central congressional repository for written reports 
supplied to Congress by executive agencies, and a system of secu- 
rity classification be developed by the Joint Committee on Na- 
tional Security: 
— A part of the Congressional Research Service focus steadily on 
issues to which Congress as a whole accords high priority, under 
the guidance of the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations : 
— There be improved reporting procedures and accounting of inter- 
national programs in which the United States participates; 
— The 1 Joint Committee on Congressional Operation-- develop better 
research facilities, including the periodical publication of a sum- 
mary of congressional foreign affairs research interests; 
— There be more travel by teams of members t<> review international 
programs, and a reporting procedure for these trips be encour- 
aged : and that 
— Public awareness of congressional activities be increased via tele- 
vised bearings. 
The majority of the Murphy Commission's recommendations actu- 
ally de:) li with the administration of foreign affairs within the execu- 
tive branch. Because the Constitution confers the primary responsi- 
bility for the conduct of foreign policy on tic 1 President, it is essential 
thai he have ;i competent staff able i<> assi • all issues with foreign 
policy implications. The NSC and State Department are assigned 
responsibility for this function. Bui ;i- the scope of foreign | 

. !o remain effective these structures must receive more input 

from other agencies involved in foreign policy issues. Such intra- 

rnraental coordination will become increasingly important with 

t he growing complexity of global issues, the Commission maintained. 



35 

To maintain an integrated approach to foreign policy as the eco- 
nomic issues become more complex, the Commission proposed a cen- 
tral coordinating role for the State Department in economic policy- 
making with international implications. However, two Commission 
members, Senator Mansfield and Mrs. Engelhard did not concur with 
this recommendation according to the State Department responsibility 
for the coordination of foreign economic issues. In appendixes to the 
Commission report, they acknowledged the growing importance of 
economic issues to foreign policy discussion, but suggested that all 
aspects of economic policy remain under the responsibility of the Sec- 
retary of the Treasury, whom they felt to be best qualified. 

The Commission further advised involving other agencies in the 
foreign economic policy decisions by broadening the XSC to allow 
more debate on economic issues, organizing several advisory boards 
with members drawn both from within the Government and from 
the private sector to advise on economic policy matters, and requiring 
greater economic expertise in the Foreign Service and throughout the 
Government. 

In its recommendations for improving congressional /executive rela- 
tions, the Commission stressed cooperation in the flow of information 
and communication between as well as within branches. Improved 
cooperation, the Commission reported, is particularly important with 
regard to executive agreements, emergenc}' powers, and executive priv- 
ilege. To improve congressional participation in foreign affairs, the 
Commission study proposed a Joint Committee on National Security. 

Intelligence oversight proposals 

Proposals for reform of congressional oversight of intelligence activ- 
ities were contained in the report to the President by the Commission 
on CIA Activities Within the United States (the "Rockefeller Com- 
mission) and the Murphy Commission reports, and they were also 
made by the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence. For 
a detailed review of these recommendations, see pp. 26-28. 

Joint Committee on National Security 

Several Members of Congress have periodically introduced legis- 
lation to coordinate the foreign affairs activities of both Houses of 
Congress through the creation of a Joint Committee on National 
Security, and the Murphy Commission also recommended establish- 
ment of such a committee. Proponents of the measure argue that a 
joint committee could improve congressional effectiveness in the area 
of foreign affairs through better coordination of the two foreign 
affairs committees, and the Murphy Commission recommended that 
a Joint Committee on National Security "could perform for the Con- 
gress 'the kinds of policy review and coordination now performed in 
the executive branch by the National Security Council, and provide 
a central point of linkage to the President and the officials at the 
Council." 2 

There has been considerable opposition to the proposal for a joint 
committee. In. supplemental remark's to the report of the Murphy Com- 
mission, Commission member. Senator Mike Mansfield objected to the 
recommendation, arguing that a joint committee might not only de- 

2 Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Tolirv. 
P. 20«. 



36 

crease the authority and power of existing standing committees, but 
could become a "supercommittee" and fall under the influence of 
the executive branch, thereby reducing rather than increasing con- 
gressional authority for national security affairs. 

Changes ix Congressional Organization 

< 'ommittee structure 

Perhaps the most important changes in 1075 relating to congressional 
reassertion of its role in foreign policymaking involved reorganization 
of the Foreign A flairs Committees of both Houses. The House Com- 
mittee on International Relations (previously the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, with name changed by II. Res. 163 in March 197.")) 
replaced its geographic subcommittees with functional subcommittees. 
The revised structure is designed "to deal more effectively with the 
major international problems which are increasingly global in nature — 
such as energy and food shortages and international trade." 3 The 
following subcommittees were established: Oversight: International 
Security and Scientific Affairs; International Operations; Interna- 
tional Political and Military Affairs; International Resources, Food 
and Energy; Internationa] Economic Policy: International Organi- 
is; and Internationa] Trade and Commerce. In addition, a Spe- 
cial Subcommittee on Investigations was created, as well as a Special 
Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development. 

The changes in the committee's subcommittee structure were also 
intended to help the International Relations Committee deal effec- 
tively with its expanded jurisdictional responsibilities. The Commit- 
tee Reform Amendments of 1074 (IT. Res. 988, adopted Oct. 8, 1074) 
broadened the jurisdiction of the Internationa] Relations Committee 
to include jurisdiction over international commodity agreements and 
Internationa] trade and trade with enemy, export controls, interna- 
tional education, and nondomestic aspects of Public Law ISO. The 
committee also gave \\\) jurisdiction over international fishing agree- 
ments and international financial and monetary organizations (do 
facto responsibility for which had already been exercised bv the House 
Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing), but it did maintain 
nonlegislal ive oversight aut hority for these an 

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted in February 107.") 
to abolish distinctions between consultative, study or oversight, and 
oc eommitte< '! 'ommittee'S subcommittee structure now in- 
clude- five regional and four functional subcommittees: African Af- 
Fairs: Arms ('out rob International Organizations, and Security 
Agreements; European Affairs ; Far Eastern Affairs; Foreign As 
ance and Economic Policy ; Mult mat ional ( Corporal ions : Near Eastern 
and Soutl ' ; Affairs; Oceans and [nternational Environment; 
and Western Hemisphere Affairs. The Foreign Relations Committee 
traditionally considers legislation, treaties, and nominations only in 
full ••ommittee, with subcommittee functions normally confined to 
oversight. However, the Subcommittee on Foreirm Assistance and 
>mic Policy was assigned legislative jurisdiction for foreign 



i r Pongres* House: Committee on Foreign Affairs. Press release Morgan announces 
new Foreign Affairs Committee structure. Feb. •"•. 1975. 



37 

economic and military assistance programs, foreign military sales 
programs, and U.S. participation in multilateral assistance programs 
and international lending institntions. 

Both the Senate and the House increased the size of committee staffs 
during 1975 to accommodate the increasing responsibilities and re- 
search needs of Congress in all areas, including foreign affairs. Senate 
Resolution 60 allows each Senator not already assigned a committee 
staff member to hire one staff person for each major committee on 
which he serves- The Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 in- 
creased all House committee staffs from 6 to 18 positions. One-third 
of these staff personnel are designated minority staff, but may be 
detailed to general committee work when necessary. 

The House International Relations Committee rules for the 94th 
Congress state that all committee and subcommittee meetings and 
markup sessions, except those relating to internal budget or personnel 
matters, shall be open to the public. 4 In some instances, hearings and 
markup sessions were held simultaneously, with administration wit- 
nesses available to answer questions during the markup. While some 
observers have criticized this procedure for removing the actual give- 
and-take involved to more informal settings away from the public eye 
and for increasing the potential for executive branch influence on 
committee decisions, it must be noted that public access to markups 
means that members' positions on legislation in the formative stages 
are part of the public record. 

Joint referrals of legislation 

The increasing interrelationship of foreign and domestic policy 
issues has resulted in increased use, in both the House and Senate. 
of joint or consecutive referral procedures. The Plouse Committee 
Reform Amendments of 1974 authorized the Speaker to refer bills 
to more than one committee, either through joint or consecutive re- 
ferrals, or by dividing a bill into various parts. For example, the 
Rhodesian chrome bill (H.R. 1287) was referred sequentially to the 
International Relations and Armed Services Committees, while the 
Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (H.R. 
9294) was referred jointly to the International Relations, Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, and Public Works and Transportation 
Committees. 

The Senate has used joint and consecutive referral procedures for 
some time, and made frequent use of them in 1975. For example, 
S. 2607, to repeal the embargo on U.S. trade with North and South 
Vietnam, was referred jointly to the Foreign Relations and Bankings 
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committees, and the International Food 
and Development Assistance Act (H.R. 9005) was referred consecu- 
tively to the Foreign Relations and Agriculture Committees. As n 
result of these joint referrals, conference committees have included 
representatives of involved committees. The conference committee on 
H.R. 9005, for example, included members of the House Internationa] 
Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations and Agricul- 
ture Committees. 



4 Meeting* can ho closed if a quorum of tho committee or subcommittee, in <>p. 
determines by rollcall vote that all or part of a day's meetings shall be closed. < 
staff estimates (hat loss than 10 percent of committee meetings wore hd<i in clos 

in 1975. 



open session 
Committee 

isoii sr«.>i,>u 



3S 

Confirmation process 

Through the power of confirmation, the Congress, and the Senate in 
particular, is able to influence the choice of policymakers who advise 
the President in foreign policy decisions and may be influential in 
determining the direction of U.S. foreign policy. In the Senate, the 
Foreign Relations Committee has imposed an informal reporting re- 
quirement on nominees submitted by the executive branch for confir- 
mations. All nominees proposed by the executive branch are requested 
to submit a statement agreeing to the National Commitments Reso- 
lution (S. Res. 91-85)° and providing information on political con- 
tributions and any possible conflicts of interest. 

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is cur- 
rently not subject to Senate confirmation. The influential role that 
Secretary Kissinger assumed while occupying this position has caused 
concern by some Members of Congress. The Murphy Commission also 
expressed concern over the situation and proposed that this position 
not be occupied by an individual with other official responsibilities. 

James Stanton incorporated many of these concerns in II. R. L1342, 
introduced on December 19, 197r). and recommended the establishment 
of the position of Special Assistant to the President for National Secu- 
rity Affairs. This Special Assistant would advise the President on the 
'•coordination and integration of domestic, foreign military, and other 
policies relating to the national security.** Me would be subject to Sen- 
jonfirmation, thus allowing the Congress limited influence and 
oversight in the conduct of his responsibilities. Finally, the Special 
Assistant would not be permitted to hold any other Federal office or 
serve on active or reserve dutv in the Armed Forces. 



"The resolution defines a national commitment as the use of the Armed Forces of the 
United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government. 
<.r people by the use of the Armed Forces or financial resources or the United Stmt. s. The 
resolution maintains that a national commitment by the United States results only front 
affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government 
by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Cong 
cally providing for such commitment. 



CONGRESS AND WAR POWERS^ 

The War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), frequently re- 
garded as a symbol of congressional resurgence in foreign policy, was 
partially implemented on four occasions in 1975. and was discussed 
in relation to U.S. involvement in the Sinai peace force and U.S. 
paramilitary involvement in Angola. In each instance when the 
resolution was actually implemented (the evacuations of U.S. and 
foreign nationals from Danang, Phnom Penh, and Saigon, and 
the Mayaguez incident), the executive branch complied with the 
law ? s section 4 reporting requirements and notified Congress of the 
actions taken regarding the use of U.S. forces. Subsequently, a House 
International Relations Subcommittee held hearings to evaluate ex- 
ecutive branch compliance with the War Powers Resolution. 1 In 
addition, the Subcommittee on International Political and Military 
Affairs of the House International Relations Committee also con- 
ducted hearings (May 14 and 15. June 12 and 25, July 25 and 31, and 
Sept. 12, 1975) on the seizure of the Mayaguez and factors involved 
in the executive branch decision to use force to retrieve the vessel, 2 
and requested that the General Accounting Office undertake a de- 
tailed study of the seizure and U.S. diplomatic and military attempts 
to secure release of the ship and crew. 

While reaction to the viability of the War Powers Resolution was 
generally favorable, reviews of congressional performance with re- 
gard to executive branch/legislative war powers prerogatives were 
mixed. Although the President did heed the provisions of the War 
Powers Resolution in the four instances involving use of U.S. forces, 
he was permitted to circumvent the series of statutory provisions en- 
acted between 1973 and 1975 which prohibit the use of funds to finance 
combat activities and other military or paramilitary operations "in, 
over, and off the shores of Xorth and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cam- 
bodia." The Vietnam Contingency Act of 1975 (H.R. 6096, H. Rept. 
94-155) was passed by the House on April 17, authorizing funds for 
the evacuation of U.S. citizens and certain Vietnamese nationals, but 
containing no congressional ly mandated authority for the use of 
U.S. Armed Forces for that purpose. The Senate-passed measure 
(S. 1484, S. Rept. 94-88) did specifically authorize the use of armed 
forces as necessary to complete the evacuation of U.S. citizens, and 
the conference report of the measure (H. Rept. 176) followed essen- 
tially the Senate model and was approved by the Senate April 25. 
However, consideration of the conference report b}' the House was 

* Prepared by Margaret Goodman, analyst in international relations. 

iU.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on In- 
ternational Security and Scientific Affairs. War Powers : a test of compliance. Hearings. 
94th Cong., 1st sess., May 7 and June 15, 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
-Office. 1975. 135 pp. 

2 Complete hearings not yet published. 

(39) 



40 

delayed from the originally scheduled date of April 29 to May 1, 
after the final evacuation from Saigon had been completed, and the 
report was then rejected by the House. 

Thus, it would appear that Congress failed to take advantage of 
an opportunity to assert its influence on executive branch activities 
through its power over the purse, by permitting the President to pro- 
ceed in Indochina in spite of statutory prohibitions on such use of 
funds. When questioned about the effect of the statutory prohibitions 
after the rescue of the Afayaguez crew. Monroe Leigh. State Depart- 
ment legal counsel, stated : 

* * * the enactment of the funds limitation provisions * * * did not tro so far as 
to prevent the President from exercising his constitutional authority to rescue 
American citizens simply because those citizens happened to he in Indochina * * * : ' 

According to another commentary on the subject, however. "( t )he law 
had become a mere inconvenience which— thanks to public support, the 
legal theories of the State Department, and the acquiescence of Con- 
gress — could be ignored. '• 4 

Presidential Compliance With the War Powers Resolution 

The four reports filed by the President 8 in compliance with the 
War Powers Resolution were brief accounts of the number of U.S. 
forces involved in each incident, the approximate times of their in- 
volvement, and the numbers of U.S. and foreign civilians directly 
affected by each operation. All four reports indicated thai the Presi- 
dent acted pursuant to his constitutional powers as Commander in 
Chief, and that the reports were filed "in accordance with the Presi- 
dent's desire to keep the Congress fully informed" and "taking note 
of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution," G rather than specifically 
indicating compliance with the resolution. In addition, the State De- 
partment legal advisor, Monroe Leigh, noted that the President had 
consulted with Congress on all four occasions, although specifically 
required to do so only in those situations inolving actual or imminent 
hostilities. 

Congressional reaction to the President's compliance with the War 
Powers Resolution was expressed principally during the 2 days of 
hearings conducted by the House International Relations Subcom- 
mittee nn Intei-national Security and Scientific Affairs. Toncem with 
the general attitude of the executive branch toward the legislation 
voiced, while more specific attention was directed toward defi- 
nitional problems. Senator Jacob Javits, one of the principal Senate 
sponsors <>f the measure, expressed satisfaction thai the legislation 
had "stood up well in its initial tests,* 5 although he observed that 



• U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Internationa] Relations. War powers; m test of 

[lam <■ pi' - 
'Olennon. Michael J. Strengthening the War Power* Resolution: (lie case lor purse 
strings restrictions. Minnesota Law Review, vol. 60. November 1975. pp. 23. 

House Committee <>n International Relations Rubeommtttee on inter 
national Security and Scientific Affaire. The War Powers Resolution: relevanl documents, 
pondence, reports. (Committee print) D4th Conr.. 2d Bess., January L976 edition. 
w hinffttrn. IT. 8. Oovemmenl Printing- Office. 1975. pp 1" t& 

"'I'll-- reports of id,' Danang ami l'linoni Penh evacuations referred to section 4<a)(21 
of the resolution, '•the Introduction of U.S. armed forces lnt«> the territory, airspace, or 
of a Foreign nation while equipped for combat.* 4 ami the report on the Mayatrurz 
i specified section 4(a)(1). "introduction of U.S. troops into hostilities or into 
where Imminent Involvement In hostilities is clearly Indicated by the circum- 
stance! " 'i"ii.' report on the Salgou evacuation referred onlj to section I. without Indication 

of BUl 



41 

the reports filed had been "brief to the point of minimal compliance 
with the requirements of the law/' and "did not provide an adequate 
informational basis for informed congressional action/' 7 

The War Powers Resolution was not fully tested in any of the four 
instances in 1975 because U.S. troops were voluntarily withdrawn in 
each case after a brief period of time. However, the executive branch 
has maintained the position put forward in the President's 1973 veto 
message, that the War Powers Resolution unconstitutionally attempts 
to restrict Presidential power as Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces. In the compliance hearings, the State Department legal ad- 
viser maintained that : 

Besides the three situations listed in subsection 2(c) of the War Powers Reso- 
lution, it appears that the President has the constitutional authority to use the 
Armed Forces to rescue American citizens abroad, to rescue foreign nationals 
where such action directly facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens abroad, to pro- 
tect U.S. Embassies and legations abroad, to suppress civil insurrection, to 
implement and administer the terms of an armistice or cease-fire designed to 
terminate hostilities involving the United States, and to carry out the terms of 
security commitments contained in treaties. We do not, however, believe that 
any such list can be a complete one, just as we do not believe that any single 
definitional statement can clearly encompass every conceivable situation in which 
the President's Commander in Chief authority could be exercised. 8 

Mr. Leigh argued further that if the President's use of the Armed 
Forces is pursuant to a constitutional grant of power — as the four 
reports submitted by President Ford claim — then any statutory provi- 
sion to cut short that use, such as the 60-90-day limit set forth in the 
War Powers Eesolution, would be unconstitutional. 9 Thus, Congress 
cannot yet claim to have achieved an effectively proven limitation on 
Presidential warmaking powers in the vehicle of the War Powers 
Resolution. 

More specific problems discussed during the hearings regarded defi- 
nitions of hostilities and consultation. Various Congressmen ques- 
tioned the fact that the President did not choose to define the situation 
surrounding the final Saigon evacuation as a possibly hostile situation, 
in spite of the fact that the airport was under rocket attack, and two 
U.S. Marines had been killed at the airfield the day preceding the final 
evacuation. In an exchange of letters which followed the hearing, the 
State and Defense Department spokesmen argued that "hostilities'' or 
"imminent hostilities" must be defined situationallv. In the case of the 
Saigon evacuation, they pointed out that since the operation had ter- 
minated by the time the President's report was filed, the question of 
possible congressional action under section 5 of the law (which is trig- 
gered by a sec. 4(a) (1) report of involvement in hostilities or immi- 
nent hostilities) was moot. However, the issue still remains, since in 
future instances the Congress and the executive branch may not agree 
on what constitutes a hostile situation, and therefore, on whether or 
not section 5 will become operative. 

Problems concerning the definition of "consultation" arose in the 
context of the Mayaaues incident in which the President claimed that 
he had consulted with congressional leaders, while most Members of 
Congress involved reported that they had been informed of Presi- 
dential opinion after the fact rather than given an opportunity to 
exchange views with the President prior to the decision. Although the 

7 r.S. Conpress. House. War powers hearings, p. <'>'■*. 
s Ihid.. pp. 00-01. 
•Ibid., p. oi. 

74-032— 70 4 



42 

law provided that the President consult with Congress, the require- 
ment is qualified by the phrase "in every possible instance,*- making 
that section, according to Representative Findley, "the least precise 
and therefore the least effective part of the War Powers Resolu- 
tion." 10 The congressional leaders involved objected to the fact that 
they did not have direct contact with the President until after key 
decisions had l>een made, and comments at the hearing expressed skep- 
bicism as to whether the President had in fact been precluded by his 
other responsibilities from more extensive interchange with Members 
of Congress. Administration witnesses argued that the communications 
between the White House and Members of Congress were consistent 
with the consultation requirements of the War Powers Resolution. 

Representative John Seiberling and Senator Thomas Eagleton in- 
troduced similar amendments (II.R. 750 i and S. 1700 respectively) to 
the War Powers Resolution to clarify the consultation provision by 
replacing the phrase "consult with Congress" with "seek the advice 
and counsel of Congress'" and by further defining the meaning of the 
phrase. Senator Javits suggested that the President should have con- 
sulted with the House International Relations Committee and the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but noted that he did not believe 
the situation warranted amending the resolution at that time. Repre- 
sentative Clement Zablocki, chairman of the House International Re- 
lations Subcommittee responsible for the war powers resolution, and 
the principal House sponsor of the measure, concurred with Senator 
Javits: neither body considered the proposed amendments in L975, 
apparently taking the position that the hearings and other publicity 
had provided the White House with a clear indication of congres- 
sional concern with the way in which the matter had been handled. 

An additional issue receiving some attention during the hearings 
concerned Presidential authority to rescue U.S. citizens and foreign 
nationals. Senator Eagleton introduced an amendment to the War 
Powers Resolution (S. 1790) to clarify the authority of the President 
to rescue U.S. citizens from threatening situations abroad. The ques- 
tion of Presidential authority to evacuate foreign nationals, an issue 
raised in the House hearings, does not relate directly to the War 
Powers Resolution, but rather to the need for specific congressional 
approval for such action and the extremely confused status of the 
Vietnam contingency legislation at the time of evacuation. 

During Senate debate on the Sinai resolution (S.J. Res. L39, Public 
Law 01-110, debated on Oct. 1), 107r>), which includes provisions for 
200 U.S. civilian technicians to be stationed in the Sinai, the War 
Powi i I; mI ut ion was debated in relation to the President's authority 
to rescue civilians. Arguing that the War Powers Resolution in effect 
gives the President authority he did not previously have to act out- 
side the United States without a declaration <>f war, Senator dames 
Abourezk proposed an amendment (to the Sinai resolution) to pro- 
hibif t he I 'resident from inl roducing I \S. A rmed Forces in tin 1 Middle 
East. His amendment was noi passed, but the Sinai resolution as ap- 
proved by the House and Senate does contain language to clarity 
that the resolution does not give thfi President any authority to intro- 
duce U.S. I POOps which he did not already DOG 

"Ibid., p. 57. 



Inclusion of U.S. Civilian Combatants Under the War Powers 

Resolution 

Senator Eagleton also reintroduced a proposal to assure that the 
War Powers Resolution covers paramilitary operations. He had orig- 
inally offered a similar proposal as an amendment to the War Powers 
Resolution in 1973, but his amendment was defeated during Senate 
debate on the measure. In 1975, he included the proposal in S. 1790, 
and when the issue reemerged later in the year as the question of 
U.S. civilian and paramilitary involvement in Angola arose, Senator 
Eagleton reintroduced the proposal as an amendment to S. 2662, the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1975. 1X 

In support of his proposed amendment, Senator Eagleton noted 
that the executive branch has claimed that the President possesses 
inherent powers to conduct paramilitary operations. According to 
Mitchell Rogovin, special council to the Director of Central Intelli- 
gence, "Congress has formally acknowledged that the President has 
inherent constitutional authority to use military force short of war. 
and this acknowledgment is implicit in the War Powers Resolu- 
tion * * * " 12 Rogovin's analysis concludes : 

If the President lias the power to dispatch troops to foreign countries and 
to use military force short of war — and the foregoing discussion clearly demon- 
strates that he does — then it would logically follow that he has the power to 
send civilian personnel to foreign countries to engage in covert action * * * 13 

Senator Eagleton pointed out that CIA Director William Colby 
had acknowledged that five U.S. pilots and five ground agents had 
been engaged in paramilitary activities in Angola; had these agents 
been U.S. military rather than CIA civilian personnel, the President 
arguably would have been required to report their activities to the 
Congress, and Congress could have sought to terminate the opera- 
tion. Eagleton argued that failure of Congress to broaden the War 
Powers Resolution might encourage Presidents in the future to resort 
to paramilitary operations to avoid the reporting requirements for 
uniformed forces. 

Language such as that contained in Senator Eagleton's proposed 
amendment presumably would also cover U.S. civilian personnel in- 
volved in the Sinai early warning system; this point, however, was 
not mentioned in remarks on the amendment or in discussion of the 
early warning system. 

Additional References 

1. Emerson, J. Terry, Constitutional authority of the President to use the 

Armed Forces in defense of American lives, liberty, and property. Congres- 
sional Record (daily ed.) v. 121. May 6, 1975, pp. S7526-S7530. 

2. Glennon, Michael J. Strengthening the war powers resolution: The case for 

purse-strings restriction. Minnesota Law Review, v. 60, No. 1, November 
1975. pp. 1-43. 

3. Jenkins, Gerald L. The War Powers Resolution : statutory limitation on the 

Commander in Chief. Harvard Journal of Legislation, v. 11, February 1974, 
pp. 181-204. 



11 See Eagleton, Thomas. Foreign Assistance Act of 1975 — S. 2662, amendment No. 1291. 
Congressional Record (daily ed.). vol. 121. Dec. 16. 1975, p. S22254. 

12 Rogovin, Mitchell. Statement before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Deo. 9. 1975. (Mimeo) p. 7. 

13 Ibid., p. S. 



CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF EXECUTIVE 
AGREEMENTS* 

In recent U.S. history Presidents have concluded executive agree- 
ments with increasing frequency. These international agreements, 
which do not go to the Senate for approval of ratification as do 
treaties, have on numerous occasions served as the basis for extensive 
commitments of U.S. men, materiel, and/or money abroad without 
the prior knowledge or approval of Congress. This unilateral execu- 
tive activity has contributed to the creation of an imbalance in the 
constitutional system of checks and balances between the executive 
and legislative branches. While the executive branch has been able 
to cite various statutory, treaty, or constitutional authorities as the 
bases for conclusion of these agreements, clear criteria acceptable to 
both branches on the differences between treaties and executive agree- 
ments have been lacking. A first step toward resolution of the im- 
balance was the 1972 enactment by the Congress of the Case-Zablocki 
Act (Public Law 92-403) which provides for the transmittal by the 
Secretary of State to the Congress of the text of any international 
agreement other than a treaty no later than 60 days after such agree- 
ment has entered into force. By this act the Congress endeavored to 
acquire access to all such agreements concluded. While Congress might 
not be concerned about every executive agreement, receipt of all of 
them would assure that Congress would make the determination as 
to which agreement might require closer attention. 

During 1975 various Members of the Congress continued their con- 
cern with the problem of executive agreements as they pertain to the 
development of foreign policy and national commitments without the 
active participation of the Congress. At least five different types of 
legislative proposals were submitted during the first session of the 
94th Congress although none was reported to the floor of either House. 
The Separation of Powers Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee held hearings on two of these bills, and at the same time 
reviewed implementation of the Case-Zablocki Act on the transmittal 
to the Congress of international agreements other than treaties. 
Finally, the Congress responded to the series of agreements which 
were associated with the Sinai Middle East accords. 

Legislative Proposals 

Of the bills submitted during 1075 which provided for some sort of 
congressional review of executive agreements, the legislation pend- 
ing before the House Committee on International Relations included 
H.K. 4438, which was submitted by Chairman Morgan of that com- 
mittee and was directed primarily at agreements which constituted 

♦Prepared by Mar.iorie Ann Browne, analyst in international relations and Clyde R. 
Mark, analyst in Middle East and North African affairs. 

(46) 



46 

commitments, and H.R. 5489, which was identical to a Senate bill, 
S. 1251, and provided for review by the Senate alone. In addition, 
H.R. 1273 was almost identical to S. 3830, which had been passed by 
the Senate in 1974, but with the word "specific'' added in the last 
section. H.R. 1268 was the only bill which provided that such agree- 
ments would not enter into force unless a concurrent resolution of 
approval were passed by both houses within 60 days. Most of the 
legislative proposals provided for entry into force after a 60-day pe- 
riod, unless a resolution of disapproval were passed. A chart identify- 
ing the important substantive elements of each bill as well as those 
of S. 3830, 93d Congress, follows : 



47 



u = « 
C/30>- 



T3-0 >» E 
qj — 03 "co o' 



> 

I 



"^ E £ *- wj 



J 


_Ei ro 


c 


<° c ^_ 


o 

E 


11°^ 


CB 
OS 

e- 

m 


the esta 
newal, co 

revision 
commitme 


_> 




3 




U 


= "- o"S*J. • 


o 
B 


ncerni 

ment, 

ance 

nation, 

esiden 

ngress 

s. 


u 




o _. o <u 


UJ 


CJ c_o>- 



c 


O) 


<v 


c 


n 


CO 


<t 


</3 


C/)0>- 


00 


1 


-o 








■— "o 


o 

E 


rsi 

o 








I.I 



"5 £ o 

x ci.ro 



O TO 



_. ~- ° 

--on. 

ro t- 

o> S 



E S. 






- O CTJ • i CO 05 to 

=^-i-> — : ~ > o -- c- 

3 to - ra *- ° <" 

SCO'S 
o *- = =£; ° 
S-^^o — ~ 
mEe <"'~> ■ 



\£ o'o 



"tun); 



™ £5" 
°>E?= ~i 

E.2 3 S.-5'S^'co 



3.2 ojE <b ° 

:°>es- 



-i <- . 
Eg 
°.2 



->-• « o 2 ~- So -- m 



■ c _, c .-. t- E _ 



qj ct c- 



■E-5 S £.2 - 

Lo' 2 m ' 2 | 

.l"g-s2 8 S 

00 "•= £ = ° 

S~c3«> !r.2'~ 

115-!!- . 

» .*. £".§«> = 

a -5= .a cua o -- E 
Q 



a> a>-— .— ' 



o o ; 
,u=" 



° 2 ° 

2 



= r: — o ■-*■ 



si 



E ■ 



!~- I ~ - 3 <n _T_L *5 

2 2 .2 a> <u = > 

, - QJ-" 1 O. X 

'■£ =:£ « •», £ « 
E Sg|£_. 

*- ^ O t O 



= - - E o qj 



.." o 



— a> ra e 
a <" — •- 

olt.1 



"5™ 

..S S~ 

- to 



fj 



»~ -° "So a> c.2 ~ ! 
in ."H a> "to .o 



<o > *? 

i- — o O) 



ssl-sll 



i 



^J 0J 

: c- *- 



lis' 

<- e- a> 



^■5-6 

=1 OT3 

O ^ c 

<c 



48 

The Separation of Powers Subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary held hearings on the two Senate bills: S. 1251 and 
S. 632. These were the only formal public hearings on the broad issue 
of executive agreements during 1975. The 13 witnesses included four 
Senators, representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, 
and Justice, and five lawyers from academia, in addition to Adm. 
Elmo R. Zumwalt, retired Chief of Naval Operations. A short time 
before the hearings started, the Xew York Times had published copies 
of two letters between President Richard Nixon and South Vietnam- 
es President Nguyen Van Thieu in 1972 and 1973 in which Nixon 
promised "swift and severe retaliatory action" by the United States 
if North Vietnam failed to abide by the terms of the 1973 Paris Peace 
Agreement. These "agreements" had never been transmitted under 
Act and in fact Congress had not known of their existence. 
Yet both Subcommittee Chairman James Abourezk and Senator 
Clifford Case took the position that they constituted a clear commit- 
ment for the United States. Senator Case pointed out during the hear- 
ings that Congress, being unaware of these commitments, had passed 
the Case-Church amendments in August, 1973 barring military ac- 
tivity on. over, or off the shores of both Vietnams, Laos, or Cambodia, 
and effectively disabled the United States from performing the Xixon 
commitments. 

The 1972 trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. was also identified by 
Senator Case as creating serious foreign policy difficulties because it 
was not submitted promptly to the Congress under the Oase-Zablocki 
Act; it Mas not officially transmitted for more than a year and then 
only after the Foreign Relations Committee requested it. One part of 
the agreement — an international agreement between the Export-Im- 
port Bank and the Vneshtorgbank of the U.S.S.R. — contemplated the 
extension of substantial credits to the Soviet Union under conditions 
favorable to the I f.S.S.R. When the details were made public, congres- 
sional action on the Export-Import Bank Renewal Act severely lim- 
ited funds that could be lent to the Soviet Union without prior con- 
gressional approval. According to Case, this congressional action waa 
a factor in the Soviet suspension of the entire trade agreement and the 
breakdown of the arrangements that had been reached on Soviet 
emigration. Prior congressional consideration of the trade agreement 
enate consideration of it as a treaty, would have, according to 
* • ' ablished the scope and Limits of the subsidized credit proposal 

prior to its entry into force and would have reduced the possibility of 
severe foreign policy repercussions. In general, executive branch wit- 
g nt these Separation of Powers Subcommittee hearings opposed 
lation which provided for congressional review and possible dis- 
approval of executive agreements, recommending instead that pro- 
cedures be devised for more frequent briefing of Congress by the 
executive branch. Specific objections were raised on constitutional 
nds against the use of a legislative veto procedure. 

[implementation or the Case-Z ablocki A< t 

Under present procedures, the agreements transmitted pursuant to 
the Oase-Zablocki A<1 arc received in the Senate Foreign Relations 
and House International Relations Con unit tees. Not ire of their trans- 



49 

mittal is published in the Congressional Record as an executive com- 
munication. Each committee circulates a list of the agreements re- 
ceived to its members and to its staff, who screen the list for agreements 
which might require further investigation. The House committee 
publishes in its calendar a country and subject index to the agree- 
ments transmitted. 

During 1975, according to tentative figures compiled by the Depart- 
ment of State, the United States concluded 13 treaties and 276 inter- 
national agreements other than treaties (executive agreements). 1 Dur- 
ing the same year, the Secretary of State, in accordance with the Case- 
Zablocki Act, transmitted to the Congress 272 unclassified and 11 
classified agreements. Since August 22, 1972, when the Case-Zablocki 
Act was signed, through the end of 1975, 868 agreements other than 
treaties had been transmitted to the Congress. In spite of these statis- 
tics, however, some Members of the House and Senate indicated that 
not all agreements have been transmitted. For example, Representative 
Les Aspin released a statement on July 21, indicating that between 
400 to 600 agreements had not been transmitted under the Case-Za- 
blocki Act. 

In addition, the Separation of Powers Subcommittee in May 1975 
received testimony with regard to the 1972 Trade Agreement with the 
U.S.S.R. and the Nixon-Thieu letters, and during hearings in July, 
State Department legal adviser Monroe Leigh acknowledged that lie 
was reviewing six agreements between U.S. intelligence agencies and 
their foreign counterparts to determine whether those agreements 
should be transmitted under the Case-Zablocki Act. 

A basic type of agreement which has usually not been considered 
by the executive branch as coming under the Case-Zablocki Act is the 
agency-to-agency arrangement. While the subjects of these agreements 
are generally routine, they are occasionally of consequence in their 
impact and effect on future foreign policy. The intelligence agreements 
referred to by Leigh might also be considered in this category. 

During early 1976, the Comptroller General of the United States 
submitted to Senator Abourezk a study which examined the imple- 
mentation of the Case-Zablocki Act relative to U.S. agreements with 
the Republic of Korea. 2 The GAO also made certain observations about 
implementation of the Case-Zablocki Act in general : 

This report focuses on the need for (1) better control procedures concerning 
the submission of agreements by Government agencies to the State Department 
and (2) clarification and reemphasis of the full extent to which the Congress 
and the State Department desire to be advised of arrangements under the Case 
Act. Particular clarification is needed regarding arrangements that may not be 
legally binding, oral arguments, arrangements with parties other than states, or 
arrangements subordinate to or implementing a broader agreement. 3 

In addition, the GAO had the following recommendations : 

The Senate Foreign Relations and House International Rela- 
tions Committees may want to specify more clearly what they 
consider to be an "international agreement/' 4 



1 During 1975. the Senate received 11 treaties and approved 6 of them in addition to 
9 treaties submitted before 1 ! > 7 T» . A total of 24 treaties were still pending at the end of 
1975 (5 of which were approved by the Senate in January 1976). 

2 U.S. General Accounting Office. U.K. agreements with the Republic of Korea. Report 
of the Comptroller General of the United States. Washington, 1976. 25 pp. ("B-ll 

Feb. 20. 1976). 

3 Ibid., p. 2. 

* Ibid., p. 18. 



50 

The committees may want to request the State Department to 
reemphasize to other agencies the need to report all agreements. 4 

* * * * * # * 

Xo comprehensive list of international arrangements being con- 
cluded with foreign countries by U.S. agencies is currently avail- 
able. A more comprehensive listing of such arrangements is 
needed. * * * The committee may * * * wish to have established 
a more inclusive agreement reporting system, which would pro- 
vide for a cumulative listing of all arrangements reached or 
negotiated by a Government agency. 5 
The Department of State, in response to the GAO report, on March 9, 
1976. circulated an airgram to all diplomatic posts outlining "Case 
Act Procedures and Department of State Criteria for Deciding What 
Constitutes an International Agreement" and directing that "all in- 
ternational agreements concluded by any officer or representative of 
the U.S. Government be transmitted to the Department of State, Office 
of Treaty Affairs, no later than 20 days after entry into force." The 
airgram indicated that agency level agreements would be transmitted 
under the Case-Zablocki Act when they met certain criteria as deter- 
mined by the executive branch. 

Review of Specific Agreements 

The Sinai accords 

The Sinai accords of September 1, 1975, produced several conflicts 
between Congress and the executive branch. 6 The most immediate issue 
was congressional approval for placing 200 U.S. civilian technicians 
along the new Sinai cease-fire lines to observe possible violations of the 
accords. Congress debated the cost, danger, need, duties, protection, 
removal, supervision, selection, and other factors relating to the tech- 
nicians before granting approval on October 9, 1975. But during the 
course of the technicians debate, several other issues emerged. The 
executive branch provided the Congress copies of several secret -igree- 
ments signed by the United States and Israel and Egypt. 7 The Presi- 
dent held that the secret agreements were executive agreements and 
beyond the purview of the Congress, while several Members of Con- 
maintained that the agreements were treaties subject to the advice 
and consent of Ww Senate. This debate was not resolved by Congn SS. 

Another area of contention between the Congress and the executive 
branch revolved around the question of whether the United States 



I., pp. 17 18. 
■ These four Items were (1) the Egyptian-Israeli accord <>n Sinai, which outlined the 
basic aereement; (2) tin- Egyptian-Israeli annex to the Sinnl accord, which established 
the lmflVr zone; (8) protocol to the Egyptian-Israeli accord (actually Blgned on Octo- 
ber 10). which provided for the mechanics <>r the movement to the new cease-Are linos: 
and (41 I U.S. proposal for nn early warning system in Sinai, which provided for U.S. 
-lit of an electronic warning system. 
7 These four items w ■ re ii) memorandum of atrreemenl between the Governments of 
and the United states, which provided for (a) U.S. consideration <>f Israeli 
economic, military, and <>i! needs, and (b) systematic consultations in the event of a 
violation of the Egyptian-Israeli accords: (2) memorandum of agreement between the 
nmenti of Israel and the United states (the general peace conference), which 
provided for a coordinated policy between the United states and Israel regarding a 
forthcoming pence conference at Geneva; (3) assurances from the U.S. Government to 
Israel, which clarified American consideration of Israel's sophisticated weapons needs; 
ami i I from the T'.s Governmenl to Egypt, which provided for 'at U.S. 

consideration of future negotiations with Syria, (h) possible U.S. reaction t«> violations 
Of the Sinai accords, and lei U.S. technical and economic assistance. 



51 

made commitments in the secret agreements. In most cases, the so-called 
commitments were so ambiguously worded that it was difficult to de- 
cide if the United States was or was not committed to take specific 
actions, but it was possible to distinguish intentions which could be in- 
terpreted later as forming the basis of commitments. The Congress 
challenged the legality of the so-called commitments or intentions on 
two grounds : First, that the agreements were not treaties and therefore 
not binding on the United States ; and second, that the wording left so 
much room for interpretation that the so-called commitments could not 
withstand simple legal tests for clarity and intent. The Congress was 
challenging the right of the executive branch to enter into commit- 
ments and to hide those commitments within nonpublic executive 
agreements. At year's end, the issue remained unresolved. 

The existence of the secret agreements also raised the issue of security 
classification and public access to executive branch documents. While 
the Congress and executive branch were arguing about release of the 
full texts of the agreements, the Washington Post and the New York 
Times on September 18 published the previously secret agreements. 
The Senate Foreign Eelations Committee on October 3, voted 12 to 2 
to release the agreements, 8 while the executive branch accused Congress 
of leaking the documents to the newspapers, and endangering national 
security. This conflict failed to produce any resolution to the issues of 
access and classification. 

Committee review of the associated agreements 

The House International Eelations Committee held 6 days of hear- 
ings on the proposal for an early warning system in September and on 
October 3 voted, 31 to 0, to approve the sending of the technicians, 
House Joint Resolution 683. 9 According to the committee report : 

The time [almost 1 month] was well spent. A variety of complex issues were 
involved in the approval which required thorough attention and discussion in the 
Congress. Further, there was a need to avoid the kind of haste which in times 
past sometimes accompanied congressional action involving national commit- 
ments : for example, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 10 

The Senate Foreign Eelations Committee held 6 days of hearings in 
executive (closed) session before holding public hearings on October 6 
and 7. Some of the comments of the committee in reporting on the 
legislation were significant : 

Most of the Committee's consideration of this matter has been centered on two 
questions : (1) the extent to which approval of the 200 technicians might commit 
the United States to a broader network of assurances, undertakings, or agree- 
ments, and (2) the extent to which the elements of this broader network were 
divulged to the Committee, the Congress, and the country. 

As indicated above, the Committee is satisfied that it has been informed of all 
the relevant assurances and undertakings which are a part of the overall Sinai 
agreements. 

Further, the Committee has taken pains, both in the language of the resolution 
before the Senate and in its legislative history, to nail down the point that Con- 
gressional approval of the proposal to send 200 technicians to the Sinai Peninsula 



8 The committee published the agreements in U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on 
Foreign Relntions. Early Warning system in Sinai. Hearings. 94th Conjr.. 1st aeBS. Oct. 6 
and 7. 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Offlee, 1975. pp. 240-253. 

9 Three of the committee's meetings -were in executive (closed) session, and two were 
open to the public. On the first day. the committee heard testimony in both open and in 

Oive sessions. 
l0 U.S. Congress. House : Committee on International Relations. To Implement the United 
States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Siani : Report together with supple- 
mental and additional views on House Joint Resolution 083. 94th Cong., LbI BOSS. House. 
Rept. 94-. r ).°,2. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. p. 2. 



52 

is precisely that — no more, no less — and that it does not imply approval or dis- 
approval of anything else. 

At the same time, the Committee recognizes that some of the ancillary agree- 
ments will result in requests to Congress for authorizations and appropriations. 
The point the Committee wishes to emphasize is that by approving the limited 
proposal for technicians in the Sinai the Congress does not in any way hind itself 
to any particular course of action with respect to future proposals. 11 

While members favored the insertion in the legislation of a statement 
disavowing congressional support for any other agreements, of what- 
ever form made during the negotiations, others considered that so 
specific an amendment would give such agreements a formality which 
they did not intend them to have. In its final form the Congress adopted 
a statement as proposed by the International Relations Committee : 

Sr.c. 5. The authority contained in this joint resolution to implement the 
''United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" does not signify 
approval of the Congress of any other agreement, understanding, or commitment 
made by the executive hranch. (Public Law 9-1-110.) 

Legal memoranda 

The issues of whether the four associated agreements should be con- 
sidered as treaties or as executive agreements and of whether their 
status as executive agreements in international and domes! ic law would 
be maintained without congressional action were the subjects of a 
memorandum of law prepared by the Senate Office of Legislative 
Counsel (OLC) at the request of Senator Dick Clark. In summary 
the September 24, 1975, memorandum by the Senate OLC concluded 
that constitutionally one of the agreements, and possibly two others, 
were beyond the power of the President to make without the advice 
and consent of the Senate. The Senate OLC further concluded that 
without the advice and consent of the Senate, one agreement and pos- 
sibly the other two, were without force and effect under domestic and 
international law. In determining the distinctions between treaties 
and executive agreements and evaluating the four associated agree- 
ments, the Senate OLC u^vd the following criteria: (1) text of the 
Constitution, (2) intent of the Framers, (3) actual practice, (1) Su- 
preme Court cases, (5) comments of authorities and views of the Sen- 
ate Foreign Relations Committee, and ((>) criteria employed by the 
Department of State in Circular 175. 

The legal adviser at the Department of State. Monroe Leigh, on 

October <">. L975, replied in writing to the memorandum of law of the 
Senate OLC '. Leigh concluded that the Senate OLC ! memo's basic pre- 
mise that all important international agreements must as a matter of 
law he submitted to the Senate as treaties and nin-t receive the advice 
ami consent of the Senate before entering into force was totally false 
and rendered invalid most of the analysis thai followed from it as well 
as the final conclusions reached. During his analysis Leigh dismissed 
several of the statements made in the Senate OLC analysis without 
discussion or justification and stressed the role of practice, custom, 
and u a basis for the use of executive agreements. Leigh stated: 

Whether an agreement la authorised by Constitution, treaty, or statute, it <-tu- 
not he refused full force and effect in either municipal or International law sim- 
ply because it was not submitted t<> the Senate as a treaty. 11 



ii T'.s Congn Senate: Committee mi Foreign Relatione. Early warning system in 
sin:ii ; Report together with individual views t<> accompany B.J. Rei IA8, 94 th Cong., 
- Renatt Rent IM lift" Washington, [J.8. Governmeni Printing Office, 1975. p 9. 
"Congressional Record [dallj ed.], i 121, Nov. 14, 1078 : S20105. 



53 

This initial exchange of legal memorandums was followed by an 
October 22, 1975, Senate OLC response to the Leigh reply of Octo- 
ber 6. 13 On February 5, 1976, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Af- 
fairs Arthur W. Rovine submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee a reply to the second memorandum by the Senate Office of 
Legislative Counsel. 14 

This exchange of legal memorandums did not resolve the issues they 
addressed, but they did identify the positions of the Senate and of the 
Department of State on the nature, origins, and use of the executive 
agreement. 

Congress and the Spanish oases agreement 

During an October 1975 briefing before the Subcommittee on Europe 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the progress of the ne- 
gotiations on the Spanish bases agreement. Assistant Secretary of State 
for Congressional Relations Robert McCloskey indicated that the 
agreement would be submitted to the Congress for approval, although 
he was not certain it would be submitted as a treaty to the Senate or as 
an executive agreement to the Congress. However, that statement repre- 
sented a positive step, as there had been requests since 1969 that it be 
submitted to the Congress in one form or the other before entering into 
force. On February 18, 1976, the President transmitted to the Senate 
for its advice and consent the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
between the United States and Spain, signed at Madrid on January 24, 
1976, together with its seven supplementary agreements and its eight 
related exchanges of notes. 



13 The first three memorandums were inserted in the Congressional Record by Senator 
John Sparkman : Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 121, Nov. 14. 1975: S20102-S20115. 

14 Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 122, Feb. 17, 1976 : S1687-S1692. 



THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN THE DETERMINATION 
OF SPECIFIC POLICIES 

The Turkish Aid Controversy* 

The July 1074 coup d'etat in Cyprus, engineered by the ruling mili- 
tary junta in Greece, and the subsequent Turkish military intervention 
on the island, generated considerable activity in the 93d and 94th Con- 
gresses in the form of resolutions and amendments affecting U.S. 
commitments abroad. These developments culminated in a challenge 
by the Congress to the administration over its conduct of foreign policy 
on the Cyprus issue, and the continuation of economic and military aid 
to Turkey in light of Turkish use of American-supplied arms and 
materiel during its invasion of the island. 

Backgrovmd 

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1975 (Public Law 93-559) , approved 
on December 30, 1974, contained a provision requiring the President 
to suspend all military assistance, sales of defense articles, and the 
issuance of licenses for the transportation of arms, ammunition, and 
implements of war to the Government of Turkey. The Turkish inter- 
vention on Cyprus and extension of military control in the northern 
part of the island were held by Congress as a violation by Turkey 
of the conditions under which American aid was provided. 1 The 
President was authorized to delay the effective date of the suspension 
until February 5, 1975, if he determined that this would further 
negotiations toward a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus situation. 
President Ford made such a determination on December 31, H>74. 
Turkey could, therefore, receive aid until February 5, 1975, providing 
that it adhered to the Cyprus cease-fire and refrained from transport- 
ing additional troops or armaments to the island. Another provision of 
Public Law 93-559 included an allocation of $25 million for (he relief 
of the 200,000 Cypriot refugees displaced by the conflict. After Febru- 
ary 5. under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act, military aid to 
Turkey could not be resumed until the President certified that: (1) 
Turkey was in compliance with all agreements entered into concerning 
the requirements of American military aid Legislation, ami (21 sub- 
stantial progress had been made toward agreement regarding military 
forces in Cyprus. 

At the heart of the embargo on military assistance and sales to Tur- 
;vas the assertion that Turkey, during its intervention on Cyprus 

in duly L974, and especially during its Subsequent extension of mili- 
tary control over the northern 38 percent of the island, had violated 

- Prepared by Richard m. Preece, specialist In Middle Eastern affaire. 

on* of [7.8. i;iu (d) of the Foreign Assistance Art of 1961 and 

s<-<-. 3(c) of t!i«' Foreign Military snics .\<-t prescribe the permissible uses of American 
mllltai oce to foreign countries, if these <-<>n<iiii<>ns or purposes are violated, an 

immedial e cutoff of aid i 1 - required. 

( 54 ) 



55 

agreements required by U.S. law by using American-supplied ma- 
teriel for purposes not envisaged in the Foreign Assistance Act and 
the Foreign Military Sales Act. Turkey had agreed in 1947 not to use 
American-supplied defense articles except for authorized purposes, 
including self-defense, internal security, and participation in collec- 
tive arrangements or measures consistent with the United Nations 
Charter. As expressed by a series of votes in the latter part of 1974, 
therefore, Congress went on record against Turkey's violation of that 
agreement and in affirming the principle that U.S. -supplied military 
equipment may not be used for purposes other than those for which 
it is furnished. 

A General Accounting Office legal opinion strongly admonished the 
Department of State for its failure to make the required determina- 
tion on Turkey's eligibility for military assistance following the vio- 
lation of U.S. iaw. It stated that : 

* * * section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act and section 3(c) of the For- 
eign Military Sales Act — in view of their express terms (particularly the refer- 
ences to "immediate" ineligibility) * * * place a specific duty upon cognizant 
officials to expeditiously consider, and make appropriate determinations con- 
cerning the applicability of such provisions in circumstances which clearly sug- 
gest potential substantial violations. 2 

In response to a request by Senator Eagleton for a legal opinion 
relating to Turkey's ineligibility for further military assistance, the 
Department of State, in a letter of November 22, 1974, stated : 

The administration decided that it was impossible publicly to express a legal 
conclusion on the issue of Turkey's eligibility for further assistance and sales 
without undermining our foreign policy objective of persuading Turkey and 
Greece to enter into direct negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem. 3 

The 1975 developments 

During January 1975, the administration endeavored to assure the 
Congress that progress was being made toward negotiations on Cyprus 
and, while an early overall resolution of the problem was not antici- 
pated, meaningful steps would likely commence in early February. 
At the same time, warnings were voiced by the Turkish Government 
that if the suspension of military aid and sales took effect on Febru- 
ary 5, Turkey would have no alternative but to review United States- 
Turkish bilateral agreements and impose restrictions on U.S. military 
installations in that country. On January 24, Secretary of State Kis- 
singer invited the Congress to join in "a new national partnership" 
in the conduct of foreign policy, and called for nonpartisan coopera- 
tion as "a national necessity." He stated that the "growing tendency 
of the Congress to legislate in detail day-to-day and week-to-wcek 
conduct of our foreign affairs raises grave issues," and pointed to the 
restrictions on aid to Turkey as one example where "tactics have de- 
feated the very purpose that both branches meant to serve, because 
the legislative sanctions were too public or too drastic or too dis- 
criminating." 4 

State Department spokesman "Robert Anderson declared in a state- 
ment on January 31 that the February 5 (leadline was "not helpful 



2 Congressional Record [daily ed.], vol. 120, Dec. 24, 1074 : S20531. 

3 Ibid. 

* "A New National Partnership." Address bv Secretary Kissinger before the Los Anjroles 
World Affairs Council on Jan. 24, 1075. Department of State Bulletin, v. 72, Feb. 17, 1075, 
pp. 202-204. 



56 

in any way in trying to induce a settlement because it puts pressure on 
one of the parties." and that the administration believed it would be 
a disaster to drive Turkey from its Western alinement and weaken 
American security interests in the eastern Mediterranean. In a meet- 
ing on February 1 between congressional sponsors of the arms cutoff 
and Secretary Kissinger, the Secretary of State disclosed that no "sub- 
stantial*' progress had been made toward a Cyprus settlement. His 
appeal for further delay of the suspension was rejected. 

With the embargo in effect, the Turkish Government announced 
the drafting of retaliatory contingency plans which included the 
closure of some U.S. military and other installations. At the same time, 
a Leading proponent of the embargo, Senator Eagleton, declared on 
February 14 that the Ford administration "may be playing a danger- 
ously irresponsible o-anie" with its statements deploring congressional 
action against Turkey. 

During a closed session of the Senate Foreign delations Committee 
on February 27. Secretary Kissinger reportedly repeated administra- 
tion concern over the Turkish arms embargo, warning that the issue 
transcended the Cyprus dispute and jeopardized United States and 
allied security interests hi the entire eastern Mediterranean region. 
In an attempt to alleviate some of the strains in the relationship 
between the United States and its two XATO allies, Secretary Kis- 
singer subsequently met with Greek Foreiirn Minister Dimitrios 
Biteios, in Brussels on March 7, and with Turkish leaders in Ankara 
on March 11 for talks on negotiations. Thereafter. Kissinger proposed 
that further negotiations looking toward a settlement be resumed 
under the auspices of United Nations Secretary General Kurt 
Waldheim. 

On March 26, the Foreign Relations Committee, by a 9 to 7 vote, 
approved a bill (S. 846) which would permit the President to lift the 
■nsion of military aid to Turkey and would require him to report 
to Congress every 30 days on progress toward a Cy nrus peace settle- 
ment. Sponsors of the bill included Majority Leader Mansfield, Minor- 
ity Leader Scott. Committee Chairman Sparkman, ranking minority 
committee member Case, and the chairman and sensor minority mem- 
ber of the Armed Services Committee, Stennis and Tower. Chairman 
Sparkman informed newsmen that the vote reflected congressional 
concern over the potential loss of Turkey as a member of XATO. and 
indicated that passage of the bill would be helpful in bringing about 
negotial ions on a Cyprus settlement. S. 846 was reported to the Senate 
from the committee on April in (S. Rept. '.'I 71). Four days later, 
on the Rouse Bide, Representatives Hamilton and Buchanan intro- 
duced a bill (U.K. .V>ls) to authorize further suspension of the 
Turkish armsembarp 

In April, the Greek Governmeni withdrew permission for the [LS. 

ftth Fleet to use the harbor of Rlefsis, 17 miles west of Athens. Various 

other American military facilities also were closed. The Government 

Icted privileges, immunities, and exemptions formerly granted 

to American personnel, and declared that the remaining fix*- U.S. 

illations in Greece were to he placed under Greek commanders, 

The Senate, on May L9,bya 11 to M) vote, passed S. 8416, which sras 

referred to t he I louse ('on unit tee on 1 nternat iona 1 KYI at ions on May 90. 

Majority Leader Mansfield had given warning thai by prolonging the 
Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, NATO would suffer severe dam- 



0< 

age. He said that the vote had been expressly scheduled to allay 
Turkish resentment of the United States and thus strengthen the hand 
of the administration in influencing progress during forthcoming talks 
on a settlement. 

During June and July, the problems of achieving a consensus on 
the issue of Turkish aid became apparent. Indeed, differences between 
the executive and legislative branches, and sharp divisions within 
the Congress itself, became manifest on July 24 when S. 8-16 failed 
passage in the House by a vote of 206 to 223. 

U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, William Macomber, stated before the 
National Press Club on June 12 that continuation of the embargo 
could produce "a disaster," with Turkish retaliation in closing U.S. 
defense and intelligence-gathering facilities in Turkey. On June 15, 
Turkish Prime Minister Demirel declared that his government ''can- 
not consider the attitude of the United States, which refuses to sell 
arms to her faithful ally of 30 years, as friendly. Turkey should not 
be expected to carry out bilateral agreements unilaterally." Two days 
later, following a meeting of the Turkish Security Council, Foreign 
Minister Ilisan Caglayangil announced in Ankara that American in- 
stallations in Turkey would be placed on ''provisional status*' on 
July 17, and that his government would notify the United States 
which of the bases would continue or cease operations. At the same 
time, a formal note was delivered to the United States which stated 
that the Turkish Government had "decided to negotiate the new rules 
and conditions governing the maintenance of joint defense facilities 
and activities with the United States.'' 

On June 19, and again on June 23 and 26. President Ford met 
with Members of Congress to appeal for resumption of military aid 
to Turkey. 

Secretary Kissinger, in a speech in Atlanta on June 2P>. reiterated 
the administration's opposition to the congressional suspension of 
aid to Turkey, and declared that alliances remained "a first interna- 
tional priority" of the United States. But Kissinger also stated in an 
apparent reference to Greece and Turkey, that "no country should 
imagine that it is doing us a favor by remaining in an alliance with 
us. * * * No ally can pressure us by a threat of termination: we will 
not accept that its security is more important to us than it is to itself.*' 

On July 8, Secretary Kissinger met with groups of House Mem- 
bers, including a brienno- to freshmen. White House legislative 
liaison staff and State and Defense Department and XATO officials 
also provided information on the potentially damaging effects of the 
ban for United States and North Atlantic Alliance interests. At the 
same time, Greek- American interest groups actively campaigned to en- 
courage citizens to communicate to their representatives their op- 
position toward lifting the embargo. 

On July 9, Representatives Morgan. Broomfield, Zablocki, Hamil- 
ton, Findley, Buchanan, and Whalen introduced TT.ii. 8464, which 
would (1) permit deliveries of military aid already contracted for 
by Turkey before the February 5 cutoff: (2) allow Turkey to purchase 
for cash any further arms it required to fulfill its XATO respon- 
sibilities; and (. >) required the President to report to Congress every 
GO days on arms sales to Turkey and progress toward a CA r orus settle- 
ment. The bill was described as being "neither pro-Turkish nor pro- 

7 1-032—70 5 



58 

Greek." but "an even-handed attempt to settle the Cyprus question 
and to preserve the XATO alliance.'* President Ford, on July 10, 
following a White House breakfast meeting with 140 House Mem- 
bers, called H.R. 8454 ; 'a good compromise." which, if passed by Con- 
gress, would lead to "the settlement of the Cyprus situation and to 
the continuation of Turkey as a strong and effective partner in 
XATO." 

Responding to an urgent request from President Ford, the House 
Committee on International Relations on July 10 met for 10 hours to 
consider the Turkish arms issue. 5 Witnesses included Under Secre- 
tary of State Joseph Sisco, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Macomber, 
Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Ilartmann. CTA Director Wil- 
liam Colby, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth. 
Testifying in opposition to the bill were former Under Secretary of 
State George Ball, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance : 
Representatives Brademas. Sarbanes. Rangel. and Beard; and rep- 
resentatives of Greek- American groups. On July 11. by a 16 to 11 
vote, the committee approved IT.R. S4.~>4. as amended. Subsequent- 
ly, by a 19 to 4 vote, the committee agreed to take up S. 846, in lieu 
of ll.R. 84T)4. and reported that bill, with amendments, to the House 
on July 16 (II. Rept. 94-365). The committee noted in its report the 
Turkish perception of the legal issues relating to its intervention on 
Cyprus. On the one hand, the 1947 United States-Turkish agreement 
limited the use of American-supplied equipment to the authorized 
purposes established in U.S. legislation. On the other hand. Turkey 
had responsibilities under articles 2 and 3 of the I960 Treaty of Guar- 
antee to maintain the independence, territorial integritv. and secu- 
rity of Cyprus, and. under article 4. the right to take action to main- 
tain arrangements that had been established for an independent Cy- 
prus; and under article 2 of the Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, 
Greece, and Turkey, each party undertook to resist •"any attack or 
aggression, direct or indirect." against the independence or territorial 
integritv of Cyprus. Whatever its position with respect to American 
law. Turkey felt it was acting according to international law and the 
1900 accords to which it was a party. Moreover, the embargo against 
Turkey indicated a selective enforcement of U.S. law in that several 
similar military agreements which bad been and were being violated 
by other friendly states had not led to denials of aid. and the United 
States had furnished arms to countries that were in possession of 
territory of other states. 

President Ford, on July 17, urged a larire deleo-ation of Hous* 1 
Members to lift, at least partially, the ban on arms shipments to 
Turkey in order to maintain operation of U.S. military installations 
in that country. On Julv 20, several thousand Greek-Americans rallied 
in front of the Capitol arainsl i resumption of aid to Turkey. On 
July 24, S. 84-fl was considered by the House and defeated by a nar- 
row margin of 17 votes. Supporters of the measure pointed out that 
the arms embargo had achieved iust the reverse of what had been 
Intended in helping to bring aboui a Cyprus settlement and claimed 
that it also had jeopardized the security of the United St. -it.'- and the 



ts Consreni Hon**; Committee on Interne tlonal Relation*. Suspension of Pro- 
hibitions tsalnsl Milltar* tsslstanee t" Tnrkev. Hearing, 04th Cong., i<t sees jnly i<>. 
1078 Washington, r 8, Gove mm en I Printing Office, 1075. 



59 

future of NATO. Opponents of S. 84G countered that Turkey had 
violated U.S. law in using equipment provided by U.S. foreign as- 
sistance in its invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 and that to lift even 
partially the embargo would sanction that violation and encourage 
similar abuses by other recipients of U.S. arms sales. Turkey's threat 
to close U.S. bases amounted to blackmail and extortion, they claimed, 
and there was no guarantee that suspension of the embargo would 
result in negotiations toward a Cyprus settlement. 

The failure of Congress to lift the arms ban, despite appeals by the 
Ford administration, brought about the threatened Turkish retalia- 
tion. The Turkish Government assumed control over all U.S. bases and 
installations, and suspended all American military operations in that 
country. Prime Minister Demirel rejected the oiler by President Ford 
of S50 million in weapons grants in return for reopening the bases 
which had been made in Helsinki at the end of July. (The President 
had offered the arms grant under legislation permitting him to provide 
arms to friendly countries when the executive branch considered such 
aid vital to the national security.) Turkey refused the grant on the 
basis that it was unwilling in principle to accept as a gift what it was 
quite willing and able to pay for. The Turkish Government claimed 
that the congressional arms embargo, which not only halted military 
aid to Turkey, but also banned the sale of military hardware on a 
commercial basis, violated common defense agreements with the United 
States that committed the United States to supply military equipment 
to NATO allies. 

Even if the arms embargo should be removed, the relationship 
between Ankara and Washington would probably not be the same 
because Turkish domestic politics Would proscribe the reopening of 
all the bases. Such bases as Turkey would consider essential to the 
NATO alliance might be reopened, but under NATO, rather than 
American control. Appearing before the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services on July 30, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger said that 
several of the U.S. installations taken over by Turkey "cannot be 
duplicated," and that "others can be duplicated at considerable 
expense." 

In response to the suspension of operations at U.S. installations in 
Turkey and to deteriorating United States-Turkish relations, the 
chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations introduced S. 2930 on July 30. The bill contained 
the same language as S. 846 which had been rejected by the House on 
July 24. The Turkish aid provisions were attached to an authorization 
for the Board of International Broadcasting for fiscal year 1076. On 
July 31, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 47-4G. The bill failed to 
come to a vote in the House before the August recess, which began 
on August 1, because of parliamentary maneuvers by its opponents. 
House Rules Committee Chairman Madden refused to convene the 
committee to consider granting the rule necessary for floor action. 

The Committee on International Relations met on September 17 
to consider S. 2230 following an urgent request from President Ford 
that the Turkish arms embargo be at least partially lifted lest U.S. 
security interests in the eastern Mediterranean be jeopardized beyond 
repair. The committee reported the bill on September 22 (IT. Rept. 
500). As reported, the measure permitted (1) delivery of approxi- 



CO 

match* $184.9 million of military equipment conn-acred for by the 
Turkish Government prior to the February 5 cutoff; (2) commercial 
sales; and (3) U.S. Government sales, credits, and guarantees 
for equipment considered necessary for Turkey's defense responsi- 
bilities to XATO. The latter, however, would be permitted only after 
enactment of the fiscal year 1976 Foreign Military Sales Act author- 
ization bill. 

Debate on S. 2230 followed much the same argument as had occurred 
for S. 840, but it included announcements by various House Members 
that they were switching their positions and supporting a suspension 
of the embargo. Their principal reason was the deterioration of U.S. 
security interests in the eastern Mediterranean region. On October 2, 
the House approved S. 2230. as amended, by a vote of 237-176. The 
Senate concurred with the House amendment on October 3, and the 
measure was approved on October 6 (Public Law 91-104). 

Turkey, in response to the passage of the bill, announced thai nego 
tiations on the status of U.S. military installations in Turkey would 
resume after Turkey's midterm elections of October 12. Turkish For- 
eign Minister Caglayangil termed the vote "a positive step toward 
lifting the shadow that has fallen on Turkish-American relations." 
Greek Government officials were reported as having acknowledged 
that the arms embargo had not accomplished the purpose of forcing 
Turkey to make concessions over the Cyprus issue, and that they 
appeared willing to try a new approach. 

On October 30, President Ford transmitted to the Congress proposed 
•ions to draft legislation, originally forwarded on May 15, to 
authorize foreign assistance programs for fiscal year 1976 and 1977 
and for the transition period July 1, 1976, through September 30, 107C'. 
These revisions contained specific amounts, including $75 million in 
military assistance and $130 million in foreign military sales credits 
for Turkey. (Greece would receive $50 million in MAP and $110 
million in FMS credits.) The President stated that these amounts 
"take into consideration urgent needs for defense articles and services 
on the part of these two important XATO allies." The President's 
proposals were introduced as H.R. 10594 and S. 2662. On December s . 
complying with provisions of Public Law 0-1—104, President Ford 
submitted his first report on administration efforts to help resolve the 
Cyprus dispute. In the report, the President said that he had initiated 
talks with both sides and with concerned European allies. lie stated 
thai there bad been "a narrowing of differences on most of the key 
necessary to negotiate a Cyprus solution." 

The Jackson- Vanik Amendment* 

The Jackson- Vanik amendment passed by Congress in L974 
prompted by specific concern about the Soviet Union's treatment of 
its Jewish minority and i me Members of Congress that the 

meaningful conces ions on human rights in ex- 
e for benefits re from the United States. The amendment 

(title [V of the Trade A<i of 1974 Public Law 93 618) prohibits 
extension of U.S. Goi ernment credits i nd most- IV. \ ored nation (MFN) 
trade Communist countries thai rostric! free emigra- 

* Prepa re i by Carlo LaPorta, analyst In European nff.iirs. 



tion of their citizens, unless the President makes a favorable deter- 
mination on conditions for a specific country and asks Congress to 
waive the Trade Act restrictions. 

Despite what appeared in October 197-i to be Soviet acceptance of 
the link between emigration of Jews and reception of U.S. trade con- 
cessions, the Soviet Government informed the United States on Janu- 
ary 10. 1975, that it could not accept the conditions Congress had 
attached to the Trade Act. as it considered the congressional action to 
be interference in Soviet internal affairs. Consequently, through 1975 
an impasse blocked the administration's plans to normalize commercial 
relations with the Soviet Union. 

This apparent stalemate raised three essential questions about con- 
gressional intervention in the conduct of foreign policy: Did the 
amendment hinder or hurt the detente process; did it cause the Soviet 
Union to purposefully cut the number of Jews allowed to leave, and so 
act to the detriment of Soviet Jews; and did its restrictions cause 
U.S. enterprise to lose trade opportunities to other industrialized 
nations which offer the Soviet Union normal trade relations and 
official credits? 

Because it may come to be regarded as one of the first successful 
congressional attempts to alter the administration's detente objectives, 
the Jackson-Vanik amendment may eventually be credited with more 
influence in redefining U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations than it deserves, for 
subsequent developments in 1975 (Portugal, Southeast Asia, Africa, 
comparative defense postures) are perhaps more important as sources 
of increasing criticism of detente in the United States. 

The Soviet Government obviously regarded Congress insistence on 
the amendment as a setback; but evidence also suggested the Soviet 
Union was willing to regard these developments as a temporary slow- 
down in only one area of improving U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. It is con- 
ceivable that the Soviet Government has been expecting that its Octo- 
ber 1972 lend-lease agreement with the United States will provide 
additional incentive to Congress to change the stand on trade with the 
Soviet Union. Under the agreement, the Soviet Union is not required 
to make any additional payments on the agreed debt other than the $48 
million alreadv paid unless the United States grants the U.S.S.R. 
MFN status by the end of 1976. 

The Soviet refusal to implement the 1972 trade agreement with the 
United States did spark some controversy between the administration 
and Congress about the role of Congress in foreign policymaking. 
Proponents of the Jackson-Vanik provisions rebutted administration 
criticism with an announcement of their firm support for the legisla- 
tion as passed. They maintained the Soviet Union had breached a com- 
mitment made in good faith and criticized the administration for 
attempting to blame Congress for the Soviet Union's bad behavior. 
After this shdrt exchange, congressional attention to this issue 
c?eased markedly after February 1975. 

President Ford did try to raise the issue again in April when he 
called for remedial legislation to correct the impasse on trade and 
emigration and repair damage done to U.S. foreign policy interests. 
Xone was forthcoming. Bills (H.R. 3307, H.R 531.°,) submitted to the 
Subcommittee on International Trade. Investment, and Monetary Pol- 
icv of the House Banking, Currency, and Housing Committee to ease a 



62 

S300 million Export-Import Bank credit ceiling on commercial agree- 
ments with the Soviet Union received minimal attention. In any case, 
these bills skirted the essential issue that the Soviet Union remains 
ineligible for U.S. Government credits, regardless of any ceiling, until 
it satisfies the Jackson- Vanik conditions or those conditions are 
changed. 

It is probably accurate to say the Jackson- Vanik amendment's ef- 
fect on Jewish emigration was probably greater while it was being 
debated than after it became law. In 1973, when the House first con- 
sidered the trade legislation, emigration reached a peak of near 35,000 
for the year. After the House approved the Jackson- Vanik amend- 
ment in December 1973, the rate of Jewish emigration declined each 
year. The decline in 1974 may have been a signal to the Senate of the 
consequences if Congress were to approve the legislation or it may have 
been the natural result of the Yom Kippur war and other factors which 
caused fewer Soviet Jewish citizens to want to leave. Once the legis- 
lation passed the Senate, emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union 
further declined to a 5-year low, of only approximately 14,000 leaving 
the U.S.S.R. in 1975. Soviet authorities argue the decline is natural. 
Critics feel it has been expressly controlled by the Soviet Government. 

Two essential considerations remain. First, although harassment 
and other measures to discourage a desire to emigrate persist, the 
Soviet Government has continued to let a certain number of Jews leave. 
Second, Congress has the power to repeal or alter its legislation, so 
that some leverage may still exist that could perhaps produce a com- 
promise understanding. 

Continued congressional interest in the emigration question and 
human rights (also stimulated by the conclusion in Helsinki of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) was expressed 
when two delegations visited the Soviet Union; one from the Senate 
in late June 1975, and the other from the House in August. During 
these visits members of the delegations also met with Soviet Jews 
wanting to emigrate in order to discuss their problems first hand. 
Some members of the delegations reportedly conceded that the Jack- 
son- Vanik provisions were not helping the situation for Soviet Jews, 
and raised the possibility of some future action to bypass the current 
trade bars, if the Soviet Union could give evidence of progress on 
human rights issues. Other members doubted the utility of any link 
between trade and emigration. 6 

Congress did. however, agree to grant MFN" and credit eligibility to 
Romania. Romania and the United States signed a trade agreement 
OH April 2, 1 1)75, but Congress waited until Julv before approving it 
in order to have an observable improvement in Romania's emigration 
rate as evidence of progress. Senator Jack-son and others supported 
this step, claiming thai .-in understanding with Romania indicated the 
trade legislation provisions on emigration were workable. 

Because many complex far-tors Influence the level of U.S.-U.S.S.R. 

trade, it is beyond the scope of this report to make a definitive aSSeSS- 

*■ T ' s 

Sc-n-itc; Committee on Forri-rTi Relation I nnd United Statea-Sorlel Relation*, 

Committee Print. 94th Cong., 1-t B ena Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 197R 

FTou C Ittee on the Jndlclar? Emigration of s..vi, i .t. wi Committee Print ''ith 
Washington, U.S. Oorernmenl Printing Office, l *. > 7 c, :,\ V] >. 



63 

ment of the effect of the Jackson- Vanik amendment on U.S. trade with 
the Soviet Union. The administration contends a lack of United States 
MFN and credits has caused the Soviet Union to turn to other coun- 
tries for technological imports, but such U.S. trade has not 'been shut 
off either. Soviet trade officials have apparently indicated their esti- 
mate of lost U.S. trade to be near $5 billion. Such an estimate cannot 
be uncritically accepted, but at the same time should not be completely 
discounted. 

In conclusion, it would appear that the Jackson-Vanik amendment 
since its passage, has not really furthered the interests of Soviet Jews 
trying to leave the Soviet Union and that leverage which caused the 
Soviet Union to take steps to influence Congress' decision is now 
diminished. Some Members of Congress became aware of this develop- 
ment, but did not propose significant measures to help correct the 
current impasse. Essentially, Congress' attention has been deferred, 
while both sides have reassessed certain elements of East-West trade 
relations. Moreover, proponents of the amendment can claim that it 
has been successfully applied with regard to Romania, and the the next 
step, therefore, should be up to the Soviet Union. 

Under current conditions, U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade of significant volume 
can continue ; but such factors as credit and a rapidly increasing Soviet 
balance-of -payments deficit with the West (perhaps in the range of 84 
to $5 billion in 1975 according to a CIA estimate) may change the main 
lines of future commercial relations. Soviet agricultural performance 
also affects the flexibility of the Soviet Union on trade decisions with 
the West. Finally, U.S.-U.S.S.R. political relations, mainly, and also 
progress on nuclear arms agreements, could strongly affect Congress 
reaction to trade developments with the Soviet Union. 



Major Functional Problems Facing U.S. Foreign Policy 



Page 

Introduction 67 

Weapons Transfer, Proliferation and Control 68 

Conventional arms transfers 68 

Nuclear exports, nuclear proliferation 73 

SALT talks 78 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 82 

Relations With the Third World 84 

Foreign aid 84 

Multilateral economic relations with developing countries 92 

Congress and the International Economy 100 

International monetary affairs 100 

Foreign investment policy 102 

International trade 109 

Participation in the United Nations System 112 

Review of 1976 General Assembly 112 

Seventh Special Session, September 1975: Preparations and results___ 115 

Participation in the 30th session 115 

Congress and financing the U.N. system 116 

The status of Israel 117 

Other congressional activities 119 

Problems of Global Resource Management 121 

Congress and U.S. foreign energy policy 121 

U.S. international food policy 126 

Congress and the Law of the Sea 132 

Space research 139 

Other international environmental issues 141 

Congress and Individual Rights: Human Rights and MIA's 146 

Human ri ghts 146 

Status of MIA's 150 



INTRODUCTION 

This section attempts to observe the congressional role in some of 
the basic foreign policy issues facing the United States, such as 
weapons control, U.S. relations with the Third World, other interna- 
tional economic questions, participation in international institutions, 
and problems of the "International Common." A common thread run- 
ning through all these issues is the concept of interdependence. As 
used here, the term implies many linkages : between U.S. domestic and 
foreign policies; the interrelationships of such issues as agriculture, 
energy, economics, nuclear proliferation, trade, et cetera; as well as 
emphasis on U.S. relations with other countries, for these problems 
can only be resolved by the world community of nations. 

As the line between foreign and domestic policy fades on many 
issues, the congressional role in determining U.S. policy in many 
cases becomes more important. Congressional prerogatives in trade 
regulation, foreign aid, commodities regulation, and support for 
U.S. participation in international institutions place increasing re- 
sponsibilty on Congress for the determination of U.S. policy priorities. 
This section examines some of the major fimctional problems of U.S. 
foreign policy, focusing primarily on those aspects of the issues which 
require congressional consideration. 

(67) 



WEAPONS TRANSFER, PROLIFERATION, AND CONTROL 
Coxykxtioxal Arms Traxsfers* 

In recent years, the most significant trend in the transfer of U.S. 
conventional arms to foreign nations has been the decreasing use of 
military assistance program (MAP) grant aid and the increasing 
reliance on the foreign military sales (FMS) program. The military 
assistance program has been reduced from an appropriation of $5.7 
billion in 1952 to less than $800 million per year for the last 8 years. 
In fiscal year 1975, the amount appropriated for the MAP was 
$475 million. Conversely, U.S. Government cash and credit arms 
sales nnder the FMS program have grown from $1.6 billion in fiscal 
year 1971 to over $10 billion in fiscal year 1974 and $9.5 billion in 
fiscal year 1975. The most dramatic increase in the FMS program 
has been the sale of large amounts of sophisticated weapons, as well as 
training and logistics support, to the oil-producing states of the 
Middle East. 

.l/7?75 sales 

This concentration of arms transfers to the Middle East, as well as 
the large amounts of arms and military services involved, stimulated 
increased congressional interest in the role of the United States as 
perhaps the world's leading supplier of military equipment. This 
interest focused on the policy issues involved in these transfers and 
on the lack of congressional control or oversight over many aspects of 
the arms transfer program. Many in Congress have felt that the United 
States has emerged as the world's leading arms merchant with little 
thought or emphasis, other than economic, on the foreign policy impli- 
cations of these sales, particularly sales to the Middle East/Persian 
Gulf area. Such arms sales, it has been contended, contribute to and, 
indeed, stimulate regional arms races, encouraging certain regimes 
to give undue attention to military as opposed to social-economic 
development. Arms transfers are also said to link the United States 
with regimes prone to practices inimical to our concepts of human 
dignity, to promote regional instability, and to increase the ability 
and the willingness of these nations to resort to force, using U.S. 
arms to settle international disputes. Moreover, it was alleged, this 
rive transfer of weapons, technology, and training reduces U.S. 
\'<)v<-i\ readiness, creates U.S. military commitments, and could involve 
the United States in international disputes in ways in which we do not 
to be involved. In addition, there was some apprehension that 
U.S. control over these weapons once they are transferred is, at best. 
tenuous and that they could be transferred to other nations and used 
in v ays not intended, as for example, against Israel. 

pared by Herbert v. Scbandler, specialist In national defense. 



In response to these policy issues concerning U.S. arms transfers, 
several committees held hearings on arms sales programs and policies 
during 1975. Closed hearings, later published, were conducted by a 
subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee in April which 
focused on the impact on U.S. readiness of sales of military equip- 
ment. 1 In March, the Subcommittee on International Political and 
Military Affairs of the House International Relations Committee con- 
ducted hearings on a request by Ethiopia to purchase arms from the 
United States to combat a rebel group in Eritrea. 2 The same subcom- 
mittee later that month conducted hearings concerning the training of 
foreign military forces by U.S. civilian contractors. 3 Of particular in- 
terest to the subcommittee was a contract which had recently been 
made public for the training of the Saudi Arabian national guard by 
the Vinnell Corp. The Senate Armed Services Committee, also in 
March, held executive hearings on the modernization of the Saudi 
Arabian national guard. That same month, the Special Subcommittee 
on the Middle East of the House Armed Services Committee reported 
on a visit by 18 members of the committee to the Middle East and com- 
mented on U.S. arms sales to the region as well as on the Vinnell con- 
tract. 4 In this regard the subcommittee report stated : 

Selling: military equipment and weapons systems to countries such as Saudi 
Arabia invariably involves the selling of training as well * * *. In summary, 
the contract is not inconsistent with the kind of technical assistance that has 
been provided in the past. 

A special study mission to gather information on U.S. arms sales 
to Iran. Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, was conducted by Representative 
Pierre S. du Pont IV, during the period May 22-31, 1975. In his re- 
port to the House International Relations Committee, Representative 
du Pont concluded that, "the United States and the Persian Gulf na- 
tions have legitimate reasons to engage in the transfer of arms," 
although he also felt that the United States, "should initiate a policy 
of restraint in its arms sales in terms of absolute amounts, level of 
sophistication of the weapons, and the percentage of each national 
market it controls.'' 5 

Annual hearings held from 1972 to 1974 on the Persian Gulf by the 
former Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia were continued 
in 197.*) by the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House 
International Relations Committee. These hearings, held during June 
and July 1975, focused on the continuing debate on arms sales to the 
Persian Gulf and provided, in the words of the subcommittee chair- 



1 T T .R. Conjrress. Senate: Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appro- 
priations, fiscal vear 1976. hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, part 5, 
94tb Comr.. 1st sess.. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. pp. 169-260. 

2 U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. U.S. Policy 
and Request for Sale of Arms to Ethiopia, hearinsr before tbe Subcommittee on International 
Political and Military Affairs. 94th Cong.. 1st sess.. Mar. 5. 1975. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office. 1975. 

3 Committee on International Relations, U.S. Defense Contractor's Trainin g of Foreign 
Military Forces, hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military 
Affairs. 94th Cong., 1st sess.. Mar. 20. 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 1975. 

4 Committee on Armed Services, report of the Special Subcommittee on the Middle East. 
94th Con-. 1st sess.. Mar. 11, 1975 (HASC No. 94-3. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 1975. 

•" U.S. Conjrress. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. U.S. 
Arms Sal«a to the Persian Gulf, report of a study mission to Iran. Kuwait, ami Saudi 
Arabia. May 22-31. 1975. Dec. 19. 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1975. 



70 

man, "an essential background on an area of vital foreign policy con- 
cern." 6 

The major provision of law which gives Congress approval or dis- 
approval authority over cash sales of arms is contained in section 
36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act. This section (the Nelson 
amendment) adopted in 1974 requires that any letter of offer to sell 
defense articles or services in the amount of $25 million or more shall 
ho submitted to the Congress prior to being issued, and shall not be 
issued if the Congress, within 20 calendar days after receiving such 
statement, adopts a concurrent resolution stating that it objects to the 
proposed sale. This provision is waived, however, if the President cer- 
tifies that an emergency exists which requires such sale in the national 
security interests of the United States. 

On July 14, 1975, Congressman Jonathan Bingham and 10 co- 
sponsors introduced House Concurrent Eesolution 337 disapproving 
proposed sale to Jordan of air defense systems (Hawk and Vulcan) . A 
similar resolution (Senate Concurrent Eesolution 50) had been intro- 
duced by Senator Case on July 11. Hearings were conducted in the 
House on the Bingham resolution on July 16 and 17, 7 and on July 24, 
the International Relations Committee formally reported the resolu- 
tion disapproving (he proposed sale on the grounds that its excessive 
size would tilt the balance of power in the Middle East against Israel 
and virtually guarantee that Jordan would be drawn into any future 
conflict. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held public hear- 
ings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 50 on July 15 and 21, 1975, and 
held executive hearings on July 18, 21, 24, and 25, 1975. However, no 
action was taken. 

Following action of the House International Relations Committee, 
the Department of State, after consultation with members of the 
committee, agreed to suspend temporarily the Hawk sale and again 
seek to negotiate a compromise. On September 3, the administration 
notified Congress of its intention to offer Jordan the same Hawk- 
missile package which Congress objected to in July. Apparently no 
compromise had been arranged, despite Secretary Kissinger's visit 
to Jordan following the successful conclusion of the negotiations on 
a new agreement in Sinai. 

Consequently, on September 1. Congressman Bingham introduced 
House Concurrent Resolution 382 which again would have prohibited 
the proposed sale. On this occasion, however, a compromise was 
reached. In a communication to the Congress on September 17 s the 
President indicated that the Government of Jordan had indicated 
that these missile systems would be permanently installed at fixed 
-sites as defensive and nonmobile antiaircraft weapons. This pledge, 
which sought to insure that these weapons could not be used in an 
offensive role, and thus would pose neither strategic threat to Israel 



•U.S. CongreRs, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, the 
Per Ian Gulf 1975: The Continuing Debute on Anns Sales, bearings before the Special 
Subcommittee <>n Investigations, 94th Cong., 1st Bess. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975. 

7 r.s. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations. Rnb- 
commlttee on International PollticaJ and Military Affairs, proponed sale to Jordan of tbe 
Hawk :in(i Vulcan Air Defense Bystems, hearings, July 16 and 17, 1975. 04th Cong., 1st 
Washington, r.s. Govern men! Printing Office, I07. r ». 

■ U.S. Congress. House. Communication from the President of the United States trans- 
mitting information concerning the sale of Hawk antiaircraft missile to Jordan, 94th 

Cong., ki sees. House Documenl No, 94 -."it;. Washington, i T .s. Government Printing 
Office, 1975. 



71 

nor affect the power balance in the Middle East, was satisfactory to 
the Congress and, on September 17, House Concurrent Resolution 
382 was withdrawn. 

Two other resolutions to prohibit proposed arms sales under the 
provisions of section 36(b) were introduced in the closing weeks of 
the first session of the 94th Congress. On December 10, Mr. Rosenthal 
submitted House Concurrent Resolution 507 which objected to a pro- 
posed sale to Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles and on December 
18, Mr. Zablocki introduced House Concurrent Resolution 517 which 
objected to the proposed sale of F-15 aircraft to Israel. The Sub- 
committee on International Political and Military Affairs held a hear- 
ing on House Concurrent Resolution 507 on December 17, but no 
further action was taken on either of these resolutions prior to the 
end of the 20-day period allowed for congressional disapproval action. 

One additional legislative action was taken by the Congress in 1975 
on the issue of arms sales. Section 150 of the Foreign Relations Au- 
thorization Act, fiscal year 1976 (Public Law 94—141), signed by the 
President on November 29, 1975, amended section 414 of the Mutual 
Security Act of 1954. section 42(A) of the Foreign Military Sales 
Act and section 511 of the Foreign Assistance Act to require that all 
decisions concerning issuing licenses for export of articles on the 
U.S. munitions list, any sale proposed to be made, or the furnishing 
of military assistance : 

shall be made in coordination with the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and shall take into account the Director's opinion as to 
whether such decision might contribute to an arms race, or increase the pos- 
sibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of 
bilateral or multilateral arms control agreements. 

Grant military aid 

Although grant military aid, as indicated, is now a small portion 
of total U.S. arms transfers, this program received a great deal of 
congressional interest and action in 1975. First, the fiscal year 1975 
appropriations bill for economic and military assistance (Public Law 
94-11) was not cleared until March 1975, three-fourths of the way 
through the fiscal year. This bill appropriated $475 million for grant 
military assistance, $125 million less than had been authorized, and 
$732 million less than had been requested by the administration (al- 
though the administration request had included $222 million for 
Cambodia). 

The rapid sequence of events in Cambodia and South Vietnam gen- 
erated congressional action on a number of bills whose provisions 
reflected the changing military conditions, with a variety of com- 
mittees considering separate bills dealing with the President's mili- 
tary aid requests, refugee assistance, troop authority, and appropri- 
ations. As they were overtaken by events, the bills were dropped or 
revised. 

A total ban on arms transfers to Turkey in reaction to the improper 
use of U.S.-supplied armaments in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, 
took effect on February 5, 1975. On October 3, Confess reversed it- 
self and cleared a bill (Public Law 94-104) partially ending this 8- 
month prohibition on military aid and arms sales to Turkey. (For 
additional details Turkish aid controversy see pp. 5^-60.) 

An 11th hour Senate battle aimed at shutting off U.S. military aid 
to two factions fighting a Communist-backed group in the Angola 



72 

civil war held up final congressional action on the $90.5 billion fiscal 

1976 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 9SG1). 

The House on December 12 approved the conference report on the 
but when the bill reached the Senate floor on December 15. a 
coalition of Senators led by John V. Tnnney insisted thai an amend- 
ment be added banning the nse of any fund's appropriated in thi 

"any activities involving Angola other than intelligence 
gathering 

This proposal was debated in open and secret sessions over a 4-day 
period, and was finally approved by the Senate on December 19. The 
defense appropriation bill was then returned to conference to resolve 
this issue. The conference accepted the Senate ban on funds for Angola 
and the bill containing this provision was adopted by the House on 
January 27. 197G and was signed into law (Public Law 94-212) on 
February 9, 1976. (For additional details, see pp. 17-^181, United 
States- Africa relations. ) 

On May 15, 1975, the President forwarded to the Congress draft 
- ation to authorize foreign assistance programs for fiscal year 
197G and 1977. and for the transition period July 1. 1976 through 
September 30, 1976 (the new fiscal year beginning in fiscal year 1977 
will begin on October 1 rather than July 1). This proposal was printed 
as House Document 94-158 and was introduced in the Senate as S. 1816. 
Because of uncertainties caused by changing events, particularly in the 
Middle East and Indochina, specific amounts for security assistance 
programs were not included in this draft legislation. 

On October 30, 1975, the President transmitted to the Congress 
proposed revisions to this draft legislation which included specific 
amounts for security assistance programs. The President proposes for 
fiscal year 1976 the following authorizations (dollars in millions) : 

Military assistance program $4L ) 1 > . 60 

Training 29. :«> 

FMS credit sales 2,374.70 

Security supporting assistance 1. 867. 55 

Middle East special requirements 50.00 

Seventy percent of the fiscal year 1976 program is concentrated in 
the Middle East. These proposals were introduced as H.R. L0594 and 
662. 

Primarily because of the late submission of the President's requcsi 
for fu ii< ling for the security assistance program, authorizing Legisla- 
tion for this program was considered separately in 1975 from author- 
izing Legislation on economic assistance programs. 

ixingS on these bills focused on the policy issues which had con- 
cerned Congress throughout the year ihe foreign policy aspects of 
the program, its statutory framework, and possible ways to bring 
aboi gthened Legislative controls on arms transfers. 

Greatly modified versions of these bills were reported out of com- 
mittee and passed by each House in early L976 (S. 2662, passed Febru- 
ary L8, ll>7<; : ELK. L1963, passed March 3, L976; conference report 
ed April 29. L976). The bill included many major modifical ions to 
the security assistance program and was described by the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee as "the most significant piece of legislation 
in the field of foreign military assistance policy since the enactment 
of the Mutual Security Act more than a quarter of a century ago." 
However, this bill was vetoed by the President on May 7, 1976. 



73 

Thus. 1975 was a period of increased congressional interest in all 
policy aspects of U.S. arms transfer programs. It was a year of fact- 
finding hearings, and investigations on this subject, leading to at- 
tempts to make major modifications to the program in 1976 which 
would emphasize expanded and strengthened congressional control 
over all aspects of U.S. arms transfers. 

Xuclear Exports, Nuclear Proliferation* 

The issue of controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a 
problem area where a number of commercial, economic, and politi- 
cal interests converge both domestically and internationally. The 
problem — proliferation of a nuclear weapons capability to other coun- 
tries — and the goal — nonproliferation of nuclear weapons — are much 
easier to define than are the steps which the United States as a member 
of the community of nations might take to realize the goal. 9 This state 
of affairs was reflected in congressional activity which tended to 
stress the immediacy and urgency of the problem, but which was 
limited to exploratory efforts at defining general recommendations 
to alleviate the problem rather than to solve it. 

The desirability of avoiding a further proliferation of nuclear 
weapons has increased as the number of nations capable of acquiring 
such weapons has grown and as there is no corresponding increase in 
world political stability. Unfortunately, in this respect, the growing 
need for energy sources other than fossil fuels has led to an increased 
emphasis on nuclear power and many nations now have the need and 
the means to acquire the materials and technology of nuclear power 
from the major nuclear exporting countries: The United States, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Germany. 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Xuclear Weapons (NPT), 
in force since 1970, spells out the obligations of its nuclear weapon 
state parties to refrain from the transfer of nuclear weapons, and of 
its non-nuclear-weapon state parties not to acquire such weapons, and 
the safeguarded conditions under which nuclear transfers are to take 
place. Nevertheless, the fact remains that not all nations, and not even 
all nuclear weapon nations, are parties to the NPT: and any party 
can dissociate itself from the treaty upon 3 months' notice. Thus, even 
on a formalisticdegalistic level, restraints on military unclear ac- 
quisition are only partial. On the economic level, it is possible for 
almost any relatively affluent nation to obtain the expertise and ma- 
terials needed for the production of some nuclear weapons. 

Section 123(d) of the Atomic Energy Act. as amended ["Public Law 
93-485 (88 Stat. 1460), 42 U.S.C. 2153] gives Congress the power to 
veto any agreement for cooperation in nuclear energy with other 
countries entered into by the United States. These agreements are the 
vehicle by which transfers of nuclear information and materials take 

* Prepared by Dacrnija Storste-Perkins. analyst in international rations. 

Some observers have questioned the desirability and realism of nonproliferation per Be 
as a coal. Alton Frye in a Jan. 11. 1970. New York Times magazine art'de. "How to Ban 
the Bomb : Sell It," cites legitimate regional security throats and resultant fears of the 
nonnuclear weapon states as an inexorable motivation for their acquiring nuclear capacity. 
To alleviate this precarious situation in which there la no reward fur self-restraint, Frye 
proposes that the I'nited States and the Soviet Union devise "credible arrangements" to 
protect nonnuclear states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, lie suggests provi- 
sion by the superpowers, in the event of a nuclear attnck on the territory <>f a nonnit 
state, of a comparable number and scale of nuclear weapons with which the victim could 
retaliate. 

7 \ o.**2 — 7ft_ 



74 

place and hence by which nuclear proliferation can occur. By this 
means, Congress has an opportunity to control U.S. international 
nuclear policy. But, it is not clear to what extent Congress can over- 
see the details of each individual proposed transaction, and the main 
congressional efforts to deal with nuclear proliferation during the past 
session concerned general policy guidelines. 

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has long been concerned 
with domestic and international aspects of nuclear energy. In a recent 
report to Congress summarizing issues of concern regarding nuclear 
developments, 10 the committee stressed the necessity for agreement 
among the nuclear supplier nations "so that transactions will not be 
conducted on the basis of which nuclear supplier has the least rigorous 
safeguard requirements," and said that such negotiations should be 
a "top foreign policy priority." The report also suggested expanding 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), role from detec- 
tion to include prevention of diversion of nuclear material, and em- 
phasized the need to assess the part that security assurances on the 
part of the United States might play in leading nations to ratify and 
adhere to the XPT. 11 And the report posed a question: Is it wise for 
the United States to use nuclear reactors and technology as "interna- 
tional political bargaining chips-'? This report was submitted pur- 
suant to Public Law 93-514 (88 Stat. 1611) and served as a tool for 
congressional and public understanding. 

The congressional committees with preeminent responsibility in for- 
eign policy and international aifairs considered the problems of nuclear 
proliferation during this session. The Subcommittee on International 
Security and Scientific Affairs of the House International Relations 
Committee held hearings 12 on House Concurrent Resolution 371 and 
Senate Concurrent Resolution 69, which deal in a comprehensive way 
with horizontal and vertical proliferation issues. 13 Starting with the 
final declaration of the NPT review conference as a point of reference, 
the resolutions make four recommendations with respect to arms con- 
trol negotiations: Embodiment of the Vladivostok recommendations 
in a treaty and a subsequent further mutual reduction in strategic 
weapons; conclusion of an agreement to end all underground nuclear 
explosions: a halt to nuclear transfers to countries cot party to the 
XPT or not accepting IAEA safeguards; and negotiation of an agree- 
ment to reprocess all plutonium resulting from nuclear transfers in 
regional multinational facilities. Testimony from administration offi- 
cials stated, on the whole, that the resolutions do not conflict with cur- 
rent U.S. policy objectives and negotiations. The resolutions were not 
reported out of committee during 1975. 

The Subcommittee on Arms Control, [nternationa] Organizations, 
and Security Agreements of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
held a number of hearings on various proliferation issues throughout 

,o r.s Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Derelopment, Use, and c\>ntn>i 
of Nuclear Energy for the Common Defense and Security and for Peaceful Purposes. First 
annual report to the United st.Mtes Congress by the joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
pursuant to tec. 20200 of the Atomic Energy Act. as amended. 94tb Cong., 1st scss. 11. 
Ket.i 8 Washington, O.S. Government Printing Office, i<>7. r >. 104 pp. 

11 Senator Symington and staff from the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, end Joint 
Atomic Energy Committees bad visited the IAEA in Vienna and SAi/r negotiators in 
n June "_".♦ Jul 
1 Con i Bouse: Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on inter- 
national Security and Scientific Affairs. Nuclear Proliferation: Future r.s. Foreign Policy 
Implications. Bearings, Oct. 21. 28. 28. .".'> : Nov. 1 and B, 1975. nith Cong., 1st less. Wash* 
Lngton, r.s. Oorernmenl Printing Office, i!»7.~. 506 pp. 

[orlsontal proliferation refers to the further 1 ri 1 1 in 1 acquisition of nuclear weapons 
while vertical proliferation refers to additions to currently existing nuclear stockpiles. 



/o 

the year, none of which had been printed by the end of the session. On 
December 10, the full committee reported favorably Senate Resolu- 
tion l!21, 14 which was agreed to by the Senate December 12. The resolu- 
tion calls on the President to assume international leadership in seek- 
ing cooperation to strengthen the IAEA, to consult in the United 
Nations and elsewhere on increasing international efforts to strengthen 
and broaden safeguards, and to seek cooperation with suppliers to 
restrain nuclear transfers. The resolution had the support of the 
administration and was passed by voice vote without substantial 
controversy. 

The House Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Energy 
and the Environment devoted a substantial part of its 1975 oversight 
hearings on nuclear energy to problems of international prolifera- 
tion. 15 Chairman Udall articulated four recommendations for the 
United States to promote in formulating new international policies : 
Strengthening the IAEA; cooperation among exporting states to 
obtain strict safeguard agreements from all recipient states; placing 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities under international control in 
regional centers; and developing a long-range energy polic} T which 
would produce alternative energy sources to nuclear power. 

Actions by the United States alone cannot, of course, solve the pro- 
liferation problem, which is tied in with international political con- 
siderations. As regards the interaction of U.S. nuclear capacity and 
foreign needs for nuclear power, commercial considerations come into 
play. Export of U.S. nuclear technology, materials, and facilities is 
expected by the Energy Research and Development Administration to 
surpass U.S. aircraft sales as the main nonagricultural balance-of -pay- 
ments asset in the next few years. In 1974, U.S. sales of uranium enrich- 
ment services abroad amounted to $121 million and it is expected that 
sales over the next decade will total about $5 billion — in addition to 
$1.5 to $2 billion annually in sales of services, equipment, and facilities 
by the U.S. nuclear industry. When the United States sells nuclear 
materials abroad, it is under safeguards contained in agreements 
between the United States and the recipient country and the IAEA. 
IAEA safeguards include protective devices on the related facilities, 
inspections, and on-site observers. Their purpose is to deter and to 
detect any diversion of nuclear materials by the recipient country to 
unauthorized, that is, military use. There has been no documented in- 
stance of diversion of material in contravention of the safeguards sys- 
tem. 16 Whether this record is testimony to universal compliance or to 
the inadequacy of the safeguards can be argued, but there is near 
unanimity in the conclusion that the IAEA, while doing an adequate 
job under its financial and legal constraints, must be augmented in 
order for its safeguards methods and personnel to be less thinly spread 
over the expanding facilities for which it is and will be responsible. 



u U.S. Congress. Senate : Committee on Foreign Relations. International Safeguards of 
Nuclear Materials : report to accompany S. Res. 221. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Rept. No. 94-525. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 6 pp. 

16 U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee on 
Energy and the Environment. Oversight hearings on nuclear energy — International Pro- 
liferation of Nuclear Technology. Hearings, July 21, 22. and 24, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st 
sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 118 pp. 



76 

Two major international convocations during 1975 served to high- 
light the major concerns of the nuclear "haves 55 and "have-nots" and 
demonstrated difficulties which eventually would have to be overcome 
for successful control of proliferation of nuclear weapons. During 
. parties to the NPT came together in Geneva for the first 5-year 
w of the treaty's operation. The final declaration of the review 
conference expressed conclusions influenced partly by the nuclear im- 
porting and Third World nations. Specifically, it focused on recom- 
mendations largely applicable to the nuclear superpowers, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, calling for priority on a comprehensive 
nuclear weapons te^t ban to halt the nuclear arms rare: stating that the 
United State-- and the Soviet Union, as steps toward this end. should 
minimize their underground nuclear weapons tests and formalize the 
Vladivostok agreement in a SALT agreement "at the earliest possible 
date," and declaring that the XPT provisions prohibiting nuclear 
weapons and nuclear weapons technology transfers from nuclear 
weapon states to nonnnclear weapon states had been "faithfully ob- 
served by all parties." The emphasis here was a clear indication that 
nonnnclear weapon states, and nuclear importing states, are increas- 
ingly looking at limitations on United States and Soviet atomic weap- 
( restrictions on "vertical proliferation'') as a precondition for 
strict limitations on their own activities. 

A second series of meetings, initiated by t]\o United States and held 
in secret sessions in London and Paris beginning in June, involved the 
major nuclear exporting countries. Participants in these talks, which 
were aimed at promoting agreement on the universal application of 
more stringent safeguards as a precondition for any nuclear exports, 
were the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, 
France, Canada. West Germany. Japan, and Italy. As the talks pro- 
gressed, it was reported that the United States encountered opposition 
to its proposal to establish multinational regional fuel processing cen- 
ters — a proposal also advanced later by Secretary of State Kissinger 
in his September 22 speech before the U.X. General Assembly — largely 
because of the question of control. 

Tt has been U.S. policy to require that the reprocessing of spent fuel 
from its nuclear exports take place in U.S. plants, in order to minimize 
the risk of diversion of weapons-grade materia] which can be derived 
from sue] i fuel. Other nations, most notably West Germany in a major 
nuclear agreement with Brazil, have actually exported facilities and 
materials for, the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrich- 
ment and reprocessing plants. Such discrepancies in export policies of 
commercial competitors would be likely subjects of an international 

i ut among the nuclear suppliers^ 

Another often mentioned goal would be the requirement bv nuclear 
suppliers that the recipient country utilize adequate physical security 

measures to prevent theft by submit ional groups — terrorist factions, 

outlaw organizations, et cetera- of nuclear material-'. It is not clear 
now thai adequate security would be constituted in each individual 
and to date no materials are reported to have been stolen by any 
such group, but there is a general fear that the possibilities for theft 
• hey should or could be. These fears a re not prompted 
solely by COndil ions in other nations but by tlie state of domest ic U.S. 

facilities as well. For instance, the digest of a General Accounting Of- 



I i 

fice report to Congress released April 23 17 recommended increased 
security for U.S. nuclear weapons shipments that travel on highways 
and streets. 

The concern over physical security was embodied in legislation con- 
sidered at length by the Senate Committee on Government Opera- 
tions during the first session and into the second session of the 94th 
Congress. The proposed Export Reorganization Act of 1975, S. 1439, 
which was the subject of hearings. 18 called for a system of interagency 
checks on nuclear exports, including a requirement that safeguards 
against theft, diversion, or sabotage in the receiving nation be at least 
as stringent as those required within the United States. At various 
times through the year committee Chairman Abraham Rubicon* and 
other members of the committee were prominent in publicizing nuclear 
proliferation problems. Other fruits of the committee's interest were 
two informational volumes 19 which received wide circulation. 

Opposition to legislation further restricting U.S. nuclear exports 
has come from the executive branch. Pursuant to section 14 of Public 
Law 93-500, the President on May 6 submitted to the Congress a re- 
port on the adequacy of laws and regulations to prevent the prolifera- 
tion of nuclear capability for nonpeaceful purposes, and on the ade- 
quacy of domestic and international safeguards. 20 Prepared by the 
Energy Research and Development Administration with assistance 
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency and others, the report concluded that no additional 
legislative authority was required to control nuclear exports and that 
the United States was making "major efforts" to gain acceptance of 
export control policies by other countries to further inhibit prolifera- 
tion. With respect to physical security measures, the report stated 
that the United States was working toward adoption of an interna- 
tional convention on this problem and was aiding IAEA safeguard 
development efforts ; and that close cooperation with the other supplier 
nations was necessary, "to avoid a competition which would be based 
on minimizing the safeguards applicable to purchaser nations.'' 

During the IAEA meeting in Paris at the end of May, Secretary 
Kissinger assured the delegates that the United States would increase 
supplies of enriched uranium to meet the demand in countries agreeing 
to currently required safeguards. This statement might have been 
intended to allay the fears of potential U.S. customers that increas- 
ingly stringent safeguards would bo imposed by the United States, and 
to reverse the slight trend toward the granting of nuclear supply 
contracts to other nuclear exporters. 



17 TtiPrrtprl in the Concessional Rrrorrl (daily edition) vol. 121, Apr. 2". 107." : P. SOSOO. 
by Senator Symintrton. 

1S T\S. Copctpss. Senate : Committer on Govprnmpnt Opprations. Tho Export Rpororaniza- 
tion Apt — 1075. Hparinsrs. Anr. 24. 30. and May 1, 107."). 04th Cone:., 1st spss. Washington, 
V.S. Onvornn'ont Printing Offipp 1975. 533 pp. 

19 F.S. Conf-pss. Spr.ate : Oonimittpp on Oovprnmpnt Opprations. Ppnopful Nuclear 
Export* and Woapons Prnlifrration : a compendium. 04th Cong., 1st spss. Committee print. 
WppMncrton. T T .S. Govprnnvnif Printir- OfT.p<v 107". 1.355 pp. 

U.S. Library of Cnnprrpss : Congressional Rpsearph Service. Eapts or. Nuclear Prolifera- 
tion : a handbook. Prpoarpd for thp Committee on Oovprnment Operation*. T'.S. Senate. 
94th Con*".. 1«t spss. Washin<r"o'i. T'.S. Government Printing Offipp. 107.". 250 pp 

20 U.S. Prpsidpnt. 107-1- (Ford). Laws and Rpjrnlations Oovornin^ Xnelpar Exports 

vn(\ Dompstio and Intprnational Nuclear Safeguards. Message from thp President of the 
T *ni f pd Statps transmitting a rpnort on thp adponapy of laws and rpirnlations to prevent tliP 
nrolifp^ntion of nmdpar capability for nonpeaceful pnrno.sps. and on thp adpqnapy of domes- 
tic and intprn-itional safeguards, pursuant to spption 14 of thp Export Administration 
Ampnrlmpnts of 1074 (Piddip Law 93-500). 04th Pnnir.. 1st spss. TTons'> Pop. 01 131, 
nshington, X T .S. Oovprnmpnt Printing Office, 107.". 55 pp. 



78 

The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks* 

Bade ground 

During 1975, the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) con- 
tinued between United States and Soviet teams of negotiators in 
Geneva and between Secretary of State Kissinger and various Soviet 
officials. These efforts were directed toward concluding an interna- 
tional agreement which would implement the principles established 
by President Ford and Soviet Party Leader Brezhnev in Vladivostok 
in late 1974. The Vladivostok agreement in principle include? a £,400 
ceiling on the number of each country's strategic delivery vehicles, of 
which 1,320 can be equipped with multiple independently targettable 
reentry vehicles (MIRV's). By September 1975, an impasse had de- 
veloped over whether to include in these ceilinjrs the Soviet "Backfire"' 
bomber and the United States cruise missile. By the end of the year, it 
was planned that Kissinger would meet with Soviet leaders in Moscow, 
in an effort to resolve the stalemate. 

On January 22, Kissinger ended 2 days of discussions, where re- 
portedly the Soviet Union offered a major proposal to deal with the 
weapons systems in contention, as well as a possible reduction in the 
overall ceilings established at Vladivostok. At the conclusion of the 
talks. Kissinger said that "we will reply in n few weeks and then 
continue the negotiations.'' In the meantime, the Geneva discussions 
reconvened on January 28, 197G. 

Congressional activities 

An opportunity for direct congressional participation in the making 
of an arms control agreement occurs when the Congress is called upon 
to approve an agreement concluded as a result of international nego- 
tiations. Aside from Senate advice and consent under the treatvmaking 
powers of the Constitution, the Congress has additional authority over 
arms control and disarmament agreements. Under the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Act of 1901. no action to limit U.S. forces can be 
taken "unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the 
Congress, 21 a provision which covers agreements which do not take 
the form of treaties. 22 Thus, through this act, the Congress is assured 
a role in any international agreement in the area of arms control, a 
point which represents a unique source of congressional power. Since 
there were no new agreements concluded during 1975, the only instance 
of this kind of congressional action was the Senate approval of the 
v.~A protocol to the ABM treaty. The protocol provides that the 
United States and the Soviet Union are each limited to one defensive 
missile site/' 1 ' Approved by the Senate in November 197r> by a vote 
of (')?> to 15, the protocol prompted little controversy during congres- 
sional consideration. 

The minimum congressional controversv was basically attributable 
to strong congressional opposition to ballistic missile defense which 



•Prepared hv Leneiee N. Wu, analyst In International relations. 
22 fJ.B.C. 2r»7V. 

r example, the Interim agreement concluded during the 1072 strateple arms limitation 
talki wns Rpnrnved bv lolnt resolution since it wai in executive agreement rather than ;i 
trentv. (Public I. - B2 148). 

-' The original ABM Treaty of n»72 provided two missile sites for each country. 



79 

had been evident since 1969. 24 Indeed, at the time the protocol was 
concluded in July 1974, the United States had already limited itself 
to one ABM site. This had been accomplished by the 1972 congres- 
sional action which denied funds in the defense procurement authori- 
zation bill to build a second ABM site around Washington, D.C. 

During 1975, congressional action on the defense appropriations 
bill (H.E. 9861) severely limited the way ABM funds could be used 
for the remaining site at Grand Forks, N. Dak. Other than funds for 
operation of the perimeter acquisition radar, as stated in the law 
(Public Law 94—212), the approved funds could be used only for 
the "expeditious termination and deactivation of all operations" of 
the Safeguard facility. 25 This language was an acceptance of the Sen- 
ate amendment, and its approval in that body was followed by the 
disclosure that the Department of Defense had planned to keep the 
system operational only until July 1, 1976, and would have placed it 
on "standby status'' after that time. 2 * 3 The action of the Congress re- 
stricted the use of ABM funds further than that planned by the 
Department of Defense, but in light of these plans, may represent 
onlv a minor initiative. 

The limitation of funds represents one of the major sources of legis- 
lative influence in matters of national security. In pursuing this course 
in the case of the ABM, the Congress also signaled a willingness to act 
upon weapons systems in a way which would limit them further than 
the restraints imposed by an international agreement. 

Although Congress has exercised little, if any, power over ongoing 
arms control negotiations, at least as far as detailed negotiating posi- 
tions and bargaining are concerned, it has attempted in a number of 
different ways to influence U.S. SALT policy and possibly the out- 
come of the negotiations. 

One of the ways in which the Congress has sought to influence SALT 
is through the concessional resolution. Two that received some atten- 
tion in 1975 were Senate Resolution 20 (with its House companion H. 
Res. 160) and Senate Concurrent Resolution 69 (H. Con. Res. 371, 
comparable, but slightly different). The simple resolutions call for 
completion of the negotiations to finalize the Vladivostok principles, as 
well as further negotiations on mutual restraints on weapons develop- 
ment within the Vladivostok ceilings, on mutual reductions to lower 
levels, and on a mutual commitment to continue talks on weapons 
systems not covered by the 1972 SALT accords. The concurrent reso- 
lutions call for "prompt embodiment" in a treaty of the Vladivostok 
principles, and suggest that a next step should be'talks on a 20-percent 
mutual reduction in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and those 
equipped with MIRV ? s. (These latter measures also address other arms 
control' areas, like an underground nuclear test ban.) Thus, these reso- 
lutions sought to address SALT issues in a substantive manner, by 
suggesting goals for the President to pursue during the negotiations. 

24 US. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Protocol to the Limitation of Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty. Report to accompany Ex. I. 93-2. Nov. 3. 1975. 04th Cnns\. 
1st sess., executive report No. 14. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 197.".. 
P. 2. 

2 " Tonference Report on II. R. 9861. Congressional Record (daily ed.). Pec. 10. l!»7."i: 
H52277. 

26 John W. Finney. Safeguard ABM System to Shut Down: $5 Billion Spent in (1 jrean 
since Debate. New York Times. Nov. 25, 1975. 



80 

During 1975, congressional action on these measures has been limited 
to hearings,- 7 which may have served to stimulate public discussion of 
the pertinent issues. 

Similar congressional activities have been in the form of substantive 
proposals by individual Members, notably in 1975, those of Senators 
Henry Jackson 28 and George McGovern. 29 One group of House Mem- 
ied by Congressmen Steven Symms and John Dent, sent a letter 
to the President with several ideas for what should be included in a 
SALT II treaty, and tied these proposals to their own approval of a 
prospective SALT II agreement. 30 The impact of measures like these, 
which elicit no public response from the administration, cannot be 
easily evaluated. When and if a SALT II agreement is concluded, it 
might be evident to what extent these congressional proposals have 
been incorporated. 

Related national security conceims 

As noted above, congressional consideration of the defense money 
bills prompted the discussion of some arms control issues involved in 
defense decisions. Besides the action which limited the U.S. ABM 
deployment, several attempts were made to limit strategic weapons 
in an effort to affect the goals of SALT negotiations. An example of 
this type of measure was the Humphrey -Brooke amendment to the 
defense procurement authorization bill (H.R. 6674) to prohibit the 
use of funds for flight testing of maneuverable reentry vehicles 
( MARY) , unless the President certified to the Congress thatthe Soviet 
Union had begun MARY flight testing or that it was in the U.S. 
national interest to begin a program. 31 The amendment also set down a 
specific congressional procedure to decide, once the President had 
made the proper determinations, whether the program should be 
disapproved. 

By curtailing MARY flight testing, supporters of the Humphrey- 
Brooke amendment asserted, the Soviet Union would have confidence 
that a U.S. MARY system had not been deployed. (Surveillance of 
flight testing has become one of the few ways in which progress toward 
deployment can be determined by national mean- oi inspection,) It 
was hoped that by stopping deployment, a mutual agreement to limit 
or eliminate MARY might be achieved at SALT. 

On June 6, 107r>, the Senate approved the amendment by a vote of 
LI. However, in conference, the Senate receded from its amend- 



i s Congress. House: Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Inter 
national Security and Scientific Affairs. The Vladivostok Accord: implications to r.s. 
Security. Arms Control, and World Peace. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st seas.. June J4. 2.",, 
and .Tuiv 8. 1975. Washington, r.s. Government I'nnrlne Office. 197"). 197 pp. The Sub- 
committee on Anns Control and international Organisation of the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee also held hearings on the Bubject of salt, hut these have not been printed 
:.-■ of this writing. 

I Strategic Arms Reduction. Congressional Uncord, (daily ed.). 
March 26. I97M : 85038 85! 

ownrd Effective Arms Control lonal Record (daily ed.), Mny 5. 1975: 

. i 87881. 

men 1 ae Warning to Ford on SALT. Congressional Record (daily oil.). 
B8Tj. 

1 The MARY system is comprl ed of a ballistic missile equipped with Its own navigation 
and control system capable of adju course following launch from the delivery 

vehicle This weapon Is being developed to achieve a high degree of accuracy and ■ 
capability to evade defensive • i \rms control supporters have contended that 

developing Increased accuracy of a strategic weapon could imply a move toward n i ; r<t- 
strlke capability. Possession of a first strike capability could have a destabilizing effect 
■ ■•I the milted states s.c.iet military balan e ai well as constitute a threat to arms 
limitation 



me-iit on the grounds that during fiscal year 1976 the only planned 
MARY night testing was for the Navy Evader missile. The conference 
report explained that testing this weapon "could in no way be con- 
strued as supporting the development of a high accuracy MAHV." : ~ 

The fate of the Humphrey-Brooke amendment might indicate the 
limits of congressional attempts of this kind. Because the weapons 
development process is an extended one. the congressional funding 
process becomes extended. In 1975. the funds sought for MARY were 
only for one of the initial stages of development. Apparently in the 
view of the Congress, this stage did not pose a threat to the strategic 
balance or arms limitation efforts. Thus, the case of the Humphrey- 
Brooke amendment may suggest that it is difficult to make arms con- 
trol considerations seem urgent in the early stages of weapons 
development. 

Other congressional efforts to seek restraint in weapons programs 
were evident in various amendments to limit or delete funds in both 
the defense authorization and appropriations bills. The strategic weap- 
ons systems affected were the B-l bomber, improvements in strategic 
weapons to achieve a counterforce capability, the Trident submarine 
and missile systems, and cruise missiles. These efforts largely failed. 
although some modest cuts were achieved. In the case of the B-l 
bomber, the conference committee warned that authorization of the 
requested funds did not represent a commitment to production of the 
system. 

Congress and alleged SALT violations 

During 1975, congressional attention also focused on allegations of 
Soviet violations of SALT I. This issue was the subject of hearings 
held by the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on 
Arms Control 33 and the House Select Committee on Intelligence. 
While the Senate committee's inquiry was on the substance of the 
allegations regarding Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreements 
of 1972, the House group approached the problem differently. Rather 
than investigating the charges of violations themselves, the House 
committee examined the executive branch machinery established to 
monitor an arms control agreement. The committee voted contempt-of- 
Congress citations against Secretary of State Kissinger in an effort 
to obtain information on this subject. Questions were raised whether 
as national security adviser, Kissinger had provided various T T .S. ofu- 
cials with complete information on Soviet compliance with SALT T. 
Following issuance of the citations, the administration provided cer- 
tain data to the committee. In addition. Kissinger's explanation at a 
press conference in December 1975, of the Government process in- 
volved' in verifying SALT compliance, cast new light on this important 
responsibility in the arms control area. The congressional initiative 
on this issue resulted in a notable example of congressional oversight 
of the implementation of an existing arms control agreement. 



r - 2 t\S. Contrress. Senate: .Authorizing appropriations for fiscal .year 1070 and the period 
beginning July 1. 1070. and ending September 30. 1070 for military procurement . . . and 
for otbor nurnoses. Conference report to accompany IT.lt 0074. Sept. 10. I07f>. 94th Cone., 
Isl hcrs., s. Ropt. No. 94-385. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. p. 75. 

88 U.S. Coneross. Senate: Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on .^rms Control. 
Soviet Compliance with Pertain Provisions of the 1072 SALT T agreements. Hearing. 04th 
Cone:.. 1st sess. Mar. 0, 1075. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 22 pp. 
Other committees held executive hearings on this BUb.1ect, which had not been printed as 
of this writing. 



82 

Arms Control axd Disarmament Agexcy 

Congressional (hire to strengthen policymaking 

Another area of arm? control in which the Congress has sought to 
exercise some influence is that of the machinery and process of policy- 
making'. During 1974 and 1975. there had been an increased congres- 
sional interest in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
( A( IDA) and its role within the U.S. Government. That interest cul- 
minated with the enactment in Xovember 197;") of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act (Public Law 94-U1) 34 , which includes a number of 
substantive changes in the Agency's enabling legislation, the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Act. 

By enacting these changes in ACDA's legislation, the Congress 
appears to have been striving for two major objectives: (1) That an 
anus control perspective be taken into account by different groups 
responsible for policymaking, including those officials associated with 
weapons acquisition, and (-2) that the Congress have adequate infor- 
mation about AC DA and its work. 

The principal changes by which the Congress sought to attain these 
objectives include the following: (1) A change in the law winch gives 
the Agency the authority to perform certain functions — under the 
direction of the President and the Secretary of State — previous legisla- 
tion merely assigned the Agency the ability to perform them; (2) the 
ACDA Director is made a principal adviser on anus control and dis- 
armament to the National Security Council, a position comparable to 
that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (3) the deletion of a provision which 
prohibits the dissemination of propaganda about the work of the 
Agency, a provision which some viewed as inhibiting the Agency's 
public information function; (4) a comprehensive description of the 
type of information required in the ACDA annual report to the Con- 
gress; and (5) consultation with the ACDA Director during several 
stages in the process by which conventional arms transfers are decided. 

. 1 rms rout i ol impact statements 

Possibly the most important change in ACDA's legislation concerns 
the requirements for arms control impact statements. The law defines 
a number of weapons programs which are affected by the require* 
ments. The programs are all those involving unclear weapons, those 
weapons programs with an overall cost of $250 million or an annual 
<•')-! of $50 million, and those which could have a significant impact on 
arms control policy and negotiations. At the time when "any Govern- 
ment agency f is] preparing any legislative or budgetary proposal" for 
any oi* the programs described, the law requires, the ACDA Director 
is (o be provided with detailed information on the program. The 
Director is also required to assess the program's arms control impact 
and advise and make recommendations to the Nat ion a I Security Coun* 
oil, th" Office of Management and Budget and the Government agency 
proposing the program. Finally, the 1975 legislation requires that 
any request to the Congress for authorization of appropriations for 
the weapon- program, "-hall include a complete statement analyzing 



. also D.S. Congress House: Committee <>" International Relation! Arms Control 
.-in.) D1 norma men 1 Ael Amendment* of 1975. June 11. 1975. Report to accompany H R. 7567. 
•i itii Congress, I I i House Rent No. 94 281. Washington, U.S. Govprimicnt Printing 

1975. 22 pp. 



83 

the impact of such program on arms control and disarmament policy 
and negotiations.'' 3i 

The enactment of this legislation is a move b} T the Congress to define 
more clearly and expand the purposes which the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency should serve. In addition, the legislation 
broadens congressional participation in this area. 

Additional References 

Arms Control Amendments Approved, Arms Control Today vol. 5, Xo. 12, Decem- 
ber 1975 : 3-4. 

Frye, Alton. A Responsible Congress : The Politics of National Security. New 
York, McGraw-Hill (Council on Foreign Relations), 1975. 238 pages. See 
especially pages 67-116. 

Kalian, Jerome H. Security in the Nuclear Age. Developing U.S. Strategic Arms 
Policy, Washington, Brookings, 1975. 361 pages. See especially pages 263-349. 

Maxfield, David M. Disputes over New Weapons Imperil Arms Pact. Congres- 
sional Quarterly, November 29, 1975 : 2583-88. 

Nitze, Paul H. Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente. Foreign Affairs 
vol. 54, No. 2, January 1976 : 207-232. 

Weiler, Lawrence. Strategic Cruise Missiles and the Future of SALT. Arms 
Control Today vol. 5, No. 10, October 1975 : 1-4. 



35 In the case of those programs which might have a significant impact on arms control, 
the determination must be made by the National Security Council before the report to the 
Congress is required. 



RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD 
Foreign Aro* 

In 1975. five major pieces of foreign aid legislation received con- 
gressional attention: The 1975 foreign assistance authorization, de- 
layed consideration of the fiscal year 1975 foreign assistance appropri- 
ation, initial consideration late in the year of the administration's fis- 
cal year 1976 security assistance program request, the 1975 replenish- 
ment of the Inter-American Development Bank capital stock, and the 
issue of aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos. 

Because of the widely divergent problems, programs, and congres- 
sional reactions, it would be unwise to generalize about a single con- 
gressional position on foreign aid. Each set of circumstances reflected 
in the consideration of the various bills is unique, and for this rea- 
son, it is more realistic to discuss each bill separately. 

1975 Foreign Economic Assistance Act 

The 1975 Foreign Assistance Act (ILK. 9005, known as the In- 
ternational Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975. Public 
Law 94-161) reflected growing congressional concern over the di- 
rection and implementation of U.S. policies on food aid and on bi- 
lateral assistance to less developed countries designed to increase food 
output capabilities. This concern arose primarily from three events: 
The impact of the 1972 Russian grain deal on the size of the U.S. food 
for peace program (Public Law 480). existence of famine and near 
famine in several areas of the world from 1972 through 1974, and the 
1974 World Food Conference. 

In the aftermath of the Soviet grain deal in 1972, U.S. grain re- 
serves were seriously depicted and grain prices rose to unprecedented 
levels, dramatically increasing prices and decreasing supplies of the 
major food items in the food-for-peace program. 'Hie decreases in food 
supplies available under Public Law 480 took place during a period 
of famine in the Sahel region of Afrira. in Bangladesh, and in Ethi- 
opia, and of short supplies in various other regions. For the less de- 
veloped countries as a group, 1971 and 1972 saw an actual decline in 
food production. The World Food Conference, held in Rome in No- 
vember 1974, served as the focal point for an examination of the world 
fool situation and particularly for an examination of the future food 
ition in the less developed countries. The congressional members 
of the (\S. delegation to the Food Conference actively participated 
in t]ic sessions of the Conference and strongly influenced the position 
eventually taken by the United States on the adi isability of establish- 
ing a world food n serve. 

For the first time, both Houses agreed to separate development 
sistance from military assistance. The 1975 Foreign Assistance Act 



Prepared bj Theodor Galdi, Analyst In Internal lonal relations. 

(841 



85 

authorized economic aid of $1,567,150,000 for fiscal year 1976 and 
$1,496,800,000 for fiscal year 1977, slightly more than requested by 
the President. The measure reaffirmed previous congressional direc- 
tives that U.S. foreign economic assistance should attempt to increase 
the amount of aid going to the world's poorest nations and to focus 
that aid more directly on the poorest people in those countries through 
such programs as food and nutrition, population planning, health, 
and agricultural assistance to small farmers. This philosophy of eco- 
nomic assistance was enunciated initially by the Congress in the For- 
eign Assistance Act of 1973 (Public Law 9:3-189) which substantially 
reformed U.S. foreign aid policy. 1 

Substantive changes contained in the 1975 act include a require- 
ment that at least 75 percent of Public Law 480 food sold abroad go 
to those countries with a per capita gross national product of $300 or 
less, and a directive that two-thirds of the funds authorized for popu- 
lation planning and health programs be used directly in population 
activities. In addition, the act urged the President to negotiate for 
an international system of food reserves, increased emphasis on dis- 
aster assistance funding and assistance to countries in meeting their 
energy requirements, and required the President to submit to Congress 
an assessment of global food production, the steps being taken by other 
countries to increase their food assistance, and the relationship of 
L T .S. aid to that of other countries. (Additional specific items in Pub- 
lic Law 94-161 are discussed in other sections of this report: See 
human rights and Africa sections in particular.) 

Both the House International Relations and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committees initiated a new procedure for consideration of 
H.H. 9005, conducting simultaneous hearings and markup during open 
sessions, with representatives of executive agencies and other witnesses 
available for direct questioning during the markups. 

The extremely large majority for passage of the foreign aid au- 
thorization in the House (244-155) would seem to indicate a degree 
of support in the body for economic assistance that has been absent 
for several years. Some concern has been expressed that the separation 
of economic aid from military aid would jeopardize the passage of 
both. Clearly, this was not the case. The passage of the "new direc- 
tions'' reforms in 1973, and the increasing awareness of Congress of 
the nature of these changes, seems to have been a major element of 
the support received in the House. The changes made in Public Law 
480 policy this year also were very widely supported. In the Senate, 
the same factors contributed to a 12-vote increase in the margin favor- 
able to passage compared to the vote on last year's foreign aid 
authorization. 

Probably the most significant factor in the passage of this year's 
foreign aid authorization was the dominant role that Congress played 
in drafting the final legislation. Of the three titles in II. I*. 1)005. titles 
I and II were almost entirely the resuli of congressional initiative. 
Like th r ) congressional! y initiated "new directions" in 1973, the changes 

1 For more detailed discussion of these roforms, see : 
U.S. Congress. Bouse : 

Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mutual Development and Cooperation A. f of 107.°.. 

TT. Popt. No. o:5 388. July 20. 107.-,. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1973 and 

Committee on International Relations, implementation of "New Directions" in 

Development Assistance. (Committee print) U.S. Government Printing Office, 

July 22. 1975. 86 pp. 



86 

made this year in Public Law 480 policy, and ro a lessor extent the 
consolidation of disaster assistance legislation, were designed to re- 
orient U.S. aid policy in a direction which is supported by large con- 
gressional majorities. 

1975 Foreign Assistance Act Legislative History 

May 15. 1975 — President Ford submitted $1.51 billion fiscal year 197t3 and $1.45 
billion fiscal year 1977 foreign economic assistance request to Congress, 
II. Doc. 94-15S. 

Aug. 1. 1975 — House International Relations Committee reports out H.R. 9005, 
the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975. II. Kept. 
9-1-442. 

Sopr. 10. 1975— H.R. 9005 passed by House. 244-155 

Oct. 1. 1975 — Senate Foreign Relations Commitree reported out H.R. 9005. S. 
Rept. 94-406. 

Oct. 28, 1975 — H.R. 9005 favorably reported by Senate Agriculture and Forestry 
Committee. S. Rept. 94-434. 

Nov. 5, 1975 — H.R. 9005 passed by Senate. 54-41. 

Dec. 4. 1975 — Conference report filed. H. Rept. 94-G91. Senate agreed to con- 
ference report by voice vote. 

Dec. 9. 1975 — House approved conference report, 265-150. 

Dec. 20, 1975 — Measure signed into law. Public Law 94-161. 

Foreign aid appropriations 

Because of the late passage of the 1074 foreign assistance authoriza- 
tion, final congressional approval of a fiscal year 1975 foreign assist- 
ance appropriation was not forthcoming until March 197,5. close to 
the end of the fiscal year. The measure eventually reported and passed 
( U.K. 1592, Public Law 94-11) appropriated s:>.(57 billion in economic 
and military a-sistanco for the year. $2.1 billion less than authorized, 
and 10 percent below the administration's budget request. Substantial 
cuts were made in nearly all programs, with the exception of security 
supporting assistance and the Middle East special requirements fund, 
which were funded at the same level as tliev had been in fiscal 
197!. 

Sim mart of Majob Provisions of Public Law 94-11, Fiscal Ykar l!>7."> 
Kojm.igx Assist.vxci: Appropriation Compared "With Am<m !TT8 Appropki- 
A'lii) for Fiscal Ykar 11)74 

(In millbns of dollars) 

Fiscal yejf— 



Title I: 

Food and nutrition. 

Population planning and health 

Fducation and human resources 

Selected development problems 

Selected countries and organizations 

Indochina postwar reconstruction 

Middle East Spe.ial Requirements Fund 

Security supporting assistance 

Military assistance 

Titl'i II : Foreign military credit sales 

Title III: 

Peace Corps 

Refugee assistance 

International financial institutions 



1975 


1974 


s.ioo 


$500 


125 


165 


82 


92 


37 


53 


30 


39 


440 


617 


100 


100 


660 


660 


475 


600 


300 


405 


77 


76 


148 


174 


619 


788 



The \'erv lukewarm Bupporl for the appropriation was probably duo 

Bveral factors. Among the most prominent were concern over the 

• lion and I he rery Large projected Federal budget deficits for fiscal 

L975 and L976; a reluctance to provide any further aid to South 



87 

Vietnam and Cambodia ; and the feeling by many that the funds could 
better be used in this country. In addition, some Members indicated 
that too much attention in the aid program was devoted to political 
and economic considerations and not enough to humanitarian 
considerations. 

Fiscal year 1976 foreign assistance appropriations were also delayed ; 
H.Ii. 12208 was reported by the House Appropriations Committee on 
March 1, 1976 (H. Eept. 94-857) , and passed by the House on March -4. 
As passed by the House, the bill provides a foreign assistance ap- 
propriation of $4.98 billion, $1.3 billion above the fiscal year 1975 
measure, and $775 million below the administration request, with a 
large part of the increase attributed to Middle East programs. The 
measure was passed by the Senate on March 23, 1976 (S. Kept. 94-704) 
and a conference report (H. Rept. 94-1006), has not been approved in 
both Houses as of this writing. 

Fiscal Year 1975 Foreign Assistance Appropriation Legislative History 

Feb. 20, 1975 — House Appropriations Committee reports out House Joint Resolu- 
tion 219 to continue foreign assistance funding through March 31, 1975. 
H. Rept. 94-16. 

Feb. 28, 19 T5 — House passed House Joint Resolution 219. House Joint Resolution 
219 passed by Senate, amended to eliminate funds for AID and other foreign 
aid programs as a demonstration of Senate dissatisfaction with repeated 
funding of foreign assistance through continuing resolutions. 

Mar. 6, 1975 — Conference committee on House Joint Resolution 219 agreed to ex- 
tend funding through March 25, with understanding that fiscal year 1!»75 
foreign assistance appropriation would be reported out promptly. H. Rept. 
94-44. 

Mar. 11, 1975 — House Appropriations Committee reported out H.R. 4592. fiscal 
year 1975 foreign assistance appropriation. H. Rept. 94-53. 

Mar. 13, 1975— H.R. 4592 passed by House, 212-202. 

Mar. 17, 1975 — H.R. 4592 reported by Senate Appropriations Committee. S. Rept. 
94-39. 

Mar. 19. 1975— H.R. 4592 passed by Senate, 57-40. 

Mar. 24. 1975 — House and Senate agreed to conference report on H.R. 4592. II. 
Rept. 94-108. 

Mar. 26, 1975 — Measure signed into law. Public Law 94-11. 

Security assistance legislation 

On October 30, 1975, 5y 2 months after the original submission of 
the administration's request for the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act, the 
President sent to Congress a message and draft legislation for the 
security assistance programs. Asserting that the delay had been duo to 
the administration's review of Middle East policy and the rapidly 
changing events in Indochina, the President proposed a security as- 
sistance package of $3.4 billion, which would finance a $4.6 billion pro- 
gram. There were no major policy changes proposed except for the 
addition of a new section on military training and the repeal of pari 
V, Indochina Postwar Reconstruction, of the Foreign Assistance Act. 

By program, the President's request was broken down as follows: 

Thousands 

Military assistance program ."540!). 000 

Security supporting assistance 1,800,000 

Foreign military credit sales 2, 324, 000 

The largest portion of the request, some $3.4 billion, was intended for 
four Middle East countries: Israel, $2.2 billion in foreign military 
credit sales and security support ing assistance : Egypt, $750 million in 
security supporting assistance; Jordan, $250 million in military as- 



sistance, foreign military credit sales, and security supporting assist- 
ance : and Syria. $90 million in security supporting assistance. In other 
areas, significant amounts were requested for Greece ($225 million). 
Turkey ($205 million), and South Korea ($200 million). Portugal was 
programed for $55 million in security supporting assistance. 

The response in Congress to the security assistance request was 
mixed. In the recent past, congressional concern over U.S. arms aid 
has been directed mostly at the grant military assistance program. 
With the continuing increase in foreign military credit sales, some 
Members of Congress have questioned all U.S. arms transfers, whether 
by grant, credit, or cash. Because many of those who favored cutting 
military aid significantly at the same time supported the $2.2 billion 
request for Israel, the exact legislative impact of their general opposi- 
tion to military aid is difficult to assess. In the Senate, S. 2662, sub- 
mitted by Senator Humphrey on November l.°>, 1075, contained many 
provisions advocated by opponents to military aid. Among its most 
significant provisions, it would abolish the military assistance pro- 
gram, except for training, by the end of fiscal year 1976: prohibit 
military aid to any country that discriminated against U.S. arms 
sellers on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex; create a 
process whereby Congress could disapprove of any arms transfer ex- 
ceeding $25 million: and create a process whereby the President or 
Congress could designate a country ineligible for any form of mili- 
tary aid. 

At the adjournment of Congress in December 1975, no security 
assistance bill had been reported in either House. 2 

I nter- American Development Bank and African Development Fund 
The House of Representatives indicated its support for multilateral 
as well as bilateral foreign assistance in 1975 when it passed II. R. 9721. 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and African Develop- 
ment Fund (AFDF) Act of 1975. The measure authorizes $2.25 billion 
as the U.S. share of a replenishment of IDB funds and $25 million 
subscription to the AFDF, the first U.S. participation in that Fund. 
The $2.25 billion IDB authorization would require congressional ap- 
propriation of $1.32 million and cash outlay of $720 million over the 
next 4 years. The U.S. share of the capital increase is broken down 
among (he various TDB funds as follows : 

[In millions of dollars] 

Fiscal year — 



1976 



1977 approxi- 1978 approxi- 1379 approxi- 

Authorintion Appropriation mation mation matien 



Total IDB $2,250 $240 $140 $110 $200 

Funrtfnr special operations '."0 0) 200 200 

1,650 219 240 240 

ill ible 93C .'J 

un.-3l pnid-in 170 40 40 40 

Die' 600 200 200 200 

i The administration is requiting $275,000,000 In fiscal \" .r 1976 to complete the U.S. commitent under 1970 IDB 
replenishment, 

7 f >lhhle ordinary capital requires a congressional appropriation but does not involve an actual budgetary cash outlay. 
It is use1 by the bank as collateral. 

- s. 2662 (S. Kept ?»i 801, .fin ::«>. 1976) was pawed by the Senate on Feb. 18, 1070. 
U.K. 11968 m Rept, 94 Ma Feb. 24, 1976), the Booee rerilou of the fiscal year 1976 
i > r < - : u' 1 1 military assistance measure, was paBted by the BoU86 OB Mar. 3, 1970. 



89 

Two amendments were added to H.R. 9721 during floor debate, 
The first is consistent with language in the International Development 
and Food Assistance Act of 1975 (Public Law 94—161) and directs the 
U.S. Governor to the IDB to vote against assistance to any country 
engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights ; 
the second instructs the U.S. Executive Director to the IDB to pro- 
pose a resolution which would make intermediate technologies major 
facets of the Bank's development strategy and to report to the Con- 
gress on the progress of this resolution. 

The large majority of House Members favoring final passage of 
H.R. 9721 (249-166) came as a surprise to both supporters and oppo- 
nents of the bill. One factor ma}' have been that it immediately pre- 
ceded the lopsided House vote to accept the conference report on 
H.R. 9005, the International Development and Food Assistance Act 
of 1975. In any case, it seems clear that the comment of the bill's floor 
manager that H.R. 9721 reflects the House Banking and Currency 
Committee's view that U.S. foreign economic assistance efforts should 
emphasize multilateral as well as bilateral channels applies equally to 
the whole House. 

Ixtek-American Development Bank and African Development Fund 
Legislative History 

Oct. 8. 1975 — H.R. 9721 reported by the House Banking and Currency Com- 
mittee, authorizing a $2.25 billion U.S. contribution to the Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank replenishment and a $25 million U.S. contribution to the African 
Development Fund. H. Rep. 94-541. 

Dec. 9. 1975— House passed H.R. 9721, 249-166. 

Mar. 1, 1976 — H.R. 9721 reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee. S. Rept. 94-673. 

Mar. 30, 1976— Senate passed H.R. 9721. 

May 11. 1976 — Senate agreed to conference report. H. Rept. 91-1121. 

May 20. 1976 — House agreed to conference report. 

May 31, 1976— Approved by President. Public Law 94-302. 

Indoch ina assistance* 

Congress' decision in 1975 to reject the administration's request for 
additional military assistance to South Vietnam and Cambodia com- 
pleted a 2-year period of decline in congressional support for Ameri- 
can military aid to the non-Communist states of Indochina. Congres- 
sional cuts in military aid in fiscal years 1973 and 1974 pointed up the 
growing differences between the administration and Congress over 
the nature and scope of the American commitment to the Govern- 
ments in Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane in their conflicts with 
Communist forces. Public opinion polls indicated that the Amercan 
people increasingly favored the position held by the congressional 
opponents of aid. 3 

Congressional sentiment against new military aid hardened with 
the advent of 1975 despite two developments. First were the numerous 
press reports, beginning in the summer of 1974. that cuts in military 
aid had seriously affected South Vietnam's military capabilities by 
creating shortages of spare parts for aircraft and artillery and short- 

* Prepared by Larry Nikseh, analyst in Asian affairs. 

• For example, a Gallup poll conducted in January 1073 Immediately following tbe 
signing of the cease-fire agreement found that 50 percent of the American people opposed 
military aid t<» South Vietnam in the event North Vietnam launched an offensive ; 38 percent 
favored aid under those circumstances. 



.2— 70- 



90 

ages of ammunition. 4 The second development was the appearance of 
signs that North Vietnam was preparing a major offensive against 
South Vietnam in 1975. 5 In January 1975. the North Vietnamese 
launched a large-scale attack in Phuoc Binh Province and seized the 
Province. High ranking Communist officials since have disclosed that 
the purpose of the Phuoc Binh offensive was to test the South Viet- 
namese Army and the reaction of the United States. 6 

Simultaneous with the Phuoc Binh offensive was the increasingly 
eroded military position of the Cambodian Government's Army. By 
early January, Khmer Eouge Forces had cut all land supply routes 
into Phnom Penh and had made increasingly difficult the U.S. -directed 
effort to supply the capital by way of Mekong River convoys. 

On January 28, 1975, President Ford requested supplemental fiscal 
year 1975 military aid appropriations of $300 million for South Viet- 
nam and $222 million for Cambodia. He stated on February 9 that he 
was willing to work out with Congress a plan to terminate all military 
and economic aid to South Vietnam after 3 years. However, the House 
Democratic Caucus voted 189 to 49 on March 12 against any new mili- 
tary aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia for fiscal year 1975. The 
Senate Democratic Caucus followed suit on March 13 by voting 38 to 5 
against additional aid to Cambodia and 35 to 6 against aid to South 
Vietnam. 

The deteriorating situation of the Khmer Republic prompted Con- 
gress to deal first with the request for Cambodia. The Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee reported a bill on March 21 (S. 663, S. Rept. 
94-54) which authorized $155.4 million in supplemental military and 
economic assistance ($82.5 million in military aid) for Cambodia. The 
bill prohibited further aid after June 30, 1975. However, the House 
International Relations Committee voted on March 15 to adiourn for 
the Easter recess without acting on a bill put forth by its Subcommit- 
tee on Special Investigations. Moreover, the administration asserted 
flint it could not accept legislation that would cut off aid after June 30. 
because such a prohibition would end any possibilitv of negotiations. 
However, by early March, senior analysts in the Defense Department 
and the CIA reportedly gave the Khmer Republic little chance of 
survival, and CIA Director William Colby reportedly expressed this 



'Senator Snm Nunn stated in a February 107.") report on his inspection trip to South 
Vietnam that congressional cuts in aid were responsible for the shortages which, in turn. 
had i "negative psychological effect" on South Vietnamese Forces. Representative rani 
McCloskey also cited a relationship between aid levels and ammunition shortages Id 

reporting on bis February 1975 visit to South Vietnam (see Congressional Record. Mar. 14. 
B1183 F11V7K Both Nunn and McCloskey noted that the South Vietnamese bad 
been trained In American tactics with heavy emphasis on the use of nirpower. artillery. 
and armor, thui necessitating hiL'h levels of outside military aid. Tn a series of articles 
published in April F»7<;. North Vietnam's Chief of Staff. Oen. Van Tien Dnng. stated that 

congressional aid cuts bad resulted in a 60-percent reduction in South Vietnamese fire- 
power and a fiO-percent reduction in South Vietnamese mobility. 

r - in October H»74. the Viet namese Communists escalated their conditions for negotia- 
tion 1 with the South Vietnamese Government, demanding President Thleu't resignation 
recondition for talks to resume. In late December 1074. a Soviet mission beaded by 
the Russian Armed Forcei Chief of staff visited Hanoi and reportedly pledged a fourfold 
Increase in Soviet milltarv aid to support an offensive (see Robert Bhaplen'a "Letter from 

Ralgnn" in the New Yorker, Apr. 21. 1!>7r>). Also in December, North Vietnam's Defense 

Minister Vo Nguyen Olap, in two major speeches, described the balance of forces in Vietnam 
as Increasingly favorable to the revolution because of the decline of morale and combat 

effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Forcei and the "political confusion and a weakened 
political position" Of the United States. Tn hil April H>70 series of articles. North Vietnam'-; 

General Dung disclosed that the Hanoi Politburo believed as early a< October 1874 thai 

the Hnlted states would not Intervene agalnsl ■ North Vietnamese offensive in the South 

because of its "internal contradictions,'' particularly President Nixon's resignation and 

momlc problems. 

nds Nayan. "Suddenly Last Bpring." Par Eastern Economic Review, v. so. Sept. 12. 

:'.. r ). This article is bated on interviews with leading Communist Official! in South 
Vietnam. 



91 

pessimistic view to the House Committee on Special Investigations 
on March 10. 7 

On March 10, North Vietnamese Forces launched major attacks in 
the central highlands of South Vietnam. On March 18, President 
Thieu ordered a general withdrawal from the northern provinces of 
military regions I and II, but the withdrawal quickly became a dis- 
organized disintegration of South Vietnamese forces in the north. By 
the end of the first week in April, six of South Vietnam's 13 combat 
divisions had ceasecl to function, and Xorth Vietnam controlled ap- 
proximately two-thirds of South Vietnam and had some 300,000 regu- 
lar troops in the country. 

Congress reconvened from its Easter recess on April 7 faced with the 
critical situation in South Vietnam and strong public sentiment 
against new military aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia. A Gallup 
poll of March 9 and a Harris poll of April 10 showed respectively 
78 and 75 percent of the American people opposed to President Ford's 
aid requests. 

On April 10, President Ford put forth a revised proposal for aid to 
South Vietnam : $722 million in military assistance and $250 in eco- 
nomic assistance for the remainder of fiscal year 1975. Bills were intro- 
duced in the House and Senate to increase the total authorization of 
military aid from $1 billion to $1.2 billion (S. 1451) and $1.42 billion 
(H.R. 5929) . Neither bill was reported out of committee. 

After April 15, administration officials acknowledged that the mili- 
tary situation in South Vietnam was untenable but argued that addi- 
tional military aid might contribute to a negotiated transfer of power 
to the Communists rather than a total North Vietnamese military vic- 
tory. However, the surrender of the Khmer Republic on April 17 and 
the bleak military prospects for South Vietnam prompted Congress to 
attempt legislation for humanitarian assistance and evacuation of 
Americans and South Vietnamese from South Vietnam. The House 
and Senate passed separate bills on April 23 (S. 1484 and H.R. 6096) 
that authorized $150 million for evacuation and humanitarian assist- 
ance and granted the President limited authority to use U.S. Armed 
Forces to evacuate American citizens and certain categories of Viet- 
namese. On April 25, conferees approved a report (S. Kept. 94-97) 
providing $327 million in refugee, evacuation, and humanitarian aid, 
and retaining the Senate bilPs evacuation authority. However, before 
a vote could be taken on this measure. South Vietnam surrendered to 
the Communists on April 30 ; and President Ford sent American troops 
into the Saigon area to assist in evacuation. On May 1, the House 
rejected the conference report, thus killing the bill. 

Shortly after South Vietnam's surrender, the Communist Pathet 
Lao took effective control of the Government of Laos. Anti-American 
demonstrations inspired by the Pathet Lao resulted in harassment of 
U.S. officials and seizure of some U.S. facilities. The L T nited States and 
Laos agreed on May 27 to close the Agency for International Devel- 
opment mission in Laos and withdraw all employees. Reacting to this 
situation, Congress in June placed a provision in a continuing appro- 
priations resolution for fiscal year 1976 (IT. J. Res. 499, Public Law 
94-41) that prohibited the use of any funds in the bill for financial aid 
to Laos, and also to North and South Vietnam and Cambodia. 

7 Lyons. Richard. "Colby Skeptical on Cambodia." Washington Post, Mar. 11. 1975. 
Getler, Michael. "Experts Fear Aid Too Late for Cambodia." Washington Post, Feb. 27, 
1975. 



92 

Multilateral Economic Relations With Developing Countries* 

In 1975, the United States participated in two major forums at which 
overall economic relations with the less-developed countries (I/DCs) 
were the primary topic of discussion: The two energy producer-con- 
sumer preparatory conferences and the resultant Conference on Inter- 
nationa] Economic Cooperation, and the Seventh Special Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly on Development and Inter- 
national Cooperation. 

In the spring of 1975, Congress held hearings on U.S. preparations 
and the issues that were likely to be discussed at the Seventh Special 
U.X. General Assembly. Congressional advice on policy formulation 
was <riven to the administration during the summer, and a large con- 
gressional delegation attended the Special Session. 

The short background which follows is included in order to under- 
stand the events which lead to the producer-consumer conferences 
and the Seventh Special General Assembly. A summary of Secretary 
Kissinger's speech to the Special Session is included because its pro- 
posals, if pursued seriously by the United States and accepted as the 
basis for concrete negotiations by the less developed countries, could 
form the agenda for the North-South economic discussions for the 
next several years. 

Background 

The year 107-i had been marked by maior confrontations between 
the United States and LDC's on international economic matters. At 
the Sixth Special U.N. General Assembly on Energy and Develop- 
ment held in April and May, the General Assembly adopted a declara- 
tion and program of action on the establishment of a new international 
economic order, which had been proposed by the Group of 77, the 
more than 100 less developed countries so named because they num- 
bered 77 when they first organized at the UXCTAD III conference 
in 1071. The acceptance of the Declaration and Program of Action 
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order was 
due mainly to the cohesion of the LDC's, which had been strengthened 
by the lack of response of the developed countries to the Arab oil boy- 
cott and the OPEC oil price increases, and by the failure of the United 
Suites and the developed countries to provide any coherent opposition 
to the new international economic order proposals. The acceptance 
of the declaration and program of action was followed in December 
bv the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States at the 29th U.N'. General Assembly by a vote of 120 in favor; 0. 
including the United States, opposed; and 12 abstentions. 

In the New International Economic Order and the Charter of Eco- 
Domic Rights and Dut ies of States, the Id H "s presented their concept 
of a completely new structure of economic relations between the de- 
veloped and less developed countries, rn the mo I significant provisions 
of these two sets of documents, the LDC's demands Included: 

(a) Full and permanent sovereignty <>ver their raw materials 
and resources; 

<1>) Special ucress to developed country markets for their ex- 
ports, including nonreciprocal tariff preferen< 

(c) The creation of integrated commodity markets through, 

• Prepared i>y Theodor Galdl, analyst to international relation!. 



93 

among other mechanisms, commodity agreements and producers 
associations ; 

(d) Indexation of prices on raw material with those of manu- 
factured goods ; 

(e) Increased automatic aid flows ; 

(f ) Monetary reform, including a link between SDK's and new 
development aid ; 

(g) Greater participation by the LDC's in the affairs of the 
international financial institutions ; 

(h) Greater access to technology ; and 
(i) Stringent controls over multinational corporations. 
In addition to opposing the adoption of important policy decisions 
by majority voting without opportunity for debate, the United States 
had opposed the New International Economic Order and the Charter 
of Economic Eights and Duties of States because of their nonmarket 
biases and because of the nonreciprocal nature of many of their 
provisions. 

The Energy Producer- Consumer Conferences 

It was against this background of LDC cohesiveness and militance 
that the energy producer-consumer preparatory conference was sched- 
uled to take place in Paris from April 7 to April 16, 1975. The United 
States at that time was reluctant to attend such a conference because 
it felt that the bargaining position of the industrialized oil-consuming 
countries was particularly weak. Attendance at the preparatory con- 
ference was made conditional upon achievement of a three part energy 
program : the adoption of conservation and floor price policies by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) and OECD acceptance of a 
standby $25 billion financial support fund to insure that industrialized 
countries would not encounter serious problems financing oil pur- 
chases. 8 

The preparatory conference adjourned without reaching final agree- 
ment on an agenda. Disagreement centered around the unwillingness 
of the developed countries to accede to LDC and oil-producing na- 
tion demands that the plenary conference consider a full range of 
development-related issues. 9 Following bilateral discussions with the 
French, other developed countries, oil producers, and LDC's a second 
preparatory conference was held in Paris on October 13-16. Agree- 
ment was reached on an aide-memoire drafted by France before the 
meeting. The aide-memoire stated that eight representatives of indus- 
trialized nations and 19 from LDC's should attend the conference, 
and that four commissions — on energy, raw materials, development, 
and financial affairs were to be established^ 

The Conference on International Economic Cooperation was held 
in Pnris December 16-19. 1975. The LTnited States was especially in- 
terested in six areas: the price of oil and the security of oil supply as 
they affected the world economy; the serious balanee-of-payments 
problems of the LDC's: the conditions of international investment; 

8 The proposed policies were accepted by the IEA in February and March, an ' on April 0. 
all of the members of the OECD except Australia agreed to participate in the financial 
snoriort fund. 

9 The United States continued to oppose expanding the negotiations to Include develop- 
ment Issues for slightly less than four weeks following the collapse of the preparatory 
conference. On May 10. 1075. In a speech piven to the Kansas Oi f y International Relations 
Council. Secretary' of State Kissinger announced that the United States was prepared to 
attend a new preparatory meeting, and that U.S. thinking on the Issue of raw materials, 
and the manner in which it could he addressed Internationally had moved forward. 



94 

commodity issues, especially food ; trade problems ; and the pressing 
needs of the poorest LDC's. 

The final communique of the conference reflected the terms of the 
French aide-memoire. Four commissions, each consisting of 15 mem- 
bers, were established. The United States and the European Commu- 
nity were represented on all four commissions, with the United States 
and Saudi Arabia assigned to be cochairman of the Energy Commis- 
sion. The commissions were to begin their work on February 11, 1976. 
The subjects to be discussed by each of the commissions were not 
spelled out in the final communique. 

Thus did 1975. a year which had started marked by intense con- 
frontation and conflict between the United States and the LDC's, end 
on a note of tentative compromise. The total disagreement between 
the industrialized and less developed countries which had manifested 
itself at the April energy producer-consumer preparatory conference 
had been softened somewhat by the final resolution of the Seventh 
Special U.N. General Assembly. By the time of the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation in December, there seemed to be 
a substantial decrease in rancor and an increased willingness to nego- 
tiate on the part of all parties. Whether the substantive points of 
difference between the United States and the LDC's, such as indexa- 
tion, mandatory controls over multinational corporations, and multi- 
ple commodity agreements can be reconciled, still remains to be 
determined. 

The Seventh Special United Nations General Assembly on Develop- 
ment and International Cooperation 

Unlike the case of the Sixth Special U.X. General Assembly which 
had been called hurriedly into session by Algeria, planning for the 
Seventh Special General Assembly on Development and International 
Cooperation began during the 29th regular General Assembly session 
held at the end of 1974. A preparatory committee for the seventh 
special session met several times in March. April, May, and June of 
1975. 

At the Mar 2, 1975, meeting of the U.X. Preparatory Committee, 
the Group of 77 LDC's circulated a provisional list of specific areas 
for consideration at the special session. These were: International 
trade, transfer of real resources and monetary reform, science and 
technology, industrialization, and structural reform of the United 
Nations. The United States felt that this list was an advance over 
previous Group of 77 generalized demands for the immediate imple- 
mentation of a new internationa] economic order. In pursuing bilat- 
eral contacts with LDCV the United States suggested Its own list of 
agenda topics. These were international commodity trade, interna- 
tional food needs, transfer of financial resources, problems with the 
poorer Id K J's, and si ruct ural changes in the U.N. system. 

(1) v try of State Kissinger's Speech to the Seventh r.X. Gen- 

eral Assembly, At the opening session of the Seventh Special Gen- 
eral Assembly on September 1. L975,U.S. Ambassador Moynihan read 
Secretary Kissinger's speech to the Genera] Assembly — one of the 
iiin-i important and comprehensive presentations ever made by the 
ted States to the United Nations. After the introductory portion, 
the speech sel out five areas that the United States felt were fundamen- 
tal to an effective development strategy: Ensuring basic economic se- 
curity, accelerating economic growth, t rade and development, commod- 



95 

ities, and assisting the poorest countries. Some 41 proposals were made 
for action to meet the demands of the Group of 77. 

Under the heading, "Ensuring Basic Economic Security" Kissinger 
proposed the creation of a new development security facility in the 
IMF to stabilize the overall export earnings of the less developed 
countries, by making loans of up to $2.5 billion a year to sustain devel- 
opment programs in the face of export earnings fluctuations. 

Under "Accelerating Economic Growth,-' Kissinger identified three 
basic requirements for accelerating the growth of LDC's : Providing 
better access of LDC's to capital markets, promoting the transfer of 
technology to them, and reaching an international consensus on the 
principles to guide the operations of multinational corporations. To 
meet the first of these requirements, Kissinger urged several policies : 

(1) The expansion of the activities of the World Bank and the 
regional development banks ; 

(2) U.S. support for a major expansion of the International 
Finance Corporation, the World Bank affiliate charged with help- 
ing private enterprise in LDC's, and the creation of an Interna- 
tional Investment Trust in the IFC to mobilize portfolio invest- 
ments in LDC local firms ; and 

(3) The provision of U.S. expertise in helping LDC's ready to 
enter long-term capital markets. 

In the area of technology transfer, Kissinger promised U.S. support 
for increased energy exploration and development through the crea- 
tion of an International Energy Institute, and for greater food pro- 
duction through increased U.S. bilateral agricultural training; and 
for industrialization through creation of an International Industrial- 
ization Institute and an International Center for the Exchange of 
Technological Information. 

Commenting on the role of multinational corporations, Kissinger 
said that the time had come for the international community to artic- 
ulate standards of conduct for multinational corporations and for host 
country governments. Among the principles that should be agreed 
upon were : (a) Host countries should treat multinational corporations 
equitably, without discrimination, and in accordance with interna- 
tional law, (b) multinational corporations and host governments 
should both respect the contractual obligations they undertake, and 
(c) standards should apply not only to private enterprises but also to 
mixed and state-owned enterprises. 

Under the heading, "Trade and Development," after observing that 
for the LDC's, trade was perhaps the most important engine of devel- 
opment, Kissinger outlined U.S. policy in this area : 

(1) LDC's in their early stages of development should receive 
special treatment through a variety of means ; 

(2) The manufacturing sectors of the LDC's should be given 
greater opportunities through tariff preferences ; in keeping with 
this, the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences was to be put 
into effect January 1, 1970 : 

(3) Nontariff barrier limitations should be adjusted to take 
into consideration the special circumstances of the LDC's: 

(4) The United States was willing to work for early agreement 
on tariffs for tropical products, and to negotiate to permit certain 
subsidies for LDC products ; and 



96 

(5) The United States was willing to join other participants 
in Geneva to negotiate changes in the current system of tariff 
escalation on raw materials whereby tariffs were lowest for un- 
processed raw materials and highest on manufactures or other 

processed goods. 

In return, the LDC's and the developed countries had an obligation 
to create a system in which no nation withheld or interfered with 
normal exports of raw materials. 

In the section. "Commodity Trade and Production", Kissinger ob- 
served that exports of primary products were crucial to the incomes 
of the LDC's, and that both industrial and developing countries would 
benefit from more stable conditions of trade and an expansion of 
productive capacity in commodities. Kissinger restated the details of 
earlier U.S. proposals for the creation of a system of nationally held 
world food reserves, and indicated that the United Stat ■ is ready 
to discuss new arrangements for individual commodities on a case-by- 
case basis. He recommended that a consumer-producer forum be esiab- 
lished for every key commodity to discuss how to promote the effi- 
ciency, growth, and stability of its market. Kissinger announced that 
the United States was actively participating in negotiations on a 
coffee agreement, was willing to join in forthcoming cocoa and sugar 
negotiations, and was prepared to sign the international tin agreement. 
In addition, Kissinger stated that the United States would support 
liberalization of the existing IMF buffer stock financing facility, 
would support the role of the World Bank in a new international 
effort to expand raw material production in LDC's, and would con- 
tribute to and support the new United Nations revolving fund for 
natural resources in its encouragement of worldwide mineral explora- 
tion and development. 

In the section of the speech, "The Poorest Nations", Kissinger dis- 
cussed the particular needs of the poorest countries and concluded 
that their elemental economic security could be assured through adop- 
tion of proposals the United States had already made. These were : ( 1 ) 
The November 1975 U.S. offer to establish a $2 billion trust fund 
in the IMF for emergency balance-of-payments relief to the poorest 
countries. (2) creation of a development security facility in the IMF 
to deal with LDC balance-of-payments fluctuations due to unstable 
export earnings, and (3) U.S. programs designed to decrease the large 
food losses in LDC's due to inadequate storage facilities and from 

Finally, in the section, "The Political Dimension", Kissinger set out 
1 1 io principles he felt should govern the exercise of ihc responsibilities 
of the increased role sought by the LDC's in international institutions 

and negotiation-. 

(1) The process of decision should be fail-. No country should 
have exclusive power in areas basic to the welfare of others. This 
principle was valid for oil as well as t rade and finance. 

(2) The methods of participation must be realistic. Only gen- 
uine rons nsua could generate action, The real diversity of inter- 
est among states should not be submerged by bloc discipline or 
in unrepresentative majorities. 



97 

(3) The process of decision should be responsive to change. 
While changes in relative economic power should be reflected in 
international institutions, continuing basic economic realities, 
such as the size of economies, participation in world trade, and 
financial contributions must carry great weight. 

(4) Participation should be tailored to fit the issues at hand. 
The institutions and procedures chosen to deal with problems 
should be those appropriate for the size and nature of the prob- 
lem. 

He then made several recommendations for restructuring the United 
Nations to rationalize its fragmented assistance programs, streamline 
the Economic and Social Council, and develop a mechanism for inde- 
pendent evaluation of U.N. programs. He concluded his speech by 
observing that the steps to be taken were not limited by technical 
possibilities, but by political will. 

(2) The Final Resolution of the Seventh Special Session. — The 
Kissinger speech, which received an initially favorable response from 
the LDC's, marked the beginning of 15 days of intensive negotiations 
on the text of the final resolution for the session, which was accepted 
by the United States only after extensive last minute negotiations, and 
after the United States entered reservations to certain sections. 

Most of the language in the final resolution paralleled that of the 
New International Economic Order, with somewhat more ambiguity 
as to the exact mechanisms to achieve the measures proposed and the 
time periods to accomplish them. The one-sided responsibilities placed 
on the developed countries for improvement of the economic condi- 
tions of the LDC's remained, although many of the proposals in Kis- 
singer's speech were incorporated into the final resolution. Several 
of the operational recommendations were to be developed in time for 
final decision at the May 1976 United Xations Conference on Trade 
and Development. An ad hoc committee was authorized to report on 
ways to make the U.N. system more capable of dealing with problems 
of international economic cooperation and development in an effective 
manner, responsive to the requirements of the New International 
Economic Order. 

As previously noted, the United States submitted a statement of 
reservations to the final resolution. In the statement. Ambassador 
Mverson said that the United States joined in most of the specific 
undertakings of the final resolution and associated itself with its 
larger objectives, but did not accept several of its provisions. 10 Assist- 
ant Secretary of State Thomas Enders. who served as chief T T .S. 
negotiator at the end of the session, stated that he believed that the 
final resolution " * * * was responsive to our needs as well as to the 
poor." " 



10 Specifically the United States maintained that it did not recojrnize that thp world 
was embarked on the establishment of a n»w international economic order : opposed any 
manipulation of the terms of trade or a policy of indexation; did not believe that specific 
envelopment aid tareets would aehieve their jroal : did not support any link between the 
creation of new SDRs and development assistance: believed that decision makin<r in in- 
ternational organizations should take due account of relative economic positions and 
contributions of resources : disagreed that the creation of a legally binding code of conduct 
for the transfer of technology was the path to pnrsue ; ;md did not support those para- 
graphs of the final resolution relating to consultations by the U.N. Industrial Development 
Organization on a series of agreements concerning industrialization between tbe developed 
and less-developed countries. 

11 Washington Post. Sept. 17, 1975. p. A21. 



98 

Role of Congress 

On May 19. 21, and July 8, 1975. the Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Organizations of the House Internationa] Relations Commit- 
tee held hearings on the issues that were forthcoming at the Seventh 
Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, and on what the 
expected United States response to these issues was likely to he. 1 - The 
interest exhibited at the«e hearings and by other members of the 
International Relations Committee continued to be expressed during 
the summer both at meetings of committee members and high ad- 
ministration officials and through contacts of committee staff members 
with the Department of State. 

On July 30, 1975, four members of the International Relations 
Committee, Representatives Fraser, Bingham, Whalen, and Biester 
sent a letter to Secretary of State Kissinger indicating that they 
hoped the United States attitude at the Seventh Special Session 
would be one of accommodation and compromise rather than of 
confrontation. The letter stated that the American position should 
avoid the defensive and negative attitude that had previously char- 
acterized U.S. policy toward the Third World. 13 

On August 10, 1975, Senators Humphrey, McGee. Percy. Clark, 
and Javits sent Secretary Kissinger a letter encouraging him to 
announce constructive U.S. initiatives at the Special Session which 
would address the concerns of the developing world. The Senators 
indicated that the current U.S. recession and the income distribution 
taking place as a Jesuit of the oil price increases made it politically 
unacceptable to advocate greater direct transfers of resources to the 
developing countries. 14 

On October 13, 1075, the congressional advisers to the Seventh Spe- 
cial Session (Senators McGee. Javits, Clark, Humphrey, Morgan, 
Gravel, Glenn, Percy, Dole. Domenici, Bellmon, and Packwood, and 
Representatives DiggS, Obey. Green. Buchanan. Whalen, Biester. 
Fraser, and Burke) issued a report on their activities. 10 In it the 
advisers indicated their support for Secretary Kissinger's proposals. 
and for the final outcome of the session as a step toward bridging the 
gap separating the rich and poor of the world. In concluding their 
report, the congressional advisers urged: (1) That the executive 
branch give the U.\. system the priority in foreign consideration it 
deserved, (2) that the success of the Seventh Special Session in cre- 
ating a positive dialogue and an atmosphere of negotiation on North/ 
South issues be carried forward in the l.N. system, the energy 
producer-consumer conferences and other forums, (3) that the execu- 
tive branch be receptive to congressional advice during the process of 
foreign policy formulation, and congressional participation in inter- 
national conferences and (1) that Congress give prompt and full 
consideration to the initiatives taken by the executive branch in this 
area. 



i s C(,n-r<^ B Coi rait tee "» International Relations, Subcommittee, mi Inter* 

■i Organization I the Special Besslon " f the 1978 D.N. General \ §embly, 

Hearing! 94tn I May 19, 21, and July B, 1975. Washington, D.B. Government 

Printing Ofl re 197 » 27 I pp 

tlonal .Tonrnal Od 25, 1975. ,,. U82. 
' r Id op 1 182 1 189 

H Committee on International Relations. Benate. Committee on 

'eft by ConaTea lonal Advisers t<» the Seventh Special Session <<t 
;t,.i x.iti. n Wa hlnpton. 0.8. Government Printing Office, 1975. 07 pp. At head 
( I nt Committee Print. 



99 

"While no Members of Congress attended the Conference on Inter- 
national Economic Cooperation, staff members from the House Bank- 
ing and Currency, House International Relations, and Senate For- 
eign Relations Committees attended. The House International Rela- 
tions Committee issued a committee print, 16 which examined the 
progress that had been made and the likely direction that the four 
commissions would take. 



16 U.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. North-South Dialogue. 
94th Cong. 2d sess. Committee Print. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 
21pp. 



CONGRESS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
International Monetary Affairs* 

During 1975, the international monetary system showed its ability 
to deal with large flows of petrodollars; and steps were taken to make 
rms in the system. Three issues of monetary reform that 
were resolved in IDT") were of concern to Congress: (1) The place of 
floating exchange rates in the IMF regime, (2) the future monetary 
rolt 1 of gold, and (3) the revision of IMF quotas. 1 Throughout 1975, 
Secretary of the Treasury Simon and other administration officials 
k< pi Congress informed of the U.S. position and the status of negotia- 
tions on international monetary reform. 

Appropriate congressional committees considered the problems ac- 
tively and issued reports and statements in response to executive 
branch positions, but accomplished little in terms of seeing their views 
adopted by either the executive branch or the IMF. Xo legislation was 
involved in IDT.";; the Congress will be requested to authorize and 
appropriate funds to provide for the increase in United States IMF 
quotas in 1 ( .>7(>. 

Following joint hearings in July of the Subcommittee on Interna- 
tiona] Trade. Investment, and Monetary Policy of the House Banking 
and Currency Committee and the Subcommittee on International 
ics of the Joint Economic Committee, the two subcommit- 
I d a joint report. 2 Three of its recommendations are of imme- 

n-i. First, the subcommittees si rongly supported the position 
of Treasury Secretary Simon on exchange rates.' 1 They recommended 
ing exchange rate system require no official IMF sanction 
and that t\iv IMF Articles of Agreement be modified to make either 
floating or fixed rates equally acceptable policies. The second recom- 
mendation was that intervention in exchange markets should take 



•Prepared by Theodor Galdi, analysl la International relations. 

1 The sixth General Review of quotas had been scheduled by the Internationa] Monetary 
Fund In 1970 to be completed by February i!»Tr». However, the Increase in economic power 
of the major oil exporting countries, the demands of the less developed countries for in- 
creased automatic Access to the Fund, and the redistribution and relative reduction in the 
share of total quotas among the major Industrialised countries all caused difficulties thai 
were not finally resolved until just before the IMF annua] meeting which began on Sept. i. 
1975 \t thai time, it was agreed that the total of nil quotas in the Fund was to he raised 
::•-' r, percent, to SDR :'.!• billion ($46.8 billion at the time of the annual meeting). The 
United States 1 share of the increased total declined to 20 percent from the previous 24 

percent. An amendment to the [MF articles was also negotiated which would require 85 

i'e,-, -.iit instead of the previous 80 percent of the votes of members to adopt decisions of 
the Fund on Important matters. 'This effectively retained the veto held by the United states 
In unit i creased quota. 

• U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Banking and Currency. Subcommittee on Inter 

national Trade. Investment and Monetary Policy, ami Joint IVonomic Committee. Sub 

committee on International Economics, Exchange Rate Policy and International Monetary 
Reform 94th Cong., 1st sess. Committee Print. Washington, r.s. Government Printing 
■ 

titutlon of floating exchange rates by the United states in February 1078, 
the ofl i position favored a continuation of the system. Treasury Secretary Simon 

•'■■"i i tated. Including at the joint hearing, that the rnited states continued 

• Ible exchange rite and that he foresaw no circumstances in the immediate 

I re: Mm t.» |i\ed rates, on the other hand, the French hnd 

•d the floating rate regime from the beginning and favored the reinstate 

men! of tin. prevlou fixed rate system 

(100) 



101 

place only to combat or prevent the emergence of disorderly conditions. 
Intervention was not to attempt to influence the trend of exchange 
rate movements. These two recommendations and the strong support 
given to the administration's position were extremely important dur- 
ing the negotiations on the continuation of floating exchange rates. 4 In 
fact, the final configuration of the exchange rate compromise was 
almost exactly what had been recommended by the subcommittees. 

The subcommittees' third recommendation, concerning gold, began 
what was to be a series of congressional disagreements over the direc- 
tion that IMF policy on gold was taking. 5 Agreeing that the decisions 
to abolish the official price of gold and dispose of the Fund's holdings 
were entirely appropriate, the subcommittees recommended that the 
IMF adhere to an agreed schedule for disposal of the gold. However, 
the subcommittees took strong exception to the proposal to sell a por- 
tion of the Fund's gold for the benefit of the less developed countries. 
The basis for this opposition was the belief that the removal of gold 
from its monetary role should not be determined by the needs of the 
developing countries. The primary purpose of the gold sale should be 
reform of the international monetary system, not aid to the less de- 
veloped countries. It was also feared that use of the profits from the 
sale in order to help the less developed countries could lead to a com- 
mitment by the IMF or its individual members to support a certain 
price or avoid sales that might depress the market below a certain level. 
The subcommittees concluded by recommending that U.S. gold sales 
should be based on a policy of converting this currently unproductive 
asset into a form yielding the maximum possible returns. 

On September 17, 1975, the chairmen of both subcommittees took 
exception to the final gold sale decisions that had been made by the 
IMF. 6 Representative Henry Reuss stated that he was opposed to the 
gold sale plan because it was extremely inequitable and would reward 
the rich more than the poor. He also indicated that the plan would 
constitute a partial revaluation of the world's gold stock and thus did 
not clearly reduce the future role of gold in the international monetary 
system. 7 

Representative Thomas M. Rees took exception to the plan because 
it enhanced the possibility that gold, at its higher price, could once 



4 Final resolution of the conflict over exchange rates did not take place until the 
November 15-17 meeting of the heads of state of France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States at Rambouillet. France. There, President Ford 
and French President Giscard D'Estaing agreed to a system providing for a continuation 
of floating exchange rates but with a formal mechanism of regular consultation among 
finance ministers to allow intervention to prevent wide fluctuations in exchange rates. 
The language that eventually appeared in the new IMF article IV on exchange rates 
closely followed this agreement. In addition, the amended IMF article stated that any 
agreement to return to fixed exchange rates would have to be approved by an 85 percent 
vote of the members. 

5 At its January 1975 meeting, the Interim Committee of the IMF decided to move toward 
a complete phaseout of the monetary role of gold. In June it was decided that this phasoout 
would include abolition of an official price for gold and removal of any obligation under 
the IMF charter requiring the use of gold in transactions between members. The changes 
were designed to enhance the role of the special drawing rierht (SDK) as the central ;<sset 
of the international monetary system. It was also agreed that a portion of the IMF's gold 
would be sold in the open market with the proceeds to be used for the benefit of the less 
developed countries. 

°It had been announced at the IMF annual meeting that one-sixth of the Fund's gold, 
some 25 million ounces, would be sold in the open market with the difference between 
the open market price and the official price — the difference being about $100 an ounce 
at the time of the annual meeting — to be set aside for the benefit of the less developed 
countries in proportion to their quotas in the Fund. A second one-sixth of the Fund's gold 
was to be returned to the members in proportion to their quotas. 

• Reuss. Henry S. The Golden Rule. IMF Style. Remarks in the House. Congressional 
Record [daily ed.] v. 121, Sept. 17, 1975 : IIS77G-H8778. 



102 

again become the central reserve asset in a new international mone- 
tary system. He saw five unfavorable consequences arising from the 
proposed sale: It would be highly inflationary: the benefits would ac- 
crue largely to the richer countries: the real value of the benefits re- 
ceived by the less developed countries would be reduced by the infla- 
tionary consequences of the growth of the money supply in developed 
countries: gold itself would become a much more important monetary 
asset: and special drawing rights, because of the large increase in 
Liquidity caused by the increased gold prices, would be devalued as 
the central asset in the international monetary system. 8 

The issue was again raised by Representative Reuss on December 17. 
107.") in a report by the Subcommittee on International Economics of 
the Joint Economic Committee on the proposed IMF gold sale. 9 Re- 
peating his earlier contention that the gold sale would result in a wind- 
fall for the richer countries, he advocated that the proceeds from what- 
ever <rold was sold by the IMF be given entirely to the less developed 
countries. Significantly, three other members of the subcommittee, 
Senators Ribicoff and Taft. and Representative Rousselot, while ob- 
jecting to the gold sale, disagreed with the Reuss position on the 
grounds that any changes in the role of gold should be kept separate 
from development aid questions, and any distribution of gold should 
be made on the basis of members' quotas in the Fund. 

Finally, on December 24, 107."). following confirmation of reports 
that the Bank for International Settlements was to be used as the agent 
of the group of 10 industrialized countries to circumvent IMF rules 
forbidding central banks to purchase gold above the official $42 an 
ounce price. Representative Reuss indicated that in addition to violat- 
ing IMF rules, this action would infringe congressional authority. He 
called upon Treasury Secretary Simon to postpone agreement on the 
gold sale until Congress had had a chance to review the matter. lie 
warned that Congress would refuse to approve the entire monetary 
reform package if the gold agreement were not postponed. 

On January 10. 107G, following agreement on the entire package 
of IMF reform proposals at Kingston, Jamaica, Secretary Simon 
indicated that Congress did not have to approve the gold sale since, 
in his opinion, gold belonged to the IMF and could be disposed of as 
the. Fund chose. However, the gold price abolition, legalization of 
floating exchange rates, and the smaller tLS. quota in the Fund all 
would have to be ratified by ( Jongr 

Foreign [nvestment Policy* 

ign investment m the United States 
Congressional action regarding control of foreign investments in 
the United Slates during M>7.> included review of several reports from 
the executive branch on foreign investment activities in the United 
States, several hearings on issues raised by the growth of foreign 
investment in the United State--, and study of issues involved in Arab 

'Prepared by John Co I In International relatione 

m Congressman R<'<< question* tenatire IMF agreement on cold. Remsrks 
in tli. l Record [dally ed.] v. 121, Sopt. 17. 1975: H. B779 H. S7S0. 

lc committee Subcommittee on International Economies. 
Mr Agreement on Gold. 94th Cong., 1st seat., .i<>int Committee Print, 
ernmenl Printing Office, 1975. it pp. 



103 

boycotts of U.S. industry. While no final action was taken in 1975, 
the concern of Congress with the growth of foreign investment in the 
United States was made evident, and groundwork was laid for possible 
legislative action during the second session of the 94th Congress. 

Pursuant to the terms of the Federal Energy Administration 
(FEA) Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-275), and the 1974 Foreign 
Investment Act (Public Law 93-479), several reports were submitted 
to Congress in 1975. A "Report to Congress on Foreign Ownership, 
Control and Influence on Domestic Energy Sources and Supply." 10 
in response to the 1974 FEA Act. notes that while data on foreign 
investment is collected by many agencies and departments within 
the Government, there are no data collection activities oriented specifi- 
cally toward foreign investment, and that comprehensive improved 
data collection will be required for such an analysis. These findings 
were also substantiated by a Joint Council on International Economic 
Policy/Office of Management and Budget (CIEP/OMB) report, 11 
pursuant to the 1975 Foreign Investment Act. The FEA report also 
notes that while foreign participation in our domestic energy in- 
dustries is small, it is growing at a faster rate than foreign invest- 
ment in the rest of the economy. 

In October 1975, the Treasury and Commerce Departments issued 
their respective interim reports on foreign direct portfolio investments 
in the United States. 12 In addition to these congressional^ mandated 
reports the Congress held extensive hearings in 1975 on foreign in- 
vestment in United States. The House International Relations Sub- 
committee on International Economic Policy requested information 
and data on foreign investment in the United States, and a progress 
report on the foreign studies, in conjunction with its review of author- 
izing legislation for the Presidents Council on International Economic 
Policy (CIEP). A summary of the committee staff findings was pub- 
lished in the hearing. 13 

A similar review of foreign investment in the United States was also 
undertaken before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Invest- 
ment and Monetary Policy of the House Committee on Banking, Cur- 
rency and Housing. 14 In conjunction with the congressional review, 
CIEP submitted to the Congress a joint CIEP/OMB study, as the 
first by the Government "to identify individual foreign investors'' 
and to highlight the reporting requirements of the regulatory agencies 
which collect data on an individual company and transaction basis. 15 



10 U.S. Federal Energy Administration. Office of International Energy Affairs. Report 
to Congress on : Foreign Ownership Control and Influence on Domestic Energy Sources 
and Supply. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1974. 80 pp. 

11 U.S. Council on International Economic Policy/Office of Management and Budget. U.S. 
Government Data Collection Activities With Respect to Foreign Investment in the United 
States. March 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 300 pp. 

12 U.S. Department of Treasury. Interim Report to Congress on Foreign Portfolio Invest- 
ment in the United States. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, 110 p. ; U.S. Department 
of Commerce. Interim Report to Congress on Foreign Direct Investment in the United 
States. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. vol. 1, 10:5 pp.. vol. 2. 
appendices. 

13 U.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Economic Policy. Authorization legislation for and the operations of the Council 
on International Economic Policy. Hearings. 94th Cong., 1st. sess. Apr. 15. 1975. Wash- 
ington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. pp. :i:5-:;!). 

14 U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing. Subcommittee 
on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy. Foreign investment in the 
United States. Hearings, 94 Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
1975. 21G pp. 

u T'.S. Council on International Economic Policy /Office of Management and Budget, 
op. cit, pp. 1-6. 



104 

Amidst growing national concern over foreign investments in the 
United State-, a number of bills were introduced in 1975 to limit such 
investments. S. 425, sponsored by Senator Harrison Williams, the For- 
eign Investment Act of 1975, proposes to amend the Securities Ex- 
change Act of 1934 : 

To require notification by foreign investors planning to acquire more than 
."> percent of the equity in United States Companies and. if the assets oi sneh 
company exceed si. 000.000. requires that such notification be given at least 30 
days before acquisition. 

It further: (1) authorizes the President to prohibit such acquisition 
as appropriate for the national security, to further the foreign policy, 
or to protect the domestic economy of the United States: and (2) re- 
quires issuers of registered securities to maintain and file with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a list of names and na- 
tionalities of the beneficial owners of their equity securities. The bill 
was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs. 

The Ford administration revised its policy on foreign investment 
in the United States, as Congress called for more statutory restrictions. 
President Ford signed Executive Order 11858 on May 7, 1075. creat- 
ing a high-level interagency committee, the Foreign Investment Com- 
mittee (FTC), chaired by the Under Secretary of the Treasury, to 
monitor foreign investment in this country. The committee will tra -\ 
the impact of foreign investment in the United States and coordinate 
I aL policy toward foreign investors. It is also hoped that the monitor- 
ing system will help guide 1 foreign governments on any major invest- 
ments they plan to make in the country. 

The momentum for restrictions on foreign investments in the United 
States was intensified witli further disclosures of: (1) The Arab boy- 
cott of American firms trading with Israel; and (2) the boycott of 
rican companies owned by Jews or employing Jews. In particular, 
in early 1975 allegations were made that several U.S. companies and 
( rovernment agencies, the Army Corps of Engineers in particular, were 
supporting indirectly the Arab boycott of Israel by discriminating 
against .Jews in hiring for jobs in Saudi Arabia. Press reports sug- 
gested that Arab States and Arab-owned Companies refused to join 
international financial consortia which involved Jews. "Jewish-owned 55 
companies, or companies on the boycott list. Others expressed Pears 
thai Arab oil money invested in the United States companies would 
both weaken U.S. control over its economy and lead to discriminatory 
pracl ices by Arab-controlled companies. 

In response to < hese disclosures, Senator Stevenson introduced S. 953 

ii>7">. in order to strengthen the ant iboycoi I provisions of 

U.S. law. S. 953 was referred to the Subcommittee on International 

Finance along with S. 425, the L975 Foreign Investment Act. for hear- 

ivember 7. L975, the International Finance Subcommittee 

ommend to the full committee a composite bill containing 
. 953 and S. t25. On December 17, L975, the full commit- 



nate : Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Bubcom- 

oal Finance. Foreign Investment and Arab boycott legislation. Hear- 

.inly 22 and 28, 1975. Washington, D.8. Government Printing 

I pp. 



105 

tee agreed to the subcommittee report. The bill was filed with the Sen- 
ate on February 6, 1976. 17 

As recommended, title I of S. 953 is to strengthen U.S. law against 
foreign boycotts and to reduce their domestic impact. In particular, the 
bill (1) prohibits U.S. firms from furnishing any information regard- 
ing the race, religion, or national origin of its employees, shareholders, 
or directors or similar information on any other U.S. company; (2) 
prohibits U.S. firms from refusing to do business with other black- 
listed firms; and (3) requires semiannual reports to Congress on ac- 
tions taken by the executive branch to implement antiboycott policies. 

Title II of S. 953 would establish methods for identifying the extent 
of ownership in U.S. companies. Since 1960, foreign investment in 
the United States has grown at a rate of $600 million a year. 18 Al- 
though reserving "broad discretion*' to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for establishing reporting procedures, the com- 
mittee would require (1) the residence and nationality of persons 
acquiring more than 5 percent of any registered equity security of 
a U.S. company; (2) information as required by the SEC by persons 
having 2 percent or more interest in a U.S. company; and (3) reports 
by the SEC on August 1, 1976, and August 1, 1977, on implementation 
of new disclosure standards. 

The Arab boycott, discrimination, and the related issue of foreign 
investment emerged as the subjects of still other congressional com- 
mittees. The Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, in particular, studied 
the impact of the Arab boycott on American industry. At a hearing 
of the subcommittee (Sept. 22) U.S. Secretary of Commerce Rogers 
C. B. Morton defied a congressional subpena requesting Commerce 
Department data on American businesses approached by the Arabs 
about cutting off trade with Israel. Morton said he was not legally 
obligated to provide the information. He cited an opinion by Attorney 
General Edward H. Levi that the Export Administration Act requires 
that such information remain confidential. A subcommittee move to 
cite the Secretary for contempt of Congress was averted when Morton 
agreed to release the reports to the committee on a confidential basis. 

The Ford administration is opposed to S. 953 for two basic reasons : 
(1) The retaliatory nature of the legislation would not alleviate the 
Arab boycott, but would, instead, risk aggravating it; and (2) Aral) 
nations would turn to other countries for supplies of goods and prod- 
ucts, which would damage U.S. interests both domestically and in the 
Middle East. As an alternative, the Ford administration suggests 
that the United States promote closer economic ties with all Middle 
East nations to demonstrate the potential contribution of U.S. firms 
to their economies, increasing Arab awareness as to the "economic 
cost*' of their boycott. 19 

In a related development, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
included a provision in the fiscal 1976 foreign economic aid authoriza- 



17 U.S. Congress. Senator Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Foreign 
Boycotts and Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Acts of liiT." ; Report 
to Accompany S. 953. 04th Conpr., 2d sess. S. Kept.' 94-G32. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 1976. 33 pp. 

1S Ibid., p. 13. 

19 ITS. Congress. Senate: Committee on Rankin.tr, Housing and Urban . A fT;iirs. Snbcommit- 
on International Finance. Foreign Investment and Arab Boycott Legislation, op. clt., 
pp. 2-9. 

74-032— 7 tl 8 



106 

tion law (Public Law 94-161. sec. 666) to stop Arab discrimination of 
American Jews. The act prohibits the President from considering race, 
religion, national origin, or sex when assigning officers or employees 
to foreign countries. 

On December 9 and 10. 197.*). the Senate Foreign Relations Subcom- 
mittee on Multinational Corporations held hearings on the impact 
of foreign investment on the U.S. economy. The hearings followed 
the release of a subcommittee study which analyzes the long-term 
impact of massive capital exports on the basic structure of the domestic 
economy in order to understand the distribution of economic returns 
between capital and labor that results from foreign investment. 20 

Multinational corporations 

Both the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the 
House International Relations Committee and the Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee, continued their studies of multinational corporations (MNC) 
activities in 1975. Hearings and reports focused on such topic< as 
multinational oil corporations and U.S. foreign policy, including 
corporate political contributions to foreign countries, the Eurodollar 
operations of MXC's, and contributions of U.S. -owned corporations 
to foreign officials. Legislation was considered which would intensify 
the monitoring of MXC's activities abroad, as well as obtain certain 
kinds of information (H.R. 7539, H.R. 7563, H. Res. 1043, II. Res. 
1<)99), and to urge the U.S. Special Representative for Trade Negotia- 
tions to work toward the development of a code of conduct for inter- 
national trade (S. Res. 265). However, no substantive legislation was 
reported by either committee, whose principal contributions were 
informational. 

From January to March 1975. the Senate Subeommitee on Multi- 
national Corporations held hearings on "Political and Financial Con- 
sequences of the OPEC Price Increases." - 1 The hearings focused on 
the following areas: The nature of the international oil crisis: the 
impact of recent oil price increases on international credit markets; 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) $25 billion financial soli- 
darity fund: oil import financing: OPEC investments in the United 
States: the Arab League boycott of multinational corporations: and 
the outlook for petroleum consumption and prices. 

The House International Relations Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy focused on somewhat different aspects of multina- 
tional activities. 88 In hearings held in June, Jul v. and September 
L975, the subcommittee probed contributions by American corpora- 
tions to foreign officials. The chairman of the subcommittee, Robert 
\ ( . i!ed at the opening of the heari] 

* * * Charges that American corporations have malntaine Funds tor 

aymenl of gratuities to foreign government and political officials nave been 

Foreign Relation! Subcommittee on Multl- 

■ rporationa Dlr»e1 Investment Al>n>.-i<i and the Multinational*: Effects on the 

Committee print. August 1975. Washington, I sment 

Ice. 1978 i 

r.s Congress. Renate : Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee <>n Multi- 
national Corporations. "Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy." 
Rearing pi 11 94tl 9. F b 8, 14, 20. 20. Mar. 11 and 18, 107.". 

rnment Printing Office, 1975. 476 pp. 
' Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter- 

national Economic Policy. "The Activities of Amor-lean Multinational Corporations 
'• Hearings. 94th Cong., Tune f». Jnlr 17. 24. 29, Sept 11, 18. and 30. 

1978 Washington irnmenl Printing Office, 197.1. :*>:;0 pp. 






107 

made and substantiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Civil Aeronautics Board. Such payments to foreign officials are not a violation 
of American law at present, although they are very often a violation of foreign 
law. However, it is a requirement of the United States Code that American 
corporations make full disclosure of their assets and liabilities to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Internal Reve- 
nue Service. It is also true that if the purpose of the payments was anticom- 
petitive in intent, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice would 
have a basis to begin legal proceedings. 1 " 

The State Department opposes any legislation that would be directed 
to the behavior of U.S. citizens abroad, or relations with foreign offi- 
cials, in particular. Such legislation would involve the United States 
in the surveillance of activities taking place in foreign countries, in- 
cluding the behavor of foreign officials, and would fundamentally 
intrude our moral veiews into a foreign culture. 24 In comments on the 
possible antitrust ramifications of these activities, Donald I. Baker, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division, De- 
partment of Justice, observed that : 

While bribery has not been explicitly at issue up to now in cases involving 
international trade * * * there is no logical reason why bribery of foreign 
officials may not be involved in future international activities which are the 
subject of antitrust litigation. 25 

In summer 1975 the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Cor- 
porations also held hearings on "political contributions to foreign 
governments." 26 The investigation focused on the following areas : 
(1) The circumstances that led to corporate payments abroad; (2) 
the legality of these payments; and (3) whether companies that made 
corporate payments abroad have investments which are guaranteed, 
in whole or in part, by the U.S. Government. Primary focus of the 
hearing concerned overseas payments by Exxon, Gulf Oil, Mobil, 
Xorthrop, and Lockheed. The subcommittee was particularly con- 
cerned about alleged Lockheed Aircraft Corp. kickbacks to Saudi 
Arabian sales agents, as well as hiring these agents for political in- 
fluence rather than for their expertise in selling aircraft to the Middle 
Eastern nations. According to Lockheed chairman Daniel J. Haugli- 
ton : "Lockheed does not defend or condone the practice of payments 
to foreign officials,'' but rather, "the practice exists, and that in many 
countries it appeared, as a matter of business judgment, necessary in 
order to compete against U.S. and foreign competitors." 27 

In February 1976, the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Cor- 
porations resumed its hearings on political contributions to foreign 
governments, revealing information detailing an extensive pattern of 
Lockheed payments to influential persons in Japan, Italy, the Nether- 
lands, West Germany, and Turkey. As a result of the disclosures many 
of these countries began their own investigations. On March 3, 1976, 
the House amended the International Security Assistance Act of 1976 
(S. 2662) to permit a cutoff of military aid to countries that extort 
or receive bribes from L T .S. corporations doing business overseas. 28 



»Ibid., p. 1. 

-* Ibid., p. 24. 

»Ibid., p. 68. 

88 U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Multi- 
national Corporations. Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy. 
Hearings, part 12. 04th Oon~. 1st soss. Mnv lfi. 19, June 0, 10, July 16, 17. ami Sept. 12, 
1975. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 1175 pp. 

wibid.. p. 346. 

2=1 Pickle. J. J. International Security Assistance Act of 1970. Remarks in House. Con- 
gressional Record [daily edition] vol. 122, Mar. P>, 1070 : II1560. 



108 

(At the time of this writing the House-Senate versions of S. 2662 have 
been referred to conference committee.) On March 28, 1976, President 
Ford announced the creation of a cabinet level task force to investi- 
gate the alleged misconduct of American corporations abroad. 29 In late 
1975 the Senate agreed to Senate Resolution 265, stating the sense of 
the Senate that the Special Trade Representative for Trade Negotia- 
tions (STR) should develop a code of conduct in international trad- 
ing. According to Senator Curtis : 

The basic thrust of the resolution is t«» express the resolve of the Senate that 
appropriate officials in the executive branch undertake to negotiate an inter- 
national code to eliminate bribing, indirect payments, kickbacks, and other un- 
ethical or questionable practices which burden international trade * * * I sub- 
mit * * *\ve are confronted here with an international problem requiring an 
international solution. 30 

Hearings were conducted in mid-1975 with respect to the domestic 
international sales corporation. At issue is continued Federal support 
of the controversial tax deferral privilege offered American companies 
that ship goods abroad. Companies with overseas subsidiaries are 
privileged to defer payment of taxes on their foreign earnings until 
and unless those earnings are repatriated in the form of dividends to 
\ .S. stockholders. Critics maintain that the deferred payment, or so- 
railed deferment, can become a permanent waiver of the tax pay- 
ment. Supporters of the DISC program contend that the tax deferral 
benefits allowed stimulate U.S. exports and help create a favorable 
balance of international trade. They also argue that the tax break is 
needed to encourage exports as an alternative to relying on sales by 
foreign subsidiaries of American companies. Still others maintain that 
the DISC program should be maintained as a bargaining chip at the 
Internationa] trade negotiations now in progress in Geneva. On July 
-2-\ the House Ways and Means Committee heard these arguments and 
others from the representatives of major exporters on whether or 
not to alter the tax deferral benefits of the DISC system. 31 

In fall 1975 the Ways and Means Committee recommended curbing 
the authorities of the DISC system. In particular, the committee rec- 
ommended: (1) Restricted use of existing provisions allowing a cor- 
poration to indefinitely defer taxes on 50 percent of income from ex- 
port- through ;i DISC 1 ; (2) denied DISC benefits for exporting mili- 
tary equipment and agricultural products not in surplus in the 1 [nited 
State- after October 2, 1DT5: and (X) allowed DISC 1 benefits to con- 
tinue for 5 years on exports of natural resources and energy products 
under fixed price or fixed quantity contracts despite repeal of the 
H for such exports by 1^75 tax cut legislation. 82 Whereas the 
I [ouse approved t hese conl roversial curbs to t he 1 )IS( ) program, 88 the 



'iv pacts t<> detail antlbrlbery plani thli wrpk : Pnnol of four doe to !ii<l 

Richard rm \ •• fori Times. Mar. 29, 1978 : C45. 

rtls, Carl T. D.S. trade abroad. Remarks in Senate. Congressional Ro.-ord [dally 
edltlonl vol 121, Nov 12, 1975 : S. 19799. 

i - Coi ■■• House: Committee on Ways and Means. Tax Reform. Hearings. 94tb 

July 28, 1975. Washington, D.S. Government Printing Office, L975. 874 pp. 

is Congress ii> n e: Committee on Ways and Means. Tai Reform \<t of liii". ; 

• to Accompany u R. 10612. * * 1 1 1 1 Cong., I si Bess. (Rept. No. 94 688). Washington, 

•nmenl Printing Office. i:i7r>. 47« pp. 
i R. 10612 was reported to the n<.us«- by tin- full committee on Nov. 12, 1975, and 
approved by th<> House of Representatives on I >ec. -J. 1975. 



109 

Senate Finance Committee held up action on these and other measures 
until the second session of the 94th Congress. 

April 14—16, 1975, members of the House of Representatives par- 
ticipated in the seventh meeting between U.S. Members of Congress 
and members of the European Parliament to discuss "The Multina- 
tionals : The View From Europe." The members of the Committee on 
International Relations filed a summary report of their activities to 
the full committee, which was published in September 1975. 34 

I X TERN ATIOX AL Tr ADE * 

Early in 1975 the 1974 Trade Reform Act (Public Law 93-618) be- 
came law, with provisions affecting U.S. foreign economic and polit- 
ical relations with the rest of the world, particularly with Communist 
countries and much of the developing world. The law represents an 
important example of congressional impact on the formulation of U.S. 
foreign policy. 

The 1974 Trade Act, signed into law by President Ford on Janu- 
ary 4, 1975, includes the Jackson- Vanik provision which prohibits 
granting most-favored-nation status and U.S. Government credit 
terms to countries which restrict free emigration of their countries. 
(See pp. 60-63.) Section 501 of the trade law provides for duty-free 
treatment for any eligible articles from certain developing countries 
while excluding various nations and all members of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). At a January 20. 1975, 
meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), 16 Latin 
American countries attacked the new U.S. Trade Act as "discrimina- 
tory" and "coercive." because Ecuador and Venezuela, members of 
OPEC, were affected by the trade law restrictions. President Ford 
voiced similar objections to the congressional ly imposed trade restric- 
tions, especially as they affected the extension of U.S. trade preferences 
to Ecuador and Venezuela. The President noted that the provision had 
"seriously complicated our new dialog with our friends in the hem- 
isphere." He made a similar observation with respect to the trade bill 
provision that had linked trade preferences for the Soviet Union to its 
emigration policies for Jewish citizens, and had limited the amount of 
U.S. credits and investment guarantees. 

With the enactment of the 1974 Trade Act. the United States was 
enabled to renew its trade negotiations under the auspices of the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A central element of 
the Trade Act is a system for congressional approval of trade agree- 
ments negotiated by the executive at the GATT session. The Trade 
Act requires that most agreements, along with legislation to imple- 
ment them, must be submitted to Congress for approval or disap- 
proval within 60 legislative days after submission (or in the case of 
bills involving revenue, 90 days). Special provisions of the act guar- 
antee that the legislation will be brought up for a vote within that time, 



• Prepared by John A. Costa, analyst in international relations. 

34 U.S. Conerress. House: Committee on International Relations. The Multinationals: 
The View From Europe. Munich : 1975. Report on the Seventh Meeting of Members of 
Congress enrt of the European Parliament, April 1075. Pursuant to H. Res. .31.". Washing- 
ton. U.S. Government Printing Office, v.;7.~i. 120 p. 



no 

meeting the objections other countries raised during earlier trade 
negotiations that Congress would not act promptly on those agree- 
ments that required legislative approval. Both Houses must approve 
such implementing legislation, by majority vote of the Members pres- 
ent and voting, before agreements negotiated ran enter into force for 
the United States. 

In addition, the new procedure requires the President to consult 
with Congress, or at least with those five Senators and five Repre- 
sentatives designated as congressional advisers. In 1975, the Ford ad- 
ministration and kev Members of Congress attempted to devise a sys- 
tem that will keep the legislative branch informed about the develop- 
ing U.S. negotiating positions before thev are finally adopted: con- 
ional advisers and designated committee aides have been given 
3S to U.S. position papers and to the cable messages that flow be- 
tween "Washington and Geneva, and briefed by the negotiator*. Also, 
the administration promised to submit informally its draft of a pro- 
posed export subsidies code to congressional advisers in order to ob- 
tain their views before transmitting the proposals to Geneva. 

On February 4. 107."). shortly after enactment of the Trade Art of 
1074, the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means issued a print entitled "Background and Status of the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations." 35 This print described the work 
in the (rATT and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) during the period from the conclusion of the 
Kennedy round in 1007 until the opening of the multilateral trade 
negotiations (MTX) with the signing of the Tokyo Declaration in 
September 1073. It also described in some detail the preparatory work 
of the United States and the ministerial level Trade Negotiations 
Committee (TXC). which is in charge of the MTX. Finally, that 
print outlined preparatory work for the MTX within the U.S. Gov- 
ernment, particularly the establishment of the Government/private 
sector advisory committee structure as required under the Trade Act 
of 1074. A second print 36 (supp. T) issued on September 10. 1975, 
summarized the progress and status of each of the six MTX areas dur- 
ing the first phase of the actual negotiations between February and 
Julv 107.") meetings of the TXC. Tt also comments on the timing and 
outlook for the MTX in the near term, including important facts of 
,' the House Ways and Means Committee should be aware in its 
trade oversight and advisory functioi 

Additional Rfi n 

D B Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations In Brazil and Mexico: Structural Sources of Eco- 
nomic and rToneconomic rower. Committee Print. August 197& Wth Cong., 
1st eess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 212 pp. 

The primary objective of the study, prepared for the Subcommittee by 
Richard s. Newfarmer and Willard F. Mueller of the University of Wisconsin. 
w.-is to develop reliable economic knowledge about such issues a< industrial 
denationalization, the determinants of market power and its use by MNC's, 
and the role of the state in lost nations as a countervailing Cores In coping 



BTOQM : rnmmltfpp nn Wayi nml Mejins. Subcommittee on TrnnV. 
''round and Btatni of the Multilateral Trade Negotiation*." Committee Print. 04th 
1978 U.S Government Printing Office. 1978 88 pp. 
<• • Committee on Wav* and Means Rnhcommlttee <~>n Trade. "' 
rronnd and Btatwi or th<- MuitMiio-r.-ii Trade Negotiations : Rnpplement I." Committer Print. 

1978. U.S. Governmenl Printing Office, 1975, ■"••" pp. 



Ill 

with multinational corporations. The authors believe that only if policy- 
makers have such a foundation of reliable knowledge of how things are and 
what makes them so can they decide how a foreign policy of mutual benefit 
to the United States and other nations in which MNCs operate might be 
constructed. 
Multinational Corporations in the Dollar Devaluation Crisis : Report on a 
Questionnaire. A Staff Report. Committee Print. June 1975. 94th Cong. 1st 
sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 122 pp. 

The Subcommittee staff also prepared a report on "Multinational Corpora- 
tions in the Dollar Devaluation Crisis : Report on a Questionnaire." The study 
is based on the responses of multinational companies, trading companies and 
small international concerns to a questionnaire requesting data on various 
types of currency and billing operations during the two-stage dollar-devalua- 
tion crisis of February and March of 1973, and data for the corresponding 
months of 1972, permitting for the first time an examination of the Euro- 
dollar operations of multinational corporations, as well as the way in which 
these corporations manage the timing of billing and payments. Also included 
are a breakdown of worldwide cash and liquid assets, by currency, with a sep- 
aration of dollar and Eurodollar holdings ; information on trade accounts re- 
ceivable and payable by currency ; information on short-term bank borrowing, 
by currencies ; and data on short-term forward purchases and sales by currency. 
The study suggests that U.S. multinational corporations did not use the forward 
market or the banking sector to hedge short-term against the devaluation of the 
dollar in the first quarter of 1973. However, the authors do argue that some 
of these firms did protect themselves against the anticipated devaluation 
over a longer term by shifting the currency composition of liquid assets and 
debt and by preparing accounts payable in currencies expected to be devalued. 
Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy. Report. Committee 
Print. January 2, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975. 172 pp. 

A narrative analysis of the American corporate presence in the major Mid- 
dle Eastern oil producing countries, the report examines the U.S. Government's 
active intervention in behalf of Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Standard Oil of Cali- 
fornia and Gulf and the foreign policy role of these countries, the system of 
supply allocation that the established international majors used to run Mid- 
dle Eastern oil during the 1950s and 1960s, and the decline of Anglo-American 
dominance of Middle East oil since 1970. 

The report, which grew out of hearings held in 1973 and 1974, brings into 
focus several issues, including whether or not the U.S. Government should 
become more involved in the decision-making and negotiating process for 
foreign oil purchasing. The Subcommittee was of the view that it would not 
be advisable to organize a Federal Energy Corporation to replace the oil 
companies as bargaining and purchasing agents, and that it is not realistic 
or desirable to return to the company run system of the past. 
Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. Inter- 
national aspects of antitrust laws. Hearings. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 1437 pp. 

This hearing includes material in the following areas : list of criminal and 
civil cases brought by the Department of Justice involving the Webb- 
Pomerene Associations; list of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cases 
against Webb-Pomerene Associations ; list of completed Webb-Pomerene cases 
classified by violation ; Department of Justice memorandum analyzing the 
antitrust issues underlying twelve cases thought by some to be examples of 
how the antitrust laws may deter United States exports ; the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council Report, The Impact of Multinational Corpora- 
tions on the Development Process and on International Relations ; and the 
National Association of Manufacturers study document, The International 
Implications of U.S. Antitrust Laws. 



PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM* 

Possibly the most significant change in U.S. policy toward the 
United Nations during 1075 was the development of new approaches 
and attitudes in U.N. forums. In part, this change was due to the 
actions taken in 1^74 by both the Sixth Special Session and the 29th 
Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly. Illustrative of the new 
approaches were: (1) The vigorous campaign waged by the newly 
installed Permament Representative to the United Nations Daniel P. 
Moynihan during the 30th Regular Session of the General Assembly; 
i -J i t he substantive proposals made by the United States at the Seventh 
Special Session in September: and (3) the delivery of the first major 
address by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the United Nations 
to a U.S. audience since he became Secretary of State. 

Congressional activities in this area during 1075 were aimed at : (1) 
Generating new U.S. policies. (2) preventing the occurrence of actions 
considered inimical to U.S. interests, and (3) reacting to events that 
had already occurred. Both the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions and the House Intel-national Relations Committee surveyed the 
impact of actions during 1974 and explored the nature of U.S. policy 
in the future. This included active promotion of the development of 
i LS. proposals in preparation for the Seventh Special Session of the 
Genera] Assembly. Members of the Senate supported efforts of the 
executive branch in opposing any action within the U.N. General 
tnbly aimed at expelling or suspending Israel from the United 
\ai ions or from participation in the General Assembly. The Congress 
restricted funding for U.S. contributions to UNESCO and to the In- 
ternational Labor Organization in response to actions taken within 
those bodies aimed at isolating Israel and acceptance of participation 
by the Palestine Liberation Organization as observer. 

Review of 1074 General Assembly 

The Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House 
Committee on International Relations held hearings to review the 197 I 
( .N. General Assembly and the US. position in the United Nations. 
In opening the hearings, Chairman Donald M. Fraser observed thai : 

Certain actions of the 1974 CT.N. General assembly became the subject <>f con- 

siderable controversy among Members <»f Congress last fall, reflecting the con- 

rsy that was apparent among the American people in general. • • * In each 

1 States and other Industrialized nations were outvoted by a wide 

margin which Included the developing countries of the Third World. TTiese actions 

ag criticism in the United States, and led the 0.8. represen- 

v.. A mbasaador Scall, to warn the Assembly of the tyranny of the 

rft.v and that American support for the U.N. was eroding -in our Congress 

;ip<i among the people. 

over the V v became Intensified with a decision .-it the UNESCO 
I ral Conference In November which cut off support for fhnf agency's regional 



tfarjorle Ann Browne, analyst In International organisation. 
(112) 



113 

programs in Israel on the grounds that Israel had ignored U.N. resolutions 
against altering the cultural character of Jerusalem [sic]. * * * 

"The opening days of the 94th Congress seem to be a particularly appropriate 
time for this subcommittee to review both the actions of the recent U.N. General 
Assembly and the U.S. position in the U.N. system. We will be interested in 
learning more about the causes and consequences of the controversial measures. 
But we also hope to take this opportunity to assess other activities of the U.N. 
and to examine U.S. interests in relation to them. 1 

Participation of the U.S. delegation to the 1974 General Assembly 

Each year, two Members of the House (alternating- with the Senate) 
serve as representatives on the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly 
during its regular September through December session. In 1974, 
Senators Charles H. Percy and Stuart Symington participated in the 
delegation and each submitted a report to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on that session. 

Senator Symington's report in May 1975 2 emphasized the dis- 
armament and arms control issues before the Assembly since this area 
was the one assigned to him for coverage. However, he also made a few 
comments on the procedure for the development of U.S. positions on 
U.N. issues : 

(1) The Secretary of State should remain in Xew York for a longer period 
during the session, thereby giving evidence to M a real U.S. interest" in the U.N. 
At least, "he should avoid being out of the country during the course of a 
session." 3 

(2) "The role of Congress in formulating foreign policy might be entirely 
ignored were it not for the custom of appointing two Members of Congress each 
year to the U.S. delegation. Even so, the congressional viewpoint is treated as 
largely irrelevant. * * * A meaningful relationship between Congress and the 
U.S. Mission is mutually desirable. The burden is on both — on Congress to have 
more frequent, serious consultations with top officials of the Mission and on the 
Mission to know congressional actions and views." * 

Senator Percy, in his March 1975 report, 5 made the following recom- 
mendations : 

(1) The United States should listen attentively and react positively to any 
constructive proposal espoused by the developing world. 

(2) We should continuously review our position on U.X. issues in the light of 
the constantly changing circumstances and avoid being cast as the principal 
proponent of the status quo. 

(3) High-level official attention should be given to issues before the General 
Assembly and decisions made at that level and not routinely down the line. 

(4) We should raise our profile and speak more often in a reasoned, frank 
manner to advance positive proposals of our own to dispel any impression that 
we are withdrawn or aloof and not taking the business of the General Assembly 
seriously. 6 

Senator Percy also proposed : 

* * * that the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States schedule 
in 1975 a series of intensive hearings on the United Nations and our participation 



1 U.S. Congress. House : Committee on Foreiirn Affairs. Subcommittee on International 
Organizations. Review of the 1974 General Assembly nnrt the U.S. Position in the United 
Nations. Hearings. 94th Con?., 1st sess.. Feb. 4-5. 1975. Washington. U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 1975. P. 1-2. 

2 U.S. Conpress. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. The United Nations, the 
United States, and Arms Control. Report by Senator Stuart Symincton. member of the 
delegation of the United Nations. May 1975. 94th Concr.. 1st sess.. Committee print Wash- 
ington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 

"Ibid., p. 0. 

* Tbid.. n. 6-7. 

5 U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. The United Nations. Report, 
bv Senator Charles H. Percy. U.S. Representative to the 29th Session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. Mar. 14. 197o. 94th Con?.. 1st sess., Committee Print. 
Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 

« Ibid., p. 22-23. 



114 

in it. This would serve many useful purposes: (1) It would provide suggestions 
for improvement of the U.N. machinery to be shared with an Ad Hoc Committee 
of the General Assembly just established to institute proceedings for a review of 
the U.X. Charter; (2) it would provide a forum to our citizens and officials to 
express their concerns and suggestions with respect to our participation in the 
various organs of the United Nations ; and (3) it would give guidance to Congress 
in the consideration of proposals to alter the basis of our financial contributions 
t-> these organs. 

It has been 20 years since the committee last reviewed U.S. participation in the 
United Nations. This year the General Assembly will have its 30th session. I 
cannot think of a more appropriate time for the committee to lend its auspices 
for a most sensitive reassessment of the United Nations and our role in it. 7 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the United States and the 
United Nations 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee responded favorably to 
Senator Percy's proposal and during May 1975 held six sessions of 
hearings on the United States and the United Nations. 8 A summary 
of the hearings released by the committee 9 identified the primary 
concerns voiced by witnesses on U.S. participation in the United Na- 
tions. The major issues discussed included — 

U.S. participation in the United Nations : 

economic and social issues (relations with the Third World) ; 

membership and voting procedures ; 

peacekeeping ; and 

human rights. 

Nomination of Moynihan a* U.S. representative 

By the start of the May hearings on the United States and the 
United Nations, the name of Daniel P. Moynihan had emerged as 
the President's choice for next permanent representative to the United 
Nations, replacing John Scali. Ambassador Moynihan had been in- 
vited to participate in the hearings but had declined, because of his 
impending nomination. However, the question of Moynihan and the 
dews set forth in his article in the March 1975 issue of Commentary 10 
were referred to throughout the hearings. Moynihan had suggested 
"that the United States speak out firmly in support of its positions in 
the United Nations without hesitating to criticize Third World coun- 
t lies of t he Soviet Union." l ' 

On May 21, 1075. the White House announced the President's in- 
tention to nominate Moynihan. The Foreign Relations ("ommittee 
considered the nomination in public hearings on June 4 and after the 
committee's approval, the Senate, on June 0. confirmed the nomina- 
tion. Moynihan started to work on July l. 12 



' U.M., p. 2:'.. 

i • Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. The United States ami the 

United Nations. Hearings 94th Cong., 1st sees., on the United States and the United 

Nations and the nomination of Daniel Patrick Moynihan t<> be D 8. Representative t<> the 

United Nations with the rank of Ambassador. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 

pp. 

enate: Committee on Foreign Relations. The United States and ttm 

T'nitrMl Nations. Summary of testimony and issues in hearings held • * • May * * *, 1975. 
94th Cong i ommittee print. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 

Prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library <>r 
i 

■ m..\ Dlhan, Daniel P. The United States in Opposition. Commentary, v. 59, March 1975 : 
::i :». 

Snmman . n. 81 

Igned on V I97d. effective .it the end of the month. Wiliinm w. 

Reran ton was sworn in as the new V s. Representative I i the United Nations on March 15, 



115 

Seventh Special Session, September 1975 : Preparations 
and Eestjlts 

Early in May 1975 a group of Members from the House and Senate 
began a 4-month dialog with Secretary of State Kissinger, aimed 
at developing substantive U.S. proposals to be presented at the Special 
Session on Development and International Economic Cooperation. 
•Meetings were held throughout the summer also at the staff level. 
According to a report by the congressional advisers to the Seventh 
Special Session — 

the input of Members from the House and Senate * * * was important to achiev- 
ing this goal. 13 

At the same time. Representative Frasers Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Organizations held three sessions of hearings during May 
and July on issues at the special session. According to Fraser : 

We would * * * like to encourage full public discussion of the various options 
open to the United States before this country's positions on the major issues 
are set. These hearings are an attempt to get on the record the views of non- 
governmental experts, as well as the views of the executive branch wit- 
nesses * * *. 14 

When the Seventh Special Session was convened on September 1, 
U.S. Representative Moynihan read a 90-minute statement for Kis- 
singer, who was out of the country. The speech, entitled "Global Con- 
sensus and Economic Development," outlined an array of proposals 
and set the stage for the dialog which marked the 2-week session. 
(See pp. 94-97.) 

Participation in the 30th Session 

Representative Donald M. Fraser and Representative J. Herbert 
Burke were appointed to the U.S. delegation for both the Seventh 
Special Session and to the 30th regular session of the General Assem- 
bly. Their reports on their participation in the 30th session have not 
yet been published. 

During the 30th session, the General Assembly considered 126 
agenda items and passed an estimated 178 resolutions. Six nations 
became U.N. members, bringing the total membership to 144. The U.S. 
position on issues at the Assembly was forcefully asserted by Ambas- 
sador Moynihan, who implemented a policy of speaking out in re- 
sponse to attacks against the United States made in U.N. forums. 
This policy and Moynihan's style at the United Nations made the As- 
sembly an arena of controversy. Some observers indicated that at last 
a U.S. representative was speaking as the average man on the street 
would in response to the comments made at the U.N. Others remarked 
that the actions of the U.S. representative were indications that the 
U.S. took the U.N. seriously and cared enough about the organization 
to assure that U.S. interests and policies were heard and understood. 
Still other commentators viewed the Moynihan style as counterproduc- 

U U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Internntional Relations. Senate: Committee 
on Foreign Relations. Report by congressional advisers to the seventh special session of 
the United Nations. 94th Cone:.. 1st sess. Joint committee print. Washington, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office. 1075. p. 31. 

"U.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Organizations. Issues at the Special Session of the 1975 U.N. General Assemblv. 
Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess.. May 19, 21, and July 8, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1975. p. 1. 



116 

tive, favoring instead a quieter diplomatic stylo. In general, one might 
view U.S. activities at the 30th session as well as at the seventh s] 

m as initial steps in the reexamination of U.S. relation-' with the 
Third World and toward rebuilding the role of ilie United States as 
an active participant at the United Nations. 

Congress and Financing the U.N. System 

Congressional influence on U.S. policy toward the U.N. system has 
been most frequently exercised through the appropriations pro 
I ,S. assessed contributions to the regular budgets of the United Na- 
tions and its agencies are financed by ( Jongress through the Department 
of Siate Appropriations Act, while U.S. voluntary contributions to the 
special programs carried on by the U.N. system are financed by Con- 
gress through the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act. 

While some legislative proposals were introduced in 1975 U^ reduce 
the level of U.S. contributions to the United Nations or to the U.N. 
system, the Congress funded, through the State Department Appro- 
priations Act, the full amount requested for contributions to the regu- 
lar budgets of the U.N. system, except for funding of UNESCO and 
TLO (discussed below). Appropriations for U.S. contributions to U.N. 
system special programs, such as the United Nations development pro- 
gram, the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), the U.N. Relief and 
Works Agency, and the World Food program, are still pending in the 
Foreign) Assistance Appropriations Act. The House, on March b 1976, 
adopted legislation which reduced appropriations for "international 
organizations and programs" from the requested $189.5 million to $160 
million. While the reductions were not specified, this would have the 
effect of reducing the appropriation for UNDP from the requested 
$120 million to 9>K~).:> million. Hie Senate Appropriations Committee 
made no reduction- in the funds requested for this category. 

I NESCO 

Much of the legislative activity a fleeting the United Nations and 
the U.N. system was taken in response to the actions or threat of 
actions within the United Nations to isolate Israel or to grant special 
status to the Palestine Liberation Organization. In 1974 the Congress 

had amended the Foreign Assistance Act (Public Law 93 569, ss Stat. 
L798) so that— 

No funds should be ' «) >i i lt: 1 1 «-*! or expended, dtrectly <>r Indirectly, to support the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation until the Presi- 
dent certifies to the Congress that such organization (1) has adopted policies 
which arc fully consistent with Its educational, scientific, and cultural objectives, 
and (2) has taken concrete steps to correct its recent actions of b primarily 

political character. 

In keeping with this limitation, which was in response to the adop- 
tion by the 1974 General Conference of UN ES( 'O of three resolut ions 
aimed at [srael, the Congress did not authorize or appropriate any 
funds for [J.S. contributions to the regular budget of UNESCO), 
deleted from the Department of State Appropriations Art 
(Public Law 94 l-l) funds which had been requested for completion 
of prior year (calendar year L974) assessments for UNESCO ($2.7 
million) and funds requested l'<>y CJNESCO for calendar year- L075 
and 1976 (fiscal year- 1976 and the transition period). 



117 

1 ' ute i national Labor Organization 

In June 1975 a committee of the International Labor Conference de- 
feated a U.S.-worker sponsored resolution requiring any liberation 
movement seeking observer status at the conference to "recognize the 
right of existence" of ILO member states, including Israel. The Inter- 
national Labor Conference admitted the PLO to observer status at 
the conference, after which the entire U.S. delegation walked out of 
the Conference. In response to this action and testimony by AFL- 
CIO President George Meany. Congress deleted from the Depart- 
ment of State Appropriations Act $5.6 million for the rest of calendar 
3 r ear 1975 funding and $16.7 million budgeted in the transition period 
for U.S. contributions to the ILO for all of calendar year 1976. 

On November 5, Secretary of State Kissinger, by letter to the Direc- 
tor General of ILO, gave formal notice of the U.S. intention to with- 
draw from ILO, explaining the reasons for this action and emphasizing 
U.S. determination to assist in creating conditions that would obviate 
the necessity of final withdrawal at the end of the 2-year waiting 
period. The letter was transmitted pursuant to article 1, paragraph 5 
of the ILO Constitution which provides for withdrawal after a notice 
of intention has been given 2 years earlier and subject to the member 
having at that time fulfilled all financial obligations arising out of its 
membership. In his letter Kissinger identified "four matters of funda- 
mental concern" to the United States : 

( 1 ) The erosion of tripartite representation ; 

(2) Selective concern for human rights ; 

(3) Disregard of due process ; and 

(4) The increasing politicization of the organization. 

On the next day President Ford established a Cabinet level committee 
to consider how the United States could help the ILO return to its 
basic principles and to a fuller achievement of its fundamental objec- 
tives. This committee is to consult with worker and employer rep- 
resentatives and "enter into the closest consultations with the Con- 
gress * * * ." The four members of the committee are Secretary of 
Commerce, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organiza- 
tion AiFairs, Director of the National Security Council, and the Secre- 
tary of Labor, who will serve as chairman. 

The Status of Israel 

After the L T NESCO General Conference action against Israel in 
1971 and the action by the U.N. General Assembly which suspended 
South Africa's delegation from further participation in the 197-1 
session of the Assembly, it became probable that attempts would be 
made during 1975 to suspend or otherwise isolate Israel at the United 
Nations. The question of the proper U.S. response to these possibilities 
had been paramount throughout the hearings on the United States 
and \]\q United Nations undertaken in May by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. For example, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg 
had recommended that the United Stares announce it would suspend 
its participation in the U.N. General Assembly if Israel were suspended 
from participation by a vote of the Assembly. In addition, Goldberg 
indicated the United States might withhold from its financial contri- 
butions that portion which would pay for the operation of the 



118 

mbly. Ambassador John Scali told the committee lie would recom- 
mend "concrete action" to show that the United States would not 
countenance such a suspension. Ambassador Moynihan told the com- 
mittee he favored Goldberg's proposal and added that the United 
States should publicly state its position soon, in order to have the 
maximum impact on nations considerine.- support of such a move. 
During his Milwaukee address on the United Nations on July 14. 
Hirer implied that the United States would not sit idly by in 
vent the U.N. General Assembly suspended Israel from partic- 
ipation in that assembly. Later that month Kissinger stated that the 
States would take "definite and clear action." 
On July 18. the Senate, supporting the administration's position 
that suspension of Israel by the U.X. Assembly would not be ignored 
by the United States, adopted Senate Resolution 214, expressing con- 
cern over persistent attempts to expel Israel from membership in the 
United Xations. The resolution further indicated that if Israel were 
expelled, the Senate would review all present U.S. commitments to 
the Third World nations involved in the expulsion and would consider 
seriously the implication of continued membership in the United 
Xations. 

Zionism-racism 

During early October a draft resolution was submitted in the 
United Xations Assembly which equated Zionism to racism. On Octo- 
ber IT. the draft resolution was passed by a committee of the Assembly 
(70 in favor; 29, including the United States, opposed; 27 abstentions). 
Throughout October and November U.S. spokesmen urged that the 
resolution be rejected by the Assembly when it was brought to a vote 
in plenary. Moynihan contended that the real target of the resolution 
r as Israel, not Zionism. On October 28, the Senate passed a resolution 
I tes. 288) on this subject declaring : 

That the United States Senate strongly condemns the resolution adopted by the 
Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on Octoher 17, 1975, in 
aid resolution wrongfully associates and equates Zionism with racism and 
racial discrimination; and urges the United Nations General Assembly to dis- 
approve that said resolution, if and when it is presented for a vote before that 
body. 

A similar resolution was pending in the House but was not acted 
upon. However,on November 10, the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote 
of 72 in favor, 35 (U.S.) opposed, with 32 abstention-, adopted the 
resolution which "determines that Zionism is a form of racism and 
racial discrimination." 

On November 11, the day after the U.N. vote, the Senate agreed to 
Senate Concurrent Resolution 73, whereby the Congress (1) sharply 
condemned the U.N. resolution. ( : 2) opposed any form of participa- 
tion of the U.S. Government in the Decade for Action to Combat 

in and Racial Discrimination SO long as Zionism was identified 

as one of the targets of that decade, (3) urged reconsideration of the 
IV ' olution, and (4) called on the Senate Foreign Relations and 
House International Relations Committees to begin hearings imme- 
ly to reassess further participation by the united States in the 
I \.\. ( General Assembly." 



ping February and March 1 1 » 7 o the Subcommittee <>n Internationa] OrpwnizMtlnns 
of On- House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relation ■ Com- 

mltteeeacb 1h-1<I limi-ln^H on i;.S. I'articiiuitlon in th<> United Nations. 



119 

The House, on November 11. by a vote of 384 yeas and nays, 
adopted House Eesolution 855, relating to the Zionism resolution. The 
House resolution was identical to that passed by the Senate on the 
same day except that it did not include a call for hearings. An earlier 
unanimous consent request for House consideration of House Con- 
current Eesolution 475, which was identical to the Senate concurrent 
resolution, was objected to by Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier 
who explained he was opposed to any threat of a U.S. withdrawal 
from the General Assembly. 

In a recent development during January 1976, press reports indi- 
cated that a policy of linking U.S. foreign assistance to votes in the 
United Nations had been initiated at the Department of State. 16 This 
might be viewed by some as a direct result of the numerous General 
Assembly votes contrary to U.S. interests. However, the new office of 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Multilateral Affairs in the Bureau of 
International Organization Affairs was created with broader func- 
tions, aimed at coordinating and focusing attention on U.S. policy 
interests within all international forums. 

Other Congressional Activities 

U.S. policy on review of the U.N. Charter 

In July 1975, the International Organizations Subcommittee held 
hearings to consider House Concurrent Resolution 206 and identical 
resolutions concerning U.S. policy on review of the U.N. Charter. 17 
These resolutions called on the President to direct the Department of 
State to formulate constructive proposals for changes in the U.N. 
Charter and procedural changes that may not require amendment of 
the charter. They also requested that the President report to the 
Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Com- 
mittees on the position of the United States and the proposals sub- 
mitted. Introduction and consideration of this resolution was linked 
to the work being done in the United Nations by an ad hoc committee 
of the General Assembly on U.N. Charter review, which met in August 
1975 to consider the question. Because the time before this meeting- 
was short, passage of the concurrent resolution was deemed impossible. 
A subcommittee report was filed on the issue, in lieu of a full com- 
mittee report on House Concurrent Resolution 206. 18 This report, pub- 
lished in November, summarized the arguments in support of and 
against charter review and identified the conclusions and recommenda- 
tions of the subcommittee on charter review. In particular, the sub- 
committee supported the U.S. position against comprehensive charter 
review and in support of specific charter amendments and reforms 
which would not require charter revision. 



18 Gelb. Leslie H. U.S. Linking: Aid to Votes at U.N. New York Times, Jan. 9. 1070. 
p. 1. 5 : Marder, Murrey. U.S. to Link Foreign Aid, U.N. Votes. Washington Post Jan. 10. 
1976. pp. Al, A3. 

17 U.S. Congress. House : Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Organizations. United States Policy on Review of the United Nations Charter. 
Hearing, 04th Cong.. 1st Sess.. on H. Con. Res. 206. Jul. 17, 1075. Washington, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, 1975. 63 pp. 

18 U.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Organizations. The Question of U.N. Charter Review: Report. 94th Cong., 1st 
sess. Committee print. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 20 pp. 



120 

R( imbursement for protection of missions to international organiza- 
tion* 

Since 1961, numerous legislative proposals have been unsuccessfully 
introduced to authorize the reimbursement of the city of New York 
for extraordinary expenditures associated with the location of the 
I \\. headquarters in the city. The annual session of the U.N. General 
mbly has drawn to the city each fall many heads of government 
and other significant personages. In addition, the U.X. buildings and 
those of the U.N. missions of now 144 member states have been the 
object of intense demonstrations and occasional attacks. It has been 
the responsibility of the local authorities to bear the full financial 
responsibility to assure the safety of foreign diplomatic missions and 
their personnel. In 1975, a bill which authorizes reimbursement under 
specific circumstances was enacted (H.R. 11184, Public Law T 94-196). 
The legislation provides that in cities where 20 or more foreign diplo- 
mat ic missions are located, reimbursement of State or local govern- 
ments may be made if — 

( 1 i there is an "extraordinary protective need" ; and 

(2) the "need arises in association with a visit to or occurs at a permanent 
mission to an international organization * * * or an observer mission invited to 
participate in the work of such organization." 

There is a ceiling of $3.5 million on the funds that can be reim- 
bursed during each fiscal year. 



PROBLEMS OF GLOBAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 

Congress and U.S. Foreign Energy Policy* 

In the area of international energy policy in 1075. the United States 
tried to deal with the long-range eti'ects of the oil price increases and 
Arab oil embargo of 1973-74. The primary U.S. response in 1974 to 
the energy crisis had been to provide the leadership that resulted in the 
creation of an international energy program and the International 
Energy Agency in the fall of 1974. and the $25 billion OECD financial 
support fund in the spring of 1975. 

The iniernatimial energy program and the International Energy 
A gen eg 

As one of the immediate reactions to the Arab oil embargo and oil 
price increases, the U.S. Government called a conference of major 
industrialized energy consumers for February 1974. "While this con- 
ference, held in Washington, substantively produced meager results, 
12 of the 13 countries present agreed to create an Energy Coordinating 
Group to develop a program to deal with the long- and short-term 
issues facing them. The Energy Coordinating Group worked during 
the following months and, on September 27, 1974. an agreement was 
signed in Brussels, Belgium, establishing an international energy 
program. 

Less than a month later, on November 18. 1974. the International 
Energy Agency was created as an autonomous organization within the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
to implement the international energy program. The United States 
acceded to the Brussels agreement on a provisional basis pending 
passage of certain domestic legislation which would allow it to comply 
fully with the provisions of the agreement. 1 

Congressional action on IE A enabling legislation 

Title XIII of the administration's Energy Independence Act, sub- 
mitted to Congress on February 4, 1975. was intended to provide the 

♦Prepared by Theodor Galdi. analyst in international relations. 

1 The international energy program as set out in the Brussels agreement has four basic 
elements : 

1. A three-part emergency oil sharing arrangement designed to limit the vulner- 
ability of IEA members to actual or threatened oil embargoes: (a) an agreement to 
create certain agreed-upon common levels of emergency reserves: (b) a promise to 
develop standby demand restraint programs to enable consumption to be cut without 
delay in case of a supply interruption : and (c) a readiness, in the event of an embargo, 
to allocate remaining available oil from all sources, domestic and imported, to spread 
the shortfall evenly among IEA members. 

2. A long-term cooperative program to reduce member's dependence on imported oil 
through conservation and cooperative efforts in research and new energy supply 
development. 

.".. An oil markel information system consisting of two parts: a general section to 
include data on the international oil market and the operations of the major oil com- 
panies in normal times, and a special section designed to provide the additional In- 
formation necessary to efficiently operate the emergencv oil allocation program during 
crises. 

4. development of a program for coordinating consumer /producer relations. 
At the time the Brussels agreement was signed, it was to he brought fullv and definitely 
into force by the members in accordance with their respective constitutional and leeal 
processes by May 1. 1975, and remain in effect for 10 years. 

(121) 
74-032— 70 9 



122 

-I. 'live authority needed to implement several key provisions of the 
Brussels agreement. Sections 1304 and 1305 provided the authority 
. ' to order the maintenance of at least 60-day reserves in ease of 
an oil embargo. Sections 1306 and 1307 granted the authority needed 
to develop a mandatory oil conservation program to allow the United 
sumption by agreed upon amounts during an embargo. 
Section 1311 provided authority to order oil companies to implement 
allocation among IEA members during em' jet out by the 

Brussels agreement. In keeping with the needs of the oil import alloca- 
tion program, section 1312 authorized voluntary agreements among 
oil companies to enable them to prepare for and carry out the manda- 
tory oil allocation program without risk of liability under U.S. anti- 
trust laws. 

\ fter 5 days of debate, on April 19, l 7r>, the Senate passed S. 
containing, among other provisions, its version of the TEA authorities 
requested by title XIII of the administration's bill. The House con- 
sidered iis bill, ILK. 7014, during 11 different days in July. August. 
ami 3 : er, finally it on September 23, 1975. In both 

Houses, the lengthy debate that took place centered mainly around 
s over i\n> oil price decontrol and mandatory conserva- 
I ie bills. The provisions of the reported bills concern- 
I EA authority were uncontroversial. After a great deal of parlia- 
maneuvering in September, October. November, and Decem- 
i conference report on S. C,l k 2 was finally a< cepted on December IS. 
nt Ford signed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
on December 22, U>7n ( Public Law 94 - 163) despite opposition to the 
oil price decontrol provisions of the bill. 

Title II of in- Energy Policy and Conservation Ac. is headed 

"Pari A: General Emergency 
Auth< - 20] 203. Section 201 grants the Presi- 

•ral authority to submit for c< ual approval en< 

H'vation plans and ener< ning plans to be put into effect 

following a severe energy supply interruption or to fulfill the obliga- 
tions of the United States under the in »nal energy program. 
l1 implementation o or the conservation plan 
i require co mal approval. Sections 202 and 203 provide 
the authority i rid standards tor creation of the energy con- 
ition and energy rationing contingency plans respectively. 
u Par1 B, authorities with respect to international energy program," 
conta i >ns 251 through 25J n 251 gives the President an 
,\ to implement the international oil allocation program after 
! ying Con >f his intenti< Tl > lengthy section 252 provides 
authority and standards to be used in developing and implementing 

oil Company vol, ; d pi ns of action needed to 

carry out the oil all* rid oil market infon i in provi- 

international energy pr< Section 253 provides au- 

i v for i ' I he P< der il E] Lminist rat ion 

ibl idvisory committees to help carry out the planning and 

implementation of th • allocation of pet roleum and creat ion of 1 1 i 

i< n 25 ! aut hori: es the Secretary of 

to ''\< J the [EA the information and data gathered 

•, for \U<- enei <. ; marl el information system. 

Finally, . which originated in the Senate [nterior'nnd In- 



123 

sular Affairs Committee, specifically declared that while the bill au- 
thorized the standby emergency authorities required to execute the 
international energy program, that it "* * * shall not be construed 
in any way as advice and consent, ratification, endorsement or other 
form of congressional approval of the specific terms of the (IEP) ex- 
ecutive agreement or any related annex, protocol, amendment, modifi- 
cation, or other agreement which has been or may in the future be 
entered into." The Senate report on S. 622 (S. Rept. 94-26) stated that 
that language was included in the bill specifically to indicate that there 
was no congressional approval for any oil floor price proposal. Such 
a proposal had formally been made to the IEA Board of Governors in 
February 1975, and, after being opposed by the Japanese and some 
Europeans, had been accepted in principle as part of a series of com- 
promises among IEA members prior to the April 1975 Paris energy 
producer-consumer preparatory conference. Exactly what legal effect 
the seven-dollar-a-barrel floor price agreed to by the IEA on Decem- 
ber 19, 1975, will have is presently unclear. 

In examining the actions of Congress in regard to the IEA enabling 
legislation, the main changes made in the administration's proposals 
did not concern substance, but rather process. Three primary congres- 
sional concerns are made manifest in the bill. First, and most impor- 
tant, in granting the President the standby authorities in title II, 
Congress made certain that it would have a direct role in approval 
of the emergency plans prepared and would also be given the opportu- 
nity to disapprove the implementation of those plans. Second, sections 
252 and 253 are an indication of the determination of Congress that 
any cooperative efforts by oil companies, advisory groups and the ad- 
ministration be open to public access as much as is possible. Finally, 
section 255 is a clear indication that Congress will not approve some 
IEA related proposals unless consultations take place and specific 
approval is given. 

It is not clear what consultation, if any, occurred between the execu- 
tive branch and Congress during the negotiations of the executive 
agreement in Brussels, or that if any such talks did occur they were 
anything more than select conversations in which certain Members of 
Congress were generally informed about events. 

State Department guidelines for the negotiations of international 
agreements (including executive agreements) provide that one of the 
responsibilities of the office or office]- conducting negotiations is to 
make sine that "* * * the appropriate congressional leaders and com- 
mittees are advised of the intention to negotiate significant new inter- 
national agreements, consulted concerning such agreemei ''• kept 
informed of developments affecting them including especially whether 
any legislation is considered necessary or desirable for the implemei 
tion of the new treaty or agreement/' (Section 723. le of circular 175.) 
It would appear that in making the Brussels agreement the executive 
branch did not consult with Congress in the manner provided for by 
the State Department circular. Rather, Congress was presented with a 
fait accompli, and was asked only to pass the necessary implementing 
legislation. 

If could also be noted that although the Brussels agreement could 
be considered a major national commitment of the kind which the 
Senate, in its 1969 National Commitment* ion, had said should 



124 

re is no indication that such a step was 
red by the executive branch. 

Other congi- \vitie& 'oncernmg the IEA 

In addition to the hearings and reports on the IEA authorizing 
bills, two hearings were held during the year in this area by subcom- 
mittees of the House Internationa] Relations Committee. The earlier 

tig, Legislation on the International Energy Agency, was held 
on March 26, li>~.~), jointly by the Subcommittees on International Or- 
ganizations and International Resources, Food, and Energy. 2 The lat- 
ter hearing, U.S. International Energy Policy, was held on May 1. 
. by the Subcommittee on international Resources, Food, and 
Ene; _ 

On ,J\mv l'7. 1975, the Subcommittee on International Economics 
of the Joint Economic Committee issued a report. ""[ Depart- 

ment's Oil Price Proposal: Should Congress Endorse it".' l The re- 
port recommended, villi dig and supplemental views, that: 

A mini ilium price for oil imports is not an appropriate method to protect do- 
investments in conventional energy sources from becoming noncompeti- 
tive i i' world energy prices drop. The U.S. Government should cease immediately 
its efforts in the International Energy Agency to set a minimum import price 
until such time as Congress authorizes the Executive to seek such an agree- 
ment. Existing legislation, such as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, sect ion 'SV1, 
should in no way he construe'! as authority to set a floor price." 

Tl>- OECDl 

On November 1 !. l!*7!. \\ of State Kissinger unveiled a live 

risumer cooperation designed to bring about 

lower prices, and, in the interim, to protect the vitality of consuming 

country economies. Kissinger saw two immediate problems that had 

alt villi : ( 1 ) The threal of a new oil embargo; and (2) the 

ble collapse of the international monetary system in attempting 

to recycle huge flows of petrodollars from oil producers to borrowers 

in order to manage the chronic balance-of-payments deficits of some 

countries. To meet these challenges, Kissinger advocated cooperation 

in five policy a reas : C a1 inn. alternal ive energy sources, relations 

relations with ; loping world, and financial 

lasl section of the November 1! speech he proposed 

<>f We pope, North America, and Japan 

ommon loan and gi ity capable of redistributing 

up to $25 billion in 1'. onhl in 1076. The facility 

not to i -an additional taxes, bul n n 

ivcling. at commercial inter . Funds flowing back 

to thi rialized countries from the oil producers. Support from 

the facility was to be i ontingenl upon n full resori to private financing 

and on reasonable telf help measures. On November 18, 1974, Secretary 

Simon elaborated u] Kje inger proposal in n 

1 k. 



on Intern ommit te< 

1 i ntematlonal R Lecislnl Ion <mi the 

1 1 h Cong., l Bt Be b. Mar. 
i s Oovernraen < Ifflce, 1978 79 pp. 

on Internationa] Relations. Subcommittee on tnter- 
1 »od nnd . ternatlonal Policy. Hearings. 94th 

• II . R is. Oovernmenl Printing Office, 1975. 189 pp. 

mmittee : Subcommittee on Internntionnl I '■• rule 

Price Proposal: Should Congress Endorse K V Join! 
Committee Print. 94th Coi Washington, r.s. Oovernmenl Printing Office, 

[bid . | 



125 

Immediately following the public presentation of the Kissinger- 
Simon proposal in November 1974, U.S. officials began a series of 
consultations to try to obtain European support. A compromise was 
reached at the January 14, 1975, meeting of the Group of Ten finance 
ministers whereby support for an expanded IMF oil facility, favored 
by the Europeans, was obtained in 'exchange for European support 
for the Kissinger-Simon proposal. After further negotiations in Jan- 
uarv, February, and March, the OECD Financial Support Fund was 
initialed by all OECD members except Turkey and Australia on 
April 9. 19*75. 

The Financial Support Fund was established for 2 years and open 
to all OECD members. Each participant was given a quota which 
served as the basis for determining its obligations, borrowing rights, 
and relative voting power. The distribution of quotas was based mainly 
on GXP and foreign trade. Of the SDR 20 billion total for the Fund, 
the United States had SDR 5.5 billion. West Germany SDR 2.5 billion, 
Japan SDR 2..') billion, France SDR 1.7 billion, and the United King- 
dom SDR 1.6 billion. Smaller amounts were established for the other 
members. Approval of loans was to be based on requiring increasingly 
larger voting percentages by the Fund's governing board as larger 
amounts of loans were made in relation to the borrower's quota. The 
Fund was intended to be used as a measure of last resort, with all 
loans granted conditional upon the borrower's following "appropriate" 
economic policies. All participants were to share jointly in any default 
risks in proportion and up to the limits of their quotas. Borrowings 
were to be financed through guarantees, either individual or group, 
or through direct appropriations by members. 

Congressional action on the Financial Support Fund 

As early as November 25, 1974, Treasury Secretary Simon gave 
testimony to the Joint Economic Committee on the status of the pro- 
posed Financial Support Fund. 6 Joint hearings on the IE A and the 
Financial Support Fund were also held by the Subcommittees on For- 
eign Economic Policy and International Organizations and Move- 
ments of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 18 and 
19, 1974. 7 At that time, many of the procedural details, the overall 
size of the U.S. quota, and the methods to be used to finance the facil- 
ity still remained to be negotiated. In the fiscal year 1976 budget, 
submitted to Congress on February 3, 1975, the administration pro- 
posed for the Financial Support Fund budget authority of $7 billion 
with expected outlays in fiscal year 1976 to be $1 billion. 

Legislative jurisdiction over the Financial Support Fund lies with 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Banking and 
Currency Committee, which shares oversight with the House Inter- 
national Relations Committee. AVhile the Financial Support Fund 
agreement was initialed in Paris on April 9, 1975, the administration 
did not submit draft legislation to Congress until the end of May. Tn 
the meantime, hearings dealing with the Fund were held by the Sub- 

8 U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Kissinger-Simon proposals for financing 

oil imports. Hearings. 93d Con--., 2d sess. Nov. 2r>. 27, and 2i), l!)74. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printinc Office. 1074. 109 

7 r.s. Congress. Bouse: Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittees on International 
Organizations and Movements and Foreign Economic Policy. U.S. policy and the Inter- 
national energy agency. Hearings. 93d Cong., 2d sess. Dec. 18 and 19, 1974. Washington, 
r.s. Government Printing Office, 1975. 59 pp. 



126 

committee on International Trade and Commerce of the House In- 
ternational Relations Committee on May 5, 1975. 8 

In the Senate, 8. 1907. to authorize U.S. participation in the Fi- 
nancial Support Fund, was introduced by Senator Sparkman on 
June 10, 1975. II.lv. SI 75. for the same purpose, was introduced in the 
House on June *24. 1975. by Representative Thomas M. Rees. Hearings 
were held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Financial 
Support Fund July 30 and 31 (not printed), and in the House Bank- 
ing and Currency Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment, 
and Monetary Policy on September IS. 1975.° As of the adjournment 
of Congress in December 1975, no bill had been reported out in either 
House. 

The amount of executive-legislative content prior to the conclusion 
of the Financial Support Fund agreement is noteworthy when com- 
pared to the complete lack of contact prior iu the conclusion of the 
Brussels agreement. 

Secretaries Kissinger and Simon indicated initial U.S. interest in 
the creation of the Financial Support Fund in speeches given on No- 
vember 14 and November 18, 1974. One week later, on November 25, 
1974, the Joint Economic Committee began hearings on the Fund 
with testimony from Treasury Secretary Simon and Under Secre- 
tary Jack Bennett. The Financial Support Fund issue was again 
examined on December IS. 1974, at a joint hearing of two subcommit- 
tees of the House International Relations Committee. However, after 
these two sets of hearings, there was no further oilicial contact between 
the administration and the responsible legislative committees until 
after the Financial Support Fund agreement had been initialed in 
Paris in April. The experience of Congress in this area demonstrates 
clearly that there will be little executive branch prior consultation on 
international energy matters unless that consultation is initiated by 
( !on£] 

U.S. International Food Polk 



- ' 



The world food problem is today one of the dominant issues oi 
increasingly interdependent ■• political, economic, and s 

vital to our relatio >ed and developing co 

with an impact on the U.S. domestic econou 

jor contribul o political insta- 

bility in I be world, i; nportat I le I ">. Con- 

■ ! admii i i and for many ii sations. 

in ( o. luch legislation itroduced ; " L975 concerning 

; .S. food policy in termsof it both U.S. foreign policy and 

; . Many i ge of food-related 

subji h vera! < • growing con- 

lem. Al- 
though the International Vn<>(\ and Development A oi 

■ 



Pr< 

.1 Relatioi i • 

tut] Commerce. Tho I Fund ($25 Billion ! 

ton, i s. Govei amenl Printing 

llllj. ■ 

,•: Currency . Subcommittee on Inter 
o authorize V. • Ion In the 

Financial Support Fund. Hearii on U.K. 8175. Sepl 

WaHhlnffti i ul Printing Office, 1975. 56 pp. 



127 

and the administration are engaged in an ongoing evaluation of U.S. 
food policy. 

The global food problem, which had reached crisis proportions as a 
result of the simultaneous intermeshing of a variety of related events — 
drought, diminished food reserves, the energy crisis, and resulting in- 
creases in the price of fertilizers and grain — showed slight improve- 
ment in 1975. Weather conditions improved, grain production in- 
creased, a world record rice crop was harvested, and U.S. planting- 
restrictions have been lifted, boosting U.S. agricultural production. 
However, it is estimated that over half a billion people in the world 
today lack sufficient nourishment. The worldwide recession and infla- 
tion particularly affected the developing countries, and as export prices 
have fallen, prices for basic food. fuel, and agricultural equipment 
have continued to rise. In addition, attempts at land reform and other 
modernization techniques have moved slowly in many developing 
countries. 

Based on past trends, and barring major crop failures and other 
unforeseen exigencies, it is anticipated that world food demand will 
increase at the rate of approximately 2.4 percent a year until 1985 (a 
2-percent growth as a result of increased population, and 0.4 percent 
resulting from increased income). However, the expected increase in 
demand in developing countries is estimated at 8.6 percent, compared 
to a 2.6 percent food production increase. According to papers pre- 
pared for the World Food Conference, world production of cereal 
grains (now about 1.2 billion metric tons) must expand by nearly 25 
million tons per year to meet rising demand brought about by popula- 
tion increases. In the developing countries, the cereals deficit is ex^ 
pectecl to reach about 85 million tons per year by 1985, as compared to 
a 16-million-ton shortfall in 1969-72. 

The role of Congress in determining U.S. Inter, Hit 'tonal food policy 

For the United States, implementation of many of the recommenda- 
tions made by the World Food Conference— held in Rome in 1974 — 
requires specific congressional action. The Congress held a number of 
hearings on the implementation of Conference proposals in 1975, with 
both the foreign affairs and agriculture committees sharing concern 
for the issues involved. 10 The issues stemmi] the Conference 

proposals relate to the need for increased food aid to developing 
countries, measures to increase world food production, establishment 
of a world food security reserve system, and coordination of global 
food policy. 



lfi U.S. Congre 

Bouse: Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Resources. 
Food, and Energy. Food problems of developing countries: implications for r.S. policy. 
Hearings. 94th C^r.a:.. 1st sess. May 21. June . -1 ». 5, 1975. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975. 355 pp. 

Senate; Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Hunger and diplomacy: a perspective 
on the U.S. role at the World Food Conference. 04th Con?.. 1st sess. committee print. 
Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 197J 

Senate: Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy. Foreign food assistance and agri- 
cultural development. Hearings. 94th Con-., it sess. Apr. it. 1975. Washington, r.S. 
Government Printing Office Office. 1975. 106 pp. 

Senate: Implementation of World Food Conference recommendations. Hearings, Ohh 
Con?.. 1st sess. May 1. 1975. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 0.1 pp. 

Senate: Implementation of World Food Conference recommendations. Hearings. 94th 
Con?.. 1st sess. Nov. 6. 107.1. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 128 pp. 

Senate: Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees. World 
hunger, health, and refugee problems. Part 6. Special study mission to Africa. Asii 
the Middle East. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. June 10, 11, 1975. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 197o. 617 pp. 



128 

Throughout 1975, numerous bills were introduced concerning imple- 
mentation of these proposals and related issues including various 
aspects of the international grain trade. The thrust of many of these 
legislative proposals were incorporated into the Internationa i Devel- 
opment and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Public Law ( J4- 161 (see 
pp. 84-86 for a discussion of other aspects of this measure and a com- 
plete legislative history). 

(1) Increased food aid. — One of the basic issues involved in the 
debate about U.S. international food policy concerns methods for 
providing needed food aid to other countries without disrupting the 
Q.S. economy by reducing grain reserves and increasing food cos 
U.S. consumers. While sharing a concern for the necessity for U.S. 
food aid and thus the potential impact on the U.S. economy, there was 
disagreement between Congress and the executive branch — as well as 
within the Congress itself — on emphasis, timing, amounts of food aid. 
and on the extent to which political as well as humanitarian considera- 
tions should be involved in aid distribution plans. 

Some Members of Congress have maintained that the United States, 
the world's leading agricultural producer with a long history of 
humanitarian assistance, can both provide substantial food aid abroad 
and protect U.S. domestic interests. They indicated that such aid 
should go to those countries designated by the World Bank as most 
seriously affected; that is, with an average per capita animal income 
of less thai) $300. Others in Congress have urged a m I rained or 

conditional food aid policy. This view was reflected in proposals to 
prohibit Public Law 480 assistance to countries which did not take 
reasonable measures to control population, and to prohibit food aid 
abroad if all domestic programs were not fully provided with adequate 
food. 

The administration maintained that while some increase in food 
assistance is necessary, the real solution requires a long range plan 
for expansion of food production in the developing countries, in addi- 
tion, the executive branch lias insisted that food aid should be used 
for political as well as for economic and humanitarian purp< 

The Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1975 (Public Law 
94-11) passed m .March 1!>7.'>. provided s;}00 million for food ht 
ance, Less than the administration's request. However, the Enter- 
national Development and Food Assistance Aci. Public Law 94-161, 
which emerged from Congress in December n>7.*>. autho h I - 
million lor food and nutrition programs for fiscal year 1976 (and 
the transition quarter), and included a number of polnv statements 
directing the disposil dose funds. The measure all< per 

cent of food aid to those count n< eriously affected, 

and assures a minimum Level of J.;) million metric tons in food com- 
ty grants distributed under title i 1 of Public Law 480 annually, 
and a minimum of 1 million metric ions for distribution abroad 
through private voluntary organizations and the world food 
program. 

(2) In food production. The L975 [nternational Develop 
incut and Food A.ssistance \<t provides for various programs to a 

in increasing world food production. The measure calls forenlarj 
[J.S. univer itj research capabilities in the area of Increasing agri 
cultural production, U.S. support for international agricultural re- 
search centers, and lor tl ii.-hment of land-granl type colleges 



129 

abroad to further research and its application toward increasing food 
production. A seven member board for international food and 'agricul- 
ture development is to be appointed to administer the programs aimed 
at increasing world food production. : 

(3) Establishment of a icorld food security reserve system. — One 
of the most controversial issues both in international forums and 
within the U.S. Government concerns the establishment of world 
food stockpiles. Initially, the idea of world food reserves was sup- 
ported by the State Department, but opposed by the Department of 
Agriculture, which had maintained that reports on the world hunger 
situation were exaggerated, that grain stockpiles were costly to main- 
tain and could seriously upset international grain trade if released, 
and that free enterprise and increased food production in the devel- 
oping countries were the best methods for promoting world food secu- 
rity. With strong support from the congressional delegates, the United 
States put forward a proposal at the World Food Conference for the 
negotiation of an agreement on a grain reserves system. 

A subsequent conference, held in London in September 1975, with 
participants from the major grain exporting and importing coun- 
tries — including the Soviet Union — considered a more detailed U.S. 
proposal for an international food reserve system. 11 However, due to 
differences between the U.S. position, which emphasized food security, 
and the position of the European Common Market countries and other 
countries with grain marketing boards which places greater import- 
ance on market stability, an international food reserve agreement has 
not yet been reached. 

Congressional support for a system of food reserves continued in 
1975 with the introduction of several bills calling for such a system 
and the eventual inclusion of language in Public Law 94—161 which 
authorized and encouraged the President to negotiate an international 
system of food reserves, with any agreement subject to congressional 
approval. 

(4) Combination of global food policy. — The proposals of the 
World Food Conference placed great emphasis on the need for greater 
international coordination of global food policy. The International 
Development and Food Assistance Act calls for the appointment of a 
special U.S. coordinator for international disaster, relief, and author- 
izes eventual U.S. participation in an International Fund for Agricul- 
tural Development, with a maximum U.S. contribution of $200 
million. 12 

Inability to reach an international agreement on food reserves, the 
continuing differences between developed and developing countries, 
and the problems encountered at the multilateral trade negotiations 
all illustrate the fact that effective international coordination of food 
policy is as yet unachieved. However, four new entities have been 
organized and are now functioning : 

(1) The World Food Council — a political body established 
primarily to implement and coordinate the recommendations of 
the World Food Conference ; 



U U.S. Congress. House. The U.S. Proposal for an International Grain Reserves System. 
Report of a staff study mission to the Sept. 29-30. 1975 meeting of the International Wheat 
Council Preparatory Group. Committee print. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. 
Government Office, November 1975. 

12 Working groups, including U.S. representatives, have been meeting to develop the 
articles of agreement for an international fund for agricultural development. The fund 
-was originally proposed at the World Food Conference by the oil producing countries as a 
means of mobilizing additional concessional resources to promote agricultural development. 

74-032—76 10 



130 

(2) The Consultative Group for Food Production and Invest- 
ment — established under the joint auspices of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Develop- 
ment Program and the World Bank to encourage a flow of re- 
sources to developing countries for food production, to improve 
the coordination of assistance and to insure a more effective use 
of resources ; 

(3) The Committee on World Food Security — a group estab- 
lished by the FAO to keep abreast of world food stock levels and 
recommend appropriate policy action when and where appropri- 
ate; and 

(4) The Global Warning and Information System — established 
under FAO to inform the World Food Council periodically con- 
cerning the world food situation. 

/ *.>'. international grain policy 

U.S. international grain policy is an important component of over- 
all U.S. food and foreign policy, in terms of its importance in interna- 
tional trade and in its role in U.S. food aid programs. Three develop- 
ments relating to grain policy received close attention from the admin- 
istration and Congress in 1975 : The revelations concerning the grain 
inspection fraud, the sudden intervention of the Soviet Union into the 
U.S. grain market, and the subsequent negotiation of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
grain agreement. 

(1) Grain inspection standards. — The Federal Government in May 
1075 began an investigation into alleged corruption in the grain inspec- 
tion system, involving allegations of bribery, adulteration of grain, 
misgrading, and shortweighting of grain in American ports. The inves- 
tigation, by the year's end, resulted in more than 50 indictments and 
40 guilty pleas. 

The investigations determined that grain shipments on both the 
commercial market and those destined for humanitarian aid had been 
of inferior quality. Because agricultural exports represent an impor- 
tant source of U.S. foreign exchange earnings, the reputation of U.S. 
grain on the international market is important to both fanners and to 
t lie overall U.S. economy. 

A number of bills directed toward improving grain standards were 
introduced in Congress in 1975. Primary attention was given to Senate 
Joint Resolution 88, the Emergency Grain Standards Act of 1075, 3 a 
proposal to increase the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to 
strengthen the system for grain inspect ion. handling, and export pro- 
cedures. The measure was passed by the Senate on September 25, 107."), 
and referred to the House Committee on Agriculture. (There was no 
further act ion on the measure in 1975.) 14 

(2) Sovii t grown purchases. — Announcements of renewed Soviet ne- 
gotiations for the purchase of U.S. grain in July L975, prompted con- 
cern in the Congress and the executive branch that renewed Soviet 
grain purchasing might bring about disruptions in the grain market; 

1972 Soviet purchases of 19 million metric tons of U.S. grain had de- 
pleted U.S. grain reserves, increased prices for U.S. consumers and 



n r s. Congress. Senate: Committee <>n Ajrrlcnltnre tnd Forestry. Einorcpnoy grain 
Btandardi amendments of 1978. s. Kept 94 886. Washington, U.S. GoTernnirnt Printing 
Office. 1978 18 pp. 

14 II.H. 12872, the Grain Btandardi Act of 197G was passed by the House and Senate In 
April 1976 



131 

the price of U.S. food aid programs, and seriously distorted the inter- 
national grain market. 

In view of the concern of many Members of Congress that not 
enough understanding or basic facts were available on the impact of 
the grain sale, several hearings were held to examine the issue, 15 and 
the relationship between United States-Soviet grain sales and oil 
trade. Senate Resolution 269, passed by the Senate on October 2, ex- 
pressed the sense of the Senate that the President, during negotiations 
with the Soviet Union on a multiyear grain trade agreement, should 
attempt to negotiate a "short term" agreement for the sale of Soviet 
oil to the United States at a price less than that set by the OPEC 
countries. 

(3) United States-Soviet grain agreement. — The United States and 
the Soviet Union signed an agreement October 20, 1975, to permit the 
sale of 6 to 8 million metric tons of U.S. grain from private commer- 
cial sources to the Soviet Union annually for 5 years, beginning Octo- 
ber 1, 1976, without additional government consultation. Soviet 
purchases are to be scaled down if U.S. supplies fall below 225 million 
metric tons. The agreement covers only corn and wheat sales, and was 
negotiated primarily to permit a better U.S. assessment of world 
import. demand each year and to try to avoid the market fluctuations 
that had been triggered by previous Soviet grain buying. It also speci- 
fies that shipment of grain under the agreement is to be in accord with 
the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Maritime Agreement. 

When the concluded agreement was announced, it was criticized by 
several Members of Congress for a variety of reasons. Senator Clifford 
Case, ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, maintained that the agreement should have been trans- 
mitted to the Senate for ratification as a treaty. Adlai Stevenson, 
chairman of the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee warned that the 
agreement masks fundamental problems, such as enforcement. 
Another concern expressed by members of the Agriculture Committees 
was that the Agriculture Department appeared to be taking a back 
seat to the State Department in matters pertaining to international 
agricultural trade. On October 20, the Senate passed Senate Resolution 
285, expressing the sense of the Senate that the Secretary of Agricul- 
ture be included in all negotiations with foreign governments concern- 
ing the exportation or importation of agricultural commodities. 

Other issues concerning the grain agreement were raised in hear- 
ings 16 and by various groups. Certain farm groups objected to the 



13 U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Russian grain sale. 
Hearings, 94th Cong.. 1st sess. Sept. 4, 1975. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1975. 87 pp. Committee on Government Operations. Permanent Subcommittee on In- 
vestigations. Grain sales to the Soviet Union. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. July 31, 
Au?. 1. 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 149 pp. 

10 U.S. Congress : 

House : Committee on Agriculture. Grain sales to Russia (statement of Under Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs) . Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. Dec. 3, 1975. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 48 pp. 

House : Committee on International Relations. U.S. grain and oil agreements with the 
Soviet Union. Hearings. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Oct. 28, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office. 1976. 71 pp. 

House : Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy. U.S. International 
frrain policy sales and management. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. Nov. 10, 1975. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1976. 

Senate : Committee on P.anking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States-Soviet grain 
ajri'eomeht, S. 2492. and other matters. Hearings. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Dec. 9 and 10, 1975. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 212 pp. 



132 

agreement on the grounds that government-to-government trading is 
wrong in principle, because it means sharing world markets on the 
basis of political determination and that the agreement established a 
precedent for more serious restrictions on farm exports. They also 
regard the agreement as a sellout to the AFI^-CIO maritime unions in 
view of the higher rates to be paid on grain export shipments, which 
can he regarded as restrictive to the promotion of foreign trade. Some 
producers fear that there are government controls built into the agree- 
ment which could mean decreased exports and lower prices in the 
future. 

Negotiations concerning Soviet oil sales went on concurrently with 
the negotiation of the grain agreement. However, though an oil agree- 
ment was not concluded with the grain agreement, the day that the 
grain agreement was signed a letter of intent addressed to the Soviet 
Minister of Foreign Trade by the Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs was issued confirming the commitment of both coun- 
tries to conclude an agreement on the sale of U.S.S.R. petroleum and 
petroleum products to the United States. 

Other related congressional actions 

The Senate passed two food related resolutions in early 1975 ; Senate 
Resolution 101 and Senate Resolution 122, expressing the sense of the 
Senate that the Secretary of Agriculture should take immediate steps 
to distribute surplus peanuts and potatoes where needed in the United 
States and abroad under domestic food assistance and Public Law 480 
programs. 

In addition, several committees held hearings on various issues 
related to the international food problem. Some of those not already 
mentioned include: 

1. U.S. Congress: House: Committee on International Relations. Subcommit- 
tee on International Trade and Commerce. Export licensing of humanitarian 
assistance to Vietnam. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. Sept. 9, 1975. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 46 pp. 

2. U.S. Congress: Senate: Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to In- 
vestigate Problems connected with Refugees and Escapees; and Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare. Subcommittee on Health. World hunger, health, and 
refugee problems. Part VI : special study mission to Africa, Asia, and Middle East. 
Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. June 10 and 11, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1975. 017 pp. 

3. U.S. Congress: Senate: Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs. 
Report on the eighteenth session of the Conference on Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. Dec. 15, 1975. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1976. 45 pp. 

( )n December 1, 1975, the Senate ratified the protocols to extend until 
. I line 30, 1976, the International Wheat Agreement of 1971. The agree- 
ment consists of the Wheat Trade Convention, which provides an ad- 
ministrative mechanism (the International Wheat Council) for inter- 
national cooperation in matters relating to the production and sale of 
wheat, and the Fond Aid Convention, which permits its parties to 
provide minimum annual quantities of food aid to developing conn- 
trie.-. 

Congress and the Law or the Sea* 

Developments over the past quarter century have increasingly em- 
phasised the degree to which traditional international maritime law 

'Prepared by Marlon m. Montague! analyst in U.8, foreign policy. 



133 

has become outmoded. Though in detail and implementation perhaps 
no international law has been more conflicting and contradictory than 
that pertaining to the sea, in essence it was based on the principle of 
freedom on the high seas, and recognition by all nations of a 3-mile 
territorial limit over which each coastal nation maintained sovereignty. 
However, many recent developments have made it clear that the law 
of the sea must be revised and augmented to relate more effectively to 
the realities of the last quarter of the 20th century, and to the pos- 
sibilities for the future. 

The Congress and the executive branch share an awareness and con- 
cern about this issue, but lack a common methodology for resolving 
the problems presented. Moreover, there are differences both within 
the Congress and the executive branch. During the first session of the 
94th Congress, Congress for the most part was divided between efforts 
to satisfy the specific interests of various constituents while at the 
same time endeavoring to consider foreign policy interests as a whole. 

The essential framework for evolving international oceans and 
fisheries policies has been the series of U. N. Law of the Sea Confer- 
ences, initiated in 1958, with the fourth session of the Third Confer- 
ence meeting in New York, March 15-May 7, 1976. 17 Virtually every 
piece of fishery- or ocean-related legislation before the Congress has 
to take into consideration the potential impact on the Law of the Sea 
negotiations, as well as on U.S. domestic and foreign policy. 

During 1975, a number of congressional committees and the National 
Ocean Policy study group have held hearings on the conference and 
on several marine issues. The most important issues before Congress 
have concerned proposals for the unilateral extension of U.S. fisheries 
jurisdiction from 12 to 200 miles, and for the unilateral authorization 
of licensing of deep sea mining claims by U.S. companies. The execu- 
tive branch has opposed both these proposals "except as a last resort," 
on the grounds that unilateral action by the United States would 
jeopardize the Law of the Sea treaty negotiations. 

Other congressional activities related to fisheries and oceans included 
legislation concerning the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975 and 
the 1975 Brazilian Shrimp Agreement, regulations relating to 
safety at sea, amendments of the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (IMCO) , and control of marine pollution. 

Congress and the Law of the Sea Conference 

The purpose of the Third U.jSF. Law of the Sea Conference — made up 
of delegates from 156 nations — is to draft a new Law of the Sea Treaty. 
Progress, in the view of many observers, including many Members of 
Congress, has been slow, as negotiations have been hampered by the 
unwieldy size of the Conference, the complexity of issues before it, 



17 The First Law of the Sea Conference in 1958 drafted four international conventions : 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High 
Seas, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the living Resources of the High 
Seas, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. The Second U.N. Law of the S^a Con- 
ference in 1960 failed to reach agreement on delineation of the territorial sea and estab- 
lishment of a fishing zone. 

The Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference held an organizational session (New York. 
1973) and two substantive sessions (Caracas, 1974, and Geneva, 1975) prior to its fourth 
session. The New York meeting begins negotiations on 304 draft articles which were pre- 
pared by the 1975 Geneva session, and is focusing on three main issues : The nature of 
the international regime for the exploitation of deep seabed resources ; the degree of con- 
trol that a coastal state can exercise in an offshore economic zone ; and the extent of the 
territorial sea and the related issue of guaranteed transit passage through international 
straits. 



134 

and by the fundamental differences in philosophy and interests be- 
tween the industrialized and the developing nations, between maritime 
powers and those countries with limited shipping, and between the 
coastal and landlocked states. 

Congress is obviously interested and involved with many aspects of 
the negotiations. The Conference deals with an all encompassing array 
of marine issues — territorial waters, a 200-mile economic zone, fishing 
rights of coastal states, the preservation of the marine environment, 
mineral rights to the deep sea bed, freedom of passage of commercial 
and naval vessels and regulation of scientific research — all of which 
impact on U.S. domestic and international policies in terms of peace 
and security, food supply, energy, natural resources, industry, trans- 
portation, and trade. 

Nine Senators and seven Members of the House of Representatives 
were designated as advisers to the U.S. delegations to the Caracas and 
Geneva sessions of the Third Law of the Sea Conference. 18 In addition, 
14 Members of Congress have served on the Law of the Sea Advisory 
Committee. This committee, composed of approximately 80 persons 
representing the different interests affected by the Conference, advise 
the Secretary of State and the Interagency Task Force on the Law of 
the Sea, which drafts U.S. policy positions for the Conference. Evi- 
dence of congressional interest in the Law of the Sea Conference is 
also indicated by the January 22, 1975, letter from 22 Senators to 
President Ford urging "that Secretary of State Kissinger take per- 
sonal command" of the law of the sea negotiations for the United 
States, and that other nations be encouraged to carry on negotiations 
at least at the ministerial level. 

During 1975, hearings on the status of the Conference were held by 
various Senate committees and the Senate National Ocean Policy 
Study Group: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 22: 
the Subcommittee on Minerals. Materials, and Fuels of the Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs on June 4, and on October 29: and by 
the study group on June 3^-. In addition, hearings and debate on 
fisheries and deep sea mining legislation in both the House and the 
Senate have considered the potential impact of a Law of the Sea 
Treaty. Indeed, some Members of Congress, citing the long delays and 
inability of the participating states to agree on fundamental aspects 
of a treaty, have become convinced that a Law of (lie Sea Treaty can- 
not be negotiated through the United Nations, and that the United. 
States must act independently and immediately with its own legislation 
to protect its vital interests. 

GotigresrionaZ action on matin* issut » 

(]) WO mile fisheries jurisdiction.- Congressional debate in 11)75 

over the question of extending U.S. fishing jurisdiction from 12 to 

200 miles centered on two highly controversial bills: ir.K. 200, the 
Marine Fisheries Conserval ion Act of 1976, and S. 0(11 . the Emergency 



1M I'.s. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Third T'.x. t.mw of the Sea 
Conference. Reporl to the Benate by senators Clalborhe Pelt Edmund Musjfle. Clifford 
and Ted Steven*, advisers, to tne r.s. delegation! Caroms. June-Augiisl 1974. Com 
mlttee print. 94tfc Coi eb B 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 

pp. Third r.\. Lav <>f the Bea Conference. Geneva a^sslon, March 
May 1975. Report to Hi" Senate by Senators ciniborno Poll, Thomas &fcln.tyre, OMfTor.i 
• immlttee print 94tn Cong., 1st sees. Washington r.s. Govern- 

meni r-rintinK Office, 1975. 158 pp. 






135 

Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1975. Though H.R. 200 and S. 961 
are directed to the same purpose, to extend the U.S. fishing jurisdic- 
tion from 12 to 200 miles in order to conserve fish stocks and to protect 
the U.S. fishing industry, and to the same broad scope, to provide for 
regulation of foreign fishing within the 200-mile zone, and to establish 
fishery management programs, they differ considerably in emphasis 
and detail. H.R. 200 provides for certain congressional oversight func- 
tions that involve U.S. foreign policy, which S. 961 does not; H.R. 200 
diminished the role of the Secretary of State in relation to that of the 
Secretary of Commerce with regard to foreign fishing while S. 961 
provides for joint authority between the two Secretaries; and H.R. 
200 places much less emphasis than does S. 961 on the interim character 
of the measure until an international treaty enters into force. 

In the House, H.R. 200 was referred to the House Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which favorably reported the meas- 
ure on August 20, 1975 (H. Kept 94-445). In addition, the House 
Committee on International Relations requested sequential referral of 
the bill, claiming that the measure "* * * impinges upon the commit- 
tee's jurisdiction over relations with foreign countries generally, the 
establishment of boundary lines between the United States and for- 
eign nations, international conferences and congresses, and JJJ8. or- 
ganizations." 19 After the Speaker ruled against this request, the 
International Relations Committee, in accordance with the Rules of 
the House which grant it special oversight functions concerning 
international fishing agreements, held oversight hearings on Septem- 
ber 24 and October 3 and 4, and submitted a report to the Speaker 
recommending against House passage of H.R. 200. On October 9, the 
House passed H.R. 200 by a vote of 208-101. 

In the Senate, S. 961 was reported favorably by the Senate Com- 
merce Committee (S. Rept. 94-416, Oct. 7, 1975) and by the Senate 
Armed Services Committee (S. Rept. 94-515, Dec. 8, 1975), but was 
reported unfavorably by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(S. Rept. 94-459, Nov. 18, 1975) . 

Congressional debate on H.R. 200 and S. 961 as reflected by the dif- 
fering views set forth in the various reports, indicates the problem 
of reconciling essentialty domestic interests of conservation and pro- 
tection of the U.S. fishing industries with such U.S. foreign policy in- 
terests as avoiding possible retaliatory action by other nations, 
successfully concluding an international oceans agreement, and pro- 
tecting existing international law. It is also worth noting that the 
major legislation relating to fisheries, and also to mining and Outer 
Continental Shelf jurisdiction — all of which if passed or implemented 
would have profound impacts on U.S. foreign policy and on interna- 
tional law — was not initiated in the Foreign Relations or Interna- 
tional Relations Committees, but in such committees as the Commerce 
Committee and the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. More- 
over, through various procedural maneuvers, the Foreign Affairs and 
International Relations Committees were actually restricted in the 
degree of influence they could exercise over this legislation. 

19 U.S. Congress. House : Committee on International Relations. Potential impact of the 
proposed 200-mile fishing zone of U.S. foreign relations. H. Rept. 94-542. 94th Cong., 1st 
sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 



136 

In summarizing its reasons for objecting to H.K. 200, the Commit- 
tee on International Relations stated in its report : 

The broad range of U.S. ocean interests can best be protected by international 
agreements, not by unilateral actions. 

H.R. 200 would damage U.S. objectives at the law of the Sea Conference 
including our efforts to obtain special regimes for salmon and for distant-water 
fisheries such as tuna and shrimp. 

There are alternative means of achieving a transition to a 200-mile coastal 
fisheries zone by international agreements, not by unilateral action. 

Unilateral action will adversely affect other important U.S. foreign policy 
interests : 

H.R. 200 would provoke retaliatory action by other nations. 

H.R. 200 is unenforceable. 

H.R. 200 is inconsistent with longstanding U.S. policy. 

H.R. 200 violates U.S. treaty obligations. 

H.R. 200 is not an interim measure. 

The adverse report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
S. 961 argued: (1) That the measure is inconsistent with the spirit of 
existing U.S. international legal obligations, particularly the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas which identifies freedom of fishing as 
an essential element of high seas freedom; and (2) that S. 961 might 
undermine current efforts of the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Con- 
ference to reach agreement on this and other marine issues. 

The principal arguments put forward by proponents of the pro- 
posal to establish a 200-mile U.S. fisheries zone concerned the need to 
protect U.S. fishing interests from the increasing foreign fishing 
activity of recent years and to conserve fish stocks. In answer to the 
expressed fears of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Commit- 
tees, supporters maintained that extension of U.S. jurisdiction over 
a 200-mile economic zone would be an interim measure contingent 
on eventual passage of an international treaty, and that enactment 
of such a law might provide needed stimulus toward completion of 
an international agreement. Further, the proponents claim that a 
unilateral U.S. action would not violate international law, for coun- 
tries have the right to take measures necessary to conserve their stocks 
of fish, that no international treaty limits national fisheries to 12 
miles, and that the bills provide for renegotiation of existing fisheries 
treaties to which the United States is party. 

While some opponents claimed that extension of U.S. fishery juris- 
diction to 200 miles could cause retaliatory action which could jeop- 
ardize national defense by limiting freedom of navigation and over- 
flight righto, the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
argued that a fisheries management proposal is clearly distinguish- 
able from jurisdictional extensions infringing on military ocean rights, 
and that considerations of national defense and security were not argu- 
ments relative to the merits of S. 9C>1. 20 

(2) I >< < i> %i abed mining. — Legislation was reintroduced in the 9-1 th 
Congress (H.R. 1270. S. 718) to protect U.S. investments in dee}) sea- 
bed mining operations. These bills are similar to the proposed Deep 
Seabed Hard Minerals Art (S. 1134) of the 9. ,, ,d Congress, which, 
though favorably reported by the Senate Committee on Interior and 



»§. T»r,i ivns T«assi'<l l>v the Senate. 77 10. on .Tnn. 2ft. 1070. and the conference report 
reconciling s. 001 and U.K. 200 (H. Rept. 04 04ft) was agreed to by the Senate on Mar. 

'JO. 107ft. nnd by the House on Mar. .'10. 1070. The measure was signed Into law (Public 
Law 94 204) on' Apr. 18, 1070. 



137 

Insular Affairs, 21 died in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at 
the end of the Congress. In the 94th Congress, H.R. 1270 was re- 
ferred to the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
and S. 713 to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
but with a stipulation that when reported, it is to be subsequently 
reported to the Committees on Armed Services, Commerce, and For- 
eign Relations simultaneously for 30 days. No action on either the 
House or Senate proposals had transpired by the end of 1975. 

Like the fisheries management measure, the deep seabed mining pro- 
posals must respond to both domestic and international concerns. 
The bills would give the Secretary of the Interior authority to issue 
licenses to U.S. nationals engaging in exploration and commercial re- 
covery of deep seabed mineral resources. The proposal would estab- 
lish an interim measure until a Law of the Sea Treaty becomes effec- 
tive, with any licenses issued under the U.S. law becoming subject to 
the treaty's provisions, and compensation provided for certain losses 
incurred through differing requirements of an international treaty. 

The passage of a Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act is favored by 
the mining industry, which fears that without the investment protec- 
tion provided for in the proposed legislation, further deepsea mining 
development will become financially too risky, that the United States 
may fall behind technologically, and that international mineral cartels 
may develop if U.S. dependence on foreign sources continues. 

The executive branch has opposed the deep seabed mining proposals 
on the grounds that such unilateral action might jeopardize the Law 
of the Sea negotiations, but it has initiated several actions to assist the 
deep seabed mining industry. The Department of State has taken the 
position that under existing international law, mining of the deep 
seabed beyond limits of national jurisdiction may proceed as a free- 
dom of the high seas. 

( 3 ) O ther Continental Shelf. — Since the energy crisis, interest in the 
production of oil and gas from the sea floor adjoining U.S. coasts, and 
in the establishment of deepwater ports, has intensified. Besides U.S. 
concern over the need to avoid marine pollution and the jursidictional 
disputes between the Federal and State Governments, the question has 
also prompted jurisdictional assertions among the member nations 
negotiating the Law of the Sea Treaty. 

In a controversial memorandum dated September 18, and released 
October 4, 1974, the Department of the Interior ordered a firm leas- 
ing schedule for Outer Continental Shelf lands which included: (1) 
10 million acres leased in 1975; (2) a sale in 1975 in both Alaska and 
the Atlantic; and (3) an alternative plan if the second condition was 
not met, which would still allow for the leasing of 10 million acres. 

This schedule was opposed on a number of grounds. Certain Con- 
gressmen objected to it on the premise that the full truth of the leas- 
ing had not been revealed. They also raised the question of infringe- 
ment of states rights. This opposition has caused delay in the im- 
plementation of the schedule. 

Considerable legislation was introduced in 1975 concerning the 
Outer Continental Shelf, and on April 22, 1975, the House passed 

- l T'.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Peen Seabed Hard 
Minerals Act; report to acoompanv S. 1134. S. Rept. 93-1116. 93d Con*?., 2d sess. Wash- 
ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. 68 pp. 



138 

House Resolution 412 approving the establishment of the ad hoc Select 
Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of consid- 
ering H.R. 6218. This bill would amend the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act of 1953, to establish a policy for the management of oil 
and natural gas in the OCS, and for the protection of the marine and 
coastal environment. The measure was not reported in 1975. 22 

(4) Fishery and ocean conventions, treaties, and regulations. — On 
August 5, 1975, the President approved the Atlantic Tunas Conven- 
tion Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-70) to implement the 1966 Conven- 
tion for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. The purpose of this law 
is to provide an overall conservation program, agreed to on an inter- 
national basis, for the conservation of the highly migratory tunas, 
and to carry out U.S. responsibilities under the convention. The law 
authorizes the appointment of U.S. Commissioners to the Interna- 
tional Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), 
which is the decisionmaking organ of the convention, and authorized 
the creation of a U.S. Advisory Committee. 

On October 28, 1 ( .>75, the Senate ratified the 1975 Brazilian Shrimp 
Agreement, to establish a basis for regulating the conduct of shrimp 
fishing in a defined area oif the coast of Brazil. The new treaty differs 
from the 1972 agreement in that it reduces the number of U.S.- (lair 
vessels which may fish within the designated fishing area at any time 
during the second year of the agreement, increases the amount of 
money the United States must pay the Brazilian Government to ex- 
ercise its enforcement responsibilities, and provides for cooperation 
in issues related to the fishing industries and exchange of scientific 
information. The President signed enabling legislation (H.R. 5709) 
imo law July 24, 1975 (Public Law 94-58). 

Also, on October 28, 1975, the Senate agreed to resolutions of rati- 
fication of the Convention on the International regulations for Pre- 
senting Collisions at Sea, 1972 (Ex. TV. 93d Cong.. 1st sess.), amend- 
ments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
( K\\ K. 93d Cong., 2d sess.) and amendments to several articles of the 
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organi- 
zation (Ex F,94±h Cong., 1st sess.). 

(5) Marine pollution. — Congress passed two laws pertaining to 
marine pollution in 1975. Public Law 94— (>2 (H.R. 5710), approved 
July 15. 1975, amends the Marine Protection) Research, and Sanctu- 
aries A'-t of 1972 to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1976 and 
Hi" transition period July 1-S<>j>! ember 30, 1970, as follows: Title L 
ocean ditfnrping permil program $5.3 million for fiscal year 1976 and 
$1,325 million lor the transition period; title II, research program 
on the eil'ecis of ocean dumping on the marine environment- -$6 mil- 
lion for !' cal year 1976 and $1.5 million for the transition period; 
and title MI. marine sanctuaries areas — $6.2 million for fiscal year 
L976 and $1.5.") for (he transition period. The law also changes from 
January to March, the month in which the Secretary of Commerce 
mint tile bis annual report on the effects of ocean dumping on the 
marine environment. 



is. Congress. Honse \'i Hoc Select Committee on tim Ontor Continental Shelf. 
Continental Shelf Landi Act Amendments. I i«':i ri n lts. 94th Con?., 1st sess. Numerous 
dates, 1975. Pts. i and 2. Washington, U.S. Goyernmenl Printing Office, I9T5. l,s::r> pp. 



139 

A transportation bill— Public Law 94-134 (H.R. 8365)— approved 
November 24, 1975, includes an appropriation of $10 million for the 
Coast Guard Pollution Control Fund to insure immediate clean up 
of oil spills. 

Legislation was introduced but not passed in 1975 (S. 2162 and 
H.R. 9294) to implement the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage, and the 1971 Convention on the Establishment 
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 
although neither convention has been ratified by the Senate. Another 
proposal concerned with marine pollution control (S. 1341) would 
amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972 and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 to extend U.S. 
vessel pollution control jurisdiction to 200 miles from U.S. coasts. 
No action was taken on this proposal in 1975. 

Other References 

Browne. Marjorie Ann. Law of the Sea Conference. Washington, Library of 
Congress Congressional Research Service. Issue Brief IB74104. Updated peri- 
odically. 18 pp. 

Dyas, Norma. Oil and Gas Development on the Continental Shelf. Washington. 
Library of Congress Congressional Research Service. Issue Brief IB74061. 
Updated periodically. 14 pp. 

Space Research* 

The foreign policy aspects of outer space programs drew little at- 
tention from Congress as a whole during 1975. Authorization for the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) passed both 
Houses of Congress with little discussion and little change from the 
administration request of approximately $3.5 billion. The final section 
of the NASA Authorization Act of 1976 did make specific reference 
to the administration's making "every effort to enlist the support and 
cooperation of appropriate scientists and engineers of other countries 
and international organizations" in monitoring and conducting re- 
search on the ozone layer of the upper atmosphere. 

During 1975 the congressional committees concerned witli outer 
space continued their interest in and encouragement of cooperation 
among nations in the use and exploration of outer space for peace- 
ful purposes. 23 International cooperation in space was brought up 
many times during the extensive investigation by the Subcommittee on 
Space Science and Applications of the House Committee on Science 
and Technology on the topic, "Future Space Programs, 1975." Hear- 
ings were held by the subcommittee on 5 days in July and numerous 
additional papers as well as the conclusions and recommendations 
of the subcommittee were published in a two-volume committee print. 
Included in the committee print was a paper by Howard and Harriet. 
Kurtz, in which they advocated "the development of pro-human U.S. 
global space power initiatives as the centerpiece for a new, and 
larger, and more effective U.S. foreign policy." 24 



♦Prepared by Vita Bite, analyst in international relations. 

23 See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Convention 
on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space : Analysis and background data. 
Committee print. 94th Cong.. 1st sess. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 

2 * U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Space 
Scipnce and Applications. Future Space Programs. 1975. 94th Cong.. 1st sess. Committee 
print. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. vol. 2, p. 603. 



140 

Among the conclusions of the subcommittee was that international 
participation is one of the major policy factors which need to be evalu- 
ated on a recurring basis in order to provide for an effective space 
program. Another conclusion was that : 

In addition to the programs on international space cooperation currently un- 
derway, efforts should be made to reinforce U.S. activity to assure that the 
space programs serve as a tool for and as a positive impetus to : 

(1) Realizing the equitable and efficient use and conservation of natural 
resources ; 

(2) Expanding the educational opportunities and medical services for all 
people; 

(3) Providing new opportunities for exchange of information and lessening 
of international tensions ; and 

(4) Providing increased business and social communications between nations. 26 

The exploration, use, and exploitation of outer space have been con- 
ducted mainly on a national basis. Yet by their very nature these ac- 
tivities transcend national boundaries and create problems that can 
be solved only within an international framework. The uses of outer 
space have created a vast potential for the solution of problems on a 
global and regional level and thus require an inherently international 
approach. 

At present there is significant international cooperation in outer 
space. Yet full realization of certain new outer space activities will 
require new international approaches, because of the political prob- 
lems which purely national or even regional approaches generate, and 
because of technical requirements inherent in fully and efficiently 
utilizing the potential of outer space activity. 

Remote sensing from space will be of particular significance in 
predicting crop production and water availability, monitoring and 
predicting climactic trends and severe storms, and monitoring the en- 
vironment. In addition, space activities have the potential to contribute 
to our Nation's energy needs. In addition to the prediction of water 
availability and climate trends, space observations could provide geo- 
logical maps. Beyond that it may be possible to generate energy in 
space and transmit it to Earth and to launch nuclear waste from Earth- 
based generators to outside of our Solar system. Utilitarian applica- 
tions, however, raise a host of problems of economic, social, military. 
political, and legal character on both the domestic and international 
levels. 

The United States is committed by statute to the advancement of 
the peaceful uses of outer space for the benefit of all mankind, and 
to conduct its civil space activities in cooperation with other nations 
and groups of nations. Pursuant to this mandate, it has developed an 
effective and ongoing program of international cooperation in space 
research and development. 

However, there arc several areas in which further action is needed, 

In the future, Congress may want to explore possible U.S. policy di- 
rections in this area. The Internal ional Relations and Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee may be especially interested in exploring the foreign 
policy implications of various space developments such as the experi- 
mental Earth resources satellites and the possibility of direct broad- 
atellites. In the case of Earth resources satellites, there is the 



-'■ [bid., vol. 1, p. 84. 



141 

fear that pictures taken from outer space coulcl be used by the launch- 
ing nation to exploit the natural resources of other states. While there 
has been widespread endorsement and international cooperation in 
the U.S. program for the development of remote sensing technology 
(some nations already operate or intend to acquire Landsat Earth 
stations of their own) a number of nations have expressed strong con- 
cerns about data secured over their territories, and the U.S. policy of 
unrestricted availability of such data to all who wish to have it. The 
U.S. Government position on this has been to acknowledge the exist- 
ence of these concerns without agreeing with the underlying reason- 
ing and the risks perceived by other nations in the present U.S. policy. 
The capabilities of the new satellites to look down upon all humanity 
and to invade the privacy of all nations, is so far beyond any human 
experience that it is almost beyond imagination. Information derived 
from the Landsat program raises important questions, such as: To 
whom does the information belong ; who has the right to its use ; and 
who has the right of access. Answers to these questions involve a very 
difficult process, in which Congress may wish to participate, of de- 
veloping a doctrine in a novel field of international legislation. 

In the case of direct broadcast satellites, fear exists that free flow 
of information might result in the subjection of receiving nations to 
undesirable broadcasts. Many countries have expressed fears that the 
new technology will bring them programs which may contain propa- 
ganda, culturally offensive material, or trivia. Some countries have 
made proposals for regulating direct broadcast programs, but these 
proposals have raised the counterconcern that regulation might 
severely limit the free flow of information. 

The present state of policy in these areas is a manifestation of the 
need for a more effective machinery for the formulation and imple- 
mentation of policies related to issues in which science, technology, 
and foreign affairs intersect. 

Other International Environmental Issues* 

Some of the concerns of the Congress on international environ- 
mental matters have been treated in the other parts of this chapter. 

Protection of the marine environment 

Protection of the marine environment is one area where Congress 
has not yet acted to implement some of the significant international 
treaties adopted. Among the treaties pending before the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee are the : 

— 1960 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damages, 
and the 

■ — 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. 
Further Senate consideration of these documents appears to have been 
postponed until the Congress has enacted implementing legislation. 
Such legislation, originally introduced during the 93d Congress, was 
reintroduced during the 94th Congress (S. 2162/H.R. 9294). In the 
Senate the legislation was referred to three committees: Commerce. 
Interior and Insular Affairs, and Public Works; no hearings on these 



•Prepared by Marjorle Ann Browne, analyst in International relations. 

74-0:12—70 U 



142 

bills were held during 1975. In the House, the companion bill was 
referred to the following three committees: International Relations, 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and Public Works and Transporta- 
tion. A subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Committee held hearings between October 1975 and January 1976. 
Meanwhile, the 1969 convention entered into force on June 19, 1975, 
without U.S. participation. 

Two significant treaties made under the auspices of the Intergov- 
ernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) during 1973 
have not yet been transmitted to the Senate : 

— Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, and 
— Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases 
of Marine Pollution by Substances Other than Oil. 
The first treaty includes five annexes and two protocols and is quite 
lengthy. The second treaty is a protocol which supplemented the 
1969 Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases 
of Oil Pollution Casualties. The 1969 convention entered into force 
on May 6. 1975. Implementing legislation for the 1973 protocol was 
introduced in late 1975 (S. 2549/II.R. 11406) and referred to the 
Senate Commerce Committee and the House Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries Committee. Xo hearings have been held. 

A useful source of information on the problems of the protection 
of the marine environment was prepared by the CRS at the request 
of the National Ocean Policy Study and published in May 1975. -*• 
The report describes most of the salient aspects of ocean pollution and 
both domestic and international efforts to control pollution in the 
marine environment. 

Antarctic policy 

During 1975. the Subcommittee on Oceans and International En- 
vironment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings, 
in executive session, on U.S. policy with respect to mineral explora- 
tion and exploitation in the Antarctic. The purposes of the hearing, 
according to Chairman Claiborne Pell, were : 

(a) To determine the current U.S. policy on this subject: (b) to discuss 
tin 1 possible alternatives available to the United States on this issue: and (c) to 
review the consequences bucd policy will have on the Antarctic Treaty and its 

10 years of successful cooperation." 7 

Dr. Dixy I -'slant Secretary of State, and Chairman 

of the Antarctic Policy Group, indicated that "an Internationally 

agreed approach for any commercial exploration and exploitation of 
Antarctic mineral resources is the advisable course of action." 18 In 
response to questions on the environmental aspects of Antarctic min- 
eral exploitation and the [T.N. environmental program (UNBP),Dr. 
I'd thai the LJNEP governing council had decided that the 
Antarcl i<- Treaty was the \"^t i'ramowork for (he consideration of such 



Committee on Commerce. National Ocean Policy Btndj 

of Mini's A'-tiviii..^ on thf Marine Environment." Prepared at the requp«1 of Hon. 

Warn rnunon. chairman, Commltt »n Commerce, and Hon EBrneal r Hoi 

chairman, National Ocean Policy Study. 94th Cong., 1^1 sesa Committee print. Pri 

• : Coi • onal Ri i "-!i Service. Washington, r.s. Government Print 

i s < . .lie- Committee ••" Foi >l«rn Relation* Rnbcommltt< '' ,; nml 

national Environment. "1 B. Antarctic Policy." Hearlnjr, 94th Cong., 1st seas., May 15, 
blngton, i s. Government Printing Office, 1975. p, -. 
[bid i 



143 

questions. Senator Pell urged that Congress be kept informed of 
executive branch considerations, even at the early stages of negotia- 
tions and the establishment of broad policy. 

Other fending treaties 

Other treaties still pending before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee which deal with international environmental questions 
were transmitted to the Senate in December 1975 : 

— Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears, November 1973, 

and 
—Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. June 1972. 

United Nations Environment Program ( UNEP) 

In 1972, after considerable planning, delegations from 113 nations 
met at Stockholm for the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment. This Conference adopted a declaration on the human 
environment and an action plan of approximately 200 recommenda- 
tions for both national and international action to assess the global 
environment and to devise management programs and agreements for 
its improvement. In addition, the Conference provided for the estab- 
lishment of institutional apparatus (consisting of Executive Director, 
Governing Council, Environment Secretariat, Environment Coordi- 
nation Board, and Environment Fund), under a United Nations en- 
vironment program. The costs of servicing the Governing Council 
and operating the Secretariat are borne by the United Nations regular 
budget while the fund, supported from voluntary contributions, pro- 
vides for the financing of new environmental initiatives within the 
U.N. system. The United States has contributed $12.5 million, between 
1973 and 1975. For the same period the U.N. Environment Fund has 
received a total of $43.1 million from all contributing countries. 

In the United Nations Environment Program Participation Act of 
1973 (Public Law 93-188) the Congress authorized U.S. participation 
in the UNEP and an appropriation of $40 million for U.S. contribu- 
tions to the UNEP, but limited appropriations to not more than $10 
million for use in fiscal year 1974. The Congress, through the Foreign 
Assistance Appropriations Act. appropriated $7.5 million in fiscal 
year 1974 and $5 million in fiscal year 1975. An appropriation of $7.5 
million is pending in the conference report of the Foreign Assistance 
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1976 (H.R. 12203: H. Kept. 94- 
1006). An appropriation of $5 million has been requested for fiscal 
year 1977. 

International law rnul the Concorde 

The approach of 1970. when the British-French supersonic trans- 
port, the Concorde, would become operational, signaled an increased 
concern in the. United States over the impart of the SST. The major 
environmental issues surrounding the Concorde relate to airport-area 
noise levels that can be generated by the Concorde and the unknown 
effect that high altitude flights by supersonic aircraft might have on 
the ozone layer in the upper atmosphere. Concessional efforts with 
respect to limiting the Concorde's entry into the United States have 
frequently been linked to noise abatement. Congressional attempts 
during July 1975 to adopt amendments to i\w Department of Trans- 



144 

pollution appropriations bill Which would have banned the Concorde 
were defeated by narrow margins in the House and Senate. In De- 
cember the House passed an amendment to the Airport and Airway 
Development Act of 1970 (H.R. D771) banning for 6 months the use 
of supersonic aircraft with noise levels above the limits set by Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations for subsonic planes. 
.Similar amendments were defeated in the Senate in March 1976. 

With regard to the effects on the ozone layer. Secretary of Trans- 
portation William T. Coleman, Jr. indicated in February 1970 that 
the FAA would proceed with a proposed high altitude pollution pro- 
gram to produce a data base necessary for the development of national 
and international regulations of aircraft operations in the stratosphere. 
This program is subject, however, to Ofiice of Management and Budget 
clearance and to congressional authorization. In addition. Coleman 
said he would request President Ford to instruct the Secretary of State 
to iiiitiate negotiations with France and Great Britain so that an 
agreement to establish a monitoring system for measuring ozone levels 
in the stratosphere could be concluded quickly among the three coun- 
tries. He also requested that the Secretary of State initiate discus- 
sions through the International Civil Aviation Organization ( ICAO) 
and the World Meteorological Organization on the development of in- 
ternational stratospheric standards for the SST. 

Executive branch activities on the Concorde climaxed on February 4, 
1976, when Secretary of Transportation Coleman approved Concorde 
flights to New York and to "Washington for a 16-month trial period 
''under certain precise limitations and restrictions." According to Cole- 
man, his decision was based, among other factors, on provisions of the 
1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, the 1946 
Bermuda Agreement with the United Kingdom, and a 1946 bilateral 
agreement with France. "These provisions," he said, "and a sense of 
justice as well, demand that the lavs of this country be applied fairly 
and without discrimination." 

The judiciary branch has also been involved with the Concorde. 
Suits have 1 been submitted by both sides in various judicial for 
including the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of ! 
York, the U.S. District Court in Washington, \).C.< and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals in Washington. None of the sni»< have 1 

Several foreign relations and international lepra] factors have bpen 
cited during the debate within the executive and branches 

and before the iudicii observers have called upon the rol 

France and the United Kingdom as two of America's allies and 

the need for the [Jnited States to support them in this endeavor which 
required the investment le amounts of time and 

money : K) yea 2 billion, ;i<- 'ording to one source. Both proponents 

and opponents of the view that Hie ( Joncorde should be allowed to land 
and operate at U.S. airports call upon int< il ti ityJawtosun- 

p arguments. On December IK L075. the Vviation Subcommit- 
tee of the Hon— Public Works and Transport! I ommittee held 
hearu < the international legal considerations involved in the 
domestic regulation of aircraft noise. Tl h and French have 
• fusal to perinil landings would be i i ion of cert 
rning international aviation. The State Department's 



145 

Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic and Business Affairs Phillip 
1\. Trimble presented a statement to rebut that argument : 

[Under existing treaty law] a country has the right to impose nondiscrimina- 
tory requirements relating to the entry and operations of the aircraft of other 
parties into its territory. 

******* 

We have concluded that noise regulation is legally permissible under the 
bilateral and other agreements. 

******* 

Although we have concluded that a nation retains the legal right to impose 
laws and regulations relating to noise standards applicable to aircraft within 
its territory, Article 11 makes it clear — along with Article 15 and other provi- 
sions — chat these national laws and regulations must be applied without dis- 
tinction us to nationality, — i.e., in a fair and non-discriminatory fashion. LJ 

During the question-and-answer period, however, Trimble acknowl- 
edged that arguments could be made on the other side and that his 
statement had been drafted toward a specific conclusion. Thus, it could 
also be argued that the United States is legally bound, under interna- 
tional agreements, to permit the Concorde to land at its airports. Hear- 
inga on FA A certification of the SST were also held by the Subcommit- 
tee on Government Activities and Transportation of the House Com- 
mittee on Government Operations. 

Another international legal factor was raised by Senator Gaylord 
Nelson who expressed the view that under the provisions of the Chicago* 
Convention, any of the other 133 states parties should "be given equal' 
nondiscriminatory treatment in regard to landing rights. If the Soviets 
request permission to operate their SST within the United States, they 
will have to be given that right. If Japan or China or Iran obtains a 
Concorde then "* * * they have the right to fly supersonic planes into 
this country." According to Nelson : 

If the Congress does not overturn this — the Coleman— decision, the door to a 
large number of daily SST flights will be flung wide open. A treaty we have rati- 
fied with over 100 other nations will bind our future course of action. Decisions 
will become increasingly difficult. The adverse environmental impacts will 
multiply. 30 



29 Congressional Record Tdaily edition] vol. 122. Feb. 3. 1976: H 662-663. 

30 Nelson. Gaylord. The Concorde Dilemma. Congressional Record [daily edition! vol. 
122. Feb. 19, 1976 : S1984-1986. 



CONGRESS AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS 

AND MIA'S 

Human Rights* 

In 1975, Congress prodded the administration to assure that U.S. 
foreign policy actions include consideration of the status of human 
rights in other countries. In some areas the prodding appeared to be 
producing positive results, while in others Congress moved to institute 
certain legislative mechanisms to assure greater attention to the human 
rights factor in foreign policy considerations. 

Organisational changes in State Department 

In the spring of 1974 the Subcommittee on International Organiza- 
tions and Movements of the House International Relations Committee 
had issued a committee print presenting policy recommendations on 
international protection of human rights. 1 Later that year Congress- 
man Fraser reported that, "many of the organizational changes recom- 
mended by the subcommittee have been accepted by the Department." 2 

Among such recommendations was the designation of human rights 
officers in all State Department geographic bureaus. A further recom- 
mendation, for appointment of a special assistant on human rights in 
the Deputy Secretary's Office to insure the consideration of human 
rights factors at the policy making level, was implemented in mid- 
1975 by creation of an Office of Humanitarian Affairs. The creation 
of sucn an office had been strongly urged by a group of Members of 
Congress, including Senator Cranston and Congressman Fraser, Bing- 
ham, and Fascell, at three meetings with Secretary of State Kissinger 
in late 1974 and early 1975. At those sessions Secretary Kissinger had 
reportedly been told that the Department of State had no one with 
whom Congress could discuss human rights and that someone should 
be put in charge of this problem immediately. 

U.S. policy at the United Nation* 

Another arena where official U.S. policy appeared to be following the 
recommendations of the Internationa] Organizations subcomm 
in voicing a stronger concern for human rights violations in 
international organizations as the United Nations, [n March 1975,1 .S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations, John Scali, in a Bpeech which 
deplored the lack of progress in human rights made by the Ui I 
Nations in o ears, announced that the Unite I States would take 

b ne ach to human rights al the United Nations. He i 

I uary 6, 1'K '• ■ had instructed the I F.S. 

Delegation to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva to support 



*tv< p«red i>v Vita Bite, analyst in Internationa] relations. 

• [t £ c.,. ,.„,. • Committee on Foreign >' *ipo on International 

. ,. :ll ,,i Movemi fhta In the World Community: \ Call for D.S. 

Committee Print. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
1074 

i >nal Record [dally edition], rol. 121. Sept Eft, II 

(HO) 



147 

thorough studies by the Commission of alleged human rights violations 
anywhere in the world — whenever complaints to the Commission indi- 
cate a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations. The 
new policy would mean that the United States would support interna- 
tional inquiries into alleged human rights violations in nations 
regarded as friends as well as adversaries. Thus in following this new 
policy the United States announced support for the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission's study of the situation in Chile. Later, when Chile 
refused to permit the Commission to do on-the-scene investigation of 
human rights conditions within the country, the United States criti- 
cized Chile for reneging on its earlier promise to allow such an 
investigation. 

Another official U.S. action at the international level was the intro- 
duction by U.S. Ambassador Moynihan (who succeeded Scali) on 
November 12, 1975. before the U.N. General Assembly of a resolution 
calling for an unconditional amnesty for all political prisoners world- 
wide, and for strengthened efforts by and greater cooperation with the 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights in its efforts on behalf of political 
prisoners. This U.S. public declaration of respect and concern for hu- 
man rights was commended by Members of Congress who usually 
criticize the administration for failure to place sufficient value on hu- 
man rights issues in its foreign policy decisionmaking. 3 The resolution, 
however, was withdrawn a few days later after numerous amendments 
were submitted which would have drastically changed its original 
intent. 

Foreign assistance 

During the past 2 years Congress has been especially concerned with 
respect for internationallv recognized human rights in countries re- 
ceiving U.S. assistance. Thus on September 20, 1974, Congressman 
Fraser delivered to Secretary of State Kissinger a letter signed by 105 
Members of Congress stating that their support for foreign aid legisla- 
tion in the future would be influenced by the extent to which U.S. 
foreign policy shows more concern for human rights in recipient coun- 
tries. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, section 502B, stated the 
souse of the Congress that "except in extraordinary circumstances the 
President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to 
any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross viola- 
tions of internationally recognized human rights." The President was 
to advise Congress of extraordinary circumstances necessitating secu- 
rity assistance to any government engaging in such human rights 
violations. 

The State Department reportedly had planned to respond to the 
requirements of tins section by submitting to Congress a country-by- 
country analysis of how would-be aid recipients handled human rights 
problems, and why security requirements dictated continued aid. Such 
a draft was, however, not submitted to Congress. Instead a bland, 
unsigned summary report, entitled "Report to the Congress on the 
Human Rights Situation in Countries "Receiving U.S. Security Assist- 
ance, ,, was transmitted on November 14. 1975. to the Senate Foreign 



■"■ Spp for example. Congressional Record plailv edition], vol. 121, Nov. 10. 1H1 
S20403-S20404. and Dec. 5, 1975 : S21241-S21244. 



148 

[Relations Committee ami the House International Relations Commit- 
tee. The report stated that the Department viewed section 502B as an 
authoritative expression of congressional concern for human rights in 
all countries receiving assistance. Accordingly the State Department 
had isstied a series of instructions to U.S. missions in the field calling 
for comprehensive reports on the human rights situation in each 
country. Such classified reports had been submitted and extensively 
analyzed by the Department. 

The report then posited the conclusion that : 

Repressive laws and actions, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, unfair trials or other 
flagrant denials of the rights of life, liberty and the security of the person are not 
extraordinary events in the world community. These are all too common, oc- 
curring within both those countries receiving U.S. security assistance and those 
that do not. 

Moreover, the report continued : 

Experience demonstrated that the political, social, and cultural problems which 

seemingly Intractable human rights abuses to occur need to he resolved be- 

fore real Improvements in human rights conditions can apparently take place — 

with or without bilateral or international pressure. In most of the world the 

problems associated with poverty and the evolution from traditional to more 
modern societies seem to take precedence over respect for human rights. 

Thus: 

In view of the widespread nature of human rights violations in the world, we 
have found no adequately objective way to make distinctions of degree between 
nations. This fact leads us, therefore, to the conclusion that neither the U.S. 

Ity interest nor the buman rights cause would be properly served by the 
public obloquy and impaired relations with security assistance recipient countries 
that would follow the making of inherently subjective U.S. Government determi- 
nations that "gross" violations do or do not exist or that a •"consistent" pattern of 
such violations does or does not exist in such eountrie . 

The report concluded that "quiet bui forceful diplomacy" continued 
to l)e i he best way to improve human rights matters. 

Adverse congressional reaction to (his report was an element in the 
continued strengthening of (he human rights section in the Interna- 
tional Development and Food Assistance Ad of r.)7.*>, IT.lv. 9005 
(Public L.-v.!!! L61), 

The final text of this reads : 

Sic. 116. Hi man RIGHTS. — (a) No assistance may he provided under this 

part to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern 
<ii" gross violations of Internationally recognized human rights. Including torture 
or cruel, Inhuman, or degrading treatment of punishment, prolonged detention 
without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, Liberty, and the se- 
cuiit.N of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in 

BUCh count ry. 

(b) r n determining whether this standard Is being met with regard to funds 
allocated under tins part, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or 
the Committee on [nternational Relations of the Mouse of Representative* may 
require the administrator primarily responsible for administering part i of this 
act to submit in writing information demonstrating that such assistance win 
directl.1 benefit the needy people in such country, together with a detailed ex- 
planation of the .-i- distance to he provided (including the dollar amounts of such 
tance) .- 1 1 1 < i ;in explanation of how such assistance will directly benefit the 
needy people in such country, if either committee or either House of Congress 
disagrees with the administrator's justification it may Initiate action t<» termi- 
itance to any country by a concurrent resolution under section 611 of 
act. 



149 

(c) In determining whether or not a government falls within the provisions 
of subsection (a), consideration shall be given to the extent of cooperation of such 
government in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged violations of in- 
ternationally recognized human rights by appropriate international organizations, 
including the International Committee of the Red Cross, or groups or persons 
acting under the authority of the United Nations or of the Organization of Ameri- 
can States. 

(d) The President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representa- 
tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, in the annual pres- 
entation materials on proposed economic development assistance programs, a 
full and complete report regarding the steps he has taken to carry out the provi- 
sions of this section. 

The human rights section of the security assistance authorization 
bill (which is the subject of legislation separate from economic aid) 
S. 2662, as worked out by conference committee of both House- calls 
for establishment within the Department of State of a Coordinator 
for Human Rights, who is to be appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. The bill permits the Congress to 
adopt concurrent resolutions by which security assistance to countries 
in violation of internationally recognized standards of human rights 
may be reduced or ended. The reports of international organizations 
are to be used to determine whether such violations are occurring. 

Hearings 

In other action as part of an ongoing, long-term study of interna- 
tional human rights and U.S. foreign policy, the Subcommittee on 
International Organizations of the House International Relations 
Committee held hearings on human rights in Korea and the Phi 
pines 4 on several days in June and on human rights in Haiti" in 
November and on Chile 6 in December. 

Women's rights 

^ Another human rights issue which was the focus of some congres- 
sional attention during the past year was women's rights. The United 
Nations designated 1975 International Women's Year, and on Janu- 
ary 9, 1975, the President by Executive Order Xo. 11832 created a Na- 
tional Commission for the Observance of International Women's Year 
to reinforce the national commitment to women's rights, and 3 months 
later, four members of Congress were named to the Commission: 
Senators Bayh and Percy, and Congresswomen Abzug and Heckler. 
Funding for International Women's Year activities on a national basis 
was incorporated in State Department authorizations and appropria- 
tions. 

The House by voice vote on May 20 agreed to House Resolution 371 
to send a congressional delegation to the International Women's Year 
Conference held in Mexico City between June 19 and July 2. The 
Speaker on June 13 appointed Representatives Sullivan, Mink, lloltz- 
man. Schroeder, Poggs, Keyes, and Holt as delegates to the Conference. 
The four congressional members of the National Commission also 
attended the Conference^. 



4 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Organizations. Human Rights in South Korea and the Philippines: Implications 
for U.S. Policy. Hearings. 94th Conp:.. 1st sess. May 20--.Tune 24. 107.1. Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 1975. .",20 pp. 

r, r.S. Congress. House Human Rlehts in Haiti. Hcnrin-. 04th Cone:.. 1st sess. Nov. 18, 
107.T Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, loin. 1:17 pp. 

6 TT.s. Congress. House. Human Rights in Chile. Hearing, 04th Cong., 1st sess. Dec 9 
1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1976. "t; pp. 



150 

In his report on the Conference 7 Senator Percy stressed the 
importance of U.S. Government implementation of proposals passed 
by the Conference. He urged a concerted and dedicated follownp 
effort on the Conference to make the recommendations of the World 
Plan of Action and resolutions a reality. The World Plan of Action and 
the resolutions called for increased participation of women in inter- 
national affairs. Senator Percy suggested that the role of women in 
foreign policy ought to be reviewed by appropriate congressional com- 
mittee-. 

Congress enacted H.R. 0924 (Public Law 04—107) calling for a Na- 
tional Women's Conference to insure that the discussions and work 
begun at Mexico City will be continued on the national level. A sense 
of Congress resolution with respect to International Women's Year, 
I louse ( Concurrent Resolution 309, expressing full support for the goals 
of International Women's Year was passed by the House on October 6, 
but was r.ot acted on by the Senate. 

Women's rights were also the subject of two treaties considered by 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during 107."). Both treaties 
waited a long time for consideration — the Inter- American Convention 
on Granting Political Rights to Women (Ex. D. 81-1) was transmitted 
to the Senate by President Truman on January 13, 1040, and the F.X. 
( Convention on the Political Rights of Women ( Ex. J. 88-1) was trans- 
mitted by President Kennedy on July 2-2, 1963. Both treaties grant 
n basic political rights — franchise and the right to hold national 
office — which have long been possessed by women in the United States. 
The committee held a brief hearing on the treaties on December 12, 
1975, and favorably reported the treaties to the Senate (Executive 
Report 0-1—20) on December 18, 1075. The Senate unanimously agreed 
to resolutions of ratification of both treaties on January 22, 107'.'). 

Status of MIA's* 

At tbe outset of the 94th Congress approximately 2,500 Americans 
remained unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.* According to the Viet- 
nam agreement of January 27. 1973, a four-party joint military 
t — FPJMT — had been established for the sole purpose of carrying 
out tbe provisions of article 8(b), which contained requirements on 
■ "■<'<■ for the missing and for the return of the remains of the 

dead ' Since mid-1974, however, only delegates from the United Stales 
South Vietnam had been attending the FPJMT sessions. 10 A spe- 

red by Marlorle Niehaus. analyst in International relations. 

7 T' s Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Wnrirl Conference of 

si Women's rear. 94th Cong., 1st Bess. Committee print. Washington, U.S. 

ce, 1 975. 

ling to an interview on Jan. R, 1975. with Dr. Henry Kenny, Professional staff 

t t!i" Select Committee on Missing Pen ons In Southensi Asia, missing Americana 

I In the followlne categories as of Dee. 31, 1975: Military Personnel R04 MTAs 

of war), J48 PFOD (Presumptive Findings of 
' ■ ■• ♦ li i . 1 230 DBNR (known to have died imt bodies not recovered), ami Civilian 18 

tlcle <*<h) of the Agreement on Eroding the War and Restoring Peace to Vietnam 

*tat< irtles shall heln en >h otl to gel Information about those military person- 

i civilians of the parties misslng-ln-action, to determine the location and 

re of the graves of the dead bo ns to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation 

nnd to take any such measures as may be required t" get information about 

' In-acl ion.'' 

Star, Jan. 29, 1975. 



151 

•cial military unit, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center — JCRC — was 
:set up at the time of the ceasefire to search for American MIA's in 
Indochina, but it had been able to locate the remains of only 8 Ameri- 
cans and helped to resolve an additional 124 cases in South Vietnam. 11 
After the fall of the Government of South Vietnam to Communist 
forces on April 30, 1975, the American FPJMT delegation and the 
JCRC were among the Americans evacuated by the U.S. military. 
No search operations of any consequences had been conducted in 
Cambodia or Laos, and the North Vietnamese had not permitted 
search operations in North Vietnam. 

On numerous occasions during 1975, North Vietnam linked what it 
considered American obligations under the Vietnam agreement of 
1073 with the Vietnamese obligation to provide information on miss- 
ing Americans. 12 In the second half of 1975, progress was made 
toward resolving the issue of missing Americans in Southeast Asia. 
On September 11, 1975, creation of a House Select Committee on 
Missing Persons in Southeast Asia was approved by a vote of 394 to 3 
(H. lies. 335). Representative G. V. Montgomery was appointed 
chairman of the 10-member committee. A twofold responsibility was 
given the committee : (1) To obtain information on persons missing in 
Southeast Asia as a result of the Vietnam conflict, and (2) to inves- 
tigate the need for international inspection teams to determine whether 
there are servicemen still held as prisoners of war or civilians unwill- 
ingly detained in Indochina. 13 In September, October, and November 
"the committee held hearings and received testimony from U.S. Gov- 
ernment officials, representatives from private groups, and individuals 
concerned with the issue of missing Americans, and former POVV T? s 
themselves. 

During the fall of 1975, the committee officials set up a meeting with 
Vietnamese officials; 12 Members of Congress, including 8 of the 10 

13 Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. News Release (second in a 
scrips i. November-December 1075. 

12 When a congressional factfinding mission met with North Vietnamese representatives 
in Saigon at the end of February 1975. North Vietnam stated publicly that an accounting 
of missing Americans would have to wait until the 1973 agreement had been fully carried 
out. (New York Times. Mar. 14. 1975.) A similar Vietnamese message was made known, 
when. < n Mar. 13. 1975. Senator Kennedy published a letter he had received from North 
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in response to his Dec. 18, 1974, letter 
Which had requested information about the missing Americans. The Trinh letter stated 
that no information would be made available so long as the United States continued pol- 
icies Which North Vietnam considered to be violations of the Vietnam agreement. The let- 
ter indicated, however, that Hanoi did possess information about American MIA's. 

On April 22. 1975. for the first time since early 1973. North Vietnam released informa- 
tion on the status of missing U.S. servicemen. The name:-, released were those of three 
American pilots whom North Vietnam said had been killed when their planes were shot 
down over North Vietnam between 19fi5 and 1972. Two of the men were already listed on 
U.S. records as killed in action. Information about the three pilots had been sent by the 
Vietnamese to Senator Kennedy's office. 

After the fail of Saigon in April 1975. North Vietnam's position toward the missing 
Americans narrowed to an association of article 21 (postwar reconstruction) and article 
R(b) (information on the missing) of the 19/3 agreement. On June 11, 1975. North Viet- 
nam, for the first time, publicly linked together the topics of U.S. postwar aid to Vietnam 
and the search for missing Americans. The New York Times published on June 12. 1975, 
an excerpt from the Vietnamese newspaper Nhan Dhan whk-h stated : "* * * the war has 
completely ended and real peace has been reached throughout Vietnam. This situation 
has created conditions for resolving problems of the consequences of war between Viet- 
nam and the United States, such as the U.S. contribution to healing the wounds of war 
In Imth parts of Vietnam, the search for U.S. MIA's. and the exhumation and repatriation 
01 the remains of Americans who died in Vietnam.'' North Vietnam reiterated this 

Which was made public on July 8. 1975, in a reply to a letter of May 27 from 27 Mem- 
ber? of the House of Representatives who had sought an accounting of the American 
MIA's. (New York Times. July 9. 107.",.) 

WU.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. Amer- 
icans Missing in Southeast Asia. Hearings, 94th Cong, 1st sess. Part 1. Wash;: 
Government Printing Office. 1975 : (II). 



lo2 

committee members, participated in a 4-day mission to Paris and 
Geneva from December 4 to 8. 1975. In Paris on December 6, the con- 
gressional delegation met with North Vietnamese Ambassador to 
France, Vo Van Sung, PRG Charge d'Affairs Huynh Thanh, and 
several other Vietnamese officials. The Vietnamese stated their desire 
to establish normal and friendly relations with the United States and 
emphasized the importance of positive American actions such as li ; 
the present trade embargo and helping to ''heal the wounds of v 
The committee stressed America's interest in continuing the resolution 
of the MIA issue and its concern about the return of the bodies of the 
two marines killed in Saigon on April 30, 1975, the repatriation of 
such remains as can be identified, and the question of the emigration 
from Vietnam of Vietnamese wives and children of Americ 
sonnel. 14 

During the discussions, the Vietnamese made three commitme] 

(1) They promised to release the remains of three American pil 

(2) they agreed to continue to search for American MIA's in Vi- 
and to report to their governments the committee's request thai 
Vietnamese assist in obtaining information about MIA's from the Lao 
and Cambodian Governments ; and (3) the Vietnamese also agreed to 
take all steps necessary to permit American civilians remaining hi 
South Vietnam the opportunity to voluntarily leave the country. 18 

On Sunday, December 7. the committee traveled to Geneva to meet 
with the International Red Cross Committee Director Jean Pierre 
Hocke and Delegate General Melchior Barsinger. The officials con- 
firmed that they were assisting in determining the needs for humani- 
tarian assistance to all parts of Vietnam. They further indie 
they were prepared to assist in the identification and repatriati i 
MIA's if permitted to do so by the Vietnamese. 16 

As an outcome of the December C> meeting in Paris and with the 
help of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, four 
members of the committee ' : flew to Hanoi, where on December 21, 
1975, in a ceremony at Gin Lam Airport, they received the remains oi 
three American pilots. The committee members stayed in Hanoi for 
2 days of meetings with Vietnamese officials. Tn response to inquiries 
from the committee, the Vietnamese stated that all surviving Ameri- 
cans were returned in 1073 but that efforts to search for missing Ameri- 
cans would continue. It was agreed that -acts of reciprocity should 
be part of improving relations between the United States and \ 
nam. 11 Immediately before this congressional trip, Chairman 

rv had received a message from President Ford which expi 
port for the committee's work and which contained the a 
v •(. are nrepared to reciprocate gestures of goodwill. 
On leaving Hanoi, the Congressmen flew to Vientiane. Laos. where 
thev turned over files on missing Americans to Lao officials. Hie Lao 
Chief of Cabinet stated that all live Americans were returned in 

bul that "as we continue to look for our own war dead, we are 



uMirt Committee on U on« In South, it k la Newi Ral« I & ■ 

i 1075. 
v,, CnmnittM on MIupIiw Paraoni In Bonthw I I Newa BdMM (■acond In a 

,,...., M,, n t"n,r-r\ m. f'i..^.-v. Ottlnger, and Oilman. 

In Bonttaoati Asia. News rate* ' ,tl ' l 



153 

looking for 3'our missing * * * and as we gather information we will 
provide you with that information.'' The delegation appealed to 
both the Vietnamese and Lao to help arrange a meeting with the 
Cambodian representatives to discuss the search for missing jour- 
nalists and servicemen in Cambodia. 20 

The Senate adopted Senate Resolution 251 on November 19, 1975, 
which stated the sense of the Senate that the President, during his 
1975 trip to the People's Republic of China, should request that 
appropriate Chinese officials use their offices to obtain a full and 
complete accounting of members of the U.S. Armed Forces and 
civilians missing in action or held as prisoners of war in Southeast 
Asia. 21 On December 4, 1975, Secretary Kissinger announced in 
Peking that officials of the PRC had given the President detailed 
information on several deceased U.S. personnel missing in Asia. 

The office of Senator Kennedy made public on December 30, 1975, 
a letter of December 19, 1975, from Vietnamese Foreign Minister 
Nguyen Duy Trinh, which stated that North Vietnam was prepared 
to return the remains of two U.S. Marines who were the last American 
servicemen killed in Vietnam. The marines' remains were released in 
Saigon to aides of Senator Kennedy on February 22, 1976, and flown 
to the United States. 

During the Paris meeting between committee officials and Viet- 
namese officials in early December 1975. there were indications that 
the Vietnamese may be willing to cooperate more closely on American 
MIA's if there were simultaneous American movements toward 
economic relations between the two countries. Some Members of 
Congress had expressed concern over the trade embargo with Vietnam 
which was imposed by the executive branch shortly after the fall of 
Saigon in April 1975, under general authority granted by Congress, 
but which was imposed with no prior consultation with Congress. 22 
Legislation (H.R. 9503) to partially lift the trade embargo of Vietnam 
was introduced by Representative Jonathan Bingham and other mem- 
bers, and three hearings 23 were held pursuant to the legislation by the 
House International Relations Subcommittee on International Trade 
and Commerce. During the hearings, Chairman Bingham and other 
members expressed their hope that the end of U.S. military involve- 
ment in Indochina would have made a gradual normalization of rela- 
tions with the governments of Indochina, rather than the imposition of 
a U.S. trade embargo, even before the policies of the new Indochina 
governments had been tested. The administration policy toward Viet- 
nam seemed to be based more on past realities rather than present 
possibilities, according to some members. 



20 ibid.* 

81 T'.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Resolutions relating to the 
President's trip to China and American MI As and POW's. Senate Report 94-457, 94th 
Cony.. 1st spss. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. Nov. 18, 1975. 

— The Treasury Department hlocked all financial and commercial transactions with 
•Cambodia on Apr. 18, and with South Vietnam on Apr. 30, 1975. A Commerce Department 
ban on any U.S. exports to these countries was issued on May 10, 1975. The legal basis for 
the export controls was the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended, which allows 
the use of export controls to "further significantly the foreign policy of the United States'' 
and authorizes the President to impose such controls for national security reasons. 

28 U.S. Congress : 

House: Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Trade 
and Commerce. Export Licensing of Private Humanitarian Assistance to Vietnam. Hear- 
ings, 94th Cong.. 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, Sent. 9, 1975. 

House: U.S. Embargo of Trade with South Vietnam and Cambodia. Hearings, 94th Cong., 
1st sess. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 9. 197." 

House: U.S. Trade Embargo of Vietnam: Church Views. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. 
•Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, Nov. 17, 1975. 



154 

State Department officials testified that because new regimes in 
South Vietnam and in Cambodia come to power through force of arms 
against the governments that the United States was supporting, and 
in light of the fact that the total trade embargo had been in effect for 
more than 10 years with respect to North Vietnam, the State Depart- 
ment had recommended that the export controls be imposed "so that we 
could monitor the situation as it evolved with the takeover of these 
new regimes.'' 

Testimony was also received from numerous leaders of churches and 
charitable groups in favor of lifting the embargo, which, they said, 
curtailed the free flow of assistance to the people of Indochina. These 
groups emphasized the need for reconciliation, and they perceived the 
embargo as an unnecessary restriction which fostered a spirit of 
suspicion and mistrust on the part of the Vietnamese. 

On the basis of the hearings and the assessment of the impact of the 
embargo on efforts to obtain a full accounting of American MXA's, the 
subcommittee on December 10, 1975, reported II. R. 950:) favorably to 
the full International Relations Committee. This bill provided for the 
amending of section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, as 
amended, to repeal the U.S. embargo on trade with North and South 
Vietnam except with respect to war and materials defined by the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1051. as amended. 

An amended version of II. R. 050.°, was incorporated into the Inter- 
national Security Assistance Act of 1976 (II.R. 1196-3, sec. 415), 24 
which was passed by the House on March 3, 1976, and submitted to the 
conference committee. Section 415 prohibits export controls on non- 
strategic trade with Vietnam for purely "foreign policy" purposes, 
but continues to allow controls for national security and dome-tic 
supply ''onsiderations (Bingham amendment). Continuation of the 
limits on the embargo beyond 180 days after enactment of this section 
i- contingent upon substantial accounting for missing Americans by 
the Viet uamese within that period (Oilman amendment). The measure 
also retains the freeze on approximately $70 million in Vietnamese 
g now under U.S. control. Section 415 makes possible limited 
private trade 25 in nonmilitary goods and technology, it encourages 
accounting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia, it makes possible 
direct discussions concerning American investments and property left 
behind in Vietnam, and ; f facilitates provision by private humanitarian 
groups in (he United States of assistance to the Vietnamese people. 

The administration is opposed to the establishmenl of ;i dire ■ link 
between trade and the MIA problem, and opposes (he lifting <><' the 
embargo with Vietnam in order to retain, according to adminisl ra( i >n 
spokesmen, full diplomatic flexibility in talking with the Vietnamese. 

Although progress was made in 1975 toward resolving the question 

of the mi Americans in Southeast Asia, difficult issues r main 

unresolved. A careful delineation of American [ riorities and skillful 

itiations will be needed to insure a reasonable resolution of these 

in l!>7n. 



• TT.B. Congre Committee on International Relation* International s.-uriiv 

f 1076. I' 94th Con*., 2d -<-^s. Washington, U.S. Q 

• ifflre. i'"i>. 2 ' I07fl. 
umptlon of oil drilling by American companies "" terms they might agree in.<>n 
Bclal of the Government of Vietnam i- the major trade development likely 
lit from this modification in t » » « - U.S. economic policy toward Vietnam, according 
t«. the commit tee report < u. Kept :i » 



Specific Regional Issues 



Pak r e 

Introduction 157 

Detente Policies 158 

Relations with the U.S.S.R 158 

Relations with China 161 

Middle East Affairs 166 

Congress and Latin America 168 

Panama Canal treaty negotiations 168 

Cuba _* 172 

Congress and Africa 174 

Southern Africa: Unresolved issues- 174 

Zaire 177 

East Africa: The Horn 178 

Aid and development 179 

Conclusion 180 

Congress and Asia: Selected Issues 182 

United States-Korean relations 182 

Congressional approval of commonwealth status for the northern 

Mariana Islands 184 



INTRODUCTION 

U.S. bilateral and regional relationships remain important, in spite 
of increased emphasis on multilateral diplomacy. U.S.-U.S.S.R. and 
U.S.-China relations, of course, are of particular importance. 

This section of "Congress and Foreign Policy 1975" does not attempt 
to review all U.S. bilateral relationships. Rather, it focuses on those 
issues for which U.S. foreign policy has been particularly influenced 
by congressional actions. 

(157) 



74-032—76 12 



DETENTE POLICIES 
Relations With the U.S.S.B 

Global rival Acs 

Congress, in 1975, was faced with the need to respond to events in 
different parts of the world which reflected the continuing rivalry of 
the two superpowers. The congressional response to regional tensions 
was shaped to a large degree by the perceived lessons of Vietnam, with 
a majority appearing determined to insure that local conflicts would 
not lead to escalating American involvement. Sentiment seemed to run 
against matching Soviet involvement in areas that were outside of 
traditional American interest spheres, including Angola and the 
Indian Ocean. Even in Portugal, a XATO ally, a congressional ma- 
jority seemed opposed to any direct American involvement. These 
developments, however, appeared to have a cumulative impact on 
congressional attitudes toward detente with the Soviet Union. 

Many Senators and Representatives expressed the view that Soviet 
meddling in countries such as Portugal and Angola violated the rules 
of detente, or called into question Soviet motives for seeking detente 
with the United States. In the case of the apparent Soviet financial 
backing of the Portuguese Communist Party, many Members alleged 
a direct violation of the noninterference provisions of the Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Arms control and the Soviet arms buildup 

The inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to come 
to terms in 197.*) on a new strategic arms limitation agreement was 
widely seen as the greatest disappointment in Soviet- American rela- 
tions. Concern over the lack of agreement on SALT II was com- 
pounded by the perceived Soviet buildup in strategic, naval, and 
other military capabilities. 1 Despite administration denials, the fear 
was voiced in Congress that the Soviet Union was not entirely living 
up to the agreements reached in SALT I. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Arms 
Control and the House Internationa] Relations Committee's Sub- 
committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs held hear- 
ings on the problems surrounding the negotiation of a ne\r arms limita- 
tion agreement, the United States-Soviet strategic balance, and the 
question of Soviet compliance with the SALT T agreement. 2 

• Prepared bj Francis T. Miko, analyst in International relatlona 

1 For ;i detailed discussion «>f srmi conl rol issues, sec eh. 1 1 1 
: D.8. Congress 

Senate: Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Arms Control. Soviet compli- 
ance with certain provisions of the 1972 SALT 1 agreements. Hearings, 04th Cong., 1st 
Mar <; 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 7 r> . 22 pp.; nod 

House: Committee <>■> International Relations. Subcommittee on Internationa] Security 
nnii Scientific Affairs, 'iiw Vladivostok Accord : Implications to O.S. security, arm 
trot, and world peace. Hearings, 94th Cong., i<t sess., June 24, 2:.. and .luiv 8, n)7r>. Wasb 
Ington, O.S. Qorernmenl Printing Office, 1975. L98 pp. 

(158) 



159 

Summit postponement 

A seeming indication that Soviet- American detente was not pro- 
gressing entirely smoothly was the repeated postponement of a Ford- 
Brezhnev summit meeting originally scheduled for the summer of 
1975. The meeting was eventually dela}^ed until at least 1976. President 
Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev met briefly in Helsinki on 
the occasion of the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe in August 1975. 

Trade 

The Soviet decision against implementing the 1972 trade agreement 
with the United States, allegedly in response to the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 (linking most-favored-nation 
treatment and credits to Soviet emigration policies) had perhaps the 
greatest impact on Soviet-American trade relations. 3 The impasse over 
the trade agreement did not result in a downturn in trade volume in 
1975 but in the view of many analysts presented a barrier to significant 
growth. 

The House Committee on International Relations sent a special study 
mission to the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia. Romania, and 
Hungary to assess reactions to the Trade Act of 1974 and future trade 
prospects. 4 The group concluded in its report that there was no urgent 
need for the United States to make the first move to resolve the trade 
impasse. 

The Soviet- American Tax Convention (Ex. T. 93-1) signed on 
June 20. 1973. was ratified by the Senate on December 15. 1975. The 
convention aimed at the facilitation of trade and investment between 
the United States and Soviet Union. 

The Soviet grain harvest of 1975 fell significantly short of target. 
Although Western estimates of the magnitude of the Soviet agricul- 
tural setback varied, it became evident that the Soviet Union would 
need to make major grain purchases in the West to offset crop failures. 
Congress demonstrated concern that unregulated Soviet grain pur- 
chases from the United States could cause domestic market disruptions 
similar to those associated with the large Soviet purchases of 1972. 
The Senate Committee on Government Operations, the Senate Com- 
mittee on Agriculture and Forestry, the House Committee on Agri- 
culture, and the House Committee on International Relations each held 
hearings for the purpose of establishing ways to avoid problems con- 
nected with previous grain sales to the Soviet Union. 5 In late 1975. the 
United States signed a 5-year agreement with the Soviet Union to end 
the sharp fluctuation in the volume of Soviet purchases. 



3 See section on the Jaekson-Vanik amendment pp. 60-63. 

4 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Soviet Bloc trade hopes r 
Reactions to the Trade Act of 1974. Report of a study mission to the Soviet Union and four 
Eastern European nations. Mar. 27 to Apr. 8, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 35 pp. 

5 U.S. Congress : 

Senate : Committee on Government Operations. Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga- 
tions. Grains sales to the Soviet Union. Hearings, 94 Cong., 1st sess., July 31, and Aug. 1, 
1975. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 14*) pp. 

Senate: Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Russian grain sales. Hearines. 94th 
Cong.. 1st sess., Sept. 4, 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 197."), 87 pp. 

House: Committee on International Relations. U.S. grain and oil agreements with the 
Soviet Union. Hearings. 94th Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 28, 1975. Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 1975. 71 pp. 

House: Committee on Agriculture. Grain sales to Russia. Hearings, 94th Cong.. 1st 
Dec. 3, 1975. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 4S pp. 



160 

Unman rights 

Violations of human rights in the Soviet Union remained a major 
area of congressional concern. The Jackson- Vanik amendment to the 
11)74 Trade Act was not followed by any increase in emigration from 
the Soviet Union. 6 In light of the agreements entered into at the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, many Members ex- 
pressed growing impatience at the apparent Soviet refusal to relax 
restrictions on emigration of Jews and other minorities and at con- 
tinued Soviet Government reprisals against dissidents. Exiled Soviet 
author Alexander Solzhenitsyn was invited to address a congressional 
reception, in part as a symbolic demonstration of this concern. Ke- 
luctance of the President to invite the Xobel prize-winning author to 
the A\ 'hiie I [ouse prompted considerable criticism from some Members. 

During trips to the Soviet Union, several Senators and Representa- 
tives contacted Soviet dissidents and Jews who had been denied exit 
visas. They also made direct appeals to Soviet leaders to reverse their 
position on minority emigration. These eiForts apparently met with no 
succe s. 

( 'on ft /■■ net ' ity find Cooperation In Europe 

The summit conclusion of the 35-riation Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe at Helsinki in August was widely seen as the 
foremost achievement of detente in 1975. Within Congress, the Final 
A i signed by President Ford and 34 other leaders was the subject of 
sharp controversy, as it was throughout the Western world. Of par- 
ticular congressional concern were the sections that appeared to ratify 
the postwar status quo in Europe and thus the annexations of the 
Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and other regions. 

The sections of the document dealing with the freer movement of 
people, information, and ideas, included on Western insistence, were 
criticized as being too vague. On May 6, 1075, the House International 
Relations Committee's Intel-national Political and Military Affairs 
Subcommittee held hearings on the conference. 7 Assistant Secretary 
of State Arthur A. ITartman assured the subcommittee that the Hel- 
sinki declaration would not change the American position of non- 
recognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. Further- 
more, he defended the freer movement and human rights provisions 
of the declaration and said that the Soviet Union would be expected to 
make meaningful concessions in these areas. At the year's end, how- 
ever, t he general feeling appeared to be that the Soviet I 'nion had not 
moved beyond a few token gestures. 

Hon-:' Resolution 864 and numerous concurrenl resolutions were 
introduced dining the year expressing the sense of Congress that the 
signing of the Helsinki Final Act did not change the American policy 
of not recognizing t\\c Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. Souk 4 
Represental ive >, reflect Lng congressional concern that the Soviet Union 
live up to the humanitarian provisions of the agreement, introduced 
resolutions to establish a Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe to oversee implementation of the provisions. The bills had not 
moved out of committee by year's end. 



m of Jackson Vanik amendment pp.60 •■•"• 
• is Cnwiur -. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional i'<>iiti<-:ii and Military Affairs. Conference on sr.-nritv and Cooperation in Europe, 
•oih Cong., ' • Hay 8, i!»7.".. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 

107.".. 52 pp. 



161 

Soviet- American cooperation in space 

After several years of preparation, the joint Apollo-Soyuz space 
flight was launched in July, providing the most visible example of 
successful Soviet- American cooperation. 

Congress generally hailed the successful mission, although some in- 
dividual opinion reflected concern that the Soviet Union was gaining 
more than the United States in terms of space technology transfer. 
The skeptics claimed that the American components of the project 
were more advanced than their Soviet counterparts and that the 
United States was granting the Soviets far greater access to its space 
achievements than it was receiving in return. 

Congressional trips to the Soviet Union 

Two delegations from the House and Senate visited the Soviet 
Union to reciprocate an earlier visit to the United States by a Supreme 
Soviet delegation. The first group of 14 Senators were in Moscow and 
Leningrad from June 29 to July 5, 1975, for discussions with Supreme 
Soviet deputies. 8 The House delegation led by Speaker Carl Albert- 
visited the Soviet Union, Romania, and Yugoslavia in August. Both 
groups held discussions with Soviet leaders in the course of which they 
raised the subjects of strategic arms limitation, emigration, human 
rights and trade, Soviet Communist Party leader Brezhnev told the 
House group at a meeting in Yalta that the human rights provisions of 
the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation could only 
be implemented on the basis of further bilateral negotiations. 

Relations With China* 

There was no major legislation passed by Congress in 1975 which 
directly concerned U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China. 
However, the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-618) became law in 
January 1975, and contained provisions which applied to China re- 
garding trade agreements, Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff treat- 
ment, and emigration. A congressional role in the shaping of U.S. 
policy toward China was reflected in 1975 by other means — through 
congressional hearings, through trips to China by members of both 
Houses, through discussions by Members of Congress with a high level 
People's Republic of China (PRC) trade delegation that visited the 
United States in September, through committee prints of the Joint 
Economic Committee on China's economy and by hearings by the 
JEC on the allocation of resources in China. Considerable support re- 
mains in the Congress for maintenance of close relations with the 
Republic of China and a number of resolutions were introduced to this 
effect. - 

The Trade Act of 1974 contained tougher provisions regarding 
granting of MFN status — including a requirement that any agree- 
ments negotiated by the United States would have to be approved by 
Congress. PRC leaders have complained to congressional and other 
visitors about the MFN issue, indicating that MFN status was neces- 



♦Prepared by M. T. Haggard, specialist in Asian affairs. 

8 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Congress and United States- 
Soviet relations : Report of a conference between members of (he U.S. Senate and delegates 
to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. 49th Cong., 1st scss. Washington, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office. 1975. 4'A pp. No report on the House delegation visit had been pub- 
lished as of this writing. 



162 

sary to the attainment of a commitment made by the United States in 
the Shanghai communique to conduct trade on the basis of "equality 
and mutual benefit." A high ranking Chinese trade delegation appar- 
ently raised the question of an exception from the emigration provision 
at a meeting with congressional leaders on September 8, 1975. in 
Washington. The emigration provision of the Trade Act was aimed 
primarily at the Soviet Union, but applies equally to the PRC. The 
President must receive assurance from the nonmarket country con- 
cerned and report to Congress that the emigration practices of the 
country concerned would "substantially lead to the achievement of" 
free emigration. 9 

The most visible evidence of a congressional role in the improved 
relations with China since 11)72 has been the visits by members of 
gress to China: 10 separate delegations have made the journey, 
four of them in 1075. 10 These visits in a sense reflect the bipartisan 
approach which has characterized the improved relationship with 
the PRC. The trips have been valuable in giving Members of the 
lative branch an opportunity to £et a better understanding of 
China's political system, of the system's achievements and failures, of 
attitudes of China's leaders toward the United States and the Amer- 
ican people, of the chances of improving political, cultural and eco- 
nomic- relations, of China's attitudes toward a continuing U.S. role in 
'. and of the obstacles to better bilateral relations. 11 

Reports have been issued in committee print form by seven of the 
delegations — with three of these reports printed in 1975 12 (including 
the report by Senator Mansfield on his December 197 o China). 

All delegations have discussed with Chinese leaders the various is 
affecting bilateral relations, including U.S. ties with Taiwan as they 
relate to normalization of U.S. -PRC relations, and the status of bilat- 
eral trade and exchanges. Tn their reports some delegations have sum- 
marized the present slate of relations as seen by both sides. Individual 
members have pressed for initiatives by the United States to speed 
normalization of relations, while others stressed the need for caution 



'■■ Secretary of State Kissinger acknowledged that the emigration provision applied to 

C In 'testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Kissinger added thai II would 

assive difficulties" if an effort was made to apply the emigration provision to 

Senate. o,,mmlttoe on Finance Emigration Amendment to tho Trade Re- 
forra Act of 1974. Bearing, Dec. 8, 1974. 98d Con., 2d Sess. Washington, D.S, Govern- 
iii. i,i Printng Office i *»T i p. 66. 

rial delegations rislting China in 1976 included : 
March 29 April 7 Bpeaker Carl Albert. House minority lender John Rhodes. 

16 Senators Charles Percy, Jacob Javlts, Claiborne Pell. A dial Stevenson. 
itatives Paul Findley, Margaret Heckler. Paul McCloskey. 
An- i Senators Roberl Byrd, James Pearson, Sam Xnnn. Representatives John 

rd Dorwinskl John Slack. 
■ 30 January ?». 1976 Representatives Margarel Heckler, Patsy Mink. Bella 
A i /.iil'. Lindy Bo ne Burke, Cardlss Collins, Elisabeth Holtsman, Patricia Scarce- 

[elen Meyner, Gladys Spellman 
n [,, fhe first year after the initial Presidential visit to China. Peking was very careful 
with congressional trips arranged through the State Department 
mi, i ii Since mi, i 1974, however, of the Beven congressional delegations 

thai I •! China, four have resulted from direct communication between the PRC 

llviduals or groups concern 

Committee on Foreign relations. China : A Quarter Century After The Founding 
,,f ti,. Republic A Report by Sen. Mlki ; January 107.1. 94th Cong., 1st 

ernmenl Printing Office, 1975 , ,-_..« 

<• sten Further Toward Normalization Rep eaker Carl Albert 

• ider John Rhodes July 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Doc. no. M 255. wain 
Printing nine... 1975. m pp m . _ , u 

Ittee on Foreign Relations. House. Committee on International Relations. 
China October 28. 1975 04th Cong., I Washington, U.S 

I ni Printing Office, 1975. 68 pp. (Report of congressional delegation whose cnair- 

ia tor < 'ha rlea Percy, i 



163 

in regard to matters affecting Taiwan. Senator Mansfield after his 
second trip (December 1974) said that the Taiwan issue would have to 
be met if normalization of relations were to be achieved. He described 
the defense treaty with Taiwan as ' ; a relic of the past'* and said that 
the United States must match its commitments to its contemporary 
interests. He said Chinese leaders emphasized that the surest way to 
normalize relations was via "the Japanese formula." by which Japa- 
nese trade relations were maintained with Taiwan. Speaker Carl Albert 
noted in a report in July 1975, that normalization of relations would 
not be completed until an acceptable way was found to deal with the 
Taiwan question and that he and House Minority Leader Rhodes had 
made it clear that longtime U.S. ties with Taiwan necessitated caution 
and gradualism. Minority Leader Rhodes noted that the Chinese placed 
no pressure on them for an immediate solution and that they were 
"patient." Senator Robert Byrd called for a gradual movement toward 
normalizing relations, but noted that the Taiwan question would have 
to be resolved first. The group headed by Senator Percy noted in its 
report that there was no pressure from the Chinese on the Taiwan 
issue. Representative John Anderson recommended a continuation of 
the policy to gradually improve relations with mainland China, while 
"living up to" treaty commitments to other Asian powers. Representa- 
tive Derwinski said he saw no reason for the United States to grant 
formal diplomatic recognition to the PRC. 

Congressional trips reports in 1975 noted China's concern about the 
Soviet L T nion but most did not indicate any special stress by Chinese 
leaders on the dangers of United States-Soviet detente. Senator Mans- 
field referred to concern by Chinese leaders about Soviet military 
power in Asia. Speaker Albert noted the PRC's pragmatic approach 
to U.S. military involvement in XATO and Europe, with China's 
leaders recognizing that a U.S. military withdrawal could increase 
Soviet pressure in Asia. The report of Senator Percy's delegation said 
that the PRC took a "realistic approach" to the question of U.S. mili- 
tary bases in Europe and parts of Asia. Senator Robert Byrd stated 
tli at the PRC viewed the Soviet Union with increasing concern and 
Chinese leaders were critical of what they considered inadequate U.S. 
efforts to keep peace with the Russians. Congressman John Anderson, 
on the other hand, in a report to President Ford noted the almost path- 
ological paranoia regarding the Soviet Union. Representative Ander- 
son, leader of the delegation which visited China August 20-29. 1975, 
said the Chinese told the delegation that the U.S.S.R. was filling every 
crevice of power the United States was vacating in Asia, and indicated 
alarm at what they viewed as U.S. naivete in dealing with the Soviet 
Union. -Representative Derwinski, a member of the Anderson delega- 
tion, in a speech on September 23, 1075. noted the preoccupation of 
Chinese leaders with the Soviet Union — stating that they frequently 
referred to thp concentration of Russian troops along the Chinese and 
Mongolian borders. ITe said that the PRC was pleased to have U.S. 
forces in the Pacific area as a possible counterweight to the Soviet 
Union. 13 

All the delegation reports issued as committee prints in 1075 dis- 
cussed the status of bilateral trade, the prospects for the expansion of 
trade and the obstacles to such expansion. Senator Mansfield noted 
that the present trade imbalance did not provide a sound basis for 

13 Congressional Record, Sept 4. 107.". S15359-S15305, Concrression.nl Record, Sept. 23, 
1975, H. 9023 Press Release, Congressman John B. Anderson, Sept. 10, 1975. 



164 

mutually beneficial trade. Unless new trade arrangements were made, 
he added, which might include provision of U.S. technological equip- 
ment for Chinese petroleum exploration and production, there might be 
a major reduction in U.S. -PRO trade after 1075. 14 He said the amend- 
ment relating to freedom of emigration "would appear to have little 
relevance" to U.S.-PitC rapproachement. He said the Chinese were 
not pressing for a quick solution to the issues of frozen assets and 
blocked claims. Speaker Albeit stated that despite a drop in trade in 
l ( .>7r>, bilateral trade would continue to grow, with industrial products 
a larger proportion of U.S. exports. The Percy report noted that as a 
minimum, the United States should maintain even-handed import 
and export policies toward China and the Soviet Union and should 
agree to technical cooperation where possible. The Chinese, the report 
noted, emphasize that trade must be mutually beneficial to be of last- 
ing value. The Chinese indicated they would not ask for loans and 
would accept only '"genuine export credits,"' meaning medium-term 
deterred payments. 

The congressional visitors have indicated to Chinese officials the 
importance of exchanges and contacts between the two peoples. Sena- 
tor Mansfield in his January 107r> report noted that the exchange had 
made a significant contribution to better understanding between the 
two countries. China, he said, appeared satisfied with the level and 
scope of the exchange at the present time but had not ruled out an 
expansion. Minority Leader Rhodes noted that he and Speaker Albert 
urged the Chinese Government to make it easier for U.S. citizens to 
visit China. The Percy delegation also urged the PRC to agree to a 
step-up in the exch;mo-e program, to include an expansion of travel 
from China to the United States. The section of the delegation's re- 
port dealing with exchange focused on scientific and cultural ex- 
changes, on exchange of students, research scholars, and journalists 
for extended periods, on exchanges in the medical and health fields, on 
cooperation and exchanges between the Smithsonian Institution and 
the PRO. 

A series of hearings were held in 107r> by two subcommittees (Fu- 
ture Foreign Policy Research and Development, and Investigate 
of the House Committee on International Relations dealing with U.S. 
relations with China." The hearings by the Future Foreign Policy Re- 
search and Development Subcommittee focused on the triangular re- 
lationship between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. 
The hearings of the Subcommittee on In ions, continuing into 

197f>. concentrated on several aspects of U.S. relations with China- 
political, economic, and cultural. One hearing dealt with \]\c status of 
the exchange program, :is seen by the National Committee on United 
States-China Relations, the Committee <>u Scholarly Communication 
with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC), and the National 




mm mm ITItiMiil' Omrrv 1B75. PP. IS 'J 1 . 

S, Congress. House. Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Future 
Foreign Policy Research and Development, Dnlted States Sovlel Union China : The Great 
Power Triangle. Hearlne*. Oct, 81 : Nor. 5. 19: Dec IS. 1975; and Mar. 10, 1976. 94th 

Washington, 0.8. Governm< ni Printing Office, 1976. 149 pp. 



165 

Council on United States-China Trade. Officials of these groups raised 
questions at the hearings about whether there was mutual benefit to 
both parties and whether Peking was concerned largely with cultural 
diplomacy and its image rather than with substance. Peking has had 
considerable control over the operation of the program, selecting indi- 
viduals and groups which visit the United States and for the most part 
determining the groups and individuals allowed to visit China. 

A third subcommittee of the House Committee on International Re- 
lations — on International Security and Scientific Affairs — published a 
committee print on December 1, 1975, which dealt with the authority 
to order the use of nuclear weapons in the Governments of the United 
States, China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France. 16 
The subcommittee plans to hold hearings on this subject in 1976. 

The Joint Economic Committee published two prints dealing with 
China ? s economy, 17 both of which included analysis of China's stra- 
tegic planning. The first (China: A Reassessment of the Economy) 
also had major sections on economic planning and performance, on 
urban and industrial development, rural and agricultural development, 
and on commercial relations. According to the report, the fourth five 
year plan (1971-1975) appeared to be reasonably successful in meeting 
targets and providing for priority needs. The print on China's economy 
is to be followed in the spring of 1976 with hearings on China's economy 
which will place stress on United States-China economic relations and 
their effect on overall bilateral political relations. The second report 
(Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China — 1975) con- 
tained hearing testimony by William Colby and other CIA officials and 
Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham and other officials of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (in June and July 1975). 

Action initiated in the Senate by Senator Humphrey resulted in the 
inclusion of funds (in the appropriations bill for the Department of 
Agriculture) for an agricultural attache in the PRC. The report of the 
Senate Appropriations Committee (S. Rept. 94-293) called the 
provision of such a matter of utmost importance and priority. 18 

10 U.S. Congress. House : Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Security and Scientific Affairs. Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(United States. United Kingdom, France. Soviet Union, Peoples Republic of China). 
Prepared by Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress. Dec. 1, 1975. 94th Cong. 
1st sess., Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975. 29 pp. 

17 U.S. Congress: Joint Economic Committee. China: A Reassessment of the Economy. 
A Compendium of papers submittal to the Joint Economic Committee July 10, 1975. 94th 
Cone:., 1st sess.. Washington ; U.S. Government Printing Office 1975. 787 pp. Subcom- 
mittee on Priorities and Economy in Government. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet 
T'nion and China — 1975. Hearings. Pt. I. June IS and July 21, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess., 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office 1975. 177 pp. 

18 Resolutions introduced in both Houses called for the establishment of a Soybean Re- 
search Institute, jointly supported by the United States and China, to improve agricultural 
yields in the production of soybeans. 



MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS* 

Congressional interest in Middle Eastern and Xorth African affairs 
may be divided into two subject areas : Israel and other. A majority of 
those Members of Congress, both House and Senate, who involve 
themselves in Middle Eastern affairs devote their efforts to reinforc- 
ing U.S. support for the State of Israel. All other Middle Eastern 
affairs are of secondary importance. 

Congressional support for Israel is often reflected in legislation 
authorizing and appropriating foreign assistance. For fiscal year 
1974, the Congress authorized and appropriated $2,550 billion, an 
increase of $25 million over the executive branch request of $l ; .5:.':> 
billion for Israel. For fiscal year 1975. Congress authorized (Public 
Law 93-559, December 30, 1974) and appropriated (Public Law 
91-11, March 26, 1975) $044.5 million for Israel, an increase of $294.5 
million above the executive branch request of $350 million. Legisla- 
tive action on the executive branch request for $2,240 billion for Israel 
for fiscal year 1976 is not yet complete. The Senate bill, S. 2662, 
reported on January 30, 1976. would provide $2,225 billion for Israel. 
a reduction of $15 million below the executive branch request of 
$2,240 billion. The House bill, IT.R. 11963, introduced on February 18, 
1970, would provide $2,225 billion for Israel, an increase of $15 million 
the executive branch request. In addition, both the House and 
the Senate bills would provide about $550 million for Israel for the 
transition quarter from July 1, 1976 to September 30, 1976. A line 
item in the fiscal year 1977 budget called for $1 billion in military 
credits for Israel. Several Members of Congress reacted to the reduced 
level of aid for Israel by stating that they would raise the fiscal year 
1977 figure up to the fiscal year 1976 level of about $2 billion. 

Other legislation passed or considered by the Congress includes 
direct and indirect support for Israel. Congress initiated the pro- 
pram to fund the resettlement of Soviet Jews in Israel — $50 million in 
fiscal year 1973. $36.5 million in fiscal year 1974, $40 million in fiscal 
year 1975, and $20 million in fiscal year 1976. all provided through 
the State Department authorization. The Trade Act of 1974 (Public 
Law 93-018. January 3, 1975) included a prohibition against extend- 
ing credits to nations which restricted emigration. The measure was 
aimed at the Soviet Union's reluctance to grant exit visas to Jews. 
Several bills introduced during 1975 (Senate 953. House "Resolution 
1 louse Resolution 5913, and .House Resolution 1967 are examples) 
prohibit U.S. Government or American business firms from engaging 
in discriminatory practices or complying with foreign economic boy- 
The target is the Arab League boycott of Israel. The military 
procurement bill (Public Law 9! mo, October 6, 1975) extended until 
; i rubor 31, 1977 the effective date " r the onen ended authorization 
to provide Israel with arms. On August 1, 1975, 215 TTouse Members 



'Prepared by rivdo R. Marks, analyst In Middle Bawl nn.i North kfrlcan Affairs. (Addi- 
tional Information on the Sinai aCCOrdl is found on pp. . r ,0 T.3.) 

( 100) 



167 

sponsored a bill which threatened U.S. withdrawal from the United 
Nations if a reported attempt to expel Israel from the world body 
were successful. During October and November 1975, when the United 
Xations was considering a resolution which equated Zionism with 
racism, several bills were introduced which called for either the U.S. 
withdrawal from the United Xations or a reconsideration of U.S. par- 
ticipation in U.X. organizations. On Xovember 11, 1975, the House 
passed House Kesolution 855 and the Senate passed Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 73 which condemned the U.X. resolution passed the day 
before. 

Members of Congress also use nonlegislative means to support 
Israel, such as giving speeches, circulating petitions, signing letters, 
sending newsletters, participating in symposia, or attending meet- 
ings which focus on Israel or Israeli causes. Secretary of State Kis- 
singer's unsuccessful diplomatic mission in late March 1975, provided 
one such issue. The press reported that both the President and the 
Secretary had stated privately that Israel was to "blame" for the 
failure. The President a] so announced that U.S. policy toward the 
Middle East would be "reassessed." Several Members of Congress 
apparently interpreted the "blaming" of Israel and the "reassess- 
ment" of the U.S. policy as signs that the United States would abandon 
Israel and become pro-Arab. Some expressed fears that the "reassess- 
ment" would delay aid to Israel, thus leaving a weakened Israel 
vulnerable to Arab attack. There were also charges that the executive 
branch had been "blackmailed" by the "Arab oil lobbjv* A letter, 
signed by 76 Senators, was sent to the President in mid-May, 1975, 
asking for a "reiteration of our Xations long-standing commitment 
to Israel's security." A similar letter, signed by 71 Senators, had been 
sent to the President in December 1974. 

Xot all Members of Congress espouse unequivocaFsupport for Israel. 
A small but growing number advocate policies which would balance 
United States friendship and support for Israel with an equal ex- 
pression of friendship and support for Arab nations, and a few Mem- 
bers of Congress openly support Arab positions. 

It is the policy of the United States to support Israel — on this the 
executive branch and Congress agree. They disagree at times over 
the intensity and expression of that support, and over the extension 
of similar support for Arabs. It is also the policy of the United States 
to pursue a diplomatically derived resolution of the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. Such a diplomatic effort requires contacts and at least toler- 
able relations with all parties to the conflict. Under these diplomatic 
conditions, open discussions can lead to the compromises necessary 
to secure the just and lasting peace all want and need. But a free 
diplomatic exchange may not be possible if the Arabs believe that 
the United States will support only a solution which is dictated by 
Israel rather than one negotiated by all. If a majority of the Members 
of Congress, through an unquestioned advocacy of Israeli positions, 
foster the improssion that the T^nited States supports Israel and only 
Israel, then the Congress may hinder the diplomatic efforts winch could 
lead to peace. Ironically, the nation which may suffer most in the 
long term from an absence of peace is Israel, the nation the Congress 
seeks to protect. 



CONGRESS AND LATIN AMERICA 

Congressional interest in Latin America in 1075 focused on matters 
of trade, human rights in Chile in relation to U.S. economic and 
military assistance, the revision of treaty arrangements concerning 

the Panama Canal, and the issue of normalization of relations with 
Cuba.* Congressional activities on the latter two issues are disci 
below. 

Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations* 

During 197.") congressional opposition to the Ford administration's 
continuing efforts to formulate a new treaty with Panama governing 
the Panama Canal seriously complicated the delicate negotiations 
while posing a major legislative challenge to Presidential conduct of 
foreign policy, this time with conservative and moderate Congress- 
men claiming "executive arrogance.*' In many ways it appeared that 
this issue had become for conservatives what Vietnam policy had 
previously symbolizedfor liberals. 

The negotiations for a new treaty have continued intermittently 
under three Presidents for more than a decade. After the "flag riots'' 
and the deaths of 20 Panamanians and 4 Americans in 1964. Presi- 
dent Johnson, after consulting with Presidents Truman and Eisen- 
hower, pledged to develop a modernized relationship with Panama by 
updating the 1903 treaty which grants the United States full author- 
ity in the Canal Zone in perpetuity, the cause of Panamanian irrita- 
tion. New draft treaties were agreed upon in 1967 hut the texts were 
not submitted for ratification due to opposition in both countries. 
Negotiations were resumed in 1071. under President Nixon, but prog- 
was limited. In 107.°), in the context of Secretary Kissinger's call 
for ;i ''new dialog" with Latin America based on reciprocity and 
mutua] respect, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker was designated ;is 
chie ' negotiator, giving impetus to the talks and preparing the way 
' . Secretary 1\ ''s visit to Panama in February 1974 bo sign 

* men! of agreed principles with Panamanian Foreign Minister 
io Tack. The principles provide for the abrogation of the 
L903 treaty and the negotiation in its place of a. new treaty for a rea- 
sonably protracted period but with a fixed termination dale, with 
provision for growing participation by Panama in the operation, eeo- 

of the canal for the life of the treaty, 
ifter which Panama would assume sole control. Since the agreen 

►tiations have continued under President Ford, with nego- 
eeking to hammer out the specific details of a treaty once 
•!tf. be completed in L975. 

• three President . State Department spokesmen, and other pro- 
poni a new treaty argue that accommodating Panamanian 

grie ential for friendly relations with Panama and the 

•Prepared by K. Larry Sturrrt, analyst In Latin American affairs. 

(108) 



169 

hemisphere, prerequisites for the continued safe, efficient, and neutral 
operation of the canal. 

Given the lack of a definite treaty and the absence of State De- 
partment lobbying and a mobilizable clientele on the issue, the pro- 
ponents of a new treaty have remained rather quiescent and ill orga- 
nized until recently. Shortly after the February 1974 agreement Sen- 
ator McGee, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's 
Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee, introduced a resolution 
(S. Con. Res. 78), cosponsored by Senators Scott, Humphrey, and 
Javits, endorsing the agreed principles. The resolution failed to pick 
up additional cosponsors, however, and it was not introduced in 
the 94th Congress, thereby leaving the field almost entirely to 
opponents. 

Over the years the so-called Panama Canal lobby has opposed the 
relinquishment of any U.S. rights in the Canal Zone on grounds that 
undiluted U.S. control is required, rather than transfer to unstable and 
ill-prepared Panama, in order to safeguard important commercial 
and strategic assets created by American expenditures and ingenuity. 
In the Senate, southern conservatives like Senators Strom Thurmond 
(R-S.C.), Jesse Helms (M.C), and John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), 
have spearheaded the coalition. In the House the group has coalesced 
around the Panama Canal Subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries Committee, with principal spokesmen being Daniel J. Flood 
(D-Pa.) , Leonor K. Sullivan (D-Mo.) , and more recently Gene Snvder 
(R-Ky,). 

This coalition has drawn support from the 40.000 American "Zon- 
ians" living in the Canal Zone, particularly the AFL-CIO unions and 
the Pilot's Association which fear the loss of various privileges, from 
shipping interests and corporate investors in the area, from the Pen- 
tagon which cherishes the military perquisites and bases, from an 
ideologically conservative constituency — the American Legion, the 
Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars being most organized — which views surrender of the Canal Zone 
as a retrenchment of American power, opening the region to Cuban 
or Soviet control, and from numerous citizens who feel an attachment 
to the Panama Canal as the American "moonwalk of the 1910's." 

Once the prospect for a treaty seemed imminent, the antitreaty forces 
redoubled their efforts. Resolutions were introduced in both Plouses 
during the 93d Congress opposing the surrender of any U.S. rights. 
Senator Thurmond's resolution to that effect (S. Res. 301) acquired 
34 cosponsors, more than a third of the Senate. Xumerous resolutions 
were submitted in the House, nearly all of them claiming a role for 
the House under article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution which 
provides for action by both Houses of Congress to dispose of U.S. 
property or territory. While the State Department had resisted tin's 
claim in the past, it appeared to yield at this time, acknowledging in 
the news release on the Kissinger-Tack agreement that "some imple- 
menting legislation by Congress as a whole would be required." 

Despite the opposition, the secret negotiations continued, mostly on 
Contadora Island, despite the turmoil of Watergate, impeachment 
proceedings, and the inauguration of a new President. By March 1, 
1075, in a major policy speech on United States-Latin American rela- 
tions, Secretary Kissinger affirmed that the talks had ''moved forward 



170 

rapidly" in the last l 1 - 2 years, and expressed his belief that "an agree- 
ment on terms fair to all is possible."' sentiments reiterated in May 
at the Fifth General Assembly of the OAS. 

A- the parties came elo-er to determining the details of the treaty, 
however, administrative infighting set in. Pentagon spokesmen began 
complaining that State was willing to settle for a 25-year treaty with 
a considerable reduction of the defense area, while the Army wished 
tain most of the present area for a term of at least 50 years with 
an option for renewal. Without administrative consensus, the talks 
temporarily stalled and opposition in Congress mounted. 

When the 04th Congress convened in January 1075. Representative 
Flood introduced House Resolution 23, modeled on prior resolutions, 
opposing the surrender of any U.S. rights in the Canal Zone, and a 
stream of Congressmen followed suit. By the end of the year, 39 similar 
' lutions had been submitted, with a total of 1G1 signatories. In the 
Senate, Senator Thurmond circulated a ''Dear Colleague" letter in 
February, seeking cosponsors for a new antitreaty resolution, similar 
to one that had garnered 34 cosponsors in the previous Congress. Some 
advocates of the treaty felt that a concerted effort by State to win 
support might hold down the number of cosponsors. particularly in 
a new, more liberal Senate. State eschewed lobbying, however, and 
the Thurmond resolution (S. Res. 97) was introduced on March 4. 
107*). evenutaily acquiring 37 cosponsors. an increase over the previous 
year and more than enough to block ratification. 

Fueled by rumors in the Canal Zone, congressional distrust of the 
executive reached new highs in April and May as concern was ex- 
pressed that the Ford administration might cede control of the zone 
to Panama by Executive order, thereby circumventing Congress. In 
closed hearings before the Panama Canal Subcommittee and in a Letter 
to the Governor of the Canal Zone, Ambassador Bunker sought to calm 
such fears, promising that "any proposed change in basic United 
States relations with Panama, and especially any jurisdictional change, 
would be submitted to the Congress for approval.-' 

Opposition peaked, on June 26, 1975. when Representative Snyder 
suddenly offered an amendment to the Stale Department appropria- 
tions bill forbidding the use of funds to negotiate "the surrender or 
relinquishment of any 1 US. rights in the Panama Canal Zone." a meas- 
ure meant lo end the talks characterized as "a clear waste of the tax- 
payer's money." Despite pleadings that the amendment was an Inap- 
propriate restriction of the President's constitutional duty to conduct 
foreign relations, it passed 246 to L64. Shortly afterward Senator Byrd 
(Independent-Va.) proposed a similar measure in the Senate. 

Given the extent of the opposition, much of it from the President's 
party, the political implications for the r.>7<> election could not be 
red. That same day, Howard Calloway, retiring as Secretary of 
\rinv to become President Ford's campaign manager, observed 
that support For an American-owned Canal was widespread and i><»lii- 
ically potent. He also disclosed publicly that State a in' Defense differed 
on acceptable terms for a treaty, the Pentagon viewing the Canal as 
strategically vital. Embassador Bunker's expected return <<> Panama 
in July tponed. 

The Snyder amendment vote spurred State t<> action, Secretary 
K vTote to General Torrijos, explaining that the talks would 



171 

continue, and to six key Senators, urging them not to interfere with the 
negotiations and promising full congressional scrutiny at the appro- 
priate moment. Senate advocates of a new treaty mounted a campaign 
against the Byrd amendment, defeating it in the Appropriations Com- 
mittee. With support dwindling, State Department officials claiming 
that 59 of the 93 Senators present had been lined up to table the meas- 
ure, Senator Byrd withdrew his amendment from floor consideration 
on August 1. 

Meanwhile, in a series of National Security Council meetings in 
July and August, administrative disunity was overcome, apparently 
by a compromise that would turn over the canal to Panama by the 
year 2000 but seek defense rights for a longer period. Symbolizing 
the new unity, Deputy Secretary of Defense Walter Clements, Chair- 
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Brown, and Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for Inter- American Affairs William D. Rogers made a 
1-day trip to Panama on September 2, where General Brown assured 
the Panamanians that Defense fully supported Bunker's efforts. 

The compromise proposals proved to be less than satisfactory to 
Panama's negotiators, however. Breaking negotiation secrecy, they 
alleged that the United States wished to defend the canal for a period 
tantamount to perpetuity. These charges led to attacks by about 800 
Panamanian students against the U.S. Embassy on September 23, in 
the most serious incidents since the flag riots of 1964. 

Returning from summer recess, the House-Senate conference, in 
lieu of the Snyder amendment, reported a compromise, on Septem- 
ber 18, 1975, affirming the sense of Congress that any new agreement 
"must protect the vital interests of the United States in the operation, 
maintenance, property, and defense of the Panama Canal." However, 
the House voted 203 to 197 on September 24 to reject the compromise 
and to insist again on the Snyder amendment. Antitreaty spokesmen 
were particularly disturbed by the vagueness of the compromise lan- 
guage and the absence of any reference to the contiguous Canal Zone. 
Two days later the Senate by voice vote rejected the Snyder amend- 
ment provision of the House bill. After a second conference, the con- 
ferees added a reference to protection of vital interests in the Canal 
Zone to the previous compromise. Backing off from earlier stances, 
the House, on October 7, 1975, approved (212-201) the second confer- 
ence compromise. The Senate accepted the compromise the following 
day, thereby ending the legislative attempt to terminate the 
negotiations. 

Ambassador Bunker returned to Panama in November, buoyed by 
the resolution of the legislative impasse and by new support from the 
Business and Professional Committee for a New Panama Canal Treaty 
as well' as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, both representing major 
U.S. corporations in Latin America. Nevertheless, progress was lim- 
ited, according to Panamanian officials. In a speech in Los Angeles, on 
December 2. 1975, Ambassador Bunker disclosed that issues yet to be 
resolved include the duration of the new treaty, the amount of eco- 
nomic benefits for Panama, and the territory to be made available to 
the Lmited States for defense of the canal. 

By the end of the year, the talks had become an issue in the 1976 
Presidential campaign. On December 13, at the Southern Republican 
Conference in Houston, Republican Presidential candidate Ronald 



172 

Reagan, reflecting conservative sentiments, attacked President Ford's 
position, characterizing it as a ''giveaway"' of "our" canal. Among the 
Democratic contenders, Governor Wallace took a similar stance. Un- 
der the circumstances, it appeared unlikely that any treaty would be 
submitted to Congress until after the election. 

References 

Franck, Thomas M. and Edward Weisband. Panama Paralysis. Foreign Policy, 
No. 21, Winter 11)75-70 : 1GS-1S-7. 

Griffith. William E. Congress is Wrecking Our Foreign Policy. Reader's Digest, 
y. 108, February 197G : 71-76. 

Leeds. Roger >S. The Panama Canal Treaty: Past and Present United States In- 
terests. Foreign Seryice Journal, v. 53, March 1976 : (5-11. 17. 

Lucier, James P. Another Vietnam? National Re\'ie\y, y. 27. Sept. 12, 1975: 
989-990. 

:. Robert A. Coping With Congress Foreign Policy. Foreign Service Jour- 
nal, y. 52, December 1975 : 15-18, 23. 

Rosenfeld, Stephen S. The Panama Negotiations — A Close-Run Thing. Foreign 
Affairs, y. 54, October 1975 : 1-13. 

Schroeder. Richard C. Panama and Latin Policy. Editorial Research Reports, 
v. II, October 24, 1975 : 767-784. 

Cuba* 

Interest in the issue of normalization of relations with Cuba inten- 
sified in Congress in 1975 as the membership reacted to movement by 
both the United States and Cuba toward conciliation of differences, 
and later in the year, to contrary events. A number of resolutions 
were introduced on both sides of the issue, hearings specifically di- 
rected toward the normalization question were held for the first time 
since 1973, and several Members of Congress made visits to Cuba. 

Some resolutions advocated the repeal of legislation by which eco- 
nomic sanctions are still applied to that country. Arguments in sup- 
port of these ranged from the belief that U.S. policy is inconsistent 
and anachronistic to the feeling that, because so many nations of the 
world have trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba, U.S. policy is 
isolating the United States. 

Resolutions against normalization reflected some of the basic issues 
that have been considered obstacles to a rapprochement with Cuba. 
The Communist system of government, Soviel military and economic 
influence, compensation for expropriated (J.S. property, aid to subver- 
sive movements, U.S. rights to the Guantanamo Naval Base, and po- 
lil ical prisoners were among the themes expressed. 

The Subcommittee on Internationa] Trade and Commerce and the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Interna- 
tional Relations Committee held a series of hearings on ILK. 6382 
proposed by Representative Jonathan Bingham to repeal the trade 
embargo on Cuba. 1 A I Secretary of State for Later-American 

Affairs William Rogers and other witnesses, representing the full 
range of opinion on the normalization of relal ions issue, test ified in the 

9 days of bearings Spread OUi Over May, June, July, and September. 



•Prepared by Barry Bklar, specialist In Latin American n(T;iirs. 

irj.8. < I Committee on Internationa] Relatione. Subcommittee on Interna* 

tlonal Trade and Commerce and Subcommittee cm International Organisations. U.S. Trade 
Bmbarjro of Cuba. Hearings. 94th Cong., 1st sets., May B, L8, 15, -JO, 22, June 11, 26, July 9, 

Sciit. 'I'.',. l!)T. r ( ( iiumibllslietn. 



173 

During the year, visits to Cuba were made by Senators McGrovern, 
Abourezk, Representatives Whalen, Solarz, Breaux, and some congres- 
sional aides. Communications from Senator Sparkman, chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to Premier Castro were 
instrumental in securing the Cuban return in August of $2 million in 
ransom money taken from hijackers of a Southern Airways plane in 
1972. 

In the latter part of the year, Cuban involvement in activities in 
support of Puerto Rican independence, in the civil war in Angola, the 
passage of anti-Zionist resolutions in the United Nations, and revela- 
tions regarding U.S. attempts to assassinate Premier Fidel Castro 
became new factors in the discussion of normalization of relations. 
In July, witnesses in a hearing before the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee testified that Cuba was playing a role in terrorist and 
other activity in support of the independence of Puerto Rico. 2 

A serious blow was dealt the movement in Congress to reestablish 
relations with Cuba when Representatives Fraser and Whalen, until 
then principal proponents of change in U.S. policy, announced, on 
separate occasions, that the changing situation had caused them to 
reevaluate the Cuba question. They were reacting to Cuba's policy on 
Puerto Rico, Cuba's active role in the passage of the U.N. resolution 
equating Zionism with racism, and the substantial support of the 
Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola by the 
Cuban military. On November 22, Representative Bingham announced 
he had dropped "for the foreseeable future" efforts to lift the U.S. 
embargo against Cuba. Whalen, in early January 1976, indicated that 
he felt Fidel Castro had changed course. 

The situation in the latter part of the year was further exacerbated 
when President Ford and Secretary Kissinger exchanged sharply 
critical remarks with Premier Castro through press conferences and 
speeches. Castro, in part, was reacting to revelations published — No- 
vember 20 — by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which 
detailed 8 separate assassination attempts against the Cuban leader 
conceived by the CIA, some with the cooperation of U.S. under- 
world figures, during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson ad- 
ministrations. 3 



2 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security 
Terrorist Activity : The Cuban Connection in Puerto Rico ; Castro's Hand in Puerto Rican 
and U.S. Terrorism. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 6, July 30, 1975. Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 

3 U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Re- 
spect to Intelligence Activities. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. An 
interim report, 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, Nov 20 
1975. ' 



74-032—7 



CONGRESS AND AFRICA* 

The record of the 94th Congress with respect to Africa reflects the 
simple truth that there is no consensus within the United States as to 
what direction U.S. policy should take. While 1975 saw the Congress 
dealing with a greater variety of African issues than has been the 
norm in recent years, the results of the activity were at times contra- 
dictory, incomplete, or determined by factors having little to do with 
Africa policy. It is difficult to find much in the way of overall con- 
gressional guidelines in activities which included : 

An overwhelming congressional vote to bar covert U.S. action 
in Angola ; 

House defeat of legislation aimed at repealing the Byrd amend- 
ment ; x 

Visits to Somalia by members of two congressional committees 
to investigate Soviet military installations; 

Continued controversy over the expansion of military facilities 
in Diego Garcia ; 

Congressional resistance to a major escalation of U.S. economic 
and military aid to Zaire; 

Revision of foreign aid legislation to orient aid toward the most 
severely distressed nations, which, in principle, ought to increase 
Africa's share of U.S. aid ; and 

Legislative restrictions on aid to nations consistently violating 
human rights, and congressional demands for aid cuts to nations 
who do not support the United States in international forums, 
which could also apply to some African nations. 
In addition, during 1975 the Senate Foreign Relations Subcom- 
mittee on Africa increased its visibility with a series of hearings on 
U.S. policy toward southern Africa, subcommittees of the House Com- 
mittee on International Relations held hearings on the question of arms 
sales to Ethiopia and U.S. policy toward Namibia, the Senate Intelli- 
gence Committee issued its report revealing CIA plans to kill Congo- 
eader Patrice Lumumba, and Secretary of State Kissinger agreed 
to "clarify" U.S. policy toward Africa following a meeting with the 
congressional Black Canons. 

Southern Africa: Unresolved Issues 

The two major legislative votes with respect to Africa policy illus- 
trate the difficulties in assessing the congressional role — the defeat of 
legislation which would have repealed the Byrd amendment, and the 



•Prepared bj Susan M. Bfowle, analyst in Internationa] relation* 

l The Byrd amendment, passed In 1071, is an amendment to the Strategic and Critical 
lali stork- Piling Act whi-h prohlblta the President from barring tiw Importation of 
rlc materials from any nation unless the ban also applies to Imports from Com« 
munlsl nations, n has the effeel of exempting chrome, ferrochrome, and other strategic 
materials from the general trade embargo agalns! Rhodesia which was Imposed in con- 
formity with O.N. Security Council llesolut Ions. 

(174) 



175 

congressional ban on covert involvement in Angola. In one sense, both 
of these votes were decisive in maintaining or restricting specific 
aspects of U.S. southern Africa policy and in both cases appear to 
represent the imposition of congressional policy over administration 
objections. Yet, in both actions, issues other than questions of Africa 
policy appear to have been significant in determining congressional 
votes ; and on the Byrd amendment vote, the extent of congressional/ 
executive split is perhaps more apparent than real. Taken together the 
two votes give a rather unclear idea of congressional intent with 
respect to the range of policy questions facing the United States in 
southern Africa. 

The Byrd amendment 

On September 25, 1975, the House voted 209-187 against H.R. 1287 
which would have repealed the Byrd amendment and restored the 
United States to full compliance with the U.X. sanctions program, 
which was designed to force the Khodesian Government to make po- 
litical concessions to the 95-percent black population. Debate on the 
Byrd amendment covered many issues — its effect on U.S. security in- 
terests, on U.S. relations with African nations and the United Nations, 
and its effect on the U.S. economy and employment. 2 

Supporters of the Byrd amendment contended that access to Rho- 
desian chrome is vital to American security to prevent dependence on 
imports from the Soviet Union for a material essential for national 
defense, that the embargo had driven up the price of chromium to 
American buyers, that its repeal could produce unemployment in 
American specialty steel industries, and that it is hypocritical to em- 
bargo trade with Ehodesia for undemocratic practices while continu- 
ing to trade with other undemocratic states such as the Soviet Union, 
China, or Uganda. 

Those favoring repeal argued that the Byrd amendment has not, in 
fact, reduced U.S. dependence on Soviet chrome imports, that the 
United States has sufficient stockpile reserves or alternative sources of 
chrome to make Rhodesian chrome unnecessary, that contravention of 
the U.N. sanctions program hurts U.S. relations with African nations 
whose raw materials are more important than Rhodesian chrome, and 
that Rhodesian imports threaten American jobs. 

The administration position on the Byrd amendment is rather 
murky. On one hand. State Department officials urged repeal; and 
just 2 days before the House vote, Secretary of State Kissinger ex- 
pressed his desire for a vote to repeal. However, supporters of repeal 
have charged that a vigorous White House campaign, which they 
contend could have switched the few votes needed to pass the bill, 
never materialized. According to this thesis, Kissinger, as part of his 
longstanding policy with regard to southern Africa, did not really 
want the Byrd amendment repealed. By coming out for repeal, but 
not lobbying sufficiently to obtain it, the administration has maintained 
the policy it wants while allowing the Congress to take the blame for 
the negative aspects of this policy. Thus, it is difficult to determine 



2 H.R. 12S7 was considered by two House Committees during the 94th Conpr. The Inter- 
national Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations hold a series of hearings, 
and the bill was then approved by the full committee. Subsequently the House Armed 
Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic Materials held hearings, and that full 
Committee ordered the bill adversely reported. The Rules Committee finally resolved the 
two conflicting reports and approved it for floor action. See committee hearings and re- 
ports at the end of this section. 



176 

whether or not the Congress missed or ignored a cue that Kissinger 

was trying to indicate a change in his southern Africa policy, perhaps 
as a result of the changes in Angola, or whether the administration, 
if not the State Department, was basically satisfied with the outcome. 
With respect to its effect on Africa policy, failure to repeal the Byrd 
amendment continues to be a source of friction in relations with Afri- 
can nati< . • jcording to African perceptions, this legislation puts 
the United States in the position of providing economic and diplo- 
matic support to the white government in Rhodesia and. by implica- 
tion, is read as an indication of the U.S. position on the broader racial 
questions of southern Africa. Coming- as it did just as South Africa 
fcing considerabl • • ire on the Smith regime to engage in 
negotiations with black nationalists concerning the political future 
of Rhodesia, it has been argued that congressional repeal might have 
aided the South African diplomatic effort and that failure to repeal 
encouraged Rhodesian intransigence. Such an interpretation raises 
additional questions concerning the administration position. 

Angola 

The 54-22 Senate vote on December 19, 1975, to amend the deft 
appropriations bill to bar covert activities in Angola would appear to 
delineate a clear U.S. policy with respect to U.S. involvement in 
African civil wars or liberation movements. 3 However, the congres- 
sional vote was probably as much if not more a referendum on con- 
•ional attitudes toward covert activities, detente, and Vietnam- 
style interventions as a policy statement that revealed much with 
respect to complex questions involved in the Angola situation and its 
implications on southern Africa as a whole. 

Apparently six congressional committees 4 were kept informed of 
U.S. covert actions in support of UNITA and FN LA. 5 who were 
Mg the Soviet supplied MPLA, and the Senate Subcommittee on 
Africa held a series of public hearings on U-S. Angola policy during 
July 1975. Nevertheless, the Senate floor action in December was trig- 
gered by press reports that the CIA was funneling funds through 
Zaire to the two Angolan factions. When publicly forced (o defend 
Angola, the administration put the entire Angola debate 
in the context of U.S. global interests and a test of the U.S. will to 
Soviet military intervention in an area outside its traditional 
3phere of interest, and not in the context of United States-Africa 
policy or on the ramifications of U.S. policy on relations with African 
natio iic. the Congress expressed disapproval of the man- 

'i which U.S. policy was being carried out and offered a different 
evaluation of Soviet intentions and capabilities. While in cong 



27, 1976. the House approved the same amendment by r rote <>f 828 99. 
• The administration contends thai it acted in full compliance with the provisions of the 
Hughes-Ryan amendment which requires that ii<» c<>\<'it operations l>" carried out unless 
nt deems 1 1 1 • - 1 1 1 Important t<» the national security and that they be reported 
ply fashion" to I irlate congressional committees Including the i 
I RpI • one and House Committees. Three commit! i 

each Chamber t< the two Select Committees on Intelligence were Informed ot 
Involvement, although at different times and according to different procedure*, 
ere the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Del 
mmlttee, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
and House Appropriations Subcommltti n Defense. See pp. IS 16 on 0.8. Intelligence 

n tenders In Angola were the National Union for the Total Independence 
of Ingola (UNITA), the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the 

nt r-.r the Liberation of Angola < MPL \ I 

3 covert operation in Angola has been variously reported as low as 
.Si's million to ai blgh as $100 million. 



177 

sional debates, opponents to the continued funding of covert activities 
argued that the United States had no overriding economic or strategic 
interests in Angola, and stressed the danger to U.S. interests in black 
Africa if the United States was identified with South Africa, it ap- 
pears that other, non- African issues dominated the decisionmaking 
of both Congress and the administration. 

Actually, the Angola vote determined only the issue of covert U.S. 
involvement in that country. It left unresolved any policy decisions 
concerning future U.S. relations with the new Angolan Government 
and future U.S. policy toward remaining independence groups in 
southern Africa such as Rhodesia. Namibia (South West Africa), 
and South Africa. Congress has not focused on what policies, if any, 
might need revision as a result of an MPLA victory in Angola and the 
manner in which it was achieved or to what extent the United States 
should use any diplomatic, economic, or military leverage to influence 
change in Rhodesia and South Africa. 

Zaire 

A congressional/executive split centering on U.S. relations with 
Zaire emerged as a result of the administration request in October 1975 
for quick congressional approval for a $60 million economic aid pack- 
age and $19 million military assistance program. At that time, the 
administration unsuccessfully sought to persuade key committee 
chairmen to approve the granting of emergency aid without formal 
congressional approval. 

The justification for the huge increase in U.S. aid put forth by the 
administration was that the emergency assistance was necessary 
as a result of the severe financial crisis caused by the drop in inter- 
national copper prices and that $750 million in American investments 
in Zaire would be jeopardized if that country defaulted on its debts. 
Unstated was the apparent administration concern for the conse- 
quences of any political instability in Zaire on the situation in Angola, 
as it was later revealed that Zaire was a major conduit for U.S. covert 
aid to the FNLA and UNITA. Congressional objections to the aid 
request focused on concern over Zaire's involvement in Angola and 
its role as a channel for U.S. covert activities, irregular Zaire financial 
practices, and the propriety of aiding Zaire while Xew York was 
threatened with bankruptcy. 

The U.S. commitment to Zaire and the government of General 
Mobutu has always been controversial, and it would seem that con- 
tinued congressional scrutiny concerning the nature and extent of our 
relations with Zaire is merited given the altered political situation 
which has developed since the independence of Angola. A principle 
of United States- Africa policy going back to the early 1060 ? s has been 
that a unified. pro-Western Zaire was essential to African stability 
and U.S. interests. In the wake of the MPLA victory in Angola the 
■current administration is likely to put increased importance on main- 
taining good relations with Zaire as a counter to what it perceives 
as growing Soviet influence in southern Africa. Yet. Zaire under Gen- 
eral Mobutu is generally regarded as one of Africa's most corrupt 
governments, and Mobutu has yet to apologize for having falsely 
accused the United States in June 1975 of attempting to overthrow 



17S 

him. There is currently substantial although disorganized anti-Mobutu 
sentiment in Zaire, but at the same time many observers believe that 
Zaire without Mobutu would mean a return to the political vacuum 
and chaos of 1960. This creates a serious policy dilemma and the ad- 
ministration appears to have opted for continued aid to Mobutu to 
prevent a collapse in Zaire. Whether it is in U.S. interests to continue 
such a policy, and what alternatives exist should be subjected to close 
congressional examination during the next session when the admin- 
istration again presses its case for economic and military aid to Zaire. 

East Africa: The Horn 

Congress focused intermittently on U.S. policy toward the poten- 
tially unstable Horn of East Africa, an area which includes Ethiopia. 
Somalia, Kenya, and the French Territory of Atl'ars and Issas. 

On March 5, 1975. the International Relations Subcommittee on 
International Political and Military Affairs held a hearing on the 
Ethiopian request to purchase arms from the United States to combat 
a secessionist rebellion in the Red Sea province of Eritrea. While the 
hearing raised important questions concerning the advisability of a 
continuing American involvement in Ethiopia, and under what con- 
ditions the relationship should be maintained, it did not develop any 
enforceable policy recommendations. Subsequently the administra- 
tion approved a $7 million arms sale. Yet the continuing policy impli- 
cations of U.S. relations with Ethiopia deserve further congressional 
attention. 

The United States has been the principal source of economic and 
military aid to Ethiopia since World War II. and the United States 
maintains the Kagnew communications facility in the secessionist 
Eritrean province, although the size of the facility had been reduced 
in recent years. The new radical military regime which overthrew the 
late Emperor Haile Selassie has shown itself to be repressive and 
identification of the United States and U.S. military equipment, which 
'] against the Eritreans, with the central government has involved 
the United States at leasl indirectly in the civil war. and has brought 
guerrilla retaliations against Americans at the Kagnew installation. 

In addition, increased hostility between Ethiopia and Somalia con- 
cerning Somalia claims to Ethiopian territory, and over the future of 
the French Territory of Affars and [ssas which both nations claim. 
raises the possibility of another African war in which the United 
States and the Soviet Union are the major arms supplier- of the two 
protagonists. 

With resped to Somalia, members of both the House and Senate 
A rmed Services ( Jommittees made separate 1 visits to that na1 ion at the 
invitation of the Somalia Government and filed reports asserting the 
existence of Soviel military installations. However, their reports also 
speculated on the reasons ror the invitations and suggested thai per- 
!i;ii a the Somalia Government was seeking to improve relations with 
the United States and reduce her dependence on the Soviel Union. 
They suggested that certain changes in U.S. policy toward Somalia 

might be explored. Thus far, however. < lie re has been no public admin- 
istration response to this suggestion. 
With regard to Kenya, a little noticed Executive communication 

to ( longTesS contained a President ial finding that it is in U.S. interests 



179 

to waive the congressional ceiling on arms sales to that nation, raising 
the possibility of the United States replacing Great Britain as Kenya's 
arms supplier. As Kenya is also a target of Somalia territorial claims, 
and given the possible future instability of that nation after Kenyatta, 
the long-term implications of U.S. involvement deserve congressional 
scrutiny. 

Finally U.S. interests in the Horn are also raised in connection with 
the controversy concerning the development of U.S. military installa- 
tions on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (see pp. 11-14). 

Administration policy toward the Horn appears to be committed 
to continuing military aid to Ethiopia, maintaining the Kagnew 
communcations facility despite its vulnerability, expanding facilities 
in Diego Garcia, and possibly developing a role as arms supplier to 
Kenya. Policy decisions on all these questions are interrelated and 
could have implications on the Middle East, U.S. security interests in 
the Persian Gulf, and American relations with key African nations. 
As yet there has been no coordinated congressional examination of the 
overall implications of current U.S. policy toward this region, and 
as a result, many administration policy decisions have gone sub- 
stantially unchallenged. 

Aid axd Development 

While the congressional role in the development of U.S. aid policy 
is covered earlier in this study (see pp. 84^89) , a few legislative actions 
applied specifically to Africa. 

The House approved a $25 million U.S. contribution to the African 
Development Fund, an affiliate of the African Development Bank, 
which makes small, concessionary loans. As the Senate had earlier 
approved legislation providing for U.S. participation in the fund, 
final passage appears likely in 1976. 

m The Foreign Assistance Act included a provision for $25 million in 
aid to Portugal and her former colonies in Africa, The bill earmarks 
$5 million for Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, and $5 mil- 
lion in aid for the drought stricken Cape Verde Islands. 

The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1075 
contains two sections with implications for Africa. Section III pro- 
vides that most food aid should be supplied to the most severely 
affected nations — a congressional attempt to depoliticize aid and focus 
on humanitarian goals. In principle this ought to increase Africa's 
share of American food aid, as many of the poorest nations are in 
Africa. Yet two other congressional actions offer somewhat contra- 
dictory guidelines. Section 116 of the same act outlines the congres- 
sional intent that no aid should be granted to any country which en- 
gages in consistent violations of human rights. While no nations arc 
singled out by name in this legislation, floor speeches indicated that 
several African nations might be included. In addition, congressional 
reaction to the U.X. General Assembly vote equating Zionism with 
racism was often expressed in speeches calling for aid cuts to Third 
World nations who did not support American positions in the United 
Xations and other international forums. Applying these three diver- 
gent expressions of congressional intent on the question of aid to 
specific African nations provides a mixed set of criteria which allows 
the administration to apply whichever one suits its poliev. 



180 

Finally the overall questions concerning the U.S. position on the 
"new economic order," commodity agreements, cartels of raw ma- 
terial producers (see pp. 92-99) are of major importance to United 
States-African relations and any congressional actions in these areas 
would have important implications for United States-Africa policy. 

Conclusion 

As a result of the significant changes which occurred in Africa dur- 
ing 1975, aspects of United States- Africa policy are likely to come 
under closer high level administration review than has been the case 
in recent years. The lack of interest and consensus in the United States 
over African policy has permitted administration decisions to escape 
the kind of congressional scrutiny to which other aspects of U.S. 
ign policy have been subjected. Consistent congressional oA'crsight 
during 1976 could aid the development of a national consensus by 
broadening the debate within the Congress and the public at large. 
The United States position on Angola derived at least in part from a 
series of assumptions concerning Africa and United States interests 
on that continent which have been shown to be questionable. It would 
appear to be time to end the rather empty debate between the adminis- 
tration and the relatively small constituency within the Congress 
which follows Africa over whether or not the United States has an 
Africa policy. The administration record over the past year provides 
sufficient evidence that it does. More fruitful debate might center on 
the assumptions and implications surrounding that policy and whether 
U.S. interests are being well served. Congressional attention seems 
vital if such a debate is to occur. 

REFERENCES 

Hearings : 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations and Related Agencies. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for P)7C>. Hearings, 94th Cons-, 1st sess. Tart 2, Economic 
Assistance: Administrator, Agency for International Development, Africa 
ion, East Asia Region, Near East and South Asia Region. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 

. Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Scapower and Strategic 

and Critical Materials. Hearings on H.R. 1287 To Amend the United Nations 
Participation Act of 1945 to Hall the Importation of Rhodesian Chrome. Hear- 
ings, 94th Cong., 1st sess. July 21 and 22, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 
Off., 1975. 

Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing, Subcommittee on Tnler 



national Development Institutions and Finance. The African Development 
Fund. Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess. on U.K. 4264, U.K. 6937, U.K. 6241, U.K. 
8033, and H.R. si<»7. July l.",, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Organiza- 



tions, The Rhodesian Sanctions Bill, Part 1. Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st session. 
February 'J'',. March 11. P.)?."). Washington, U.S. Govt. Print Off., L975. 

. Subcommittee On International Political and Military Affairs. U.S. Policy 



and Requesl for Sale of Arms to Ethiopia. Hearing, 94th Oong., 1st sess. 
March 5, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print, off.. H'T".. 

. Committee on international Relations, Subcommittee on international 
Organizations. The Rhodesian sanctions urn. Pari n. Hearings, 94th Cong., 
j. June 19, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 

.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate 

Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees and Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare. Subcommittee on Health, World Hunger, Health, and Refugee 

Problems, Part VI: Special Study -Mission to Africa, Asia ami Middle Mast. 



181 

Hearings, 94tli Cong., 1st sess. June 10 and 11, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt 
Print. Oft'., 1975. 

. Committee on Foreign Relations. Nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be 

Assistant Secretarv of State for African Affairs. Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st 
sess. February 19, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 

Subcommittee on African Affairs and Subcommittee on Foreign Assist- 



ance. Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire. Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess. 
October 24, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 

Subcommittee on African Affairs. U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa. 



Hearing, 94th Cong., 1st sess. June 11, 13, 16: July 9, 10. 14, 23, 24, 28, and 

29, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 

. Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. Foreign Assistance Authorization : 



Examination of U.S. Foreign Aid Programs and Policies. Hearings, 94th Cong., 
1st sess. June 3 and 13, July 17, 21, 23, and 29, and September 17 and 23, 
1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 

Foreign Assistance Authorization : Arms Sales Issues. Hearings. 94th 



Cong., 1st sess. June 17 and 18. November 19 and 21, and December 4 and 5, 
1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 

Reports 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Amending the United 

Nations Participation Act of 1945. Adverse Report to Accompany H.R. 1287. 

July 26, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 
. Special Subcommittee to Inspect Facilities at Berbera, Somalia. Report, 

July 15, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 

Committee on International Relations. Amending the United Nations 



Participation Act of 1945. Report to Accompany H.R. 1287. July 15, 1975. 94th 

Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Activities Related to- 

Resettlement of Refugees in Somalia. Report of Senator Dewey F. Bartlett. 

September 2, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 

1975. 
. Disapproving Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia. Report 

to Accompany S. Res. 160. June IS, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, 

U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 

Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia. Report of Senator 



Bartlett. July, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
1975. 

-. Committee on Foreign Relations. Restrictions on Assistance to Angola. 



Report to Accompany S.J. Res. 156. December 18, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. 
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 

Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to- 



Intelligence Activities. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. 
An Interim Report. November 20, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington. U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 



CONGRESS AND ASIA: SELECTED ISSUES 
United States-Korean Relations* 

In 1975. the Congress dealt with the problem of continuing military 

and economic assistance to the Republic of Korea (ROK) in light of 
U.S. commitments to and interests in South Korea, as well as the 
authoritarian actions of the South Korean Government. 

Section 26 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1074 (Public Law 03- 
. in reference to South Korea, had limited military assistance. 
3S defense articles, and military sales credits and guarantees to si !:» 
million in fiscal year 1975. unless the President reported to Congress 
that the Government of South Korea had made "substantial progress 
in the observance of internationally recognized standards of human 
rights," in which case military assistance would have been increased to 
$165 million. The President made no such determination and the $145 
million limit was not increased. This provision did not appear to 
encourage less repression by the Park regime. In fact, new restrictions 
on human rights in South Korea were imposed during 1975. 1 

President Park apparently was motivated, however, to placate his 
U.S. clitics. On February 15. 1975. lie released 148 of those arrested in 
1074 for opposing the Government. 2 

The U.S. Treaty with South Korea provides that in the event of an 
armed attack in the Pacific area upon either of the parties the oi 
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitu- 
tional processes. Approximately 42,000 U.S. troops are stationed in 
South Korea, and several hundred nuclear weapons are maintained 
there. During H>75. the Congress continued its efforts i<> determine 
whether the U.S. special relationship with South Korea was contrib- 
uting to ends consistent with American democratic traditions or was, 
Instead, contributing to oppression within South Korea. 



•Prepared by Marjorie Niehaus, analyst in Internationa] relations. 

iOn Mar. 1!) 1975, the National Assembly adopted a law Forbidding any Sontb Korean 
citizen from criticizing the Government in conversation with foreigners, especially the 
foreign press Demonstrations erupted in April at several universities, and President Park 
on April 8, a new decree prohibiting any rampus demonstrations against the Gov- 
ernmenl with penalties of up to 10 years' Imprisonment The following day, the Govern- 
ment executed eight of the dissidents sentenced in 1974. on May 13, lit?."., the Govern- 
ment Issued emergency measure No '•'. which makes it a crime, punishable hy prison terms 
ate repeal of the constitution, broadcast or publish any news 

report of opposition to the constitution, stage any student demonstration or sssemhly for 

political purposes, oppose or report Opposition to the new decree, or move any Korean-owned 

property oul of the country. The measure also gave the Government authority to close down 
universities and broadcasting stations, and it permitted arre-r, detention, search and seizure 
without warrant The New York 'limes reported on Dec. 81, 1975, that the Government 

ted .Miid imprisoned f H people for violation of the decree A Harris poll Ol -Inly .",1. 

1!'7.~.. reported that IL> percent of Americans agT I with the statement "BOUth Korea is 

hip and takes away the rights of its political opposition, ami it is WTOng for us to 

support such a government'' '-'"J percent disagreed and 28 percent were "not sure, i 

Mn an interview published in tin- New York Times on Aug. 21, 1975, President Park 
BSld that If the North Koreans gave up their Objective "Of Unifying thC whole Ol Korea 

ina of force and violence, ami if they accepted peaceful coexistence with us, then 
I would immediately repeal the emergency measures I have taken ami I would take much 
Used policies." in the same interview. President Park predicted that I.- 
Mon would no longer need American ground, air or naval forces or even logistic 

port to help defend it-elf if North Korea attacked without ChineM or Soviet aid. 

(182) 



183 

Congressional hearings 3 provided a public forum for the examina- 
tion of U.S. foreign assistance and contributed greatly, along with 
congressional study missions, 4 to the debate over U.S. commitments to 
the EOK in the light of political restrictions within South Korea. 5 

Charges of corruption within the South Korean Government were 
disclosed when the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multi- 
national Corporations received testimony in May 1975, from the 
chairman of the Gulf Oil Co., who said that the party of President 
Park Chung Hee had demanded donations from Gulf in 1966 and in 
1970 in return for the right to continue business in South Korea. 6 

The administration proposal for economic assistance to South Korea 
for fiscal year 1976 included $5 million for a loan project, and $592,000 
for three continuing grant projects. According to administration plans, 
fiscal year 1976 will be the final year of bilateral concessional funding 
of AID loans and grants to South Korea. The Congress on December 9, 
1975, completed action on a 2-year $3.1 billion foreign economic aid bill 
(Public Law 94-161). Section 116 of the law prohibits economic aid to 
any country engaging in a consistent pattern of "gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights" unless Congress determines 
that the aid benefits needy people. In making that decision, either the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House International Rela- 
tions Committee can require a report from the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development on the benefits of such assistance to poor people. 
Congress is also to give consideration to the country's cooperation with 
human rights investigations by international agencies in making its 
determinations. The President is to report annually to the Congress on 
implementation of section 116. 

The administration proposal for military assistance to South Korea 
for fiscal year 1976 contains: $74 million in grant military assistance; 
$126 million in military sales credits: and $2 million for training 
funds. Neither the Senate nor the House completed work during 1975 
on bills authorizing fiscal year 1976 funding for foreign military and 
security supporting assistance. 

In December 1975, South Korea requested the United States to pro- 
vide $1.5 billion in government-backed credit over the next 5 years for 



S U.S. Congress. House: Committee on International Relations. Human Rights in South 
Korea and the Philippines : Implications for U.S. Policy. Hearings. May and June 1975. 
94th Cong.. 1st sess. Washngton, U.S. Government Printing Offioe, 1975. 

4 January 4-8. 1975. headed hy Representative Leo Ryan; (U.S. Congress House: Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs. Vietnam and Korea : Human Rights and U.S. Assistance. A 
Study Mission Report of the Full Committee. Committee Print. 94th Cong.. 1st sess. Wash- 
ington. U.S. Government Printing Office. Feh. 9, 1975.) Mar. 30-Apr. 2, 1975. headed by 
Representative Donald Fraser : Aug. 1-13, 1975. headed by Representative Lester Wolff. 
(U.S. Congress House: Committee on International Relations. Asia in a New Era: Im- 
plications for Future U.S. Policy. Report of a Study Mission to Asia Aug. 1-13, 1975. Com- 
mittee Print. 94th Cong.. 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1975, 
75 p. 

5 Stability and prevention of war are the publicly stated goals of U.S. policv in Korea 
and are given priority over the internal political situation in South Korea. President Ford 
and Prime Minister Miki of Japan issued a joint announcement in August 1975 which 
said that "the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to the maintenance of peace 
on the Korean peninsula, which in turn is necessary for peace and securitv in Bast Asia, 
including Japan." Administration officials and others who favor U.S. assistance to South 
Korea do not approve of the ROK policies on human ricrhts ; but thev believe that, for 
security reasons, the United States should continue its support of stability in Northeast 
Asia, where the interests of major powers converge. Current U.S. policy Is to provide clear 
evidence that the United States is not withdrawing from Asia. 

e U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations Multinational Corporations 
and L.S. Foreign Policy. Pt. 12. Political Contributions to Foreign Governments. Hearings, 
May. June .July and September 1975. 94th Cone:.. 1st sess. Washington, US. Government 
Printing Office. 1975. 



184 

a new military hardware program. The new aid plan asked only for 
U.S. Government-backed loans and no giant assis ance. 

Congressional Approval of Commonwealth Status for the 
Northern Mariana Islands* 

The reduction of U.S. military force levels, the loss of bases in A 
and the possibility that forward base areas in the island countric - 
the mainland — Japan and Okinawa, the Philippines — may at some 
point be denied the United States for political reasons has resulted in 
rch for alternative or standby bases from which U.S. military 
power can be projected into the western Pacific. Defense planner- 
focused on possible base areas in the Trust Territory of the Pacific, 
particularly in the northern Marianas. The willingness of the United 
- to promote admission of northern Marianas as a separate 
Commonwealth has been based largely on these strategic considera- 
tions. The rationale for such a course includes not only the possible 
future development of base areas, but also the need to deny use of 
this large area to others. 7 

Plans in the early 1970's that called for beginning of base const ruc- 
tion on Tinian Island, one of the northern Marianas, have been post- 
poned. Critics in ( ongress and elsewhere of the proposed base com- 
plex have argued that even if the bases may be needed at some time the 
requirement is not urgent, and that therefore large sums of money 
should not be spent until the long-range picture is clearer. The House 
Appropriations Committee in August 1074 said that it doubted that 
construction could be justified so loiur as the United States retained 
38 to Japanese and Korean bases.- Secretary of Defense Schles- 
inger in testimony before the Subcommittee on the Department of 
Defense of the House Appropriations Committee on the Department 
of Defense fiscal year 1976 appropriations said that the phas 
development r for Tinian had been replaced by "extremely 

modesl plans" to upgrade some basic facilities and that plans 
use of Tinian were being redrafted. Schlesinirer said that Cong 

d be briefed when specific uses in the base area were clarifies 
that authorization would be requested when it became necessary to 
a any base consl rud ion. 
The present phase of the United States-Micronesia relatioi 

'.J- with the creation of the Congress of Micronesia. The 
Concfress of Micronesia requested status negotiations and several 

considered by the Interior Committees of the U.S. Con- 

the 1965 69 period. The Ho-is.- took the approach that the 

ble courst tion would be Tor tl><> executive brano 

itiate a status which rould then be considered by the Congress. 

Early n''j_ r o<iatioii< For a single status for a unified territo e un- 



•Prepared by M. T. Haggard, specialist in Asian affairs. 
■ 

it,.,. on a -us. Subcommittee on the Department <>f Defense. 

! • m . Hi of D • 6 Hearings. Pt I. '.»4tii Cong 

ton. U.S Governmenl Prlntlnc Office, 1975 p 
Senate: Committee on I on Armed Rervla nt i<» 

Comn Qwealth of the Northern Mi ads In Political Union wi 

company H.J. Re 540. Rep. N 
i i - Waahin ament Printing Office. 1976 p B. 

i tigress. House: Committee on Approprlatl rtmenl of Defei 

-, bill 1975. Rept. No 93 1255, Aug. I, 1974. 93d Cong., 2d sesa. Washington, U.S. 
i . 1974. p 



185 

successful, and in 1972 separate status negotiations began with the 
Mariana Islands. These negotiations were concluded in 1975 and rati- 
fied by the islanders in a United Nations observed plebiscite in June 
1975. Congressional involvement to this point had included briefings 
of the Interior Committees on progress in negotiations. 9 The Covenant 
to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands in 
Political Union with the United States of America was transmitted 
to the Congress for approval by the President on July 8, 1975. after 
the results of the plebiscite in the northern Marianas had been 
certified. 10 

The covenant provides that the northern Marianas be a self-gov- 
erning commonwealth under the sovereignty of the United States, 
which will have complete authority over foreign affairs and defense 
matters. It provides for a $14 million annual U.S. payment for 7 
years and a one-time payment of $19 million for a land lease pay- 
ment. The United States is given the right to lease up to 18.000 acres 
for military purposes. 11 The administrative separation of the northern 
Marianas from the rest of the Trust Territory is to be initiated soon 
after the approval of the covenant by the U.S. Congress. A constitu- 
tion is to be drafted at a constitutional convention, submitted to a 
referendum and then will be subject to approval by the U.S. Govern- 
ment. Approval will be followed by elections and the financial pro- 
visions of article VI of the covenant will become effective. When the 
U.X. Trusteeship Agreement is terminated, the President will issue 
a proclamation establishing the Commonwealth of the northern 
Mariana Islands. 12 

Congressional action on the covenant was completed in less than 8 
months, and involved the House Interior Committee and three Senate 
committees. Interior, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations. Fol- 
lowing hearings, the House Interior Committee favorably reported 
House Joint Resolution 549 on July 16. 1975, and the measure passed 
the House under suspension of the rules on July 21. 1975. The Senate 
Interior Committee conducted a hearing on a similar resolution. 
Senate Joint Resolution 107, and on October 3. 1975. ordered House 
Joint Resolution 549. as amended, reported without dissent. 13 

In hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ad- 
ministration spokesmen emphasized that approval of the covenant 
would fulfill an international obligation under the U.X. Trusteeship 
Agreement and would strengthen the national security of the United 
States in the western Pacific. 14 Amendments submitted which focused 
on the need for agreements to resolve the political status of all the 
Trust Territory rather than only a part of it were rejected, 15 and an 

e U.S. Congress. House: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee on 
Territorial and Insular Affairs. Marianas Political Status. Hearing. Apr. 14. 1975. (Serial 
No. 94-13.) 94th Cong.. 1st <ess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1075. 

in U.S. Congress. Senate : Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. The Covenant To 
Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Report to Accompany H.J. 
Res. 549. S. Rept. 94-433. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Orhce. 1975. pp. 95-96. 

" U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Providing Author- 
ization for the Civil Government for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Hearing 
on H.R. 7688. July 23, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing 
Offire. 1075. 

« S. Rept. 94-596. p. 5-6. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXXIV, No. 9. 
Feb. L'^. 1976. p. 473. 

1:1 S. Rept. M 433. pp. 95-96. 

14 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Commonwealth of the North- 
ern Mariana Islands. Hearing on H.J. Res. 549. Nov. 5, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Wash- 
ington. F.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 

13 S. Rept. 94-596. pp. 11-14. 



1S6 

amendment was adopted which provided that at least every 10 years 
special representatives of the President and of the Governor of the 
northern Marianas would consider issues affecting the relationship 
and make a report and recommendations. This amendment was added 
to neutralize the argument that the action was a step toward Amer- 
ican colonization. 10 The Foreign Relations Committee on January 20, 
1976. recommended that the Senate adopt House Joint Resolution 549 
as amended. 17 

The Senate Armed Services Committee also rejected an amend- 
ment which stated the U.S. obligation to promote the development of 
the entire Trust Territory could be best accomplished by considera- 
tion of an agreement resolving the political status of the entire Trust 
Territory. 18 and the two Senate committees filed a joint report ( S. 
Kept. 94-596) on the resolution. The Senate passed the resolution 
66-23 on February 24, 1976. The House concurred in the Senate 
amendments on March 11, 1976, and the bill became Public Law 94- 
241 (Mar. 24, 1976 ). 19 



16 The Senate on Dec. 16, 1975, adopted S. Res. 331. providing for a special delegation 
of Members of the Senate to vist the Trust Territory and other countries in the Southwest 
Pacific to conduct a study of U.S. security and foreign policy interests in that area. The 
delegation left Washington on Jan. 2, 1976 and returned on Jan. 17. U.S. Congress. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. The Southwest Pacific 1976. Report of a Special Delega- 
tion. February 1976. 94th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1976. i»p. 1, '6-A. 

J7 S. Rept. 94-596. pp. 7, 14. 

a S. Rept. 94-59(1. p. 15. 

19 Congressional Research Service. Legislative Status Checklist of the 94th Cong. Mar. 29, 
1976. p. 33. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Feb. 28. 1976. pp. 472-473. 

O 



UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 



3 1262 09114 0011